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The topic of the human soul has seen renewed interest in recent years. Studies 
have been produced that have looked at the soul in light of modern science and medicine 
along with a continued focus on the thoughts of the ancients on this topic. The early 
Church Fathers played an important role in mediating the thoughts of the ancients to 
more recent times. Because of this role, it is important to understand what function the 
Scriptures had as a source of authority in this process. 
In light of this, the following study researches and analyzes the usage of the two 
key soul words, ψυχή and anima in the writings of the early Church Fathers. Their 
semantic range and the understanding of the powers and activities of the soul are studied. 
Following this background examination, the study then looks at the role of Scripture as 
an authoritative source for the early Church Fathers in the development of this doctrine. 
The results of this study highlight the prevalent usage of Scripture and scriptural 
themes in defining the doctrine of the soul. Ideas such as the soul coming from the breath 
of God (Gen 2:7) and creation in the image of God (Gen 1:26-27) provide a foundation 
for discussing the origins of the soul. 
In looking at the state of the soul after the death of the body, the early Church 
Fathers repeatedly look to the scriptural notion of a future judgment to defend the 
necessity of an immortal soul. This is an important discovery as it is often argued that the 
concept of an immortal soul comes to the early Church Fathers only from Greek 
philosophy. 
The impact of the philosophical thinking prevalent in the context in which the 
early Church Fathers lived and wrote can be seen in the similarities of the semantic usage 
of the terms ψυχή and anima. However, this study has demonstrated the necessity of 
noting closely the usage of their normative writings, the Scriptures, to more clearly 
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I approached my doctoral studies in many ways unprepared for the journey. 
Several times throughout my course work, I had the opportunity to study the writings of 
the early Church. Through this exposure, I came to a much greater appreciation for their 
love for the church and, more importantly, their knowledge of the Scriptures. 
As my faith community is, to a degree, at variance with the doctrine of the soul as 
it is generally expressed by the early Church Fathers, I wondered how these early 
scholars of the Christian faith used the Scriptures while developing the doctrine of the 
soul. Through previous readings in them, I was convinced that they were neither ignorant 
of the Scriptures nor inclined to set them aside easily. This formed my interest in this 
time period and specifically with how the Scriptures were used by them in formulating 
this important church teaching. 
I wish to thank the Andrews University Theological Seminary for financial help 
in pursuing this study. In addition, several people have played an important role. I wish to 
acknowledge the staff of the James White Library, with special mention going to the 
Inter-Library Loan department. They worked tirelessly to find documents both near and 
far and by this have contributed greatly to my ability to access important works and 
strengthen the secondary source material of this dissertation. 
My committee has helped guide this dissertation from beginning to end. Denis 
Fortin, Miroslav Kiš, and Fernando Canale provided guidance and feedback that made 
this work better. Special thanks goes to Dr. Fortin, my adviser, who had to work through 
early drafts, pointing out numerous errors, and helping shape my focus by pressing me to 
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more clearly articulate my research. As is inevitable in a project of this size, errors surely 
remain. The responsibility for these rests solely with me. 
My parents have been a strong and stable force in my life. Their love has been a 
source of support through this long process of education. And for instilling in me a love 
of reading at an early age, my mother is to be thanked. Without that gift, this work would 
not have been possible. My highest gratitude is reserved for my wife, Lena, with whom I 
began the journey towards a doctoral degree some years ago. When in the midst of our 
studies two boys, Matthew and Andrew, brightened our lives, she took time away from 
her dissertation writing to feed and guide their developing minds. For this, I am most 
grateful. 










The study of the soul has long been an important theme in human inquiry.1 In the 
conclusion of a recent book on the ideas of the afterlife in various Western cultures, Alan 
Segal writes:  
Consciousness is the truly mysterious obsession of modern Western philosophical 
inquiry. Technical progress has not brought us much closer to understanding it, though 
research into the physical action of the brain has dethroned our surety of the self’s 
importance. Although the history of philosophy for centuries has been devoted to a 
description of the soul and the self, both in the West and the East, it still remains the 
perennial subject of philosophy, religion, and poetry all over the world, with little hope 
of achieving a consensus soon.2 
The resurgence of interest in recent times regarding the understanding of the soul in 
modern theology has brought about an increase in studies produced on the topic.3 Issues 
such as the impact of modern science on the understanding of the soul have led to increased 
                                                 
1For an overview, see Nancey Murphy, “Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and 
Religious Issues,” in Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits 
of Human Nature, ed. Warren S. Brown et al., Theology and the Sciences (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1998). 
2Alan F. Segal, Life after Death: A History of the Afterlife in the Religions of the 
West (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 715. 
3See for example Michelle A. Gonzalez, Created in God’s Image: An Introduction to 
Feminist Theological Anthropology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2007); Joel B. Green and Stuart 
L. Palmer, eds., In Search of the Soul: Four Views of the Mind-Body Problem (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2005); Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For an overview of current challenges of 
the doctrine of the soul in theology, see Heino Sonnemans, “Soul, Afterlife, Salvation,” 
Communio 14 (1987): 256-261. 
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study on the soul in the Bible along with its understanding throughout Church history.4 The 
following study seeks to be part of this resurgence by drawing attention once again to the 
development of doctrine in the formative years of the Ante-Nicene era. 
There has been much scholarly discussion on the relationship of the Church Fathers 
to the cultural milieu of the period, especially on the doctrine of the soul. In this context, 
some have gone so far as to claim boldly that Christianity does not have a doctrine of the 
soul. Such is the ominous finding of historical theologian Jaroslav Pelikan.5 In his book on 
the topic of death in the early Church, he writes that it is more precise to say that 
Christianity has several doctrines of the soul. He adds, “Either Christians are not to speak 
about the soul in any consistent and reasoned manner at all, or they must be willing to learn 
about the soul from other places, in addition to the Scriptures.”6 Later he more strongly 
argues, “The Bible has no original and consistent doctrine of the soul. Yet the Bible does 
speak about the soul, and thus it obliges its interpreters to speak about the soul too.”7 
Segal writes, “In the modern period, the self has come more and more to be 
identified with the immortal soul. Personal consciousness is transcendent in society because 
                                                 
4See Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Maloney, Whatever 
Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1998). Cf. Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997). 
5“Christianity has no doctrine of the soul; or, more precisely, it has several.” Jaroslav 
Pelikan, The Shape of Death: Life, Death, and Immortality in the Early Fathers (New York: 
Abingdon Press, 1961), 33. 
6Ibid., 34. Fernández-Ardanaz notes that part of the difficulty is in the usage of the 
term psyche by the early Christians which was not corresponding to any one Hebrew term 
and was loaded with philosophical connotations. Santiago Fernández Ardanaz, El Mito del 
“hombre Nuevo” en el Siglo II: El Dialogo Cristianismo-Helenismo (Madrid: Fundacion 
Universitaria Española, 1991), 90. 
7Pelikan, The Shape of Death, 51. 
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we value it as divine.”8 He later adds, “It was Plato’s doctrine of the immortality of the soul 
that allowed us to focus on our conscious experiences, that valorized those experiences and 
eventually made the ‘self’ as well as God, a transcendent value in Western thought.”9 
The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has been accepted and taught as orthodox 
doctrine for the greater part of the Christian Church’s history.10 Pelikan notes that after 
some “polemic” against the notion of immortality by early Christian writers, their 
apocalyptic vision waned and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul became a “standard 
element in Christian teaching.”11 While some have insisted on a notion of conditional 
immortality or soul sleep, theologians and ecclesiastics alike have for the most part branded 
these thinkers as heretical. 
Pelikan has shown that some of the early Church Fathers used notions from the 
surrounding philosophical milieu in developing the Christian doctrine of the soul.12 Hans 
                                                 
8Segal, Life after Death, 715. 
9Ibid., 716. 
10Cullmann writes, “If we were to ask an ordinary Christian today (whether well-
read Protestant or Catholic, or not) what he conceived to be the New Testament teaching 
concerning the fate of man after death, with few exceptions we should get the answer: ‘The 
immortality of the soul.’” Oscar Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the 
Dead? The Witness of the New Testament (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 15. 
11Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), vol. 1 of The 
Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), 30. Cf. Justo L. González, From the Beginnings to the Council of 
Chalcedon, vol. 1 of A History of Christian Thought (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 
1987), 51. 
12Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), 47-49. For a recent, 
though rather brief, discussion on this “tense” relationship, see Hans G. Thümmel, “Die 
Seele im Platonismus und bei den Kirchenvätern,” in Psyche–Seele–Anima: Festschrift für 
Karin Alt zum 7. Mai 1998, ed. Jens Holzhausen, Beiträge zur Altertumskunde (Stuttgart: B. 
G. Teubner, 1998). 
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Thümmel points specifically to the Christian usage of Platonic concepts of the soul to define 
the contents of the early Church’s doctrine.13 Roger Olson concludes that “the second-
century Christian apologists chose instead to defend the truth of Christianity on the basis of 
the philosophies of Platonism and Stoicism—or an amalgam of the two—that were widely 
accepted as superior to the other options.”14 Roman mystery religions were also prevalent in 
this period and had certain similarities with Christianity.15 
Segal, in commenting on the concept of an afterlife, has asserted that culture is the 
more important influence when shaping the notions of the afterlife and the immortality of 
the soul. “The notion of heaven and the afterlife always reflects what is most valuable to the 
culture. God may be sending revelations but we are talking to ourselves when we interpret 
our Scriptures. We are telling ourselves what the Scriptures must mean in the current 
circumstance; it is not God speaking to us directly.”16 He adds, “It is just as true of 
fundamentalist doctrines as it is of liberal ones.”17 The biblical writings, then, were not the 
only source used by the early Christian writers in developing the doctrine of the soul in the 
early Christian Church. 
The Problem 
There is no comprehensive study of the concept of the soul in the early Church 
                                                 
13Thümmel, 244. 
14Roger E. Olson, The Story of Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition 
and Reform (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 56. 
15See, for example, Everett Ferguson, Doctrines of Human Nature, Sin, and 
Salvation in the Early Church, Studies in Early Christianity, ed. Everett Ferguson et al. 
(New York and London: Garland, 1993), 235-281. 




Fathers nor of the developmental path that this key component of Christian theology took 
during the Ante-Nicene era. The question of how ψυχή and anima were understood and 
used during this time period is one that has not been answered outside of dictionary articles. 
In addition, while much has been written on various Fathers and their indebtedness to the 
cultural philosophies of the day, no study has adequately probed the role that the Christian 
Scriptures played in this process. This lacunae in contemporary scholarship has led many to 
conclude that the Greco-Roman ideas of the day along with commonly accepted definitions 
of these two “soul” terms were the primary stimuli for shaping the early Church’s thought 
on the human soul. Furthermore, it has led many to assume a rather static “doctrine” of the 
soul, inherited almost in toto from prior thinking, lacking both development and continuity 
with contemporaneous Christian thinking.18 
 
                                                 
18It is recognized that recent Patristic scholarship has moved beyond the 
“Hellenization” thesis of Adolf von Harnack’s era. For major works of his on this topic, see 
Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (Leipzig: Mohr, 1909); idem, Die 
Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in der ersten drei Jahrhunderten (Leipzig: J. C. 
Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1924). For a discussion on the decline of the Hellenization 
thesis in Patristic scholarship, see Wendy E. Helleman, Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a 
Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World (Lanham: University Press of America, 
1994). In Seventh-day Adventist circles, however, this is still a widely accepted idea. Thus 
while this aspect of the study may seem superfluous to some readers, to others it will not be. 
It should be noted here that while the “Hellenization” thesis has been set aside by many, 
nevertheless, it has not been demonstrated that this should indeed be done, insofar as it 
relates to the impact of Greco-Roman philosophies and cultures on early Christian thinking 
on the soul. Therefore, this study further corroborates this recent trend in Patristic studies. It 
should be noted as well that some of the questions addressed in the study will be more 
important to those who approach the early Church Fathers from within the Seventh-day 
Adventist tradition. As this church’s understanding of the soul is at variance with the picture 
that emerges from the writings of the early Church Fathers, the role of Scripture in their 
work has been often misunderstood and is still held to be more closely aligned with the 
Harnack hypothesis of Hellenization. Thus various topics and even phrases may be used that 
seem “ecclesial” and not relevant. If the reader comes upon discussions that seem obvious 
or even out of place, one may safely assume that this point is speaking to a different 
audience. No disrespect is meant. The purpose is only to allow the study to speak to scholars 
from both within and without the Seventh-day Adventist tradition. 
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Purpose of Study 
This study, therefore, seeks to fill the gap in current scholarship on the development 
of the concept of the soul in the Ante-Nicene period and the role that the Christian 
Scriptures played in this process. 19 It analyzes the usage of the two soul words, ψυχή and 
anima, in the early Church Fathers and seeks to develop a history of the general 
understanding of the soul and its powers. It studies the foundational role of Scripture as an 
authoritative source used by the early Church Fathers in arguing their various 
understandings of the soul. This study focuses on the variety of Scripture texts used and 
what aspect of the concept of the soul they supported. Hermeneutical issues regarding how 
the early Church Fathers used Scripture, while important in recent scholarship, are not the 
focus of this study. 20 
Throughout this process, this study looks for historical trends and similarities and 
dissimilarities among the authors of the period under review. It points out areas of 
consensus and historical trends among the Fathers in their usage of Scripture when 
developing the doctrine of the soul.21 It also points out areas of development that only begin 
                                                 
19Throughout this study, reference will be made to the doctrine of the soul. This is 
done while recognizing that no creedal statements were made by the church in this period as 
the first ecumenical council Nicea lies at the end of this period. This not withstanding, what 
is said by these early Church Fathers provides most, if not all, of what will become the 
Church’s teaching on the origin and end of the soul. On the role of the writings of the early 
Church Fathers in the doctrinal development of the Church, see Pelikan, The Emergence of 
the Catholic Tradition (100-600), vi-x. 
20On this, see for example D. Jeffrey Bingham, ed., The Bible in Ancient Christianity 
(Boston, MA: Brill, 2004-); Robert L. Wilken, ed., The Church’s Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2003-); Thomas C. Oden, ed., Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998-). 
21Cf. Jerónimo Leal, La antropología de Tertuliano: estudio de los tratados 
polémicos de los años 207-212 d.C. (Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 2001), 
14-16. Leal groups Justin Martyr, Ireneus, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian and Melito of 




towards the end of the period under study but become more prominent in the years that 
follow. 
 
Justification for the Research 
Given the importance of the doctrine of the soul, one may rightly ask what place the 
Bible had in the development of this Christian teaching. While recent Protestant theologians 
have debated this issue in connection with the doctrine of hell,22 it does have other 
implications as well. The first relates fundamentally to the Protestant notion of sola 
scriptura, which has driven Protestant theology since the time of the Reformation. The 
belief in sola scriptura has consistently been an insistence upon having the Bible as the final 
authority for doctrines of faith. If there is no biblical support for this doctrine, what is its 
place in church dogma? 
In addition, church dogma plays a role in the minds of its adherents. Segal notes that 
“heavenly journeys and NDEs [near death experiences] have constantly reinforced notions 
of the immortality of the soul and testified to the reality of resurrection.”23 Within 
contemporary culture, belief in the life of the soul after the death of the body has become 
commonplace. This provides another factor for understanding the Church’s teaching on the 
soul and its biblical basis. 
While theologians and students of philosophy have written much regarding the early 
                                                 
a high value on the body rather than only the soul as in the Platonic and Stoic schools. This, 
he notes, is more a cultural than a geographic label. 
22A recent article in Christianity Today details the current, often heated, discussions 
in Evangelical circles regarding hell and the immortality of the soul. Robert A. Peterson, 
“Undying Worm Unquenchable Fire,” Christianity Today, 23 October 2000, 30-37. 
23Segal, Life after Death, 714. 
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Church’s concept of the soul, no study to date has undertaken the purpose outlined here. 
Pelikan surveys the positions of five of the early Church Fathers on the soul,24 while 
Heinrich Karpp has a study on the origin of the soul in several of the Church Fathers.25 
Brian Daley did a study on the eschatological hope of the early Church in which he looks at 
ideas on the state of the soul after death.26 John Roller attempts to look at all the early 
Church Fathers up to Nicea, but gives only a cursory sample of statements by each author 
on the topic. His study is woefully lacking in depth and serious analysis.27 Le Roy Froom 
also studied the doctrine of the immortality of the soul in the early Church Fathers but his 
study focused specifically on whether a writer believed in a conditional or unconditional 
immortal nature of the soul, often focusing on statements that relate to death and destruction 
outside of any discussion of the soul itself.28 Robert Morey has also contributed in this area 
and offers a critique of the results arrived at by Froom.29 
Other studies have been done throughout the last century on the theological 
anthropology of the early Church Fathers. However, these in general have not focused 
                                                 
24Pelikan, The Shape of Death. Pelikan looks at Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, 
Tertullian, Origen, and Irenaeus. Notably missing from this list are some of the apologists. 
25Heinrich Karpp, Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie: Biblische Anthropologie 
und philosophische Psychologie bei den Kirchenvätern des dritten Jahrhunderts (Gütersloh: 
C. Bertelsmann, 1950). 
26Brain E. Daley, The Hope of the Early Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). 
27John H. Roller, The Doctrine of Immortality in the Early Church (Charlotte, NC: 
by the author, 1999). 
28Le Roy Edwin Froom, The Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers: The Conflict of 
the Ages Over the Nature and Destiny of Man (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1965). 




specifically on their psychology; rather they have looked at the entire doctrine of man. One 
example of this type of study is that done by Juan Ayan Calvo.30 These also have tended to 
focus on detailing the relationship between the early Church Fathers and other non-Christian 
writers. A recent, good example of this type of study is that of Dietmar Wyrwa.31 
 
Scope and Delimitations 
This study analyzes the writings of the early Church Fathers which are extant in 
either Greek or Latin. As a rule, works which are generally recognized as spurious or of 
doubtful origin have been excluded along with writers and/or documents generally 
considered heretical.32 Fragments and works for which no modern translation or electronic 
database of the original text is available have also been excluded. Occurrences where a 
writer quotes from a scriptural passage in which the word soul appears but in which it is 
apparent from the context that the writer is not attempting to make a point specifically 
regarding the soul, but is rather using the citation for another purpose, were not considered 
relevant or part of this study. As for the Scriptures used by the early Church Fathers, this 
study focuses on the generally accepted canonical texts, thus excluding other works which 
do not find they way into the “Orthodox” tradition. 
                                                 
30Juan José Ayán Calvo, Antropología de San Justino: Exégesis del mártir a Gen. I-
III (Córdoba: Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Corboba, 1988). 
31Dietmar Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” in Psyche–Seele–
Anima: Festschrift für Karin Alt zum 7. Mai 1998, ed. Jens Holzhausen, Beiträge zur 
Altertumskunde (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1998). 
32Thus, for example, works belonging to the Nag Hammadi corpus are not included 
in this study. In so doing, it is not the intent of this study to suggest that this literature would 
not be valuable to a study of the development of doctrine in the early church. Rather, this 
study has chosen to focus on the writers and works that in the end were more directly a part 
of the main stream of the doctrinal development of the church. 
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While the possibility of using an electronic database provides the opportunity for a 
much wider scope of word study, it is also recognized that this methodology has the 
inherent limitation of not addressing those citations where an author may discuss a concept 
related to the doctrine of the soul but where the word soul is not used. As such, this 
reference does not make it into this study. This limitation, while known, should not prevent 
access to a sufficient range of references needed in order to achieve a viable study. 
The study divides the works into three separate chapters, the Apostolic Fathers, the 
Greek Ante-Nicene Fathers, and the Latin Ante-Nicene Fathers. Documents from the 




Clement of Rome 
Ignatius of Antioch 
Epistle of Barnabas 
Shepherd of Hermas 
Didache 
Mathetes Epistle to Diognetus 
 
Greek Ante-Nicene Fathers 
 
Justin Martyr 
Tatian of Assyria 
Theophilus of Antioch 
Athenagoras of Athens 
Melito of Sardis 
Irenaeus of Lyons 
Clement of Alexandria 
Hippolytus of Portus Romanus 
Origen of Alexandria 
Gregory Thaumaturgus 
Methodius 
                                                 
33This list is divided according to the commonly accepted format. This arrangement 
does not imply any prior categorization of the early Church Fathers according to a 




Latin Ante-Nicene Fathers 
 
Tertullian of Carthage 
Minucius Felix of Arica 
Cyprian of Carthage 
Commodianus of Africa 
Novatian of Rome 




This study is primarily a historical-linguistic investigation carried out by a literary 
analysis of primary source documents produced by the early Church Fathers. While the 
scriptural sources used in these writings are noted and cataloged, little exegetical work 
relating to these occurrences is done, nor are hermeneutical questions regarding how the 
early Church Fathers used their Scriptural sources addressed. Doing so would have 
necessitated a much smaller delimitation of authors. While some may argue that this would 
be preferable, it would have ultimately truncated the results that this study has produced, 
failing to give the desired “big picture” of the time period. Instead, the study focuses on the 
variety of Scripture that was used and what aspects of the teaching on the soul were 
supported by the various scriptural passages used. 
The first chapter focuses on the background of ideas in Greco-Roman and Jewish 
writings along with those in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures that may have influenced 
the early Church Fathers. This chapter utilizes primarily secondary literature in its 
investigation in an attempt to provide a useful background to the ideas under investigation 
in the remainder of the study. 
The next chapters investigate the relevant primary documents using searchable 
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databases of both the Greek and Latin works of the period.34 The Greek word ψυχή was 
searched using the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae database35 and the Latin anima was 
searched using the CETEDOC database.36  
In this study of the primary documents, there are  two lines of research. The first 
focuses on the semantic usage of the soul words, ψυχή and anima, in the Church Fathers. It 
also looks at several general concepts such as what a specific author understands the essence 
of the soul to be, and how he presents the relationship of the soul to the mind, the various 
powers and divisions of the soul, and its relationship to the corporeal world. By studying the 
usage of the word soul in the early Church Fathers, a background will be developed which 
will enable a more careful analysis of the doctrinal nature of their understanding of the soul. 
In the presentation of data on each writer, this constitutes the first section under the heading 
“Usage of Psyche/Anima.” In general, scriptural usage is not as common in this part but 
where authors note scriptural arguments, they will be listed. 
The second aspect of this study analyzes the doctrine of the soul in each of the 
authors and the role that Scripture played in this development. This section focuses on four 
main foci: (1) their teaching regarding the origin of the soul, (2) their understanding of the 
                                                 
34With the continued growth of electronic databases containing the works of the 
early Church Fathers, it is possible to develop a methodology for a very focused topical 
study based upon a selected key word or words. For an example of this in current research 
in the field of historical theology, see Lienhard’s study of Joseph, husband of Mary, in the 
writings of Augustine. Joseph T. Lienhard, “Augustine, Sermon 51: St. Joseph in Early 
Christianity,” in In Dominico Eloquio In Lordly Eloquence: Essays in Patristic Exegesis in 
Honor of Robert L. Wilken, ed. Paul M. Blowers et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002). 
35Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, University of California, Irvine (accessed September 
2002-June 2005). 




relationship of the soul to the human person, (3) their teaching on death and the intermediate 
state of the soul from the death of the body to the eschaton, and (4) their teaching on the 
final state of the soul after the commencement of the eschaton, both for the righteous and 
the unrighteous. At times, other notions concerning the soul and an author’s biblical defense 
of it are noted as well. 
The conclusions of this study seek to bring together the information noted 
throughout the study. They note any historical developments in the usage and general 
understanding of the soul, developments of a doctrinal nature, and the role that Scripture 
played in this process. This analysis groups together those Fathers with similar doctrines 
and scriptural usage patterns in order to determine the range of scriptural usage that may 
have emerged during the period under study.37 
Scriptural citations are given using the KJV version unless otherwise noted. When 
citing the works of the early Church Fathers, the edition used is the one listed in the relevant 
edition of CETEDOC and TLG, generally either the CSEL, CCL, GCS, SC, PG or PL. The 
English translation provided is generally from the ANF. Some document translations are not 
available in this edition and then other editions have been used, such as ACW and FC. 
Where I have supplied the translation, this is noted in the text. 
                                                 
37For instance, González notes that in the period of the Apostolic Fathers, “one 
discovers the beginning of certain schools or theological tendencies.” He further notes that 
these are assignable to the Church in four distinct geographical regions: Rome; Alexandria; 








BACKGROUND CONCEPTS OF THE SOUL 
 
This chapter surveys various ideas regarding the soul which existed both in 
Greco-Roman and Jewish religious thought and in the philosophical ideas leading in to 
the early years of the first centuries C.E. The purpose is to provide the context in which 
the early Church Fathers wrote and to identify possible background and/or competing 
ideas to the various teachings of the Church Fathers regarding the soul. Due to the 
limitations of being an introductory chapter, this overview is not meant to be exhaustive 
but rather to provide a survey of the land.1 
The complexities involved in the early Church’s doctrine of the soul and its 
relationship to those found in the Greco-Roman literature are well documented.2 Pelikan 
notes a certain ambivalence in how to deal with this relationship. Werner Jaeger states 
categorically, “The Greeks … share with the Jews the honour of creating an 
intellectualized faith in God; but it was the Greeks alone who were to determine for 
                                                 
1For a more thorough comparison of the Hebrew and Greek understanding, see 
Graham J. Warne, Hebrew Perspectives on the Human Person in the Hellenistic Era: 
Philo and Paul, vol. 35 (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Biblical Press, 1995), 55-121. 
2Cf. Pelikan’s assessment of the Cappadocians’ doctrine of God and of human 
nature and the interplay with related ideas in other literature. Jaroslav Pelikan, 
Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the 
Christian Encounter with Hellenism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 280. For 
a recent study on the image of God in the early Church, see Regina Götz, Der 
geschlechtliche Mensch—ein Ebenbild Gottes: Die Auslegung von Gen 1,27 durch die 
wichtigsten griechischen Kirchenväter (Frankfurt am Main: Josef Knecht, 2003). 
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several millennia the way in which civilized man would conceive the nature and destiny 
of the soul.”3 However, Robert Wilken writes, “The soul’s continuation after death is not, 
in the minds of early Christians, a philosophical idea imported from the Greeks but part 
of the Church’s tradition as handed on in the New Testament and the writings of the 
earliest and most authoritative fathers.”4 Wilken does allow for a connection between the 
idea of an immortal soul in Greek philosophy and the Christian doctrine but insists “that 
the later development rests on traditional ideas ‘preached in the churches’ and interpreted 
in personal and religious terms.”5 
The ideas connected with the soul have gone through considerable development 
throughout both Greco-Roman and Christian history. 6 This survey begins in the earliest 
recorded documents of Greek civilization and traces these through to the Greco-Roman 
period. It also looks at the Scriptures which the early Christians held to be normative, 
these being the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. 
 
Soul in the Hebrew Bible 
An important distinction between Hebrew thought and that of many other 
accounts regarding the origins of the world is the lack of a stark dualistic concept of 
                                                 
3Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1936), 73. 
4Robert L. Wilken, “The Immortality of the Soul and the Christian Hope,” Dialog 
15, no. 2 (1976): 114. 
5Ibid. 
6Jan N. Bremmer, The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife: The 1995 Read-Tuckwell 
Lectures at the University of Bristol (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 1-9; 
Segal, Life after Death, 249. Cf. Lewis R. Farnell, Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of 
Immortality, Reprinted Lithographically ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 2; Josef 
Kroll, Die Himmelfahrt der Seele in der Antike (Cologne: Oskar Müller, 1931). 
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matter and spirit where matter is thought of as evil, while spirit is considered good.7 
Another distinction, perhaps connected to the lack of a dualistic perspective, was a 
phenomenal instead of a metaphysical outlook on reality. “The Hebrew accepted things 
as they were, or, more accurately, as they appeared to be to the human observer.”8 This 
phenomenal view of reality includes the human person. 
For all the different parts or aspects which comprise the human phenomenon, the 
human person was nevertheless seen as a totality, as a psycho-physical unity. . . . The 
western dichotomy between the psychic and the somatic, between soul and body, 
spirit and flesh, is foreign to the ‘classically Hebraic’ conception of the human 
person. In the Hebraic perspective, the human person is viewed from a variety of 
different perspectives, but human personhood is not seen to consist of any of these in 
themselves. Rather, by means of synecdoche, particular aspects were used to 
represent that which was characteristic of the whole.9 
The idea of using one aspect to look at the whole in Hebrew anthropology is 
elaborated on by M. E. Dahl. “The Hebrew mind never produces anything quite like an 
abstraction; ‘soul’ and ‘heart’ and ‘flesh’ mean the totality of man considered from 
different aspects, and they comprehend concepts like mouth, eyes, lips, reins, belly, 
bones, and so on in such a way that these refer, not to a physical organ or limb, so much 
as to the whole of man acting in a certain way.”10 
In this context, then, it becomes noteworthy when some scholars argue that in 
Hebrew thought, the human person is not necessarily a whole but can be divided, at least 
at death. Segal declares, “If the term ‘soul’ . . . in Hebrew means what it appears to mean, 




10M. E. Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body (A Study of I Corinthians 15), vol. 36 
(London: SCM, 1963), 71-72. 
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then there has to be something that survives death in the ancient Biblical world.”11 He 
then proceeds to note that the scholarly consensus is that the Jewish Scriptures do not 
teach doctrinally an afterlife. He, along with others such as James Barr and John Cooper, 
has suggested that there is something of the human person that survives death in 
something of an intermediate state before the “day of the Lord.”12 With this question in 
the scholarly community, it will be helpful to outline the arguments to obtain as clear an 
understanding as possible of the Hebrew understanding. 
The concept of soul in the Hebrew Bible13 is multifaceted.14 The translation of the 
HB into Greek, the Septuagint (LXX), itself may have contributed to some of the transfer 
of ideas between the Greek world and that of the early Church. Thümmel notes this 
                                                 
11Segal, Life after Death, 142. Later, during his discussion of Second Temple 
Judaism, he states that throughout Hebrew cultures, “the soul is the equivalent of ghost or 
spirit.” Ibid., 279. 
12James Barr, The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality, 1st Fortress Press 
ed.  (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); John W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life 
Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1989). Segal notes that Cooper seems quite intent on attributing a life for the 
soul after death to Hebrew thought. Segal, Life after Death, 142. 
13In order to stay clear of the scholarly discussion regarding the dating of the 
various books found in the Jewish canon, this study treats them as one unit. In doing so, 
no attempt is made to trace any historical development within the corpus but rather treats 
it in its final form. While writing on a related theme, Segal notes that it is not necessary to 
deal with all of the textual critical issues regarding manuscripts in order to deal with their 
implications for studying the afterlife. Segal, 276. For further discussion on this 
difficulty, see Nico van Uchelen, “Death and the After-life in the Hebrew Bible of 
Ancient Israel,” in Hidden Futures: Death and Immortality in Ancient Egypt, Anatolia, 
the Classical, Biblical and Arabic-Islamic World, ed. Jan M. Bremer et al. (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 1994), 77-78. 
14See Karpp, Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie, 28. For a detailed analysis 
of soul in the HB, see A. Murtonen, “The Living Soul, A Study of the Meaning of the 
Word NPS in the Hebrew Language,” Studia Orientalia 23, no. 1 (1980), 1-105. 
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possibility with the translation of ruach by pneuma and nefesh by psyche.15 
The key word in this discussion is the Hebrew term nefesh (ֶנֶפׁש). Nefesh is used 
around 750 times in the HB.16 It occurs several times throughout the creation narrative 
but perhaps most prominently in regard to the human individual in Gen 2:7.17 There 
nefesh hayah ( הַחָּיֽ  is translated ψυχη ζῶσα in the LXX, which was translated as (ֶנֶפׁש 
“living soul” in the KJV. Based upon Charles Briggs’s study18 in 1897 and those of other 
scholars throughout the twentieth century, many modern translators have used “living 
being” instead of “living soul.”19 
The KJV translates nefesh variously throughout the Jewish Scriptures.20 Daniel 
Lys notes that “even in the earliest Old Testament texts this word has several meanings: 
life; what lives and dies; the affections, i.e., need and appetite, desire and pleasure, the 
feelings; several localizations (‘interior’, liver, blood, breath’ [sic]); the animate, living 
                                                 
15Thümmel, 246. Jacob notes that psyche is also used in the LXX to translate 
several other Hebrew words as well. Edmond Jacob, “The Anthropology of the Old 
Testament,” TDNT (1974), 9:617-618. 
16The Westminster Electronic Morphology of BHS Release 3.5 2001 was 
searched using BibleWorks version 6.0.005y 2003. It returned 757 occurrences of ֶנֶפׁש in 
686 separate verses. Briggs gives 756, Wolff gives 755, while Anderson and Murtonen 
list 754 instances. 
17Johannes Frey, Tod, Seelenglaube und Seelenkult im alten Israel (Leipzig: A. 
Deichert, 1898), 18. 
18Charles A. Briggs, “The Use of NPS in the Old Testament,” JBL 16 (1897): 30. 
19JB, NSAB, NIV, RSV. 
20Murtonen lists these as “soul” (465 times); “life” (120 times); “person” (26 
times); “heart” (16 times); “mind” (15 times); “creature” (10 times); the personal pronoun 
(10 times); “dead” (5 times); “body” (4 times); “dead body” (4 times); “pleasure” (4 
times); “any . . . man, thing, beast, appetite, ghost, lust” (2 times each); “any . . . desire, 
will” (3 times each). Murtonen, 7-8, quoted in Warne, 61-62. 
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being (cf. even the animal), and the Self, I.”21 
Ellis Brotzman has divided these into ten basic categories of meanings.22  
1. Appetitive use. Here Nefesh is often used “to express the seat of desire for 
physical food or drink (e.g., meat, Deut 12:15; grapes, Deut 23:24 [Heb., v. 25]; and 
water, Isa 29:8).”23 
2. Personal use. Nefesh can also refer to an individual or group of individuals. For 
instance, in Lev 2:1, a nefesh brings an offering. 
3. Reference to life. In this usage, nefesh refers to the life of an individual. This 
usage is common in reference to taking someone’s life (Exod 4:19). 
4. Pronominal use. Here nefesh is a simple pronoun. It is another way of writing 
one or one’s self. (Lev 11:43-44) This can be found in prose and poetry. 
5. Emotional use. Nefesh can often be associated with various emotions such as 
discouragement, bitterness, or sadness (2 Kgs 4:27; Jonah 2:7). 
6. In connection with the heart. Nefesh can be linked with the heart as in  
Deut 6:4-5. 
7. Used for a corpse. Interestingly, nefesh can also be used to refer to a dead body 
(Lev 19:28). 
                                                 
21Daniel Lys, “The Israelite Soul According to the LXX,” Vetus Testamentum 16 
(1966): 182. 
22Ellis R. Brotzman, “Man and the Meaning of Nephesh,” Bibliotheca Sacra 145, 
no. 580 (1988): 401-407. Briggs classifies the meanings of nefesh as: “that which 
breathes,” “living being,” “life itself,” “man himself,” “seat of the appetites,” “seat of the 
emotions and passions,” “mental acts,” possibly for “acts of will” and “character.” He 
argues against the meaning of breath being found in the biblical Hebrew. Briggs, 17-30. 
23Brotzman, Man and the Meaning of Nephesh, 401. 
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8. Used for throat. The nefesh can refer to the throat24 as is indicated by cognates 
in Akkadian and Ugaritic.25 
9. For physical breath. Nefesh seems to mean breath in several HB usages. For 
instance, when Rachel dies, her nefesh leaves. Brotzman argues that this cannot be the 
soul but could be the breath (Gen 35:18). 
10. Used for animals. The last usage is different in that if refers to animals such as 
in the creation account (Gen 1:20).26 
Graham Warne also emphasizes this idea of the concrete reality. “In any 
translation of ֶנֶפׁש, the Hebraic trait of thinking concretely must be kept foremost in 
mind. ֶנֶפׁש has been variously associated with throat, neck and breath as its basic concrete 
expression.”27 He concludes that the basic meaning most probably was “throat” or “neck” 
and that it is from this that the concept of breath developed.28 Nicholas Tromp indicates a 
connection to Ugaritic texts. In Isa 5:14, he states that “throat is to be favoured as the 
translation for 29”.ֶנֶפׁש Based upon this connection with the throat and then with breath, 
                                                 
24Cf. H. Seebass, “Nefesh,” TDOT (1998), 9:504. Seebas suggests that this is 
usually assumed to be the “concrete primary meaning” while Brotzman lists it as one of 
the secondary categories. Brotzman, Man and the Meaning of Nephesh, 401. 
25Ibid., 499-502. 
26For a complete analysis of each of these categories, see Ellis R. Brotzman, “The 
Plurality of ‘Soul’ in the Old Testament with Special Attention Given to the Use of 
Nephesh” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1987). 
27Warne, 62. 
28Ibid. Lys notes the etymological connection between “nphsh” and the 
“Akkadian napashu, ‘to breathe’ (with localization in the ‘throat,’ napishtu), i.e., not 
merely to live but to get more potentiality in a dynamic way.” Lys, The Israelite Soul, 
185-186. 
29Nicholas J. Tromp, Primitive Conceptions of Death and the Nether World in the 
Old Testament (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1969), 105. 
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Warne notes that “most interpreters have interpreted ֶנֶפׁש as the equivalent of ‘anima’ 
(Latin), that is, the life-breath of the human person.”30 Lys has noted that this concept of 
breath is clearly evidenced when the LXX translates qol nefesh ( ל־ֶנֶפׁשּכָ  ) as πᾶν 
ἐμπέον, “every breathing thing” in Josh 10:28, 30, 35, 37, 39 and 11:11 stating, 
“nephesh is understood on the basis of the idea of respiration and life: ‘every soul’ means 
‘every breathing being.’”31 
Lys describes nefesh in its most basic meaning as “the primitive idea of 
‘potentiality’ manifested in the various aspects of vitality, as expressing the totality of 
life, the starting point being the act of breathing and its localization in the throat. But if 
nefesh can indicate the living being and be rendered by the personal pronoun, it has no 
personal quality; it is the animation of a personal being, but not what gives this being his 
personal identity; in other words, nefesh is not an ontological substance.”32 “Nefesh, then, 
did not refer to an immaterial principle within the human person, which could have its 
own independent existence apart from the person. Nefesh was an integral part of the 
human organism, and was perceived as inseparable from the concretely existing human 
person.”33 Along these lines, Aubrey Johnson writes “that in Israelite thought man is 
conceived, not so much in dual fashion as ‘body’ and ‘soul’, but synthetically as a unit of 
                                                 
30Warne, 62. Wolff notes that the English translation of soul, the French 
translation of âme, and the German translation of seele go back to the Greek translation in 
the LXX of nefesh (ֶנֶפׁש) by ψυχή and the Latin translation by anima. Hans W. Wolff, 
Anthropology of the Old Testament, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1974), 
10. 





vital power or (in current terminology) a psycho-physical organism. That is to say, the 
various members and secretions of the body, such as the bones, the heart, the bowels, and 
the kidneys, as well as the flesh and the blood, can all be though of as revealing psychical 
properties.”34  
In an overarching statement regarding nefesh, Segal concludes, “Although nefesh 
occurs quite frequently in the Hebrew text, there is no evidence that the ancient Hebrews 
conceived of an ‘immortal’ soul in our philosophical sense of the term. . . . It [soul] is 
important because it marks the identity of the person but not because it survives death for 
a beatific reward.”35 In regard to the notion of personhood, it is important to keep in mind 
that this does not carry with the modern idea of consciousness. In Hebrew thought, the 
soul could be diminished in certain people and could be elevated in others.36 Jan 
Bremmer notes that the ancient Hebrew concept has no connection to the Pythagorean or 
Platonic doctrine of immortality.37 Segal sums up the difference between Hebrew and 
modern thought, “We think we have a soul; the Hebrews thought they were a soul.”38 
 
Soul in Greek and Roman Thought 
This study now turns to the idea of the soul in the Greek and Roman world. 
Bremer states that it is not easy to determine what the Greeks meant by either soul or 
                                                 
34Aubrey R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient 
Israel, 2d ed. (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1964), 87. 
35Segal, Life after Death, 143. This notion of identity will prove important in the 
early Church Fathers. 
36Ibid., 144. Cf. Johnson, 7. 
37Bremmer, The Rise and Fall, 11-40. 
38Segal, Life after Death, 144. 
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immortality, especially in the early stages of its usage.39 In fact, in the early period the 
Greeks did not have a word to correspond to the modern notion of soul.40  
 
Homer and Hesiod 
The twentieth-century Western mind associates soul (ψυχή) with the rise of 
psychology and psychiatry as fields of study. One’s soul is the seat of one’s thoughts and 
emotions. The ancient Greek at the time of Homer thought along completely different 
lines.41 Bremmer notes that, for them, one’s soul is only mentioned in times of personal 
crisis, never as part of the normal functioning person.42 While there has been much 
                                                 
39Jan M. Bremer, “Death and Immortality in Some Greek Poems,” in Hidden 
Futures: Death and Immortality in Ancient Egypt, Anatolia, the Classical, Biblical and 
Arabic-Islamic World, ed. Jan M. Bremer et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 1994). Cf. Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1995), 3-37. Martin argues, at times unconvincingly, that the body/soul dichotomy 
in modern thought and culture, being mediated through the Cartesian revolution, is 
unrelated to that found in Plato and others of his time. 
40See Albrecht Dihle, “Psyche in the Greek World,” TDNT (1974), 9:608. 
41For studies on the Homeric understanding of the soul, see D. B. Claus, Toward 
the Soul: An Enquiry into the Meaning of Psyche before Plato (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1981), 57-102; Thomas Jahn, Zum Wortfeld “Seele-Geist” in der 
Sprache Homers (Munich: Beck, 1987), 27-38; Ruth Padel, In and Out of the Mind: 
Greek Images of the Tragic Self (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Erwin 
Rohde, Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks, trans. W. 
B. Hillis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), 3-54; Hans Schwabl, “Homer und 
die platonische Seelenlehre,” in Psyche–Seele–Anima: Festschrift für Karin Alt zum 7. 
Mai 1998, ed. Jens Holzhausen, Beiträge zur Altertumskunde (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 
1998); Sonnemans, 249-253; Shirley D. Sullivan, Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What 
Early Greeks Say, vol. 144 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 77-90. Solmsen notes that for Homer, 
the presence of the soul in the body meant life whereas its absence meant death. F. 
Solmsen, “Plato and the Concept of the Soul,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 3 
(1983): 355. For a study on the relationship of the soul and body in antiquity, see 
Johannes Herschberger, Seele und Leib in der Spätantike, vol. 8, no. 1 (Wiesbaden: Franz 
Steiner, 1969) 
42See for example Homer, Iliad 9:322. Cf. Jan N. Bremmer, The Early Greek 
Concept of the Soul (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 14-20. One’s ψυχη 




scholarly debate over the Homeric soul, David Claus asserts that “the only meanings of 
ψυχή clearly attested in Homer are the ‘shade’ and the ‘life’ destroyed at death.”43 This 
“modern” function of the ψυχη as the seat of the psychological individual in Greek 
thought was not located in one place but in many, such as the thymos, menos, nous, and 
the words for other body organs such as kidney, heart, and lung.44 
Modern anthropologists have shed light on how “primitive” peoples view the 
human soul. They have shown that they often looked on themselves as having two souls. 
On the one hand, there is what these scholars call the free soul, a soul which 
represents the individual personality. This soul is inactive when the body is active; it 
only manifests itself during swoons, dreams or at death . . . but it has no clear 
connections with the physical or psychological aspects of the body. On the other 
hand, there are a number of body-souls, which endow the body with life and 
consciousness, but of which none stands for that part of a person that survives after 
death. 
 The Homeric concept of the soul of the living is clearly closely related to these 
ideas. Here too we find on the one hand the psyche, a kind of free-soul, and on the 
                                                 
dreams. See also Bremmer, The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife, 1-2; John Chadwick, 
Lexicographica Graeca: Contributions to the Lexicography of Ancient Greek (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), 307-320; Dihle, “Psyche in the Greek World,” 9:609; Padel; 
Rohde,  Psyche, 6, 8; Sullivan, Psychological and Ethical Ideas, 77-78; idem, Euripides’ 
Use of Psychological Terminology (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 
83. For a comparison with the later Hippocratic understanding, see Beate Gundert, “Soma 
and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine,” in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and 
Metaphysicians on the Mind-body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment, ed. John P. 
Wright et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). 
43Claus, 61. Cf. Athenagoras Zakopoulos, Plato and Saint Paul on Man 
(Thessalonica: n.p., 2002), 3. 
44Jan N. Bremmer, “The Soul in Early and Classical Greece,” in Der Begriff der 
Seele in der Religionswissenschaft, ed. Johann Figl et al. (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 2002), 160; Sullivan, Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks 
Say, 14-18; idem, Aeschylus’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997); idem, Euripides’ Use of 




other the body-souls, the thymos and all that.45 
It is this free soul that finds a connection with the notion of breath. The connection in 
Greek thought between soul and breath is demonstrated etymologically by the connection 
between ψυχή and ψυχείν, “to breathe.”46 
Farnell argues that in Homer’s theory, “a man has one soul only, such as it is, not 
many souls or selves inside him to which different things may happen after death, as we 
find in the psychology or the theologic metaphysic of some advanced and some primitive 
peoples: secondly the departed soul plays little or no part in the lives of the living, the 
ghost is not an object of terror, nor does his wrath pursue the living.”47 
The soul in the time of the Homeric poems was known to survive death,48 after 
                                                 
45Bremmer, “The Soul in Early and Classical Greece,” 160. Bremmer notes in a 
later work that it is not correct to say that this body-soul is non-physical, rather that it 
does not have a connection to the physical aspects of the individual’s body. Bremmer, 
The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife, 2. 
46See D. Q. Adams, A Dictionary of Tocharian B (Amsterdam, n.p., 1999), 41-42; 
Bremmer, The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife, 2; J. Jouanna, “Le souffle, la vie et le froid: 
remarques sur la famille de psychô d’Homère à Hippocrate,” Revue des Études Grecques 
100 (1987): 203-224; J. T. Katz, “Shorter Notes—Homeric Hymn to Hermes 296,” 
Classical Quarterly 49 (1999): 318n18; M. L. West, The East Face of Helicon (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 151-152. West connects to Near Eastern beliefs in 
contrast to the accepted view of an Indo-European link. 
47Farnell, 9. 
48Cf. ibid., 3. On the relationship between death and one’s philosophy of soul, see 
Bartel Poortman, “Death and Immortality in Greek Philosophy,” in Hidden Futures: 
Death and Immortality in Ancient Egypt, Anatolia, the Classical, Biblical and Arabic-
Islamic World, ed. Jan M. Bremer et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
1994). He notes that the Homeric poems give a picture of Hellenic life during the 
eleventh and tenth centuries and concludes that the poems generally can be taken to 
represent beliefs that had not grown up overnight but rather reached even further back 
into Greek history thus indicating that they did believe in the survival of the soul. The 
hero cults and the cult of ancestors give evidence of early hope for the continued 
existence of the individual, if not specifically the soul, after death. Farnell writes, “The 
souls are not without hope, for special divinities, Hermes and the Earth-mother, have 




which it made its way to Hades.49 Patroclus says to the sleeping Achilles before he is 
buried, “You sleep, and have forgotten me, Achilles. Not in my life were You unmindful 
of me, but now in my death! Bury me with all speed, that I pass within the gates of 
Hades. Afar do the spirits keep me aloof, the phantoms of men that have done with toils, 
neither suffer they me to join myself to them beyond the River, but vainly I wander 
through the wide-gated house of Hades.”50 After hearing Patroclus’s spirit speaking to 
him, Achilles reached out to take hold of him. 
So saying he reached forth with his hands, yet clasped him not; but the spirit like a 
vapour was gone beneath the earth, gibbering faintly. And seized with amazement 
Achilles sprang up, and smote his hands together, and spake a word of wailing: “Look 
you now, even in the house of Hades is the spirit and phantom somewhat, albeit the 
mind be not anywise therein; for the whole night long hath the spirit of hapless 
Patroclus stood over me, weeping and wailing, and gave me charge concerning each 
thing, and was wondrously like his very self.51 
Here the soul of Patroclus is described as needing a proper burial in order to cross 
over to Hades. Achilles hears the plea for a burial and reaches out to touch his slain friend 
but sees that there is nothing but vapor where he had imagined his comrade. 
The gods of the underworld would not allow Patroclus entrance to Hades without 
his burial. This notion of the underworld being under the control of certain gods is noted 
                                                 
dear ones. Here for the first time in Europe we have record of a service similar to prayers 
for the dead; and this implies the feeling that the lot of the soul after death may be the 
happier if the nether powers can be specially propitiated.” Farnell, 346.  
49Richardson notes that after the burning of the body, the soul was free to go to 
Hades and suggests that cremation was possibly noted as a quicker way to release the 
soul from this world though he notes that the Greeks practiced both inhumation and 
cremation side by side. N. J. Richardson, “Early Greek Views about Life after Death,” in 
Greek Religion and Society, ed. P. E. Easterling et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 50-51. 
50Homer Il. 23.69-74. 
51Homer Il. 23.99-108. 
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by Farnell. He highlights this as an important distinction between Homeric thought and 
that of the Hebrews. “Another fact emerges in the Homeric theory of importance for the 
future development of a higher belief concerning the soul. The spirit-world, unlike Sheol 
in the older Hebraic view, is under the control of certain deities, a phenomenon found 
also in other polytheistic religions.”52 
Bremmer notes that the “meaning of psychê as ‘soul of the dead’ will remain 
present all through antiquity.”53 What is important to note is that one’s soul was not the 
only mode in which one existed after the death of the body. He also notes that 
the deceased was also compared to a shadow or presented as an eidolon or ‘image’, a 
word that suggests that for the ancient Greeks the dead looked like the living. Yet, 
this is only true to a limited extent, as the physical actions of the souls of the dead 
were described in two opposite ways. On the one hand, the Greeks believed that the 
dead souls moved and spoke like the living; the image of the deceased in the memory 
of the living plays a major part in this activity. . . . On the other hand, the souls of the 
dead are depicted as being unable to move or speak properly.54 
Maurice Hogan connects the ideas surrounding the soul with the wider world 
view that was in place. In commenting on the impact of Hesiod he writes,  
Hesiod moves beyond the myth in his discovery of the order of existence that can be 
lost and this gives rise to his experiences of anxiety and hope which lie at the 
experiential core. His insight is that the just order of living decreed by Zeus demands 
of man that he shoulder the burden of existence and work in justice with his fellow 
human beings. However, the life of the soul has not yet become an independent 
source of order but is still tied to the social and cosmic order so that once society 
declines, the soul has no option but to follow. The soul’s consciousness of its 
independence and its attunement to a divine source of order beyond society has yet to 
be articulated.55 
                                                 
52Farnell, 9-10. 
53Bremmer, “The Soul in Early and Classical Greece,” 164. Cf. Sullivan, 
Aeschylus’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New, 150. 
54Bremmer, “The Soul in Early and Classical Greece,” 164. 




Hogan further argues that the notion of the soul as developed after Hesiod served 
to provide a new source of order to compete with the older concept of polis. He notes that 
the two centuries after Hesiod “were marked by the appearance of a remarkable 
succession of individual thinkers which had the effect of letting the soul emerge as the 
tentative source of order in competition with the myth and the aristocratic culture of the 
polis. Nevertheless, within the polis occurred the differentiation of personality as the epic 
was succeeded by the lyric, the lyric by tragedy, and tragedy by philosophy.”56 
By the end of the Archaic Age, the soul in Greek thought does not leave the body 
as it had previously in Homer.57 A development in the doctrine had been taking place 
throughout the Archaic Age and this is only one of the changes exhibited.58 During the 
sixth century, several major developments “helped to provide a richer experience of the 
soul from which later philosophers could draw. The Orphic movement centred on the 
                                                 
Philosophical Anthropology, vol. 504 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1994), 35. 
56Ibid., 30. 
57Bremmer, The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife, 2. 
58What is still unclear and open for debate is why this development took place. 
What were the precise stimuli that acted upon Greek thinkers to bring about this change? 
Many scholars have suggested an influence from shamanism. Another suggestion is that 
political changes were taking place and that the changing of the understanding of the soul 
paralleled this. Bremmer, Rise and Fall, 2n15, along with material on shamanism and 
Bremmer’s ideas at the end of chapter 2. For more on Greek shamanism, see Leonid J. 
Zhmud, Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion im frühen Pythagoreismus (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1997), 107-116. Cf. Voegelin who speaks of the “vexing problem of 
the soul—vexing because the extant literary documents are so scanty that the 
development towards the self-understanding of the soul cannot be traced in continuity. 
There is a period in which a knowledge of the soul does not yet exist, and we may 
roughly call this period ‘Homeric’; and then, all of a sudden, the meaning of the soul is 
present in the work of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Heraclitus, probably under the 
influence of the Pythagorean movement.” Eric Voegelin, Order and History (n.p.: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 2:221. 
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purification of the soul, while the Pythagoreans developed a way of life and discipline 
through which the immortality of the soul could be attained.”59 
 
Orphism 
The Orphic notion of the origin of the soul is related to the earlier discussion on 
the meaning of both ψυχή and anima. “The idea behind this is that the soul, the life-
principle, either is itself air or being of similar substance is blown about with the winds 
and is drawn into the body at birth.”60 Aristotle tells us this about the Orphic soul, stating 
that it “comes into us from space as we breathe, born by the winds.”61 A new element 
here is the notion of heavenly or divine origins.62 
In the late archaic and early classical eras, Orphism began to develop63 what 
                                                 
59Hogan, 36. 
60William Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion: A Study of the Orphic 
Movement, 2d ed. (London: Methuen and Company, 1952), 94. 
61Aristotle De anima 1.5 410b28. Guthrie connects this to the idea of the egg 
which is born by the wind, indicating that the female conceived alone without the aid of a 
male partner. On this see ibid., 92-104.  
62Claude Tresmontant, Le problème de l’âme (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1971), 16-
17; Zakopoulos, 9. 
63The connection between Orphism and Pythagoras is not entirely clear. Rohde 
states, “In any case we must take it as certain that the correspondence of Orphic and 
Pythagorean doctrine on the subject of the soul is not purely accidental. Did Pythagoras 
when he came to Italy (about 532) find Orphic societies already settled in Kroton and 
Metapontum, and did he associate himself with their ideas? Or did the ‘Orphic’ sectaries 
(as Herodotos [sic] imagined) owe their inspiration to Pythagoras and his disciples.” 
Rohde, Psyche, 337. Cf. Fritz Graf, Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung Athens in 
vorhellenisticher Zeit, ed. Walter Burkert et al., vol. 33 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 
92-94. For overviews of the Orphic background, see Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek 
Religion, 6-68; G. R. S. Mead, Orpheus (London: John M Watkins, 1965), 13-25. For a 
discussion on the world soul concept in Orphism, see Mead, 174-186. 
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Redfield refers to as a counter-cultural movement.64 As Farnell has already noted, a belief 
in some sort of afterlife seems to have been in existence from the earliest years of Greek 
thinking. With the Orphics, however, another key development “occurs when the next 
world is seen as compensatory for the moral inadequacy of this one.”65 In the middle of 
the fifth century, Pindar asserts that mortals pay in this life for crimes committed in the 
previous world and will pay for crimes in the next world for evils committed in this 
one.66 He adds to this the teaching that those who pass three times from this world to the 
next and back without committing crimes will then be granted the right to pass to the Isle 
of the Blessed.67 
Behind this Orphic anthropology is earlier Greek mythology. Accordingly, 
humans were believed to have been created out the ashes of the Titans. The Titans had 
been destroyed by Zeus because they had murdered and boiled his son Dionysus. Thus, 
humans were seen as having a body from the Titans and a divine soul from Dionysus. 
                                                 
64James Redfield, “The Politics of Immortality,” in Orphisme et Orphée: en 
l’honneur de Jean Rudhardt, ed. Philippe Borgeaud, Recherches et Rencontres (Geneva: 
Droz, 1991), 105. The ecstatic Thracian worship of Dionysus seems to have been the 
fertile ground out of which Orpheus drew his religious rites. On this religion of Dionysus, 
Rohde states, “Wherever a cultus of this kind, making its aim and object the evocation of 
ecstatic raptures, has taken root—whether in whole races of men or in religious 
communities—there we find in close alliance with it, whether as cause or effect or both, a 
peculiarly vital belief in the life and power of the soul of man after its separation from the 
body. Our comparative glance over the analogous phenomena of other lands has shown 
us that the exalted worship offered to ‘Dionysos’ among the Thracians was only a single 
variety of a method, familiar to more than half the human race, of getting into touch with 
the divine by a religious ‘enthousiasmos’.” Rohde, Psyche, 263. For an analysis of the 
connection between Orpheus and the Eleusian mysteries, see Graf, Eleusis und die 
orphische Dichtung, 22-39. 
65Redfield, 105. See also Dihle, “Psyche in the Greek World,” 9:611. 
66Pindar, Ol. 2.53-56. 
67Pindar, Ol. 2.68-77. See Rohde, Psyche, 414-419. 
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The body, in this matrix, is conceived of as a prison for the soul from which the soul must 
escape.68 This is illustrated in the following Orphic description of life after death. 
“Having avoided the dangers of error on the road, the soul addresses the divine guardians 
of the Lake of Memory in terms that proclaim his kinship with God: ‘I am the son of 
earth and starry heaven, and by birth I come from God: ye know this well yourselves.’ 
We have here the claim to immortality based on the presence of the divine element in 
man’s soul; and the origin of man in this Orphic Confessional is the same as that which 
Hesiod attributes to the Gods.”69 
Farnell identifies two other key points in Orphic eschatology and anthropology: 
“(a) the doctrine of purgative punishments whereby the soul is purified—‘I have paid the 
penalty for unrighteous deeds’ is the confession of the purified soul; (b) the doctrine of 
reincarnation through a cycle of existences at the close of which the soul may find 
deliverance and rest—‘I have fled forth from the wheel of bitter and sorrowful 
existence.’”70 
The philosophic base of Orphism is an underlying dualism that is remedied by 
                                                 
68See Kroll, 8; Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic 
Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 30. On Dionysus as the lord of souls, 
see Walter Burkert, Homo necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual 
and Myth, trans. Peter Bing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 226-227. 
69Farnell, 375. On the connection between human souls and astral bodies, see Ioan 
P. Culianu, Psychanodia I: A Survey of the Evidence Concerning the Ascension of the 
Soul and Its Relevance (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 10-12. 
70Farnell, 377. See also Mead, 187-195. The idea of reincarnation is described by 
Plato in the Cratylus: “According to some the body is the sepulchre of the soul.” Plato, 
Crat. 5.513. Note the play on words between body and sepulchre. On the idea of a 
soul/body dualism, see also Rohde, 342. Plato seems to indicate this in Crat. 400c. For a 
bibliography on metempsychosis in the Orphics, see Giovanni Casadio, “La 
Metempsicosi tra Orgeo e Pitagora,” in Orphisme et Orphée: en l’honneur de Jean 
Rudhardt, ed. Philippe Borgeaud (Geneva: Droz, 1991). 
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asceticism and various purification rites. 
The body is regarded as evil . . . and the soul suffers from its imprisonment within it: 
this life is a purgation, and the only way to avoid the contamination of the body is to 
practice extreme and anxious purity. Purity safeguards the divine element within us, 
which is further maintained by sacrificial communion. The purified soul at once, after 
leaving the body, enters upon the higher life, but the purgation must continue through 
a cycle of lives, perhaps three; and the soul that emerges successfully is at last 
released and henceforth abides perpetually with God, and is itself a god. The soul is 
here conceived, so far as conception was possible to the average mind, as immaterial, 
and there is in this system no resurrection of the body.71 
Purity could be obtained by avoiding certain foods, avoiding certain 
contaminating situations, and also by priestly purification rituals.72 “The soul which 
comes from the divine and strives to return thither, has no other purpose to fulfill upon 
earth (and therefore no other moral law to obey); it must be free from life itself and be 
pure from all that is earthly.”73 Purification here concerns the soul, but what the soul is to 
be purified from is the deeds of the body. 
In Orphism, the soul was in a constant cyclical state of being entombed in a body 
and then released at death only to be reunited with another body a short while later. This 
imprisonment in the body was a punishment for the faults of its previous life. Those 
initiated in the orphic mysteries and who kept themselves pure were able, upon the soul’s 
release from the body, to descend to the underworld and there find the blessed state of 
eternal existence free from any more bodies.74 
However another idea slowly makes its introduction here. Whereas, usually, the 
                                                 
71Farnell, 381. 
72Herodotus mentions that the Egyptians avoid wool in temples or being buried in 
it (Hist 2.81), and Euripides (Hipp. 952) speaks regarding not eating animal flesh. 
73Rohde, Psyche, 343. 
74On this, see ibid., 344-345. Cf. Mead, 187-195. 
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soul would go down after death, the Orphics also write of the final resting place after 
release from the cycle of rebirth as above. “That the soul should go to Heaven seems to 
have been a familiar idea in the fifth century. The word used is not usually Heaven, but 
aither. Aither was the substance which filled the pure outer reaches of Heaven, beyond 
the impure atmosphere (aer) which surrounds the earth and extends as far as the moon. It 
was in this region that divinity dwelt, and the aither itself was supposed to be divine.”75 
 
Pythagoras 
The connections between Pythagorean thought and that of the Orphic school in 
regard to anthropology are not clear. Bremmer argues, “It seems, then, that Orphism was 
the product of Pythagorean influence on Bacchic mysteries in the first quarter of the fifth 
century, but despite their similarities both movements also displayed many differences.”76 
However, earlier Kroll wrote that Orphic thought on the immortality of the soul was 
“taken over” and “refined” by the Pythagoreans.77 Which came first is not entirely clear, 
but that there are connections is uncontested. 
As with the Orphic school of thought, the transmigration of the soul, or 
metempsychosis,78 and the immortality of the soul79 are two important ideas connected to 
                                                 
75Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion, 185. Guthrie mentions Euripides’ 
statement in Hel 1016 that the mind is an “immortal thing, plunging into the immortal 
aither.” In the Placita, Orphics suggested that the stars were inhabitable. O.F. 22. 
76Bremmer, The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife, 24. For the connection with the 
Eleusian mysteries, see Graf. 
77Kroll, 9. 
78Walter Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, trans. Edwin L. 
Minar, Jr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 120. Cf. J. Barnes, The 
Presocratic Philosophers (Londong: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 104. He suggests 
that the connection between transmigration and Pythagoras is “dubious.” For recent 




Pythagoras.80 Two ancient documents mention Pythagoras’s concept of reincarnation. 
Aristotle states, “They try to say what kind of thing the soul is, but do not go on to 
specify about the body which is to receive the soul, as though it were possible, as in the 
tales of the Pythagoreans, for just any soul to clothe itself in just any body.”81 Bremmer 
mentions an epigram from first-century Ephesus, “if according to Pythagoras the psyche 
passes to somebody else”82 where the notion of a transmigrating soul is again attributed 
to Pythagoras. An important concept regarding the immortality of the Pythagorean soul 
which is capable of reincarnation is its distinction from nature.83 It is only entombed 
                                                 
Rise and Fall of the Afterlife, 24-26. Cf. Karl Hoheisel, “Das frühe Christentum und die 
Seelenwanderung,” Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 1984/1985 (1985): 25-34. 
79As noted above, Bremmer suggests that the development of the notion of an 
immortal soul may have been prompted by a loss of political influence. In order for this 
to happen, the development in the Greek doctrine of the soul, identifying it with the self 
was a necessary corollary. Bremmer, Rise and Fall, 2n15. For a similar political 
suggestion regarding the Orphics and Pythagoras, see Redfield, 107-108. Cf. Sullivan, 
Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Say. She notes that it is difficult to 
say for sure what Pythagoras’s teachings were because of their originally secret nature. 
For a discussion on whether Pythagoras or Pherecydes is the first to teach these two 
doctrines, see Bremmer, The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife, 12-13. 
80Rohde states in regard to the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul, “The soul of 
man, once more regarded entirely as the ‘double’ of the visible body and its powers, is a 
daimonic immortal being that has been cast down from divine heights and for a 
punishment is confined within the ‘custody’ of the body. It has no real relationship with 
the body; it is not what may be called the personality of the individual visible man: any 
soul may dwell in any body.” Rohde, Psyche, 375. For recent studies on Pythagoras’s 
view of the soul, see Russell, 30; Sullivan, Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early 
Greeks Say, 106-111; Zhmud, 117-128. 
81Aristotle, On the Soul, 407b20. Though Aristotle does not attribute this directly 
to Pythagoras but rather to the Pythagoreans, it still seems likely that this does give an 
indication of the master’s teaching. Cf. James A. Philip, Pythagoras and Early 
Pythagoreanism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 151-171. 
82I. Ephesos 3901 (SEG 31.951), quoted in Bremmer, The Rise and Fall of the 
Afterlife, 12. 
83See Rohde, Psyche, 376. 
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within the body as a form of punishment. The entire goal of the life of the soul is to find 
release at death. 
 
Pre-Socratic Thought 
As was hinted at by the Orphics, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and 
Empedocles begin to relate the soul to the divine. In this, they have been described as 
being “primarily of a religious nature. . . . They are the first major experiences of the soul 
in its participation in a transcendent divine reality which are recognized by individuals 
who were undergoing these experiences.”84 
In the teaching of the Ionian philosophers, the idea of the soul changed from 
being connected to an individual person in the Homeric period to a notion of force or 
movement that was present throughout the world. “Thus, the psyche loses the special 
singularity that distinguished it from all the other things and substance in the world, and 
made it incomparable and unique.”85 
Willem Verdenius notes that for Heraclitus, soul is equated with fire and the 
human soul is not separated from the world soul.86 Thus a drunk soul has lost its way and 
a dry soul is best. For Heraclitus, “The soul of man has a claim to immortality only as an 
emanation of this universal Reason, and shares the immortality which belongs to it.”87 
This is because Heraclitus has changed the concept of death. For him, everything is 
                                                 
84Hogan, 37. 
85Rohde, Psyche, 365. 
86Willem J. Verdenius, “Some Aspects of Heraclitus’ Anthropology,” in Images 
of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1976). 
87Rohde, 370-371. Cf. Zakopoulos, 11. 
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becoming; a perpetual change from fire to water to earth and back again.88 This even 
seems to be true for the One.89 
Heraclitus connects the notion of divinity and the wisdom of philosophical 
thought directly with the immortality of the soul.  
He began the first differentiated exploration of the soul and his lasting achievement 
was to state that the soul would have to be a spiritual or divine being (daimon) in 
order to be immortal, thus creating a basis for a critical philosophical 
anthropology. . . . Wisdom is the attribute of the divine; seeking wisdom is the 
defining attribute of man so that the philosophical orientation of the soul becomes the 
criterion of ‘true’ humanity. The soul therefore is the source of truth only when it is 
directed to the divine in the loving pursuit of wisdom.90 
Hogan notes that the new developments in the doctrine of the soul were, in a way, 
a transition in the source of authority over the individual. “The emergence of the new 
source of authority in the soul of the mystic philosophers is expressed by Xenophanes in 
his opposition to the polis. He pits his new arête, or excellence of sophie (wisdom) 
against the aretai of the Olympic games which were ranked highest by the polis.”91 
Parmenides was the one “who differentiated the soul to the point where its 
supernatural destiny achieves consciousness and reaches linguistic articulation for the 
first time.”92 Empedocles also emphasized the Orphic notions of purification in 
                                                 
88Verdenius, 31-32. 
89See for instance fr. 78 where Heraclitus states that “the One that is in all things 
is at once dead and alive.”  
90Hogan, 39-40. Cf. Rohde who notes that “the individual in its isolation has, for 
Herakleitos, neither value nor importance: to persist in this isolation (if it had been 
possible) would have seemed to him a crime. The Fire is for him indestructible and 
immortal as a totality, not as divided into individual particles, but only as the one 
Universal Mind that transforms itself into all things and draws all things back into itself.” 





connection with the immortality of the soul. 
The transition from the Homeric understanding of the soul, which saw it as 
existing as a shade in Hades after the separation from the body at death, to a concept of 
true immortality, understood as an entity which was capable of eternally experiencing 
regular human pleasures as experienced during its connection to the body, was not one 
that could be made without outside influence, according to Erwin Rohde.93 He notes that 
it was clear in Greek thought that to be immortal was to be divine but yet the separation 
that existed between the divine and the human was also a key element to Greek thought.94 
Thus there needed to be an introduction, from outside of Greece, regarding the divinity 
and immortality of the human soul. Rohde sees this as coming from mysticism which he 
described as “a second order of religion which, though little remarked by the religion of 
the people and by orthodox believers, gained a footing in isolated sects and influenced 
certain philosophical schools.”95 
 
Poets 
The concept of soul undergoes a further development with the lyric and elegiac 
poets.96 It now clearly represents a separate active entity of the psychological self. In 
                                                 
93See Rohde, Psyche, 253. He goes so far as to say that it was “impossible, then, 
that the cult of the souls should produce out of itself the idea . . . of the soul indestructible 
by its very nature.” 
94Ibid., 253-254. 
95Ibid., 254-255. Rohde sees this introduction in the Thracian worship of 
Dionysus. 
96Cf. Philip, 154; Sullivan, Aeschylus’ Use of Psychological Terminology: 
Traditional and New, 144. For this section on Aeschylus, I rely on Sullivan, Aeschylus’ 
Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New. 
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doing so, it does not lose its previous usage. “The influence of Heraclitus is evident in the 
works of the Athenian tragedians, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, in that he had 
developed a vocabulary for speaking about the soul. . . . The great tragedies of Aeschylus 
are deliberately created actions and their truth is the process by which the mature man 
reaches his decision by means of the movements of his soul. The participation of the soul 
in the unseen transcendent divinity is explored in the action.”97 
In Aeschylus, several new usages are mentioned. It can be ransomed or 
destroyed.98 One can pay with it or find that it has worn away.99 It even takes on the role 
of judgment.100 Aegisthus writes of a ‘cowardly’ soul.101 
Pindar describes two varying doctrines regarding the soul. In one of them, he 
suggests that after death, all that is left to the soul is its memory by the living. This falls 
in line with the cult of the souls that existed previously in popular thought. However, 
Pindar also could speak of the soul, which is asleep while the individual is awake. It is 
not representative of the individual person or of one’s mental powers. It follows along the 
lines of an individual’s double that was seen in previous times also.102 This soul was 
subject to the birth/rebirth process well-known by this time. Several faultless lives were 
needed before one could escape the cycle. 
                                                 
97Hogan, 40. 
98Aeschylus Ag. 965; 1457; 1466. 
99Aeschylus Choe. 276; 749. 
100Aeschylus Per. 29. 
101Aegisthus Ag. 1643. For a more complete analysis of these usages, see 
Sullivan, Aeschylus’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New, 150. 





Perhaps none has influenced the Western understanding of the soul more than 
Plato.103 He combined the mystical elements of the Orphic-Pythagorean approach with 
the emergent philosophy of the day.104 
For Plato, an essential aspect of the soul is self-motion.105 As the principle of 
movement it becomes also the principle of life. When the soul is in the body, the body 
moves and can be said to be alive. This is known because the body moves. With the 
connection between movement and life, the soul can be said to be life itself.106 Regarding 
the origin of the soul, there has been a great deal of scholarly debate. Some argue for a 
soul with no beginning as described in the Phaedrus while others look to the Laws and 
                                                 
103Johann Figl, “Bilder für die Seele: Eine religionswissenschaftlich-
vergleichende Perspektive,” in Der Begriff der Seele in der Religionswissenschaft, ed. 
Johann Figl et al. (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002), 22; Thümmel, 244. Cf. 
Thomas M. Robinson, “The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of 
Plato,” in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-body Problem 
from Antiquity to Enlightenment, ed. John P. Wright et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2000), 37. In this section, no attempt is made to differentiate between the thought of 
Socrates in the early dialogues and that of his pupil Plato. For a manuscript devoted 
entirely to Plato’s psychology, see Thomas M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1970). See also John Burnet, “Socratic Doctrine of the 
Soul,” in Essays and Addresses (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1930), 126-
162; Claus, 163-164; Kenneth Dorter, Plato’s Phaedo: An Interpretation (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982), 141-191; Rohde, Psyche, 463-489; Solmsen; Warne, 
105-115. Translations used are from the LCL unless otherwise indicated. 
104E. R. Dodds, “Plato and the Irrational Soul,” in Plato: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 
208-210. 
105Plato Phaedrus 245E2-4; Laws 896A1-3. See William Guthrie, “Plato’s Views 
on the Nature of the Soul,” in Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Gregory Vlastos 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 240-241; Zakopoulos, 35-36. 
106Plato Rep. 353D7-9. 
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thus point out that there it is spoken of as being produced first and before the body.107 
What is clear is that the soul’s origin predates that of the body. He argues this by writing, 
“If those realities we are always talking about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all 
that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality, discovering that 
it existed before and is ours, and we compare these things with it, then, just as they exist, 
so our soul must exist before we are born.”108 
In agreement with Orphic teaching, Plato assumes a fundamental dualism in 
regard to the soul and body.109 The soul is understood to be “pure spirit” and is connected 
with the body only as a result of a fall or descent from above.110 This dualism is also 
                                                 
107Plato Laws 892C3-8; 899C7 et al. Phaedrus 245C6-246A2. Zakopoulos has an 
overview of the current interpretative debates. Zakopoulos, 39-45. 
108Plato Phaed. 77D-E. 
109Lys, The Israelite Soul, 182. Cf. Robinson, “The Defining Features of Mind-
Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato,” 37; Jean R. Zurcher, The Nature and Destiny of 
Man, trans. Mabel R. Bartlett (New York: Philosophical Library, 1969), 17. On this 
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Flammarion, 1992), 35-42; Richard D. Mohr, The Platonic Cosmology (Leiden: Brill, 
1985), 171-178; E. N. Ostenfeld, Forms, Matter and Mind: Three Strands in Plato’s 
Metaphysics (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), 242-253; Thomas M. Robinson, Plato’s 
Psychology, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Peter M. Steiner, 
Psyche bei Platon, Neue Studien zur Philosophie 3, ed. Rüdiger Bubner et al. (Gottingen: 




related to the concept of a world soul.111 This connects with Plato’s notion that all souls 
are immortal.112 Death, then, is seen as the separation of the soul from the body.113 
In Plato’s Socratic dialogues,114 the notion of the care for one’s soul is 
emphasized. In the Apology, Socrates insists that he goes “about doing nothing else than 
urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for 
the perfection of your souls.”115 Later in the Apology, Socrates states that he urged his 
listeners “to care for virtue.”116 While proposing a counter-sentence for his conviction, 
Socrates states that “I tried to persuade each of you to care for himself and his own 
perfection.”117 This statement appears to connect the ideas of soul, care of virtue, and 
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113Phaedo 64c. See I. M. Crombie, Plato on Man and Society, vol. 1 of An 
Examination of Plato’s Doctrines (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 303-304. 
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the current debate, see Ellen Wagner, “Introduction,” in Essays on Plato’s Psychology, 
ed. Ellen Wagner (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 22-25. 
115Plato Apol. 30B2. 
116Plato Apol. 31B7-8. 




At the end of the Apology, Socrates states that there are two options regarding 
death. “Either it is virtually nothingness, . . . or as people say, change and migration of 
the soul from this to another place. And if it is unconsciousness, like a sleep in which the 
sleeper does not even dream, death would be a wonderful gain.”118 In describing this 
migration possibility, Socrates calls it a “change of habitation” and continues by 
describing all the things he would do if he were to meet all of the famous people who had 
died before him. 
The soul also functions as a moral agent, directing between right and wrong. A 
clear example is seen in the Crito: “What about the part of us which is mutilated by 
wrong actions and benefited by right ones? Is life worth living with this part ruined? Or 
do we believe that this part of us, whatever it may be, in which right and wrong operate, 
is of less importance than the body?”119 Here soul is a moral principle.120 
The soul and the idea of the forms is not entirely clear. Plato argues that if the 
soul does exist, it must be as one of the forms. In commenting on this notion, Segal notes 
that Plato suggested that “it is also possible that the soul is a harmony, not a being in 
itself but a relationship between the parts, what we would today call an emergent 
property, which would die with the body and even devolve prior to demise. This latter 
                                                 
118Plato Apol. 40C-D. 
119Plato Crito 47E-48A. 
120Dilman suggests that “reference to the soul” in Gorgias “is thus a means of 
talking about a moral reality that is hidden or disguised by many aspects of our lives.” 
This he terms the impersonal part of the soul. “This is the part of the soul which responds 
to the affliction of another or cries out against real injustice, that forgives those who have 
wronged one and is thankful for what it receives.” Ilham Dilman, Morality and the Inner 
Life: A Study in Plato’s Gorgias (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1979), 180-181. 
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possibility, refuted by Socrates, comes rather close to modern notions of the self.”121 
Plato’s description in the Phaedrus of the soul as a chariot team is well known.122 
Here the concept of harmony seems in mind as the soul is said to be “the union of powers 
in a team of winged steeds and their winged charioteer.” This highlights a difficult 
challenge of Plato’s soul theory. Is the soul simple or is it tripartite? How to maintain this 
view together with a simple, immortal soul has been problematic.123 Guthrie argues that 
in its truest nature, it is simple. It is only through a connection with the body and the 
process of birth and rebirth that it is conceived as composite.124 
In the Republic, the just soul is compared to the just city. Socrates said, “‘We 
must remember, then, that each of us also in whom the several parts within him perform 
each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair.’”125 This 
statement can also be made of the city as there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the parts which perform their task in the city and the parts which perform their tasks in 
the soul. The soul here is divided into three parts, the rational, spirited, and appetitive, 
while the city is divided into the philosopher-guardian, the soldiers, and the laborers. 
Some have questioned the need of some commentators to focus on the parts of 
                                                 
121Segal, Life after Death, 231. 
122Pieper, 76-78. For a thorough study on the Palinode, see Crombie, 341-359; 
Charles L. Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), 74-137. 
123For a review of the various positions taken by modern scholars, see 
Zakopoulos, 47-62. 
124Guthrie, “Plato’s Views on the Nature of the Soul,” 232-233. 
125Plato Rep. 4.441d-e. 
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Plato’s soul.126 Robert Cross and Anthony Woozley conclude that “if Plato’s soul has 
parts, it has so in a metaphorical sense; and, until the metaphor is cashed into literal 
language, nothing is gained by asking whether Plato divided the soul into parts, while 
something is lost, because of the natural association of ‘part’ with physical division, 
which in the present context is grossly misleading.”127 
Plato’s distinction between the bodily desires of the appetitive soul and the desire 
for knowledge, which the rational element exhibits, indicates an inconsistency with his 
doctrine of the immortal soul, which he describes in Republic X.128 Though he does note 
that three of the four virtues common to the state and the soul relate to the body, he does 
                                                 
126See for example Robert C. Cross and Anthony D. Woozley, Plato’s Republic: 
A Philosophical Commentary (London: Macmillan, 1964), 127-133. 
127Ibid., 128. Cf. Petric who argues that the parts are to be taken literally. James 
Petric, “Incontinence and Desire in Plato’s Tripartite Psychology,” Diálogos 27, no. 60 
(1992): 43. Cross and Woozley acknowledge one difficulty that interpreters have noted. 
If the soul is comprised of related elements and if our actions might arise from any one or 
a combination of elements, who is to be held accountable for an individual’s actions? “If 
a man’s soul or self is composed of these three elements, how can he be anything over 
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responsible, for his actions?” Cross and Woozley, 129. However, Ostenfeld claims that 
this is a spurious argument and that “all acts . . . belong to us (the immortal self) and we 
are responsible.” Ostenfeld, Forms, Matter and Mind, 218. See also James V. Robinson, 
“The Nature of the Soul in Republic 10,” Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1990-
1991): 214-222; David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden: 
Brill, 1986), 301-302. 
128“It is impossible to see what he can mean by ‘soul’, if he wishes both to say 
that the soul survives the death and decomposition of the body and to specify one of the 
elements of the soul as that which desires bodily pleasures. At one point in the Republic 
(518d-e) he shows some awareness of this difficulty . . . but even there he does not seem 
to recognize the extent of the difficulty. It is one thing to say that the soul is separable 
from the body, while allowing that during its existence in the body it may be temporarily 
affected by its relationship with it. But it is quite another thing to say both that the soul is 
separable from the body, and that some elements of the soul have desires for bodily 
experiences. The latter claim involves an irresolvable contradiction between the account 
given of the soul and the proposition that it is immortal.” Cross and Woozley, 119-120. 
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not acknowledge the difficulty his theory presents at this point. This inconsistency, 
caused by proposing a soul which survives the dissolution of the body and of a soul 
which, in part at least, exhibits bodily desires deserves more attention in Platonic 
studies.129 
The immortality of the soul is discussed principally in the Phaedo, the Republic, 
and the Phaedrus. In the Phaedo, he presents three arguments. They are a generation 
from opposites, from recollection, and from affinities.130 The affinity argument is 
important as it seeks to show that the soul is most like the imperceptible and intelligible 
while the body is more akin to the perceptible and perishable. As what is intelligible does 
not perish, so then the soul should not be thought to perish. In the Republic, Plato gives 
an argument which states that nothing can be destroyed except by its own specific 
disease. As the diseases or evils of the soul do not destroy it, then it can be concluded that 
it will exist forever. In the Phaedrus, Plato argues the immortality of the soul on the basis 
of its definition of being self-moved.131 “In the dialogues of Plato we see the end of the 
transition from primitive ideas of the survival of depleted shades or ghosts to the ardent 
desire for and belief in an immortality in which the highest possibilities glimpsed in this 
life may be fulfilled.”132 
Plato also taught the notion of the reincarnation of the soul in connection with 
                                                 
129For instance, Cross and Woozley admit that this involves an “irresolvable 
contradiction” and that “it is difficult to see how Plato thought that what he says in 611c 
could be reconciled at all with his previous account of justice.” Ibid., 120. 
130See Crombie, 303-325. 
131See ibid., 325-329. 
132J. Hick, Death and Eternal Life (Glasgow: Collins, 1976), 72. 
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preparation for the ascent back to the divine. “In the Phaedrus, Plato suggested that 
humans are reincarnated for the purposes of discipline, askesis, in order to purify the soul 
by affliction. In the Symposium, Plato described the process of ascent as one of 
intellection, learning by progressive stages of abstraction, to appreciate abstract good, in 
and of itself. By this process of intellection, and the ascetic processes necessary to perfect 
it, the soul ascends to heaven again and, with luck, never has to be reincarnated again.”133 
“Neither Plato nor the Greeks thought that consciousness per se was important—it 
was merely the experience of a soul caught in the prison-house of matter—but what Plato 
started was the valorization of the self because the experience of intellection was the key 
to demonstrating immortality of the soul.”134 Plato writes, “But if we are guided by me 
we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good 
and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with 
wisdom always and ever.”135 This connection of wisdom with the immortality of the soul 
continues what Heraclitus introduced. 
“The soul’s salvation for Plato was quintessentially an individual process. The 
soul is on an individual mission to purify itself. It travels through many bodies and 
cleanses itself from the impurities it gathers in human society. The intellectual 
achievement of the redemption of the soul is an individual process, though it may find 
what little solace adheres to life in a community of like-minded individuals.”136 
 
                                                 
133Segal, Life after Death, 234. 
134Ibid., 716. 
135Plato Resp. 10.620e. 




For Aristotle, the soul is the basis of animate life.137 Segal describes it as “the 
principle of life.”138 It is a “system of abilities possessed and manifested by animate 
bodies of suitable structure.”139 It is inseparable from “the body as bodies are primary and 
their forms or ideas are secondary, to be perceived by us by our senses.”140 For Aristotle, 
“‘soul’ was not immaterial; even if ‘soul’ is not the same thing as body, neither is it 
‘nonmatter’ but can still occupy ‘space.’”141 It can be separated however. He writes, “Just 
as the body comes into being before the soul, so also is the irrational prior to the 
rational.”142 
“The soul,” Aristotle writes, “will be the actuality of the body.”143 “The soul is the 
body’s essential whatness. . . . The soul is the origin of movement where sensation, 
appetite and thought are each considered movements with respect to the soul.”144 What 
                                                 
137Aristotle De anima 402a. Cf. D. Martin, 7. 
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139Hendrik Lorenz, Ancient Theories of Soul, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
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140Segal, Life after Death, 238. See also D. Martin, 7. Cf. Lorenz, Ancient 
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Portraits of Human Nature, ed. Warren S. Brown et al., Theology and the Sciences 
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143Aristotle De anima 412a16. See Dihle, “Psyche in the Greek World,” 9:613. 
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Border,” in Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology: Reason, Meaning and 
Experience (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 112. 
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this means is that “he censures all beliefs which speak of soul and body as two separate 
things. There are not two things, soul and body, there is just one thing, the person. To 
speak of the body as the tomb or prison of the soul naturally becomes absurd.”145 This is 
why he writes regarding the prior Greek thinkers who “join the soul to a body, or place it 
in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily 
conditions required for it.”146 This is an important change that Aristotle introduces to the 
previous stream of Greek thinking, which had generally developed the notion that the 
soul is a separate entity with powers that continued to exist after the death of the 
individual. 
 
Epicurean and Stoic Thought 
Epicurus had the salvation of the soul as his primary goal. 147 He writes that it is 
the same thing for a doctor to be unable to cure one’s body of disease as it is for a 
philosopher’s teaching to be unable to cure one’s soul of disease.148 Diseases of the soul, 
such as passion or wrong desire, are a “mistaken value judgment.”149 
The atomist teachings of Epicurus held the soul, “like everything else that there is 
                                                 
145Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion: A Study of the Orphic Movement, 245. 
146Aristotle De anima 407b 13. 
147Epicureans and Stoics are grouped together in this section because of their 
similar doctrine of the soul. On this, see A. A. Long, “Epicureans and Stoics,” in 
Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman (New York: Crossroad, 
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148Porphyry To Marcella 31.  
149Niko Huttunen, “Stoic Law in Paul?” in Stoicism in Early Christianity, ed. 
Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg (Grand Rapids, MI: 
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except for the void, to be ultimately composed of atoms.”150 With this materialist 
understanding, it naturally follows that “for Epicurus birth and death are limits which 
contain the existence of a person. I have not existed in another body prior to this life, nor 
am I liable to experience a further incarnation following this life.”151 The soul itself is a 
material or corporeal soul. He argued that “that which is not body is void. . . . More 
specifically, soul consists of atoms which act upon and are affected by atoms constituting 
the body itself.”152 
The soul also includes a special material that provides it sense-perception. In fact, 
“the soul then . . . is the ‘primary cause of sensation.’ . . . From the soul the body acquires 
a derivative share in sensation; there is physical contact, naturally, between the body and 
the soul, and the movements of atoms within the body affect and are affected by those of 
the soul.”153 
The soul, given this atomist/materialist viewpoint, is destroyed at death, along 
with the body. This understanding leads to Epicurus writing, “Death is nothing to us; for 
that which has been dissolved lacks sensation; and that which lacks sensation is no 
concern to us.”154 Lucretius writes, “But neither eyes nor nostrils nor hand nor tongue nor 
ears can exist for the soul apart from the body. Therefore souls on their own cannot feel, 
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nor even exist.”155 Thus the Epicureans denied any life or sensation after death for the 
human individual. 
Because of this view, the Epicureans were an important opponent of the early 
Church Fathers and their discussions on the soul. The early Church Fathers would come 
to argue for the necessity of a soul that survives the death of the body since the reality of 
a future judgment for all people was pivotal to their eschatological hope. 
The Stoics, as a school, lasted from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius. It had many major 
philosophers who followed the general tenets of the school. They, like the Epicureans 
before them, taught that everything that exists is corporeal.156 An important distinction 
which they make regarding the soul is that they no longer refer to a living organism as 
ensouled. The vital functions given to the soul by previous authors are denied, leaving 
only the mental, cognitive powers. 
The soul is an arrangement of the individual  pneuma.157 This pneuma “pervades 
the whole cosmic sphere . . . and is equally at work in every individual body.”158 So the 
human soul is a part of the cosmic soul or as it could also be described “the vital, 
intelligent, warm breath which permeates the entire cosmos.”159 
                                                 
155Lucretius 630-633. This argument bears a resemblance to Aristotle’s thought as 
well. It also has similarities with what will be argued by the Christian apologists 
regarding the reality of a bodily resurrection where they argue that the soul must rejoin 
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Stoicism had eight divisions or faculties of the soul. These included the five basic 
senses along with the ability to reproduce and to speak, and the ruling (hegemonikon) 
faculty.160 With the strong emphasis upon assent and reason as powers of the soul, the 
Stoics introduced the idea that all impulses in adult humans are the result of the assent of 
the soul. They had to defend this idea against other authors who argued that there are 
irrational impulses, which according to this school of thought did not exist. 
Though Stoicism did not hold to the immortality of the soul, yet most did believe 
that the soul survived for a limited time after the death of the body.  
 
Neo-Platonism 
The school of Plato was influential during the time period of the early Church 
Fathers. Several writers from among the Neo-Platonists are thought to have exerted some 
degree of influence on the doctrine of the soul. Among these are Porphyry, Plotinus,161 
Iamblichus, Damascius, and Priscianus.162 Here, Plotinus’s doctrine of the soul is 
examined as exemplary of the thought of this school. 
                                                 
160See Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 173; Marcia L. 
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Plotinus was a Platonist and founder of Neo-Platonism.163 The individual soul for 
Plotinus was directly related to the world soul. It was also necessary to the body’s 
existence.164 Blumenthal notes, “Even if the position of the individual soul in relation to 
other forms of soul is not immediately clear, it follows from its being soul as such that it 
is both immaterial and essentially separate from body.”165 Though Plotinus does face the 
challenge of describing the relationship between the soul and body, yet he differs from 
Plato in that the soul is in the body in an immaterial way.166 
Plotinus saw the soul as the principle of self-cohesion.167 It was tripartite in nature 
consisting of a purely intellectual part, a discursive middle element, and lower vegetative 
or irrational part.168 These latter two parts form the logos in the human person. The 
higher, intellectual part cannot be brought into contact with the lower, irrational part.169 
The middle discursive element must choose which part to be attracted to. 
The soul could also be impacted by the body. To those not aware, the soul could 
be negatively impacted by the body.170 If the soul becomes “mixed up” with the body, it 
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can become “isolated and weak.”171 The soul was instead supposed to be concerned with 
spiritual realities. In order to do this, it needed to turn inwards. “Let there, then, be in the 
soul a shining imagination of a sphere, having everything within it. . . . Keep this, and 
apprehend in your mind another, taking away the mass: take away also the places, and the 
mental picture of matter in yourself, and do not try to apprehend another sphere smaller 
in mass than the original one, but calling on the god who made that of which you have 
the mental picture, pray him to come.”172 It is through the vision into the self that the soul 
gains self-knowledge.173 The soul originates from the World Soul, descending from it 
into a body.174 
The soul for Plotinus is incorporeal, and thus immortal.175 He argues this based 
also on the soul’s ability to contemplate eternal realities.176 The soul also desires to be 
rejoined with the supreme Good.177 This power is available to all, though few are aware 
of it and use it. 
 
Intertestamental Judaism 
During the intertestamental period, soul maintained several of the key meanings 
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from the HB. On origins, Wis 15:11 reads, “Forasmuch as he knew not his Maker, and 
him that inspired into him an active soul, and breathed in a living spirit.” Here the soul is 
inspired or breathed in by God. Regarding soul for life, Jdt 7:27 reads, “For it is better for 
us to be made a spoil unto them, than to die for thirst: for we will be his servants, that our 
souls may live.” Here soul seems to refer to natural life in the face of death. In the book 
of Tobit, the author writes, “Because I remembered God with all my heart.”178 Here heart 
is rendered for psyche but clearly refers to the entire person. 
The term soul also began to experience an expanded meaning during this period. 
One important notion is the “differentiation of body and soul.”179 From this, the idea that 
the soul survives the death of the body was able to be incorporated.180 Second Baruch 
30:2-5 reads: 
Then all who have fallen asleep in hope of Him shall rise again. And it shall come to 
pass at that time that the treasuries will be opened in which is preserved the number 
of the souls of the righteous, and they shall come forth, and a multitude of souls shall 
be seen together in one assemblage of one thought, and the first shall rejoice and the 
last shall not be grieved. For they know that the time has come of which it is said, that 
it is the consummation of the times. But the souls of the wicked, when they behold all 
these things, shall then waste away the more. For they shall know that their torment 
has come and their perdition has arrived.181 
In 4 Macc 18:23, the author writes, “But the sons of Abraham with their 
victorious mother are gathered together into the chorus of the fathers, and have received 
pure and immortal souls from God” (NRSV). Here souls are referred to directly as 
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The chief exponent of Hellenic Judaism was Philo of Alexandria. He has been 
described as mediating between Platonism and Christianity.182 His anthropology is 
largely developed from the book of Genesis and Plato’s writings183 attributing to the 
human person a duality between soul and body.184 He also divided the soul itself into 
various parts. Generally this was in a bipartite fashion having both a rational and 
irrational part,185 but at times he could speak of three parts of the soul. He writes, “The 
human soul is tripartite, and that intelligence and reason is said to have possession of one 
part of it, the spirited element of another, and the appetites of the third.”186 
One feature of Philo’s thought that distinguishes it from the Hellenistic thinking 
of his time is his understanding that the soul is created by God, not divine itself seeking 
to ascend to its prior divine state.187 Philo relates humans to God through their ability to 
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reason.188 Philo does, however, often follow the Platonic notion of the “moral good of the 
soul,” though rarely he does allow for “lower goods through which the immature soul 
must pass, before coming to possess the spiritual goods.”189 
Philo connected sin with the soul. Through the Feast of Yom Kippur, the soul 
abandons sin and returns to its pure source.190 The result is a true freedom of the soul. 
An important aspect of Philo’s understanding of the soul is evident in his usage of 
παλιγγενεσια. Burnett describes παλιγγενεσια in Philo as the  
rebirth of the soul into incorporeal existence. Although the migrating soul can 
envision the intelligible world and experience an ethical rebirth while still in mixture 
with the body, it is after the mixture is dissolved, i.e., after physical death, that 
παλιγγενεσια occurs in any metaphysical or essential way. Philo does not present a 
clear, systematic statement about what incorporeal existence for the soul means, but 
he seems to imply that the soul continues to exist as a distinct entity in the presence of 
God.191 
Burnett finds also that Philo does not have the Stoic concept of souls reborn after a 
general conflagration. Immortality for the soul is a reality but not as an inherent quality of 
the soul, but because God worked directly in its creation.192 
Philo speaks about the soul’s assent to God in several places. In commenting on 
Gen 12:1 and the move of Abraham, Philo writes, “God begins the carrying out of His 
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will to cleanse man’s soul by giving it a starting-point for full salvation in its removal out 
of three localities: body, sense-perception, and speech.”193 This illustrates well the way 
allegory came to be used in regard to the soul. This notion is further illustrated in a 
commentary on Gen 15:18 where he notes that when Abraham was promised the land 
from the Nile to the Euphrates, this is to be understood as “our body and the passions 
engendered in it or by it are likened to the river of Egypt, but the soul and what the soul 
loves—to the Euphrates.”194 Pearce notes that “Philo is a flexible interpreter; for him, the 
inspired application of the allegorical method allows the reader to find meanings that are 
different but true in the same words of Scripture.”195 
 Philo also has the concept of a world soul.196 Robert Berchman interprets Philo’s 
God in terms of the Pythagorean Nous and the Logos as both mind and soul, the former 
being above matter and the latter not.197 
 
New Testament Writings 
There are several challenges when attempting to determine the understanding of 
the soul in the NT. One is that the NT does not directly seek to develop such an 
understanding.198 Joel Green notes several methodological issues with a “word study 
                                                 
193Philo Migration of Abraham 2. See Pearce, 101-103. 
194Philo De Somniis 2.255. 
195Pearce, 108. 
196For a listing of this expression, see I. Leisegang, Register Philonis 
Alexandrinae opera quae supersunt, ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland (Berolini 1896ff., Bd. 
7), 872, under Number 14. 
197Robert M. Berchman, From Philo to Origen (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984), 
28, 41. 




approach” or a method focused primarily on an “eschatological anthropology.”199 He 
argues, instead, for looking at the available cultural references and then noting how the 
NT both “absorbed and censured” these.200 
In the Gospels, soul often refers to natural, physical life.201 This is often in 
connection with giving one’s life, seeking one’s life, taking one’s life, and saving a 
life.202 Mark 10:45 speaks of giving one’s life, while John 10:11 describes the shepherd 
who lays down his life.203 In Matt 6:25, Jesus urges people not to worry for their life. 
Matthew 10:39 speaks of losing and finding one’s life.204 In Acts 20:24, Paul indicates 
that he does not hold his life dear or value it. In Matt 2:20, Herod seeks the baby Jesus’ 
life. All these demonstrate the understanding of physical life of an individual using 
psyche.  
Soul can refer to the individual in toto. This is reflected in the HB expression 
πᾶσα ψυχή to speak of “everyone” in Acts 2:43.205 Similarly, Jesus describes one who 
loves God with all their heart, soul, and mind in Matt 22:37, clearly referencing the HB 
                                                 
discussed more for completeness than with any substantial contribution. Walter Gutbrod, 
Paulinische Anthropologie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1934), 75. 
199Green, “‘Bodies—That Is, Human Lives’: A Re-Examination of Human Nature 
in the Bible,” 152-153.  
200Ibid., 154. 
201Eduard Schweizer, “Psyche in the New Testament,” TDNT (1974), 9:637. 
202Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early 
Christian Literature, trans. William F. Arndt et al., 2nd ed. (1958), s.v. “psyche.” 
203See also Matt 20:28. 




passage of Deut 6:5. 
 Jesus also refers to finding rest for one’s soul in Matt 11:29. The soul is also the 
seat of emotions. God’s soul is well pleased in Matt 12:18, and in Mark 14:34, Jesus’ 
soul experiences sorrow. It is influenced by others, both for good or evil (Acts 14:2; 
14:22). 
The soul is used in contrast to the body in Matt 10:28, where Jesus distinguishes 
between killing either the body alone or both the body and the soul.206 In commenting on 
Luke’s usage as exemplified in the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, Eduard 
Schweizer notes that Luke “is obviously teaching the corporeality of the resurrection as 
distinct from the Hellenistic survival of the soul.”207 
Paul uses psyche thirteen times.208 Athenagoras Zakopoulos argues for three 
categories of usage: (1) life or life-principle; (2) seat of feeling, will, and thought; (3) and 
the individual.209 Paul uses soul to refer to natural life in quoting 1 Kgs 10:10 where 
Elijah despairs of his life (Rom 11:3) and to describe Priscilla and Aquila who risked 
themselves to save Paul’s own life (Rom 16:4).210 Paul quotes Gen 2:7, stating that 
“Adam became a living soul” (1 Cor 12:45) and he also calls God as a witness against his 
                                                 
206Here Schweizer proposes that this is an example of the authenticate life of the 
individual before God as indicated in Mark 8:35. Ibid., 9:646. 
207Ibid., 9:647. 
208On Paul’s anthropology in general, see Gutbrod; W. D. Stacey, The Pauline 
View of Man in Relation to Its Judaic and Hellenistic Background (London: Macmillan, 
1956). 
209See Zakopoulos, 87-91. Cf. Warne, 157-220. 
210Other examples in Phil 2:30 and 1 Thess 2:8. See also Warne, 158-160. 
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soul (2 Cor 1:23).211 As the seat of emotion and will, he urges slaves to do the will of 
God “from the heart” (Eph 6:6).212 In referring to the whole person or individual, Paul 
notes that God will punish “every soul of man that doeth evil” (Rom 2:9). In what seems 
a similar usage, he also writes of “every soul” referring to all people (Rom. 13:1).213 
Walter Gutbrod argues against the notion that in Paul, sarx and psyche go together in 
defining the human person as has been the case with nefesh,214 allowing this only in his 
analysis of 1 Cor 15:44. In general, he argues that it refers to a person.215 
In 1 Thess 5:23, Paul invokes a tripartite expression describing the human person, 
body, soul, and mind.216 Green suggests that by this, Paul is signifying the completeness 
of God’s sanctification rather than a “parts” list of the human person as understood in a 
Hellenized sense.217 In addressing Paul’s use of “one soul” in Phil 1:27, Warne notes that 
while this may appear to refer to an “immaterial psyche, . . . the emphasis is not so much 
on ontological/metaphysical definitions of πνεῦμα and ψυχή, or even upon a 
conceptual affinity between the two, but upon a motivational oneness of will in 
cooperative human ventures.”218 
                                                 
211For a discussion of this problematic passage, see Zakopoulos, 87-91. 
212This idea is repeated in Col 3:23. 
213Cf. Warne, 185-187. This expression also occurs in Acts 3:23, Jude 1:15, Rev 
16:3 
214Gutbrod, 76.  
215Ibid., 77. 
216See Fernández Ardanaz, El Mito, 76. 
217Green, “‘Bodies—That Is, Human Lives’: A Re-Examination of Human Nature 
in the Bible,” 162. See also Warne, 199-203. 
218Warne, 190-191. See also Schweizer, 9:649. 
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Hebrews 12:3 describes the tiredness of souls. Hebrews 4:12 presents an 
ambiguous usage when it speaks of the sword penetrating soul and spirit. Schweizer 
contends it means that “the Word has penetrated the πνεῦμα and ψυχή as it has the 
bones and marrow.”219 
Schweizer argues that 1 Pet 2:11 is “the most strongly Hellenised ψυχή passage 
in the NT.”220 In this verse, the passions of the flesh attack the soul. Here the soul stands 
in contrast to the flesh with the notion of the passions being a contagion in the soul, 
similar themes to those found in earlier Greek thought. 
The description of the souls under the altar in Rev 6:9 is of interest in that it is 
limited to the martyrs.221 Schweizer notes this, and in conjunction with 20:13 suggests 
that “for non-believers at least there will be no consciously experienced intermediate 
state.”222 In a recent commentary, Ben Witherington argues that “psuche should probably 
not be translated ‘soul’ here, for it means the living person or personality, without a 
body.”223 Later, writers in the early Church will take note of verses such as these and 
argue for a corporeal soul as these souls are able to be seen and to talk. 
 
Conclusion 
This survey of beliefs regarding the soul has shown that there were both 
                                                 
219Schweizer, 9:651. 
220Ibid., 9:653. 
221Cf. 4 Ezra 4:35. 
222Schweizer, 9:655. 
223Ben Witherington III, Revelation, The New Cambridge Bible Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 135. 
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differences and similarities between the HB and NT understanding of the soul and that 
found in the writings of the Greco-Roman world. One big difference between the HB and 
the Greco-Roman writers is that the HB presents a person as being a soul rather than 
having a soul, as was usual among secular writers. Though early in the Homeric period, 
the soul was present only at times of mortal danger or as a shade after the death of the 
body. 
The notions of breath and life were present in both the HB and the Greco-Roman 
writings. In the biblical tradition, the soul stood more for the person as a complete entity. 
Outside of biblical thinking, the soul came to be clearly understood as referring to a 
separate entity from the body with the powers of sense and reason and capable of existing 
separately from the body.  
The soul takes on more complex activities in the later periods of its development. 
Desire and reason exist in the soul. Correspondingly, people are urged to make reason 
rule over desire in their souls. The notion of purity in the soul is an important 
development here. This comes to be seen as a way of escape from continued 
reincarnation into different bodies. Many Greco-Roman writers argued that after the 
death of the body, the soul continued to exist and only through purification could the soul 
ascend up to the abode of the divine. The intertestamental Jewish writers taught this also. 
The Epicureans argued for the cessation of life at death with no further existence of the 
soul.224 In the Scriptures, there is little to suggest any notion of divinity connected with 
the soul or the accompanying belief in the soul’s immortality. 
In the NT, the soul has many similarities to the usage found in the HB. The soul 
                                                 




can refer to life and to the entire person. It can experience emotions and weakness. The 
soul also appears after the death of the body in apocalyptic language. The NT at times 








THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS 
 
The Apostolic Fathers form the background to the doctrinal development 
produced during the Ante-Nicene and Nicene eras. During this early time period, 
developed theology was the focus of those writings which are extant. In general, 
ecclesiastical and ethical norms were much more significant in this era. This holds true as 
well in the area of the doctrine of the soul. As this chapter demonstrates, the Church 
Fathers were little concerned with formulating a Christian doctrine of the soul. However, 
they do use soul in ways that will prove consistent throughout the Ante-Nicene period. 
But they focus little on the nature, origin, or future possibilities of the soul. 
 
Clement of Rome 
Clement of Rome is generally considered to be the first author1 of any extant 
extra-biblical material produced by the early Church Fathers. His letter to the Church at 
Corinth is titled 1 Clement. The so-called 2 Clement and the pseudo-Clementines are 
generally considered spurious2 and are not part of this study. 
                                                 
1On dating see Kurt Erlemann, “Die Datierung des ersten Klemensbriefes—
Anfragen an eine communis opinio,” New Testament Studies 44, no. 4 (1998): 605-606; 
Thomas J. Herron, “The Most Probable Date of the First Epistle of Clement to the 
Corinthians,” Studia Patristica 21 (1989): 106-121; Johannes Quasten, Patrology 
(Utrecht: Spectrum Publishers, 1950), 1:49-50. 





Usage of Psyche 
Clement writes that Christ gave his blood for us, his flesh for our flesh, and his 
soul for our soul.3 Here soul seems clearly to be used for natural life rather than as an 
entity separate from the body. 
Clement also uses the expression “eyes of our soul.” He writes, “Let us 
contemplate Him with our understanding, and look with the eyes of our soul to His long-
suffering will.”4 This phrase occurs among various authors in Greek philosophy and quite 
often later among the early Church Fathers. The parallel between ratiocination and the 
“eyes of the soul” is readily apparent.5 
For Clement, a “double-minded” person is described literally as two-souled.6 The 
                                                 
3“τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν ἐν 
θελήματι θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σάρκα ὑπὲρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ 
τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν.” 1 Clement 49.6.4. Annie Jaubert notes that this should be 
interpreted from a Semitic point of view. Annie Jaubert, Clément de Rome: épître aux 
Corinthiens, Sources Chrétiennes 167 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1971), 181n3. This notion 
of exchange exists also in Epistle to Diognetus 9 and Irenaeus’s Against Heresies 5.1, 
though one finds the parallel of flesh for flesh, and soul for soul only in Irenaeus’s 
passage. On the triad of blood, body, and soul, see Andreas Lindemann, Die 
Clemensbrief, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 17, ed. Andreas Lindemann (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 145. 
4“ἐμβλέψωμεν τοῖς ὄμμασιν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ μακρόθυμον αὐτοῦ 
βούλημα.” 1 Clement 19.3.2. The expression comes from Plato; so Lindemann, 69. For 
a discussion of the expression other ancient sources, see Ysabel de Andia, “The Eyes of 
the Soul,” Communio 14 (1987): 230-236. The expression also occurs in Philo Sacrifice 
of Cain and Abel 69 et al. The related expression “eyes of your heart” occurs in Eph 1:18. 
5Horacio E. Lona, Der erste Clemensbrief, Kommentar zu den Apostolischen 
Vätern (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 2:248-249. 
6“δίψυχοι.” 1 Clement 11.2.5; 23.2.2; 23.3.2. See also Didache 4.4, Epistle of 
Barnabas 19.5, and Pastor 98.2.4. As this form is a variant of ψυχή, it will not be 
studied in detail. On the term and its origins, see Oscar J. F. Seitz, “Antecedents and 
Signification of the term Dipsychos,” JBL 66 (1947): 211-219. 
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notion of being “two-souled” is directed towards a believer who is full of doubt.7 This 
leads one to suggest that for Clement, faith is an act of the soul. Clement describes the 
soul as capable of pride. He writes, “Neither let our soul be lifted up.”8 He also attributes 
holiness to the soul, writing that the believer should approach God with holiness of soul.9 
Clement also lists meekness as an attribute of Esther’s soul,10 visible when she fasted and 
prayed before entering the king’s palace. 
Clement urges the believer’s soul to be bound to God.11 In this context, Clement 
is exhorting believers regarding the resurrection. It is not clear if he has an ethical or 
ontological unity in mind in suggesting the notion of binding one’s soul to God. The 
former may be in mind, prefiguring chap. 30, where Clement urges practical godliness in 
response to the surety of the resurrection. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Clement claims to be quoting from Scripture when he writes, “Wretched are the 
double-minded, who doubt in their soul.”12 The location of this citation is not certain. It 
                                                 
7Cf. 1 Clement 23.3.2. 
8“μηδὲ ἰνδαλλέσθω ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν.” Ibid. Lindemann notes that this use of 
soul is not in a dogmatic sense. Lindemann, 83. 
9“Προσέλθωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ ἐν ὁσιότητι ψυχῆς, ἁγνὰς καὶ ἀμιάντους 
χεῖρας αἴροντες πρὸς αὐτόν.” 1 Clement 29.1.1. 
10“ὃς ἰδὼν τὸ ταπεινὸν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς.” Ibid., 55.6.6. 
11“προσδεδέσθωσαν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν.” Ibid., 27.1.1. 
12Ibid., 23.3.2. See also 11.2.5; 23.2.2; 23.3.2. There is some discussion here as to 
what Scripture this could be referring to. ANF 1:11 states that some think it to be a 




does again indicate that Clement saw faith and doubt as located in the soul. Beyond this, 
he does not write specifically on the doctrine of the soul. 
In summary, Clement uses soul for natural life. It is the seat of understanding. It is 
also the location of both good and evil attributes. Both faith and unbelief take place in the 
soul. He also suggests the notion of the soul’s union with God. He does not directly quote 
from any known passages of Scripture. This is typical of most of the early Church 
Fathers. It continues among some of the later apologists as well. 
 
Ignatius 
Ignatius is one of the few Apostolic Fathers of whom much is known personally.13 
He has authored seven, extant letters considered to be genuine.14 They are To the 
Ephesians, To the Magnesians, To the Trallians, To the Romans, To the Philadelphians, 
To the Smyrnans, and To Polycarp. In this study, only the Middle Recension is studied.15 
                                                 
13Paul Foster, “The Epistles of Ignatius of Antioch (Part I),” Expository Times 
117, no. 12 (2006): 487. 
14Cross, The Early Christian Fathers, 15; Quasten, 1:73. This view is not 
universal however. See below on authorship. 
15For an overview of the debate of the recensions of Ignatius’s writings, see C. P. 
Hammond Bammel, “Igantian Problems,” in Personalities of the Early Church, ed. 
Everett Ferguson (New York: Garland, 1993), 44-97; Allen Brent, “The Enigma of 
Ignatius of Antioch,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 57, no. 3 (2006): 429-431; Foster, 
489; Quasten, 1:74; William R. Schoedel, “Are the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch 
Authentic?” Religious Studies Review 6 (1980): 196-201; idem, Ignatius of Antioch, 
Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 4-7. Most scholars accept the Middle 
Recension as being the authentic one. Some, such as Weijenborg, have argued for the 
Long Recension. Reinoud Weijenborg, Les lettres d’Ignace d’Antioche (Leiden: Brill, 
1969). More recently, several have attempted to push the date of the letters to the latter 
half of the second century. Reinhard M. Hübner, “Thesen zur Echtheit und Datierun der 
sieben Briefe des Ignatius Antichen,” Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 1 (1997): 44-72. 
Cf. Jack W. Hannah, “The Setting of the Ignatian Long Recension,” JBL 79, no. 3 
(1960): 221-238. In the Long Recension, ψυχή appears several more times in varying 
usages from that found in the Middle Recension. This bears further study but falls outside 




Usage of Psyche 
Ignatius writes concerning the bishop of Philadelphia, “Wherefore my soul 
declares his mind towards God a happy one.”16 Here Ignatius distinguishes between his 
soul, the mind, or will (γνώμην) of the other bishop. Ignatius then attributes virtue and 
perfection to the bishop’s mind rather than his soul, describing it as immovable and free 
from anger.17 With later authors, these ideas are generally attributed to the soul. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Ignatius writes regarding fellow believers who have helped him, “May the Lord 
Jesus Christ honour them, in whom they hope, in flesh, and soul, and spirit.”18 This 
trichotomy of “flesh and soul and spirit” to refer to the human person becomes quite 
common among some of the later writers.19 Ignatius does not elaborate at all regarding 
whether he understands any distinction between these or if he invokes this as a simple 
expression of the entire person.20 It is possible that he sees this as imitating 1 Thess 5:23. 
                                                 
16“Διὸ μακαρίζει μου ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν εἰς θεὸν αὐτοῦ γνώμην, ἐπιγνοὺς 
ἐνάρετον καὶ τέλειον οὖσαν, τὸ ἀκίνητον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀόργητον αὐτοῦ ἐν 
πάσῃ ἐπιεικείᾳ θεοῦ ζῶντος.” To the Philadelphians 1.2.3. 
17Cf. below on page 407 were Lactantius also clearly distinguishes between soul 
and mind. 
18“ Τιμήσει αὐτοὺς ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, εἰς ὃν ἐλπίζουσιν σαρκί, 
ψυχῇ, πνεύματι, πίστει; ἀγάπῃ, ὁμονοίᾳ.” To the Philadelphians 11.2.5. See 
Henning Paulsen, Die Briefe des Ignatius von Antiochia und der Brief des Polykarp von 
Smyrna, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 18, ed. Andreas Lindemann (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1985), 89. He suggests there is some manuscript evidence to support πνεύμα 
instead of ψυχή. On the connection to hope, see Henning Paulsen, Studien zur Theologie 
des Ignatius von Antiochien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1978), 67. 
19See, for example, the discussion of Irenaeus’s usage below on page 146. 
20The only difference between Ignatius’s trichotomy and that found in 1 Thess 




In summary, Ignatius attributes virtue, perfection, and anger to the soul, 
connecting it with the mind. He also uses the tripartite expression of the human person 
similar to that found in 1 Thess 5:23, but does not elaborate further on his understanding 
of the human person. He does not directly quote from any known passages of Scripture. 
 
Barnabas 
The Epistle of Barnabas is generally considered pseudonymous, the identification 
of the author being unknown. This has not, however, prevented this document from being 
considered an important addition to the Apostolic Fathers.21  
 
Usage of Psyche 
Barnabas claims to love those whom he is writing to more than his own soul.22 In 
a similar usage, he encourages followers of the way of light to love their neighbors more 
than their own soul.23 These examples seem clearly to refer to natural life. Elsewhere he 
                                                 
Antioch, The Apostolic Fathers (Camden, NJ: Thomas Nelson, 1966), 4:109. 
21On authorship, provenance, and dating, see Berthold Altaner, Patrology (New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1961), 80-82; Cross, The Early Christian Fathers, 21-22; 
James C. Paget, The Epistle of Barnabas: Outlook and Background, Wissenschaftliche 
Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testatment 2. Reihe 64, ed. Martin Hengel et al. (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1994), 3-36; James C. Paget, “The Epistle of Barnabas,” Expository 
Times 117, no. 11 (2006): 441-446; Pierre Prigent, L’épître de Barnabé I-XVI et ses 
sources (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1961), 11-16; Ferdinand R. Prostmeier, Der 
Barnabasbrief, Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1999), 8:119-130; Quasten, 89-90; Klaus Wengst, Didache (Apostellehre), 
Barnabasbrief, Zweiter Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet: Eingeleitet, herausgegeben, 
übertragen und erläutert, vol. 2 (Munich: Kösel, 1984), 114-118. On issues of redaction, 
see Klaus Wengst, Tradition und Theologie des Barnabasbriefes, Arbeiten zur 
Kirchengeschichte 42, ed. Kurt Aland et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971). 
22“ἀγαπᾶν ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ τὴν ψυχήν μου.” Epistle of Barnabas 1.4.4. See also 
ibid., 4.6. See Wengst, Tradition und Theologie des Barnabasbriefes, 20. Wengst argues 
this line demonstrates that this part was written by Barnabas rather than a later redactor. 




writes that “the Lord endured to suffer for our soul.”24 Here it is not so clear whether soul 
refers to natural life or to a separate entity from the body, although within the 
development of the concept of the soul, it seems early to argue that this refers to a 
separated soul. 
Barnabas also employs a usage of soul that seems different from others. In an 
obvious reference to Jesus’ declaration in Matt 18:3 that only those like children would 
enter the kingdom of heaven, Barnabas writes “that we should possess the soul of 
children.”25 This statement is made in the context of the remission of sins and renewal, 
which a Christian receives upon accepting Christ and seems to suggest that sin exists in 
the soul and that it is there that renewal takes place. 
Barnabas appears to employ soul for mind when he writes, “My soul hopes that it 
has not omitted anything,”26 pertaining to salvation. One might argue that it may simply 
be an expression of longing, thus suggesting more of an emotive rather than cognitive 
function. It could also be a means of referring to the self. 
Barnabas advises people not to “give loose reins to our soul, that it should have 
power to run with sinners and the wicked, lest we become like them.”27 The soul, here, is 
                                                 
19.5c.1. Prigent translates this as “oneself.” Pierre Prigent, Épître de Barnabé, Sources 
Chrétiennes 172 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1971), 202. 
24“ὁ κύριος ὑπέμεινεν παθεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν.” Epistle of Barnabas 
5.5.2. 
25“ὡς παιδίον ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν.” Ibid., 6.11.2. Prostmeier suggests the sense 
of καρδία here. Prostmeier, 272. 
26“ἐλπίζει μου ἡ ψυχὴ μὴ παραλελοιπέναι τι.” Epistle of Barnabas 17.1.2. 
Prostmeier sees this as a rhetorical device. Prostmeier, 526. 
27“Μὴ δῶμεν τῇ ἑαυτῶν ψυχῇ ἄνεσιν, ὥστε ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐξουσίαν μετὰ 
πονηρῶν καὶ ἁμαρτωλῶν συντρέχειν.” Epistle of Barnabas 4.2.2. 
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that which can run with sinners and be like them. By stating, “Do not give loose reins to 
the soul,” it seems that some other entity is the controlling party which must choose who 
the soul comports with. It could be argued, however, that this is simply using soul to refer 
to the individual. Elsewhere, he warns of an insolent soul.28 This is a similar usage to the 
previous one, as is seen from its location in the “way of life” exhortations of chap. 19. In 
that chapter, he urges people to be pure of soul29 and commands them not to join their 
soul to the haughty.30 The soul then can be influenced for good or evil by those it is in 
company with. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
In Barnabas’s description of the way of darkness, he mentions the destruction of 
the soul. He writes, “But the way of darkness is crooked, and full of cursing; for it is the 
way of eternal death with punishment, in which way are the things that destroy the soul, 
viz., idolatry, over-confidence, the arrogance of power, hypocrisy, double-heartedness, 
adultery, murder, rapine, haughtiness, transgression, deceit, malice, self-sufficiency, 
poisoning, magic, avarice, want of the fear of God.”31 The idea that a soul that can be 
destroyed is connected with the way of “eternal death with punishment.” The author does 
not make entirely clear what “eternal death with punishment” means or how things along 
this way lead to the destruction of the soul. In later times, sin can be referred to as leading 
                                                 
28“οὐ δώσεις τῇ ψυχῇ σου θράσος.” Ibid., 19.3b.3. 
29“Ὅσον δύνασαι, ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς σου ἁγνεύσεις.” Ibid., 19.8c.1. 
30“οὐδὲ κολληθήσῃ ἐκ ψυχῆς σου μετὰ ὑψηλῶν.” Ibid., 19.6b.2. 
31“Ὅλως γάρ ἐστιν ὁδὸς θανάτου αἰωνίου μετὰ τιμωρίας, ἐν ᾗ ἐστὶν τὰ 
ἀπολλύντα τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν∙ εἰδωλολατρεία, θρασύτης, ὕψος δυνάμεως, 
ὑπόκρισις, διπλοκαρδία, μοιχεία, φόνος, ἁρπαγή, ὑπερηφανία.” Ibid., 20.1b.2 
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to the death of the soul.32 As can be seen from the current arguments of both 
annihilationists and traditionalists, the word eternal can admit of varied meanings.33 
In summary, the letter of Barnabas employs soul to refer to life and views it as the 
seat of understanding, hope, sin, and Christian renewal. The soul is also subject to the 
influence of evil company.34 
Barnabas also writes of the destruction of the soul referring to the eternal death of 
punishment. This idea is not supported with direct biblical citations, though the notion of 
a future retribution is in view which seems to have scriptural overtones and is a theme 
that is developed more thoroughly by later authors. 
 
Shepherd of Hermas 
The Shepherd of Hermas is divided into three books.35 The first records visions, 
                                                 
32Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Novation all discuss this idea. With the first 
two, it is clear that this does not refer to the extinction of the soul at a future time. See 
below on pp. 214, 279 and 391. 
33For a recent look at the varied interpretation in this controversy, see Edward 
Fudge and Robert A. Peterson, Two Views of Hell: A Biblical and Theological Dialogue 
(Downers Grove, IL: InverVarsity Press, 2000). As will be seen throughout this study, 
the early Church Fathers often define certain key terms such as death, life, destruction, 
etc., in different ways, noting that they are even used in different ways in Scripture. Thus, 
just because an author uses death or destruction, this does not automatically place that 
author in either the annihilationists’ or traditionalists’ camp. 
34Prostmeier argues that, in general, soul in Barnabas is used as a personal 
pronoun, suggesting it does not have specific anthropological connotations other than 
referring to the individual. Prostmeier, 195-196. 
35For an overview of the document, see Joseph Verheyden, “The Shepherd of 
Hermas,” Expository Times 117, no. 10 (2006): 397-401. On dating and authorship, see 
Altaner, 85; Cross, The Early Christian Fathers, 23; Robert Joly, Hermas Le Pasteur, 
Sources Chrétiennes 53 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1958), 11-16; Graydon Snyder, The 
Shepherd of Hermas, The Apostolic Fathers (London: Thomas Nelson, 1968), 6:22-24; J. 
Christian Wilson, Toward a Reassessment of the Shepherd of Hermas: Its Date and Its 
Pneumatology (Lewiston: Mellen Biblical Press, 1993), 9-61. 
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the second gives commandments, and the third is on similitudes or parables.36 It was 
often found in ancient manuscripts among the books considered to be part of Scripture. 
 
Usage of Psyche 
Hermas uses soul for natural life in the context of dying or giving one’s life. He 
writes of those who have “laid down their lives.”37 
Hermas also uses the soul in reference to the individual. When asking for an 
explanation of Similitude IX, he says so “that every soul, trusting in the Lord, and 
hearing it, may glorify His great, and marvellous, and glorious name.”38 This seems 
clearly to be using soul as a reference to an individual rather than denoting a separate 
entity from the body. 
In the Shepherd, one’s soul can be sick.39 It can also be in need of repentance.40 
Believers are called on to be humble and to torment their soul.41 In chap. 39, Hermas 
discusses the believer who doubts, which is a repeated theme throughout the document. 
When a believer asks something in faith from God, Hermas calls this a “request of your 
                                                 
36On the issue of unity and multiple authors, see Carolyn Osiek, “The Shepherd of 
Hermas in Context,” Acta Patristica et Byzantina 8 (1997): 115-134; idem, Shepherd of 
Hermas, Hermeneia (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), 8-10. Citations in this 
section have a secondary number where S=Similitudes, C=Commandments, and 
V=Visions. 
37“οἳ καὶ προθύμως ἔπαθον ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας καὶ παρέδωκαν τὰς 
ψυχὰς αὐτῶν.” Pastor 105.3.1 (S.9). 
38“ἵνα πᾶσα ψυχὴ πεποιθυῖα ἐπὶ.” Ibid., 95.5.2 (S.9). 
39“καὶ ταπεινοῖ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν.” Ibid., 38.10.7 (C.8). 
40“μετανοήσουσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ αὐτῶν.” Ibid., 1.9.2 (V.1). 
41“καὶ ταπεινοῖ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν καὶ βασανίζει.” Ibid., 30.2.7 (C.4). Cf. 
Ibid., 66.4.5 (S.7). 
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soul.”42 Those who ask and firmly believe that God will grant the request are contrasted 
with the διψυχία or doubters, who do not believe that God will grant what has been 
requested.43 In chap. 43, Hermas speaks of a false prophet who speaks to doubters who 
ask about their future as one who “fills their souls with expectations, according to their 
own wishes.”44 Here again, Hermas discusses the desires of the soul but here the 
unbeliever is the one who has their soul filled with whatever they desired. Hermas 
prefaces this by noting that they are wicked desires. Thus belief and desire reside in the 
soul for Hermas. 
Hermas uses soul in the context of agitation or concern. He wants some 
information regarding one of the similitudes and states, “On all these points put my mind 
at rest, sir, and explain them to me.”45 Here the soul seeks rest, presumably from worry. 
In an admonition to believers against accumulating wealth, Hermas exhorts them 
to buy afflicted souls and visit widows and orphans.46 It is not clear what is to be 
understood by the expression “buy afflicted souls.” Does he intend this to describe the 
                                                 
42“ἀλλὰ τὸ αἴτημα τῆς ψυχῆς σου πληροφορήσει” Pastor 39.3.1 (C.9). 
43On this, see Patricia C. Miller, “‘All the Words Were Frightful’: Salvation by 
Dreams in the Shepherd of Hermas,” Vigiliae Christianae 42 (1988): 330; Carolyn Osiek, 
Rich and Poor in the Shepherd of Hermas, The Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph 
Series 15 (Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 50; Oscar 
J. F. Seitz, “Relationship of the Shepherd of Hermas to the Epistle of James,” JBL 63 
(1944): 136-139; idem, “Antecedents and Signification of the Term Dipsychos”; idem, 
“Afterthoughts on the Term Dipsychos,” New Testament Studies 4 (1958): 27-334. 





46“ἀντὶ ἀγρῶν οὖν ἀγοράζετε ψυχὰς θλιβομένας.” Ibid., 50.8.1 (S.1). 
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actual purchase of oppressed people or slaves? Or does it refer to the visitation of widows 
and orphans? It seems probable that caring for the widows and orphans is the better 
understanding, especially when compared with his statements in chaps. 51 and 56. In 
chap. 51, Hermas describes how the “rich, again, aiding the poor in their necessities, 
satisfy their souls.”47 Here, “their souls” is to be understood as referring to the souls of 
the poor who have received help from the gifts of the wealthy. In chap. 56, Hermas, in 
describing the procedure that should be followed by anyone fasting, describes taking the 
money that would have been spent to buy food for the day and giving it to a widow or 
orphan or some other person in need. When this is done, the recipient will be able to “fill 
his own soul”48 from the money the one fasting has given. Presumably, here the money 
would be used to buy food to fill the poor person’s stomach. What seems clear here is 
that Hermas is using soul to refer to that part of the widows, orphans, and poor which is 
able to be satisfied by the gifts of the rich. This seems to be referring to the physical part 
of the body which is aided by eating food rather than referring to the life-spirit. 
Hermas writes about the affliction of soul that is needed by those who have 
repented of sins. He writes that “he who repents must torture his own soul, and be 
exceedingly humble in all his conduct, and be afflicted with many kinds of affliction; and 
if he endure the afflictions that come upon him, He who created all things, and endued 
them with power, will assuredly have compassion, and will heal him.”49 The parallel of a 
                                                 
47“οἱ πλούσιοι χορηγοῦντες τοῖς πένησι τὰ δέοντα πληροφοροῦσι τὰς 
ψυχὰς αὐτῶν.” Ibid., 51.8.7 (S.2). 
48“ἵνα ἐκ τῆς ταπεινοφροσύνης σου ὁ εἰληφὼς ἐμπλήσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
ψυχὴν.” Ibid., 56.7.6 (S.5). See Martin Dibelius, Der Hirt des Hermas, Handbuch zum 
Neuen Testament 4, ed. Hans Lietzmann (Tügingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1923), 567. Dibelius 





tortured, afflicted soul with one who is humble in conduct suggests a connection between 
the life of the soul and that of the body. Earlier Hermas described the afflictions which 
are placed upon sinners. They are “punished with losses, others with want, others with 
sicknesses of various kinds, and others with all kinds of disorder and confusion; others 
are insulted by unworthy persons, and exposed to suffering in many ways; for many, 
becoming unstable in their plans, try many things, and none of them at all succeed.”50 
These afflictions seem to be carried out in one’s life in a similar way that the satisfied 
soul is filled from eating physical food. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Hermas writes about a soul as that part of a person that can be saved and, 
correspondingly, apparently lost.51 He writes that the commandments are described as 
“excellent, and powerful, and glorious, and able to save a man’s soul.”52 Later he refers to 
an “angel of luxury and deceit: he wears out the souls of the servants of God, and perverts 
them from the truth, deceiving them with wicked desires, through which they will perish; 
for they forget the commandments of the living God.”53 He also describes those who do not 
keep company with believers, stating that “they destroy their own souls.”54 
                                                 
66.4.5 (S.7). 
50Ibid., 63. 
51Cf. 1 Pet 1:9, “for you are receiving the outcome of your faith, the salvation of 
your souls.” 
52“καὶ ἔνδοξοι καὶ δυνάμεναι σῶσαι ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου.” Pastor 61.1.3 
(S.6) 
53“οὗτος οὖν ἐκτρίβει τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δούλων τοῦ θεοῦ.” Ibid., 62.1.2 (S.6) 
54“ἀπολλύουσι τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς.” Pastor 103.4.1 (S.9). Cf. Didache 16.2.  
 
77 
In summary, Hermas uses the soul for life and to refer to an individual. It is the 
seat of sin in the person. Doubt on the part of a believer happens in the soul and what 
goes on in the soul affects the actions of the body. He also uses soul in an apparent 
reference to the physical person. The soul can be saved and it can be destroyed. While the 
notions of salvation and damnation clearly refer to biblical themes, still there is no 
conclusive reference or allusions to specific passages in this document. 
 
Didache 
The Didache, or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles as it is also known, contains 
little in connection with the doctrine of the soul.55 It has several statements that are 
directly related to statements from the Epistle of Barnabas.56 
 
Usage of Psyche 
The Didache teaches that “some you shall love more than thine own soul.”57 This 
                                                 
55Translation based on Kirsopp Lake’s edition for the LCL. For a current 
bibliograpnhy, see Marcello Del Verme, Didache and Judaism: Jewish Roots of an 
Ancient Christian-Jewish Work (New York: T & T Clark International, 2004). On 
provenance, see Clayton N. Jefford, “The Milieu of Matthew, the Didache, and Ignatius 
of Antioch: Agreements and Differences,” in Matthew and the Didache: Two Documents 
from the Same Jewish-Christian Milieu? ed. Huub van de Sandt (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2005). As to the document’s unity and relationship to the Gospels along 
with the dating issue, see Aaron Milavec, The Didache: Faith, Hope and Life of the 
Earliest Christian Communitites, 50-70 C.E. (New York: Newman Press, 2003), 695-
739; idem, “When, Why, and for Whom Was the Didache Created? Insights into the 
Social and Historical Setting of the Didache Communities,” in Matthew and the Didache: 
Two Documents from the Same Jewish-Christian Milieu? ed. Huub van de Sandt 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005). 
56On this, see Jonathan A. Draper, “Barnabas and the Riddle of the Didache 
Revisited,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 58 (1995): 89-113. 
57“οὓς δὲ ἀγαπήσεις ὑπὲρ τὴν ψυχήν σου.” Didache 2.7.2. See Kurt 
Niederwimmer, The Didache, Hermeneia (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), 92-
93. Niederwimmer suggests that soul here should be understood as either one’s own life 




seems to be an example of soul standing for natural life. 
The Didache also urges “nor let thy soul be presumptuous.”58 Another statement 
on the same theme is, “Thy soul shall not consort with the lofty.”59 By themselves, these 
statements locate sin of pride in the soul. However, when compared to the other usages of 
soul in the Didache, one could argue that this also is using soul as referring to one’s self. 
The final usage also concerns whom the soul associates with. “But be frequently 
gathered together seeking the things which are profitable for your souls.”60 Here the soul 
seems capable of receiving some harm or benefit for the individual’s salvation from 
association with others. The author does not elaborate on what benefit may be received or 
how this may take place, leaving it open to conjecture. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
The Didache does not comment on the doctrine of the soul or contain any usage 
of biblical sources on the soul. 
                                                 
Lecoffre, 1958), 294. This passage parellels Epistle of Barnabas 1.4; 4.6. See 
Niederwimmer, 92n55. 
58“οὐδὲ δώσεις τῇ ψυχῇ σου θράσος.” Didache 3.9.2. For a parallel, see “οὐ 
δώσεις τῇ ψυχῇ σου θράσος.” Epistle of Barnabas 19.3b.3. 
59“Οὐ κολληθήσεται ἡ ψυχή σου μετὰ ὑψηλῶν.” Didache 3.9.2. Cf. “οὐδὲ 
κολληθήσῃ ἐκ ψυχῆς σου μετὰ ὑψηλῶν.” Epistle of Barnabas 19.6b.2. 
60“Πυκνῶς δὲ συναχθήσεσθε ζητοῦντες τὰ ἀνήκοντα ταῖς ψυχαῖς 
ὑμῶν.” Didache 16.2.2. Klaus Wengst argues that this should be understood as replacing 
the personal pronoun. Wengst, Didache (Apostellehre), Barnabasbrief, Zweiter 
Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet: Eingeleitet, herausgegeben, übertragen und erläutert, 
89n128. See Barnabas 4.9 for a parallel statement. Cf. Pastor 103.4.1 for the negative 
admonition. The Didache in 4.4.1 also uses the phrase “do not be double-minded” (Οὐ 
διψυχήσεις), again mirroring the Epistle of Barnabas 19.5a.1, “Οὐ μὴ διψυχήσῃς.” In 
the Apostolic Fathers, this terminology is found most frequently in the Shepherd of 
Hermas. Cf. Pastor 11.5.1. 
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In summary, in several statements, the Didache echoes ideas and phrases 
concerning the soul found in the Epistle of Barnabas. The soul is used to refer to natural 
life and called upon not to be proud. It also urges that keeping good company has a 
positive effect on one’s soul. He does not directly quote from any known passages of 
Scripture. 
 
Epistle to Diognetus 
The author of the Epistle to Diognetus takes the title Mathetes, or Disciple. 
Beyond this, little is known about the document’s author.61 This document has the first 
extended section on the soul in the Apostolic Fathers. 
 
Usage of Psyche 
The Epistle to Diognetus uses the relationship of the soul and body as a metaphor 
for describing the relationship of the Christian to the world.62 The author begins with 
“what the soul is in the body, that are Christians in the world.”63 This introductory 
declaration sets up the remainder of the section. The author clearly intends to convey a 
dichotomous distinction between the soul and body. The author makes several points 
regarding this distinction. First, the soul “is dispersed through all the members of the 
                                                 
61Cross, The Early Christian Fathers, 28. On dating and authorship, see Altaner, 
135-136; Theofried Baumeister, “Zur Datierung der Schrift an Diognet,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 42 (1988): 105-111; Henri I. Marrou, A Diognète, Sources Chrétiennes 33 
(Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1965), 241-268; Quasten, 248-249. 
62Marrou notes the difficulty in precisely understanding the author’s theology 
because of its expression in comparison form. Marrou, 138. On the Platonic backgrounds 
to this section, see Wengst, Didache (Apostellehre), Barnabasbrief, Zweiter 
Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet: Eingeleitet, herausgegeben, übertragen und erläutert, 
321-323. 
63“ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν σώματι ψυχή.” Ad Diognetum 6.1.1. 
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body.”64 Second, “the soul dwells in the body, yet it is not of the body.”65 While both of 
these statements might seem to imply some physical properties of the soul—the ability to 
be spread throughout another body and to be located in it—yet it is probable that this is 
not the case as many subsequent authors will write of this understanding and yet clearly 
understand the soul as incorporeal. 
Furthermore the author writes, “The invisible soul is guarded by the visible 
body.”66 Here the soul is explicitly stated to be invisible, which may also hint at a notion 
of incorporeality as mentioned previously. This statement also suggests that the godliness 
of the Christian is invisible even though the Christian is visible bodily in the world. Here 
θεοσέβεια, or acts of godliness, are compared to the invisible soul. It may also be 
possible to sense the notion of the soul as the principle of movement in this statement. 
This common idea is that the soul cannot be seen except through the movements of the 
visible body. 
The Epistle to Diognetus uses the Platonic concept of the soul being captive to the 
body stating, “The soul is imprisoned in the body, yet preserves that very body.”67 Here 
two important ideas are suggested. First, the body is to be understood as the prison of the 
                                                 
64“Ἔσπαρται κατὰ πάντων τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν ἡ ψυχή.” Ibid., 6.2.2. 
65“Οἰκεῖ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι ψυχή.” Ibid., 6.2.2. This is reminiscent of 
Stoicism. Marrou, 139. Others have argued differently. R. Godfrey Tanner, “The Epistle 
to Diognetus and Contemporary Greek Thought,” Studia Patristica 15 pt. 1 (1985): 502. 
66“Ἀόρατος ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ὁρατῷ φρουρεῖται τῷ σώματι.” Ad Diognetum 6.4.1. 
67“Ἐγκέκλεισται μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι, συνέχει δὲ αὐτὴ τὸ σῶμα.” Ad 
Diognetum 6.7.1. This notion is found in Plato. Robert Joly, Christianisme et 
philosophie: etudes sur Justin et les apologistes grecs du deuxième siècle, Université 
libre de Bruxelles, Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres 52 (Brussels: Editions de 
l’Université de Bruxelles, 1973), 205; Tanner, 503. 
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soul. This notion, often referring to the body as a tomb, is well known in philosophical 
thought and is used by later writers in this study. Secondly, the author suggests that the 
presence of the soul in the body is what keeps the body alive. This notion of soul as the 
principle of life is also well attested in earlier philosophical writings. 
The Epistle to Diognetus finishes the soul/Christian metaphor with, “The soul, 
when but ill-provided with food and drink, becomes better.”68 The author here implies a 
connection between the body and the soul, declaring that bodily fasting is good for the 
soul. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
The statement in the Epistle to Diognetus, “The immortal soul dwells in a mortal 
tabernacle,”69 is the first of its kind in the Apostolic Fathers, attributing immortality to the 
soul. It seems fairly clear that this immortality is to be understood as already present as 
an attribute of the soul. It is not something that is to be attained at a future time. The 
notion of a “mortal tabernacle” seems to continue the idea stated previously that the body 
is the tomb of the soul, thus implying a break from it, which the author brings to view by 
stating that the Christian is “looking for incorruption in the heavens.”70 This juxtaposition 
of an immortal soul with the notion of a future incorruption to be received is not 
unknown among other writers and perhaps reflects an ambivalence between the clear 
biblical notion of future heavenly rewards for the believer with the Greek concept of the 
natural immortality of the human soul. 
                                                 
68“Κακουργουμένη σιτίοις καὶ ποτοῖς ἡ ψυχὴ βελτιοῦται.” Ad Diognetum 
6.9.1. 
69“Ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν θνητῷ σκηνώματι κατοικεῖ.” Ibid., 6.8.2. 
70Ad Diognetum 6.8.2. 
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The author also writes, “The flesh hates the soul, and wars against it, though itself 
suffering no injury, because it is prevented from enjoying pleasures.”71 Here the soul is 
disconnected from the pleasures of the body, which presumably must only be enjoyed in 
the “flesh.” Then he adds, “The soul loves the flesh that hates it, and the members.”72 
Whether flesh is to be understood here in metaphorical terms rather than referring simply 
to the flesh of the earthly body is not made clear, though the addition of the phrase “and 
the members” seems to focus on the physical aspect. It is possible that this is taken from 
1 Pet 2:11, “Beloved, I urge you as aliens and exiles to abstain from the desires of the 
flesh that wage war against the soul.” This idea of the body at war with the soul is one 
that is not used much again until the later Latin Fathers where it will be picked up and 
become a major part of the understanding of the human person. 
In summary, the Epistle to Diognetus is the first Apostolic Father to have a 
section devoted to discussing the soul in any sort of detail. The clear distinction between 
the soul and body, along with an emphasis on the immortality of the soul itself, sets the 
stage for much of what develops later. The soul is invisible, held captive in the body, 
functions as the principle of movement in the body, and yet is affected by the actions of 
the body.73 All of these notions will be developed further by later authors, but no direct 
citations of the Scriptures are used. 
 
                                                 
71“Μισεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ πολεμεῖ μηδὲν ἀδικουμένη, δίοτι ταῖς 
ἡδοναῖς κωλύεται χρῆσθαι.” Ibid., 6.5.1. Cf. 2 Pet 2:11. Note the usage here of σάρξ 
rather than σώμα. 
72“Ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν μισοῦσαν ἀγαπᾷ σάρκα καὶ τὰ μέλη.” Ad Diognetum 
6.6.1. 
73Marrou argues that the author’s usage of soul is based on the world-soul concept 




This chapter has studied both the usage of soul and the scant doctrinal hints that 
appear in the Apostolic Fathers. The soul often carries the notion of natural life. It is also 
the seat of emotions and mental activity. Faith and unbelief are found in the soul and the 
soul can be influenced by the body. The need to guard and guide the soul in relation to 
sin is also prominent. The idea of the destruction of the soul is discussed along with the 
notion of an entombed soul. This later development is introduced which also clearly goes 
the furthest along doctrinal lines when it attributes immortality to the soul. 
The authors in this period do not use the Scriptures when discussing the soul. 
They mention the soul in connection with salvation and punishment, which are clearly 
biblical themes but these are only allusions at best. It is in the next period that the 








JUSTIN MARTYR TO MELITO OF SARDIS 
 
The Greek Fathers of the early and middle second century devoted much of their 
writing to apologetic works. In these documents, the concept of the soul begins to take on 
a more important role. Issues especially important in this time period are the origin of the 
soul and the future life of the soul. These two relate directly to God as creator and God as 
judge and redeemer, important concepts in the self-definition of early Christianity. 
Though the Scriptures are not used as much by some authors because of the apologetic 




The extant documents of Justin Martyr are early examples of Christian 
apologetics. His First Apology along with a shorter Second Apology and an extended 
Dialogue with Trypho are his main works.1 There are several other of Justin’s known 
works that are no longer extant.2 
                                                 
1See Altaner, 121-123; Cross, The Early Christian Fathers, 49-53; Erwin R. 
Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr: An Investigation into the Conceptions of 
Early Christian Literature and Its Hellenistic and Judaistic Influences, Reprint of 1923 
ed. (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968), 80-100; Quasten, 198-204. 
2See Altaner, 123-124; Claudio Moreschini and Enrico Norelli, Early Christian 
Greek and Latin Literature: A Literary History, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell, vol. 1 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2005), 202-203; Quasten, 204-207; Oskar Skarsaune, 





Usage of Psyche 
Justin seems to employ soul to refer to physical life when he writes that one 
should be a lover of truth even before one’s life.3 It does not appear to make sense if this 
usage of soul is interpreted as a separate existence from the body. 
Justin also uses soul to refer to an individual. He writes “that it was justly 
recorded concerning the people, that the soul which shall not be circumcised on the 
eighth day shall be cut off from his family.”4 In a similar usage, he writes “that the word 
of God speaks to those who believe in Him as being one soul, and one synagogue, and 
one church.”5 He seems to be drawing upon a concept of the simpleness of the soul as a 
metaphor for the singleness of those who are believers in Christ.6 
The concept of soul as a thinking agent is also used by Justin. He writes that 
“because we are well aware that it is not easy suddenly to change a soul possessed by 
ignorance, we intend to add a few things, for the sake of persuading those who love the 
                                                 
“Justin Martyr,” Dictionary of Early Christian Literature, 357. 
3“πρὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς.” Apologia 2.1.6. 
4“ἐξολοθρευθήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη ἐκ τοῦ γένους αὐτῆς, ἣ οὐ 
περιτμηθήσεται τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ὀγδόῃ.” Dialogus cum Tryphone 23.4.6. The word soul 
is not in either the Hebrew or Latin text of Gen 17:12-14 to which this passage must 
allude where “every male” is used. Thus Justin uses soul to refer to any male Israelite 
person. 
5“ καὶ ὅτι τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύουσιν, ὡς οὖσι μιᾷ ψυχῇ καὶ μιᾷ 
συναγωγῇ καὶ μιᾷ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ λέγει.” Ibid., 63.5.4. 
6In a somewhat different usage, Justin can also accuse Trypho and the Jewish 
teachers of believing that God is a composite being, believing that He “has hands and 
feet, and fingers, and a soul.” Ibid., 114.3.4. Here the soul, when combined with the 
various bodily members, indicates a composite being. 
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truth.”7 Here one’s soul has the mental capacity to hold tightly to ignorance. He also 
writes of a “well-conditioned soul.”8 In addition, Justin mentions a Pythagorean 
philosopher who told him that he should study those branches of learning which “wean 
the soul from sensible objects.”9 These usages suggest a mental capacity in Justin’s 
understanding of the soul. 
Justin writes of the soul as a place of desire by describing a time “when my soul 
was eagerly desirous.”10 He writes regarding his conversion that “straightway a flame 
was kindled in my soul.”11 He also urges Trypho to “abandon” hope from his soul12 
concerning salvation by virtue of being Abraham’s seed. He also writes of the baptism of 
the “soul from wrath and from covetousness, from envy, and from hatred.”13 In this 
context, he describes the actions of the body as distinct from the sins of the soul. These 
sins which the soul commits, then, are understood as occurring inside of one’s self rather 
than as external actions of the body. Thus the soul, for Justin, is capable of a wide variety 
                                                 
7“ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ γνωρίζομεν οὐ ῥᾷον ἀγνοίᾳ κατεχομένην ψυχὴν συντόμως 
μεταβάλλειν.” Apologia 12.11.3. 
8“ἀπείη δὲ σωφρονούσης ψυχῆς ἔννοια τοιαύτη περὶ θεῶν.” Ibid.,  
21.5.1. While σωφρονέω may be understood as a person who has their right mental 
faculties about them, in Justin it can also have a moral sense. For this, see ibid., 14.2; 
15.1. 
9“ἃ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν περισπάσει.” Dialogus cum Tryphone 
2.4.8. 
10“τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔτι μου σπαργώσης.” Ibid., 2.4.1 
11“ἐμοῦ δὲ παραχρῆμα πῦρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνήφθη.” Ibid., 8.1.3. 
12“ὡς τεμόντας ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν τὴν ἐλπίδα ταύτην 
σπουδάσαι δεῖ ἐπιγνῶναι.” Ibid., 44.4.2. 
13“βαπτίσθητε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀπὸ πλεονεξίας, ἀπὸ φθόνου, 
ἀπὸ μίσους.” Ibid., 14.2.2. This idea of cleansing by water for sins of the soul is 
repeated again in ibid., 18.2.2. A soul purified from sin is also mentioned in ibid., 41.1.5. 
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of desires, ranging from the positive feelings of a new convert to Christianity, to the evil 
desires and wickedness of a sinner. 
Justin has one example of the concept “the eyes of the soul” found elsewhere in 
the philosophers and early Church Fathers. In commenting on Jacob’s marriage to two 
sisters, Justin asserts that it happened as a typological event, rather than as an example to 
be imitated by later generations. Leah represents Israel and Rachel represents the Church. 
Leah, Justin writes, was weak-eyed, “for the eyes of your souls are excessively weak.”14 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Justin conceives of the human person as consisting of both body and soul.15 An 
example is seen when he describes Christ’s incarnation. He writes, “Christ, who appeared 
for our sakes, became the whole rational being, both body, and reason, and soul.”16 
Reason seems added here to the body and soul specifically in reference to Christ as Justin 
is well-known for his logos Christology. 
Justin argues that the soul after death has sensation.17 He describes people 
                                                 
14“Λείας ἀσθενεῖς ἦσαν οἱ ὀφθαλμοί∙ καὶ γὰρ ὑμῶν σφόδρα οἱ τῆς 
ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμοί.” Dialogus cum Tryphone 134.5.6. Cf. Paul’s metaphor in Gal 4 of 
Sarah and Hagar. Justin also uses the phrase “eyes of the mind.” Ibid., 4.1. Cf Eph 1:18. 
15Ayán Calvo, 91-92. For discussions on whether Justin held to a dichotomy or 
trichotomy of the human person, see Ayán Calvo, 93-101; Leslie W. Barnard, Justin 
Martyr: His Life and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 113-114; 
Goodenough, 219-220, 240-241; Eric F. Osborn, Justin Martyr, Beiträge zur historischen 
Theologie 47, ed. Gerhard Ebeling (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973), 145-147; Pierre 
Prigent, Justin et l’Ancien Testament (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1964), 59-60.  
16“τὰ ἡμέτερα διὰ τοῦ τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον τὸν φανέντα δι᾽ ἡμᾶς 
Χριστὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχήν.” Apologia Secunda 10.1.4. 
17Ayán Calvo notes that for Justin, though the soul does survive the death of the 
body, yet it does not retain then the notion of anthropos. As already noted, both body and 
soul are required for a human person. See Ayán Calvo, 92, 102. 
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“calling human souls”18 and those who are “thrown down by the souls of the dead”19 as 
practices in pagan culture that should convince his readers to accept the Christian notion 
of a sentient soul after death.20 He argues that if there is no sensation after death, this 
would be a godsend to the wicked.21 Justin here connects the notion of a continued state 
of sensation after death for souls with the necessity of a future judgment. 
Justin allows that there is a similarity to this notion as taught by some of the 
philosophers. He writes that when “we affirm that the souls of the wicked, being 
endowed with sensation even after death, are punished, and that those of the good being 
delivered from punishment spend a blessed existence, we shall seem to say the same 
things as the poets and philosophers.”22  
As an explanation for this shared idea, Justin discusses the origins of the doctrine 
                                                 
18“καὶ ψυχῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κλήσεις.” Apologia 18.3.2. 
19“καὶ οἱ ψυχαῖς ἀποθανόντων λαμβανόμενοι καὶ ῥιπτούμενοι 
ἄνθρωποι.” Ibid., 18.4.2. The throwing of persons by the souls of the dead seems to 
have a connection with the people possessed by evil spirits in the Gospel accounts. 
20“ὅτι καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ἐν αἰσθήσει εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαί.” Ibid., 8.3.5. 
21Ibid., 18.1.2. Cf. ibid., 57. Goodenough, in comparing this statement with 
Dialogus cum Tryphone 45.4 where Justin writes, “some are sent to be punished 
unceasingly into judgment and condemnation of fire; but others shall exist in freedom 
from suffering, from corruption, and from grief, and in immortality,” sees a contradiction 
which he says means that it is impossible to know Justin’s teaching about the state of 
souls after death. Goodenough, 224. 
22“τῷ δὲ κολάζεσθαι ἐν αἰσθήσει καὶ μετὰ θάνατον οὔσας τὰς τῶν 
ἀδίκων ψυχάς, τὰς δὲ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀπηλλαγμένας τῶν τιμωριῶν εὖ 
διάγειν, ποιηταῖς καὶ φιλοσόφοις τὰ αὐτὰ λέγειν δόξομεν.” Apologia 20.4. It is 
worth noting that Justin makes it clear that this doctrine “seems” to be the same as that of 
the poets and philosophers, thus giving the impression that there is not an exact 
correspondence. Young attempts to connect this with Dialogue with Trypho 117.3 to 
argue unconvincingly that Justin believed in an interim state where souls would be 
punished before receiving the eternal punishment after the judgment. M. O. Young, 
“Justin Martyr and the Death of Souls,” Studia Patristica 16 pt 2 (1985): 211-212. 
 
89 
of immortality among the Christians and philosophers.23 He writes, “For Moses is more 
ancient than all the Greek writers. And whatever both philosophers and poets have said 
concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of 
things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from 
the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things.”24 While he 
admits that the philosophers may have seen truth in their teaching relating to such 
doctrines as the immortality of the soul, he insists that the origin and true understanding 
of such teaching are found only in the prophets.25 In his Dialogue with Trypho, Justin 
discusses the soul and he acknowledges there that some think that it is immortal and 
immaterial.26 
Justin adds scriptural proofs to the idea of a sentient soul after death. In the 
context of discussing Christ’s death, Justin again brings up the idea of the soul surviving 
the death of the body. He argues that the soul can be possessed by demons at death. 
                                                 
23Barnhard argues that Justin believed in an immortal soul. Barnard, Justin 
Martyr, 113. As will be demonstrated, this does not appear to be the case. So Ayán 
Calvo, 92-93; Osborn, Just Martyr, 145; M. Young, 211. 
24“καὶ πάντα, ὅσα περὶ ἀθανασίας ψυχῆς ἢ τιμωριῶν τῶν μετὰ 
θάνατον ἢ θεωρίας οὐρανίων ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων δογμάτων.” Apologia 44.9.2. On the 
immortality of the soul, see Carl Andresen, “Justin und der mittlere Platonismus,” ZNW 
44 (1952-1953): 162. 
25Cf. Osborn, Justin Martyr, 17-19. On this point, Osborn notes that while it can 
be said that the source of Justin’s theology is Scripture and Plato, because Justin 
conceives of the truth of the philosophers as coming from their reading of the prophets, 
thus one can say that Justin conceived of his theology as coming from Scripture alone. 
Osborn then shows that though Justin may have believed this to be the case, he did in fact 
use ideas which were more platonic that scriptural. Justin states that when contradictions 
are found in the philosophers concerning these teachings, it is because they do not have 
the full light of truth or Christ. 
26“ἄλλοι δέ τινες, ὑποστησάμενοι ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχήν.” 
Dialogus cum Tryphone 1.5.7. 
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Taking Ps 22 to be a prayer of Jesus, he states regarding v. 20, “And the prayer that His 
soul should be saved from the sword, and lion’s mouth, and hand of the dog, was a prayer 
that no one should take possession of His soul: so that, when we arrive at the end of life, 
we may ask the same petition from God.”27 In this understanding, the soul can be 
overcome by demonic forces at death. It is then necessary that the person pray to God to 
avoid this demonic possession. As further biblical support of this theory, Justin cites the 
episode from 1 Sam 28:12-13 of Saul going to see the Witch of Endor to ask advice of 
the deceased prophet Samuel. Justin claims that Samuel’s soul appeared when beckoned 
by the medium, thus adding further proof that demonic forces have power over the soul 
of a dead believer. He also cites Luke 23:46 where Christ states, “Father, into Thy hands 
I commend my spirit.” Justin uses these three instances to prove biblically that the soul 
does survive the grave and that, in fact, demons have a degree of power over the soul 
after death. 
This concept of a sentient soul after the death of the body is intended to support 
the idea that, in harmony with what Plato had said about Rhadamanthus and Minos, the 
wicked would be punished with their soul united again to the body.28 The punishment is 
to be eternal fire suffered by the soul and the body rather than for only a period of one 
thousand years as reported by Plato. As support for the teaching of punishment for both 
soul and body, Justin quotes Matt 10:28, “Fear not them that kill you, and after that can 
                                                 
27Dialogus cum Tryphone 105.3. 
28“καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς σώμασι μετὰ τῶν ψυχῶν γινομένων.” Apologia 8.4.4. 
Ayán Calvo notes that it is on the basis of this text that some conclude that Justin’s 
understanding of the human person exhibits a dichotomy composed of body and soul 
rather than a trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit. Ayán Calvo, 93. 
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do no more; but fear Him who after death is able to cast both soul and body into hell.”29 
This is his first quotation of Scripture in support of the doctrine of punishment of the 
wicked used in the context of a teaching on the soul, namely that it will be reunited with 
the body.30 
In his Dialog with Trypho, Justin states clearly that one’s soul does not go straight 
to heaven upon the death of the body.31 Rather, there will be a resurrection of the dead at 
                                                 
29Apologia 19.7.3 
30Note Justin’s statement, “Since we expect to receive again our own bodies, 
though they be dead and cast into the earth,” in First Apology 18 and also “So also judge 
ye that it is not impossible that the bodies of men, after they have been dissolved, and like 
seeds resolved into earth, should in God’s appointed time rise again and put on 
incorruption,” in First Apology 19. In both of these statements, Justin clearly states that 
the souls of the saved will be reunited with their bodies for eternal salvation. Later he 
writes, “And while we affirm that the souls of the wicked, being endowed with sensation 
even after death, are punished, and that those of the good being delivered from 
punishment spend a blessed existence, we shall seem to say the same things as the poets 
and philosophers” (Apologia 20.4.5). Here he mentions only the soul’s salvation for the 
saved and the soul’s damnation for the lost, failing to mention the body in regard to 
either. Compare the above statements with others regarding the punishment of the wicked 
where he first states, “We believe . . . that every man will suffer punishment in eternal 
fire according to the merit of his deed,” in the First Apology 17 and again “Since 
sensation remains to all who have ever lived and eternal punishment is laid up,” in First 
Apology 18 and finally, “And hell is a place where those are to be punished who have 
lived wickedly, and who do not believe that those things which God has taught us by 
Christ will come to pass” Apologia 19. In none of these statements does Justin refer to the 
soul being rejoined to the body prior to its punishment. In First Apology 8.4.4, he does 
indicate that the bodies of the wicked will be joined to their souls for punishment. Ayán 
Calvo, on the basis of this last statement, also indicates that Justin believes the soul of the 
wicked will be reunited with the body for punishment. See Ayán Calvo, 92.  
31“οἳ καὶ λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν, ἀλλὰ ἅμα τῷ 
ἀποθνήσκειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν.” Dialogus 
cum Tryphone 80.4. In stating this, Justin acknowledges that there are some so-called 
Christians who teach this. Cf. Bardo Weiss, “Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele als 
eschatologisches Heilsgut nach Origenes,” Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift 80 (1971): 
157-158. Weiss argues this means that Justin does not allow for an immediate happiness 
for the soul after death. As other authors argue for at least a measure of bliss during the 
intermediate period, Weiss seems to overstate what Justin is arguing for. 
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a future time which will be followed by a millennial reign in the earthly Jerusalem. It is 
unclear if here Justin intends that the soul should be understood to be dead or residing in 
some place other than heaven. In this next section, Justin’s ideas on the soul, as expressed 
in his reported discussion with a elderly Christian during his conversation with Trypho 
the Jew, are studied. 
In the Dialogue with Trypho, the soul receives special attention in the opening 
chapters dealing with Justin’s conversion from philosophy to Christianity.32 In these 
chapters, care must be taken to distinguish ideas regarding the soul which are spoken by 
Justin’s elderly interlocutor, from those of Justin before his conversion to Christianity 
and from those of Justin after his conversion.33 Some scholars seem to ignore this 
altogether, using anything admitted by Justin or stated by his elderly Christian 
interlocutor during the conversation which precipitated Justin’s conversion as being 
Justin’s own doctrine.34 
An example of this difficulty is found in the first chapter of the dialogue. Justin 
notes that there are some who “having supposed the soul to be immortal and immaterial, 
believe that though they have committed evil they will not suffer punishment (for that 
                                                 
32On the identity of Trypho and authenticity of the dialogue, see Timothy J. 
Horner, Listening to Trypho: Justin Martyr’s Dialogue Reconsidered (Leuven: Peeters, 
2001), 15-32. 
33On Justin’s conversion, see Oskar Skarsaune, “The Conversion of Justin 
Martyr,” Studia Theologica 30, no. 1 (1976): 53-73. 
34Cf. Ayán Calvo, 89-92. Some scholars use this section of the Dialogue primarily 
to show Justin’s philosophical mind-set in Middle Platonism. Cf. Barnard, Justin 
Marthyr, 27-38; Goodenough, 57-71; Manfred Hoffmann, Der Dialog bei den 
christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten Vier Jarhunderte (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 
11-12. This has value, but then one must ask what its purpose is in the Dialogue. Cf. Joly, 




which is immaterial is insensible), and that the soul, in consequence of its immortality, 
needs nothing from God.”35 Here Justin is discussing the ideas of others and does not 
explicitly give his view. It is only from tracing the arguments in the next several chapters 
that it becomes apparent that Justin does not support the idea that the soul is immortal and 
therefore it does need something from God, which consequently means it does matter 
whether one acts in a good or evil manner. Following this, it is implicitly implied that the 
soul is not divine in origin and thus needs immortality from God. This notion then sets up 
the rest of the introductory dialogue describing Justin’s conversion which he relates to 
Trypho. 
Chapter 4 of the Dialogue begins with the several questions asked by an elderly, 
Christian interlocutor, whom the unconverted Justin met while walking alone by the sea. 
The main topic of the inquiry is the soul and how the mind is able to see God. In this 
conversation, the unnamed mans asks, “Is the soul also divine and immortal?”36 Justin 
replies affirmatively. Then he asked if the souls of humans and animals are of the same 
kind or different. Justin replies that they are similar.37 His interlocutor then asks if the 
souls of animals shall see God, to which Justin replies negatively, asserting also that not 
                                                 
35“ἄλλοι δέ τινες, ὑποστησάμενοι ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχήν, 
οὔτε κακόν τι δράσαντες ἡγοῦνται δώσειν δίκην (ἀπαθὲς γὰρ τὸ ἀσώματον), 
οὔτε, ἀθανάτου αὐτῆς ὑπαρχούσης, δέονταί τι.” Dialogus cum Tryphone 1.5.7. 
36“ἢ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ θεία καὶ ἀθάνατός ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ 
βασιλικοῦ νοῦ μέρος.” Ibid., 4.2.2. 
37On Justin’s connection between ψυχή and νοῦς βασιλικός, see Goodenough, 
65-66. Goodenough is one of the few scholars who seeks to find a dividing line between 
Justin’s thought in Platonism and the subsequent change with his conversion to 
Christianity. Goodenough does not attempt, however, to clearly distinguish between the 
two and in his discussion on chapter 5 will fail to make any distinction between the ideas 
of Justin and that of his interlocutor. 
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all men will see God either, only the just and righteous. Justin’s interlocutor then points 
out that this must not be on account of the affinity of the human soul with God that a 
person can apprehend God, or else all humans, or even all animals would be able to do 
so. The interlocutor asks Justin if the soul can see God while in the body or without. 
Justin admits that it can while in the body by means of the mind but “especially when it 
has been set free from the body.” The interlocutor then asks if anyone can remember this 
when they are back in the body. Justin admits that they cannot. The interlocutor in 
conclusion asks if those who do not receive this vision and are reincarnated as beasts are 
able to know the reason for their situation. Again Justin admits that they do not. The 
conclusion is thus admitted that souls cannot see God and there is no reincarnation of 
souls from one body to another. 
Chapter 5 of the Dialogue begins with the conclusion that the philosophers do not 
know anything about the soul. The interlocutor then states, “Nor ought it [the soul] to be 
called immortal; for if it is immortal, it is plainly unbegotten.”38 This is an important 
premise in Justin. That is, he understands that to be immortal means to be unbegotten. It 
does not refer only to the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body. 
Arguing from the accepted premise that the world is begotten, the interlocutor declares 
that the soul is also begotten and thus not immortal.39 He quickly clarifies what the 
                                                 
38“Οὐδὲ μὴν ἀθάνατον χρὴ λέγειν αὐτήν.” Dialogus cum Tryphone 5.1. See 
Gregory Telepneff, “The Concept of the Person in the Christian Hellenism of the Greek 
Church Fathers: A Study of Origen, St. Gregory the Theologian, and St. Maximos the 
Confessor” (Th.D. diss., Graduate Theological Union, 1991), 140. On this basis, 
Telepneff argues that Justin does not hold to the notion of an immortal soul. See also 
Ayán Calvo, 92-93. 
39Cf. Barnard, Justin Martyr, 34. Here Barnard is indicative of those scholars who 
fail to make any distinction between the sayings attributed to Justin and his Christian 
interlocutor, attributing both to Justin’s thought. 
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implications are for this. “But I do not say, indeed, that all souls die; for that were truly a 
piece of good fortune to the evil. What then? The souls of the pious remain in a better 
place, while those of the unjust and wicked are in a worse, waiting for the time of 
judgment. Thus some which have appeared worthy of God never die; but others are 
punished so long as God wills them to exist and to be punished.”40 Here again Justin 
argues that if the soul were to die, this would be a benefit to evil doers. This is used as 
support for the future existence of the soul. Throughout the rest of chapter 5, Justin 
reiterates his understanding to the interlocutor that immortality belongs to God alone and 
thus everything created may cease to exist. In this chapter, Justin changes his mind from 
the previous one. Having there stated that the soul is immortal, he is now, at the 
prompting of his interlocutor, seen to be arguing quite the opposite. However, urged on 
by the necessity of a future judgment, he argues that souls do not die at the death of the 
body. Rather, they are saved for the judgment. 
Chapter 6 of the Dialogue offers another argument against the immortality of the 
soul. Justin’s elderly interlocutor states that either the soul is life or it has life.41 If it is 
life, then it would cause something else to be alive. As no one denies that the soul lives,42 
                                                 
40“ Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκειν φημὶ πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγώ.” Dialogus 
cum Tryphone 5.3. Cf. Apologia Secunda 7.1. Goodenough sees Justin’s appeal to 
“practical expediency” as a fairly weak argument for setting aside the ability of the soul 
to obtain a vision of God and the doctrine of reincarnation. He notes, however, that this 
was acceptable as a legitimate philosophical argument in Justin’s time and was thus 
probably more acceptable to Justin’s contemporaries than it appears to modern scholars. 
Goodenough, 66-68. Joly notes that Justin is unique in suggesting the end of the 
punishment of the wicked, though citing several similar ideas. Joly, Christianisme et 
philosophie: etudes sur Justin et les apologistes grecs du deuxième siècle, 51-52. 
41“ἡ ψυχὴ ἤτοι ζωή ἐστιν ἢ ζωὴν ἔχει.” Dialogus cum Tryphone 6.1. 
42“ὅτι δὲ ζῇ ψυχή, οὐδεὶς ἀντείποι.” Ibid., 6.1. 
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it must follow that the soul has life and thus lives as long as God wills it to.43 The 
interlocutor thus reasons regarding the soul: “For to live is not its attribute, as it is God’s; 
but as a man does not live always, and the soul is not for ever conjoined with the body, 
since, whenever this harmony must be broken up, the soul leaves the body, and the man 
exists no longer; even so, whenever the soul must cease to exist, the spirit of life is 
removed from it, and there is no more soul, but it goes back to the place from whence it 
was taken.”44 
Justin ends his discussion on the soul here. There are two resultant issues that now 
need to be discussed. The first of these is to question what was Justin’s purpose in 
relating this extended discussion of the soul. The second is to attempt to discover which 
of the statements regarding the soul by the unconverted Justin and his Christian 
interlocutor may be taken as reflective of Justin’s mature theology. 
To answer why Justin inserts this long discussion on the soul, it is necessary to 
compare both the beginning of this pericope and its conclusion. This section begins with 
                                                 
43“ζωῆς δὲ ψυχὴ μετέχει, ἐπεὶ ζῆν αὐτὴν ὁ θεὸς βούλεται.” Dialogus cum 
Tryphone 6.1. On the idea of the soul having life rather than being life in ancient thought, 
see Joly, Christianisme et philosophie: etudes sur Justin et les apologistes grecs du 






χωρεῖ πάλιν.” Dialogus cum Tryphone 6.2. Cf. Weiss, 157. On this basis, Weiss states 
that Justin taught the doctrine of Thnetopsychismus. It should be noted that Justin argues 
that upon the death of the body and the separation of the soul from it, the person no 
longer exists. Here Justin mentions the place from which souls are taken. He does not 
elaborate on this location and its relation to the origin of souls. He clearly states 
elsewhere that they are begotten but he gives no clue as to when he understands this to 
have taken place, at birth: conception, or some time prior to this. On the idea of the 
“return” of the soul, see Osborn, Justin Martyr, 146-147. 
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Trypho’s desire to learn something of philosophy from Justin. Justin responds with a 
question, “‘And in what,’ said I, ‘would you be profited by philosophy so much as by 
your own lawgiver and the prophets?’” Trypho responds, “‘Why not? . . . Do not the 
philosophers turn every discourse on God? . . . Is not this truly the duty of philosophy, to 
investigate the Deity.” Justin then lists the ideas of several philosophical schools, 
concluding with the previously discussed statement of “those who supposed the soul to 
be immortal and immaterial” and therefore believe they are not responsible for any evil 
acts they might commit and therefore have no need of the divine.45 What this 
demonstrates is that Justin connects the desire of Trypho to know God with the 
philosophic schools that claim that you can know God by knowing the soul because the 
soul is divine. Justin rejects this view. This exchange sets up the story that follows in 
which Justin relays his journey through the various philosophical schools of his day46 and 
concludes with an extended discussion between Justin and the elderly, Christian 
interlocutor, who is the one who leads Justin to convert to Christianity. 
Justin begins by telling his interlocutor that philosophy brings happiness, and 
philosophy itself is the knowledge “of that which really exists and a clear perception of 
the truth.”47 Justin is then asked to define God to which he answers, “That which always 
maintains the same nature, and in the same manner, and is the cause of all other things.” 
Then his interlocutor presses Justin regarding knowledge and how one could come to a 
knowledge of God. He ends by asking Justin, “How then . . . should the philosophers 
                                                 
45Dialogus cum Tryphone 1.5.7. 
46See Barnard, Justin Martyr, 27-38; Goodenough, 58-63. 
47Dialogus cum Tryphone 4. 
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judge correctly about God . . . when they have no knowledge of Him?”48 It is from this 
conclusion that the interlocutor leads Justin into a discussion of the soul, attempting, 
finally, to demonstrate that the soul is not capable of knowing God uninstructed by the 
Holy Spirit. Chapters 5 through 7 of the Dialogue may therefore be seen as 
demonstrating that the human soul is not capable of knowing the divine by itself. 
The argument against the immortality of the soul is prompted by the Christian 
whom Justin meets while walking by the sea. Thus one can rightly ask which, if any, of 
these statements arguing against the immortality of the soul may be attributed to the 
thought of Justin as well. The problem with disregarding this interpretation of the soul’s 
immortality is that Justin never refutes the conclusions of his interlocutor that the soul is 
not immortal. In fact, several of the statements regarding the non-immortality of the soul 
are spoken by Justin himself throughout the course of the conversation with his 
interlocutor.49 While some might argue that he was simply answering a question in the 
midst of a somewhat Socratic style of conversation rather than making a statement of 
doctrine or belief, such a conclusion still seems to lack an explanation of why the 
conversation on the immortality of the soul is left in the state it is, that of the accepted 
conclusion that the soul is not immortal. Later, Justin states to Trypho, his Jewish 
interlocutor, “Wherefore, Trypho, I will proclaim to you, and to those who wish to become 
proselytes, the divine message which I heard from that man.”50 This would further suggest 
Justin’s high level of confidence in the message of his Christian interlocutor. 
                                                 
48Dialogus cum Tryphone 4. 
49Cf. Ibid., 5. There Justin is asked in reference to human souls, “They are not, 






Justin has a fairly wide, though typical, usage of soul. It encompasses one’s life, 
person, and location of feelings and desires. It also is seen as a psychological entity that 
separates from the body and survives the death of the individual. 
Justin argues that the soul, though not immortal, survives the death of the 
individual. This is imperative to maintain the doctrine of a future judgment. The soul 
awaits the resurrection of the body at a future date, though not in heaven. At death, it is 
under threat from demonic forces. It may die according to the wish of God at a later point 
though no certainty is given regarding the final state of the souls of the wicked. 
Justin uses Matt 10:28 to support the notion of the punishment of the entire 
person, soul, and body. He cites Ps 22:20, 1 Sam 28:12-13, and Luke 23:46 to support the 
teaching of a continued existence of the soul after the death of the body. Both the Lukan 
passage and that from the Psalms refer initially to Christ and are referred then to 
humanity in general. Of note is that neither the witch of Endor story nor Christ’s 
utterance from the cross uses the word soul. Justin gives no exact reference to his belief 
that the soul suffers eternal punishment along with the body; however, it is clear he 
believes this to be the teaching of Scripture. While Justin uses it to defend the punishment 
of the body and soul together, Matt 10:28 is used by several subsequent Latin authors to 
defend the immortality of the soul. 
Tatian 
Tatian, a disciple of Justin Martyr, is an early example of a Christian writer who 
later in life was declared heretical.51 Though he is known to have written several 
                                                 
51Robert M. Grant, “The Heresy of Tatian,” Journal of Theological Studies 4 




documents, only his Exhortation to the Greeks and the Diatessaron are extant.52 The 
Diatessaron, however, though it may have been written in Greek, survives only in several 
translations.53 
 
Usage of Psyche 
In contrast to other writers, Tatian proposes a composite soul. He writes, “The 
human soul consists of many parts, and is not simple; it is composite.”54 This is because 
the soul is manifest throughout the body, holding it together.55 He writes additionally, 
“The bond of the flesh is the soul; that which encloses the soul is the flesh.”56 This latter 
part is similar to the notion of an entombed soul described by many other authors. 
Tatian chastises the Greeks because they use poetry to describe the “battles, and 
the amours of the gods, and the corruption of the soul.”57 In connection with the combat 
                                                 
Tatian: The Damaging Effects of Polemical Rhetoric,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 
16, no. 1 (2008): 1-30. 
52On his anthropology, see Martin Elze, Tatian und seine Theologie, Forschungen 
zur Krichen- und Dogmengeschichte 9 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1960), 
88-100; Molly Whittaker, Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments, Oxford Early 
Christian Texts, ed. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), xvi. 
53There is some dispute of whether it was originally written in Syriac or Greek. 
Peter Bruns, “Tatian the Syrian,” DECL, 552; Cross, The Early Christian Fathers, 66-68; 
Moreschini and Norelli, 205; Quasten, 224-225. 
54“ψυχὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολυμερής ἐστι καὶ οὐ μονομερής. 




σαρκὸς ψυχή, σχετικὴ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ σάρξ.” Ibid., 15.2. 
57“ποιητικὴν δέ, μάχας ἵνα συντάσσητε θεῶν καὶ ἔρωτας καὶ ψυχῆς 
διαφθοράν.” Oratio ad Graecos 1.4. 
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games of the gladiators, he writes, “You purchase men to supply a cannibal banquet for 
the soul, nourishing it by the most impious blood shedding.”58 By this, Tatian suggests a 
connection between the material world and the soul. Both the poetry regarding battles and 
the actual fights of the gladiators serve to bring about evil in the soul. 
The soul also may be subject to grief. Tatian writes that “grief does not consume 
my soul.”59 Later he also speaks of his soul having been taught by God.60 While the 
former speaks of emotions of the soul, the latter speaks to learning. Tatian also notes that 
souls among the Greeks are deceived by the demons through ignorance and false 
appearances.61 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Tatian views the human person as a composite of both body and soul. Both are 
required elements in order to speak of an individual. Tatian writes, “For neither could 
[the soul] ever appear by itself without the body, nor does the flesh rise again without the 
soul.”62 This dualism is one that is intimately linked together. The soul does not appear 
without the body and vice versa. The context for this discussion is the imago dei and the 
                                                 
58“θύετε ζῶα διὰ τὴν κρεωφαγίαν καὶ ἀνθρώπους ὠνεῖσθε τῇ ψυχῇ 
[διὰ] τὴν ἀνθρωποσφαγίαν παρεχόμενοι, τρέφοντες αὐτὴν αἱματεκχυσίαις 
ἀθεωτάταις.” Ibid., 23.2. 
59“λύπη μου τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀναλίσκει.” Ibid., 11.1. 





συνθετὴ γάρ ἐστιν ὡς εἶναι φανερὰν αὐτὴν διὰ σώματος.” Oratio ad Graecos 
15.1. See Fernández Ardanaz, El Mito, 44. 
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loss brought in by sin. 
Tatian describes the soul as joined to a spirit.63 This is similar to what Tatian 
writes later when he describes two spirits, one of which is called the soul and the other 
which he terms greater than the soul.64 The soul pervades the material, while the spirit 
that is greater than the soul is the divine spirit.65 Initially, humans possessed both of these 
spirits but after the fall, only the lower “soul” remained with the more divine spirit 
departing.66 This basic description represents the body, soul, and spirit tripartite view of 
the human person mentioned once by Paul in 1 Thess 5:23. Various authors throughout 
this era allude to it. The general plan argued for is that the soul needs to choose between 
the body which houses it and the Spirit which has been lost through the fall into sin. The 
result of this choice will ultimately determine one’s salvation or damnation. 
This is further illustrated by the following. Tatian declares that humans need to 
obtain what they once had but have since lost. This is the union of the soul with the Holy 
                                                 
63“πνεῦμα γὰρ τὸ διὰ τῆς ὕλης διῆκον, ἔλαττον ὑπάρχον τοῦ θειοτέρου 
πνεύματος, ὥσπερ δὲ ψυχῇ παρωμοιωμένον, οὐ τιμητέον ἐπ᾽ ἴσης τῷ τελείῳ 
θεῷ.” Oratio ad Graecos 4.2.10. Grant interprets Tatian as believing that the Holy Spirit 
had originally been given to humans, referred to in the image and likeness of God from 
Gen 1:26 and that this had been lost and would be gained later by the saved to produce 
immortality. Robert M. Grant, “Tatian and the Bible,” Studia Patristica 1 (1957): 300, 
304. Cf. Elze, 96. Grant’s proposal of the lost image of God through the Holy Spirit may 
correspond in some ways to the later notion of Origen regarding the change from nous to 
psyche. 
64“Δύο πνευμάτων διαφορὰς ἴσμεν ἡμεῖς, ὧν τὸ μὲν καλεῖται ψυχή, τὸ 
δὲ μεῖζον μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς, θεοῦ δὲ εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωσις.” Oratio ad Graecos 12.1.2.  
65It has been noted that for Tatian, the soul has a feminine connotation while the 
higher spirit is understood in masculine terms. Fernández Ardanaz, El Mito, 159. 
66See Daley, 22; William L. Petersen, “Tatian the Assyrian,” in A Companion to 
Second-Century Christian ‘Heretics’, ed. Antti Marjanen et al., Supplements to Vigiliae 
Christianae Formerly Philosophia Patrum Texts and Studies of Early Christian Life and 
Language (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 150. 
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Spirit and thus with God.67 Tatian elsewhere makes a similar point. In a statement that 
has caused confusion for translators he states, “We, however, have learned things which 
were unknown to us, through the teaching of the prophets, who, being fully persuaded 
that the heavenly spirit along with the soul will acquire a heavenly clothing of mortality, 
foretold things which other minds were unacquainted with.”68 Another translation is, “We 
have learned that, of which we were ignorant, through the Prophets; who, being 
persuaded that the Spirit together with the soul will receive immortality—the heavenly 
covering of mortality.”69 The latter translation seems to fit better the context and point 
that Tatian is making. It would imply that the spirit that is received by the soul from 
above becomes part of it, even to the point of receiving immortality with it. Either way, 
the point is clear that the soul must be joined with the spirit in reaching immortality. 
Tatian concludes, “But it is possible for every one who is naked to obtain this apparel, 
and to return to its ancient kindred.”70 In some ways this seems to argue for prior 
existence of the soul. Or perhaps, Tatian is thinking of all souls at least metaphorically 
participating in Adam and his fall. It does seem that the clothing referred to by Tatian 
makes more sense if it is understood as immortal rather than mortal. This then would 
                                                 
67“Καὶ χρὴ λοιπὸν ἡμᾶς ὅπερ ἔχοντες ἀπολωλέκαμεν τοῦτο νῦν 
ἀναζητεῖν ζευγνύναι τε τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ καὶ τὴν κατὰ θεὸν 
συζυγίαν πραγματεύεσθαι.” Oratio ad Graecos 15.1.2. On the proposed identity of 
the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, see Ioann. Carol. Theod. von Otto, Tatiani oratio ad 
Graecos (Wiesbaden: Sändig, 1969), 60n1. 
68“οἵτινες ἅμα τῇ ψυχῇ πεπεισμένοι ὅτι πνεῦμα τὸ οὐράνιον ἐπένδυμα 
τῆς θνητότητος τὴν ἀθανασίαν κεκτήσεται τὰ ὅσα μὴ ἐγίνωσκον αἱ λοιπαὶ 
ψυχαί, προὔλεγον.” Oratio ad Graecos 20.2. 
69John Kaye, Some Account of the Writings and Opinions of Justin Martyr, 3d ed. 
(London: Francis and John Rivington, 1853), 188. 
70Oratio ad Graecos 20.2. 
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connect with the description given earlier in chap. 15 of the imago dei which was lost and 
which believers seek to regain. This notion of the soul needing to be joined to the 
superior spirit is part of Tatian’s understanding that the soul cannot be conceived of as 
divine. 
On the basis of John 1:5, Tatian describes the soul as darkness and preserved by 
the light of the spirit.71 He states that the soul does not sustain the spirit but rather the 
spirit sustains the soul.72 He writes, “The Logos, in truth, is the light of God, but the 
ignorant soul is darkness.”73 And then he states, “For the dwelling-place of the spirit is 
above, but the origin of the soul is from beneath.”74 The Spirit of God combines with 
“those who live justly and intimately combining with the soul, by prophecies it 
announced hidden things to other souls.”75 From this it is clear that for Tatian, the soul is 
not divine or immortal. In fact, Tatian notes that its origin is from below. 
Going back to Tatian’s discussion of the human person, he notes that it is this 
constituted entity in which the spirit of God will dwell, should one believe the truth. In 
                                                 
71On Tatian’s use of the Bible, see Robert M. Grant, Greek Apologists of the 
Second Century (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1988), 124-129. 
72“ψυχὴ γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὴ τὸ πνεῦμα ἔσωσεν, ἐσώθη δὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ.” Oratio 
ad Graecos 13.1.9.  
73“τὸ φῶς τὴν σκοτίαν κατέλαβεν ᾗ λόγος μέν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ φῶς, 
σκότος δὲ ἡ ἀνεπιστήμων ψυχή.” Ibid., 13.2.2. 
74“τοῦ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἄνω τὸ οἰκητήριον, τῆς δὲ κάτωθέν ἐστιν ἡ 
γένεσις.” Ibid., 13.2.7. This seems to echo Oratio ad Graecos 20.1.4 where he describes 








the discussion regarding how man bears the image of God, Tatian writes, “The perfect 
God is without flesh; but man is flesh. The bond of the flesh is the soul; that which 
encloses the soul is the flesh.”76 This clarifies the notion discussed earlier regarding the 
spirit which pervades matter and further confirms his understanding of the human person. 
Although Tatian does argue for the composite character of the human person, he 
also exhibits the negative dualistic understanding regarding matter. While discussing the 
nature of demons, he writes, “But matter desired to exercise lordship over the soul.”77 
This resulted in death and the loss of immortality. Here matter seems to describe the 
demons, in contrast to the Spirit of God. In the very least, the material world is clearly 
connected with sin and death. 
In the context of discussing demonic activity against people, Tatian writes, “But 
the demons who rule over men are not the souls of men; for how should these be capable 
of action after death? Unless man, who while living was void of understanding and 
power, should be believed when dead to be endowed with more of active power. But 
neither could this be the case.”78 One can conclude that this is in support of Tatian’s idea 
that the souls of the dead have dissolved and thus cannot be involved in demonic activity. 
He continues, “And it is difficult to conceive that the immortal soul, which is impeded by 
                                                 
76“ἄσαρκος μὲν οὖν ὁ τέλειος θεός, ἄνθρωπος δὲ σάρξ∙ δεσμὸς δὲ τῆς 
σαρκὸς ψυχή, σχετικὴ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ σάρξ.” Ibid., 15.2. On the notion of the 
image of God in Tatian, see A. G. Hamman, L’homme, image de Dieu: essai d’une 
anthropologie chrétienne dans l’Église des cinq premiers siècles (Paris: Desclée, 1987), 
41-42. 
77“τῆς γὰρ ὕλης καὶ πονηρίας εἰσὶν ἀπαυγάσματα, ὕλη δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς 
κατεξουσιάζειν ἠθέλησεν.” Oratio ad Graecos 15.3. 
78“Δαίμονες δὲ οἱ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιτάττοντες οὔκ εἰσιν αἱ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων ψυχαί. πῶς γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο δραστικαὶ καὶ μετὰ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν.” 
Oratio ad Graecos 16.1. 
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the members of the body, should become more intelligent when it has migrated from 
it.”79 While it may seem that Tatian here declares the soul to be immortal, it appears to be 
only for the sake of his argument and it is only declared so after death. However, he also 
writes, “But from us the things which are in the world are not hidden, and the divine is 
easily apprehended by us if the power that makes souls immortal visits us.”80 He adds as 
a further argument that it is difficult to understand how the soul could gain understanding 
by death when the soul is already inclined to follow the “deceptive scenic 
representations” of the demons while “impeded by the members of the body.” Seeing that 
Tatian can describe the soul as being made immortal makes for a clearer understanding of 
his famous statement which now becomes the focus of this study. 
Perhaps Tatian’s most well-known line on the soul is, “The soul is not in itself 
immortal, O Greeks, but mortal.”81 Thus begins chap. 13 of his Oration to the Greeks. In 
this context, however, he notes that it is possible for the soul not to die.82 He explains that 
the soul which knows God will not die, even though it may be dissolved for a time. Here 
knowledge of Tatian’s definition of death proves valuable. The soul which does not know 
God does dies and is dissolved with the body, only to be raised again with the body at the 
judgment to receive eternal punishment.83 What appears clear is that when Tatian says the 
                                                 
79“καὶ χαλεπὸν οἴεσθαι τὴν ἀθάνατον ‘ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν 
ἐμποδιζομένην.” Ibid., 16.1. 
80“καὶ ὑμῖν εὐκατάληπτον ἔσται τὸ θεῖον τῆς ἀπαθανατιζούσης τὰς 
ψυχὰς ὑμῖν προσελθούσης.” Ibid., 16.2. 
81“Οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθάνατος, ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, ἡ ψυχὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν, θνητὴ 
δέ.” Ibid., 13.1.9. 
82Cf. John 6:50. 
83Oratio ad Graecos 13.1.3-7. On the death of the soul along with the body, see 
Elze, 88. On Tatian’s definition of death, see Elze, 95. 
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soul is not immortal, he does so with the important caveat, “in itself.” Elsewhere, Tatian 
while discussing demons and their punishment alludes to human souls and their reward 
after death. He writes, “We, to whom it now easily happens to die, afterwards receive the 
immortal with enjoyment, or the painful with immortality.”84 This again displays how 
Tatian can redefine immortal depending on the context. 
In another place, in the midst of a chapter in which Tatian writes strongly against 
the teachings of the philosophers, he states that Aristotle does not believe in the 
immortality of the soul.85 Then to add to the controversy, Tatian states that though some 
Greeks may state that only the soul is immortal, yet he declares that the flesh also is 
immortal.86 This surely is said, though, in the context of its future state, after the 
resurrection. It seems clear that Tatian’s prior point—that the soul is dissolved after death 
and before the resurrection of the body and soul on judgment day and that, after the 
judgment, both the soul and body will receive either immortal happiness or immortal 
punishment87—would be his explanation for his statement that both the soul and the body 
are immortal. Thus it is not because of any innate natural immortality of either the soul or 
the flesh but rather according to the will of God.88 
 
                                                 
84Oratio ad Graecos 14. 
85“ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης τῆς ψυχῆς διαβάλλει τὴν ἀθανασίαν.” Ibid., 25.2. 
86“ ἀπαθανατίζεσθαι μόνην τὴν ψυχήν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τὸ σὺν αὐτῇ 
σαρκίον.” Ibid., 25.2. 
87Oratio ad Graecos 14. 




Tatian clearly believes that the soul is intimately connected with the body in the 
constitution of the human person. The soul is affected by the actions of the body and is 
the seat of temptation, grief, and learning. The soul itself is not divine in origin but is 
from below and thus not innately immortal. When perfect, it was joined to the Spirit. 
Having lost this, it is subject to the leadings of demons. Both soul and body dissolve at 
death and are reunited at the judgment to receive eternal rewards or eternal punishments. 
It is in this resurrected state that Tatian can write of the soul and body being immortal. 
As is seen with several of the Apologists, Tatian does not rely on explicit biblical 
references for his teaching. However, allusions to the imago dei, the inability of the souls 
of the dead to interact with the living, and the understanding of a future judgment and 
reward are all clear examples of biblical ideas used in shaping his doctrine of the soul. 
 
Theophilus 
Theophilus was from the city of Antioch. His only extant writing is a work 
composed of three letters written to a pagan friend and titled To Autolycus.89 Other works 
written by him are mentioned both in To Autolycus and by later writers including 
Eusebius and Jerome. His work is unique in that he does not mention Christ.90 
 
                                                 
89See Peter Pilhofer, “Theophilus of Antioch,” DECL, 573; Nicole Zeegers, 
“Theophilus von Antiochien,” Theologische Realenzyklopädie (2002), 3:370-371. 
90See J. Bentivegna, “A Christianity without Christ by Theophilus of Antioch,” 
Studia Patristica 13 (1975): 107-130. For a study of Theophilus’s life and works, see 
Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century, 140-174; Rick Rogers, Theophilus of 




Usage of Psyche 
Theophilus uses soul for life when he writes, “But the power of God is manifested 
in this, that out of things that are not He makes whatever He pleases; just as the bestowal 
of life and motion is the prerogative of no other than God alone.” 91 In a similar usage, he 
twice uses it for people. In reference to the biblical flood, he writes, “And he says that 
eight human beings (souls) were preserved in the ark.”92 He also uses the expression 
“wakened up in soul” which presumably means “came to one’s senses.”93 
Theophilus notes that the “the soul in man is not seen, being invisible to men, but 
is perceived through the motion of the body.”94 Thus Theophilus accepts the common 
understanding of the soul as a principle of movement and declares it to be invisible. 
Theophilus uses the phrase “eyes of the soul”95 which, he states, are able to see 
God, in contrast to the eyes of the body which can see only earthly objects. He also urges 
that a man should have a “pure soul.”96 
 
                                                 
91“καὶ τὸ ψυχὴν δοῦναι καὶ κίνησιν οὐχ ἑτέρου τινός ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μόνου 
θεοῦ.” Ad Autolycus 2.4.20. 
92“ὀκτὼ δέ φησιν τὰς πάσας ψυχὰς ἀνθρώπων ἐν τῇ κιβωτῷ 
διασεσῶσθαι.” Ibid., 3.19.3. See also “ὀκτὼ οὖν αἱ πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ ἀνθρώπων 
διεσώθησαν.” Ibid., 3.19.14. 
93“πλὴν ἐνίοτέ τινες τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκνήψαντες ἐξ αὐτῶν εἶπον ἀκόλουθα 
τοῖς προφήταις.” Ibid., 2.8.59. 
94“Καθάπερ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ βλέπεται, ἀόρατος οὖσα 
ἀνθρώποις, διὰ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ σώματος νοεῖται ἡ ψυχή.” Ibid., 1.5.1. 
95“τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς.” Ad Autolycus 1.2.3; 1.2.10; 1.2.12. 
96“οὕτως δεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔχειν καθαρὰν ψυχήν.” Ibid., 1.2.20. 
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Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
In describing the creation of man, Theophilus quotes Gen 2:7 and then concludes, 
“Whence also by most persons the soul is called immortal.”97 No explicit attempt is made 
to make clear the connection he sees between “and God made man of the dust of the 
earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul” and the 
conclusion that “Whence also by most persons the soul is called immortal.” Neither does 
he say if he agrees with “most persons,” presumably here implying most Christians, since 
he has just quoted from the Bible. He does, however, state that the Scriptures teach that 
the soul is immortal. Having earlier discussed immortality as one of God’s attributes, it 
seems reasonable to assume that Theophilus understood that it was through the breath of 
God that many hold that the soul is immortal.98 
Elsewhere Theophilus writes, “And Plato, who spoke much of the unity of God 
and of the soul of man, asserting that the soul is immortal, is not he himself afterwards 
found inconsistently with himself, to maintain that some souls pass into other men, and 




Ibid., 2.19.19. Rogers recognizes that Theophilus is somewhat tentative here. Rogers, 38, 
55. Cf. Juan P. Martin, “La antropologia de Filon y de Teofilo de Antioquia,” 
Salmanticensis 36, no. 1 (1989): 51-52; Nicole Zeegers, “La création de l’homme (Gn 
1,26) chez Théophile d’Antioche,” Vigiliae Christianae 30 (1976): 258-267. Theophilus, 
in this context, argues for human freedom in choosing death or immortality. See Nicole 
Zeegers, “Les trois cultures de Théophile d’Antioche,” in Les apologistes chrétiens et la 
culture Grecque (Paris: Beauchesne, 1998), 155. In Ad Autolycus 2.27, Theophilus 
discusses humanity’s immortality in the context of creation, indicating that originally, 
humans were neither mortal nor immortal but created with the power of choice. Based on 
Ad Autolycus 2.27, Weiss states that Theophilus did not teach the soul’s natural 
immortality. Weiss, 157. 




that others take their departure into irrational animals.”99 He clearly does not approve of 
Plato’s doctrine of transmigration, referring to it as “dreadful and monstrous,” but is one 
then to assume, since he was setting up opposite statements, that Theophilus agrees with 
the first statement quoted, namely that the soul is immortal? A compelling reason for this 
to be the case is not given. 
Theophilus writes that in order for the soul’s eyes to see God, they must be 
enabled to do so. He then points out that Autolycus’s eyes of the soul are diseased by sin 
and thus cannot see God.100 He later states that this is “because of the blindness of your 
soul, and the hardness of your heart.”101 Throughout this chapter, Theophilus has used the 
expression “the eyes of the soul” as that part of the human person which can see God. At 
the end though, he states, after listing many sins, that “to those who do these things God 
is not manifest” and then twice states, “All these things, then, involve you in 
darkness.”102 Here it is clear that the actions of the body affect the ability of the soul to 
see God. 
Elsewhere, Theophilus clarifies how one’s soul can see God. “For as the soul in 
man is not seen, being invisible to men, but is perceived through the motion of the body, 
so God cannot indeed be seen by human eyes, but is beheld and perceived through His 




ἀνθρώπους, ἐνίων δὲ καὶ εἰς ἄλογα ζῶα χωρεῖν.” Ibid., 3.7.15. 
100“ἔχεις ὑποκεχυμένους τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς σου ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἁμαρτημάτων.” Ibid., 1.2.17. 
101“διὰ τὴν τύφλωσιν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πήρωσιν τῆς καρδίας σου.” Ibid., 
1.7.9. 
102Ad Autolycus 1.2. 
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providence and works.”103 The perception of God that Theophilus refers to as possible for 
the soul is through acknowledging his creatorship of the world and work in it.104 He uses 
several metaphors to demonstrate that one can infer God’s existence from what one sees 
but one cannot behold God. It seems that this is what Theophilus means when he states 
that the eyes of the soul cannot behold God. Theophilus’s statement that Autolycus could 
not see God because of sin then makes sense in this understanding as his sin is what 
prevents him from perceiving God’s work in the world.105 
Theophilus adds another dimension to this idea, noting that God is perceived 
through the soul’s acceptance of Him as the creator. He writes, “When you have put off 
the mortal, and put on incorruption, then you will see God worthily. For God will raise 
your flesh immortal with your soul; and then, having become immortal, you will see the 
Immortal.”106 Here, it could be argued that Theophilus sees the mortal flesh as a 
hindrance to the soul in perceiving God in his fullness and that this will be taken away at 
the resurrection when the individual will put on immortality.107 




προνοίας καὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ βλέπεται” Ibid., 1.5.1-2. 
104See ibid., 1.4. 
105This seems to be further corroborated when, after listing all of the creative 
powers and works of God, Theophilus writes, “If you perceive these things, O man, 
living chastely, and holily, and righteously, you can see God. But before all, let faith and 
the fear of God have rule in thy heart, and then shall understand these things.” Ibid., 1.7. 
Thus seeing God is directly linked to living a holy life in faith and fear of God as the 
creator of the world. 
106“ὅταν ἀπόθῃ τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἐνδύσῃ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν, τότε ὄψῃ κατὰ 
ἀξίαν τὸν θεόν. ἀνεγείρει γάρ σου τὴν σάρκα ἀθάνατον σὺν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ θεός∙ 
καὶ τότε ὄψῃ γενόμενος ἀθάνατος τὸν ἀθάνατον.” Ad Autolycus 1.7.24. 
107Cf. Zeegers, “Theophilus von Antiochien,” 370. 
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Theophilus argued for the notion of sensation after death. He writes that while 
Homer did state, “Like fleeting vision passed the soul away,” he also said, “To Hades 
went the disembodied soul.”108 He quotes the two opposing statements to show that 
Homer changed his opinion on the notion of sensation (presumably the soul’s) after 
death, moving from the first opinion to the latter. Theophilus contends that Homer is only 
confirming what was said by the Hebrew prophets. The context suggests the conclusion 




Theophilus uses soul for life and for individuals. He holds that the soul is the 
principle of movement in the body and writes of the “eyes of the soul.” He teaches that 
the soul that is holy can perceive God in His works. He states that it is understood by 
many to be immortal, based upon Gen 2:7. The usage of Gen 2:7 in connection with the 
nature of the soul in the early Church Fathers begins with Theophilus. This verse is used 
by future authors for similar purposes. 
Theophilus argues for the soul’s sensation after death, connecting this with a 
future judgment. This is another key development in the doctrine of the soul. This 
connection between the reality of a future judgment and the consequent necessity that the 
dead be alive to receive their judgment is one that continues to appear in future authors. 
 
                                                 
108“Ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠΰτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται, ἐν ἑτέρῳ λέγει∙ Ψυχὴ 
δ᾽ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδόσδε βεβήκει.” Ad Autolycus 2.38.22-24. Theophilus was 




Athenagoras has two main documents extant. The first is A Plea for the Christians 
and the second is The Resurrection of the Dead.109 There has been some debate regarding 
the authenticity of the latter document.110 There is scant witness to him during the time 
period of the early Church. 
 
Usage of Psyche 
Athenagoras uses soul for natural life in the context of death. He uses it in 
combination with the body, as a reference to the life of the individual which was being 
sought by those persecuting Christians111 and also by itself, again in the context of 
persecution. He writes “that we shall suffer no such great evil here, even should our lives 
be taken from us, compared with what we shall there receive for our meek and 
benevolent and moderate life from the great Judge.”112 He also uses soul for one’s life 
outside of the context of persecution when he writes that the life of the king is in the hand 
of God.113 
                                                 
109See Leslie W. Barnard, “The Authenticity of Athenagoras’ De Resurrectione,” 
Studia Patristica 15, no. 1 (1984): 39-49; Bernard Pouderon, Athénagore d’Athènes: 
philosophe chrétien (Paris: Beauchesne, 1989), 19-114; William R. Schoedel, 
Athenagoras: Legatio and De Resurrectione (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1972), ix-xxxvi. 
On Athenagoras’s usage of Scripture, see Leslie W. Barnard, “Background of 
Athenagoras,” in Epektasis: mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 11-16. 
110See Peter Pilhofer, “Athenagoras,” DECL, 60. 
111“ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχάς.” Legatio 1.4. 
112“καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπιδιδόντες.” Legatio 3.2; “κἂν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμᾶς 
ἀφαιρῶνταί τινες.” Ibid., 12.1. See also Legatio 3.2. In Legatio 12, Athenagoras writes 
that those who equate death and sleep argue against the notion of a future judgment, tying 
this to a quotation from Homer’s Il. 16.672. 
113“βασιλέως γὰρ ψυχὴ ἐν χειρὶ θεοῦ.” Legatio 18.2. 
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Athenagoras, in describing the relationship between the body and soul, writes that 
the “soul [has] been fitted to the need of the body and to its experiences.”114 He also 
writes that what the body wants is to be “obedient to the reins of the soul, and guided by 
it as with a bridle.”115 This describes the close relationship that he sees between body and 
soul.116 In using this description of bridle and horse, he is reminiscent of Plato’s 
understanding, which is repeated in several future authors. 
For Athenagoras, the soul can also be where pleasure takes place. He writes, 
“Therefore, having the hope of eternal life, we despise the things of this life, even to the 
pleasures of the soul, each of us reckoning her his wife whom he has married according 
to the laws laid down by us, and that only for the purpose of having children.”117 It is of 
note that Athenagoras describes the marital intimacy as a pleasure of the soul rather than 
the body. This strongly suggests a perceived connection between the body and the soul. 
This statement must also take into account the following statement on desire and the soul. 
He writes, while defending the resurrection of the body, “How can it possibly be other 
than unjust for the soul to be judged by itself in respect of things towards which in its 
own nature it feels no appetite, no motion, no impulse, such as licentiousness, violence, 
                                                 
114“μάτην μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ συνήρμοσται τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδείᾳ.” De 
resurrectione 15.7. 
115“ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡνίαις ὑπεῖκον καὶ χαλιναγωγούμενον.” Ibid., 15.7. 
On this, see Leslie W. Barnard, “The Father of Christian Anthropology,” ZNW 63 (1972): 
258; Pouderon, 221. 
116Barnhard describes Athenagoras’s understanding as “a composite being of the 




μέχρι τοῦ παιδοποιήσασθαι.” Legatio 33.1. 
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covetousness, injustice, and the unjust acts arising out of these? For if the majority of 
such evils come from men’s not having the mastery of the passions which solicit 
them.”118 It is almost as if, on the one hand, he is describing a “theoretical” soul which 
has no contact with the material world, while on the other hand, admitting the close 
relationship that exists in the actual person compounded of both soul and body. This 
precise point is one the future authors will struggle with. In general, the consensus will be 
that the body is the source of desire and it is the soul’s job to control those desires 
temperately. It is clear from this discussion that Athenagoras has a dichotomous view of 
the human person, consisting of body and soul as two separate entities. 
In writing regarding the ability to reason, Athenagoras writes of “irrational and 
fantastic movements of the soul about opinions” producing a diversity of idols.119 Here it 
seems that the soul is responsible for thinking, though this thinking is of an irrational 
kind. In this context, he notes that “this happens to a soul especially when it partakes of 
the material spirit.”120 These “irrational and fantastic movements of the soul, then, give 
birth to empty visions in the mind.”121 Empty visions happen to souls who are “tender 
                                                 
118“ ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικον τὴν ψυχὴν κρίνεσθαι καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδ᾽ 
ἡντινοῦν ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν οὐκ ὄρεξιν οὐ κίνησιν οὐχ ὁρμήν, οἷον 
λαγνείας ἢ βίας ἢ πλεονεξίας [ἀδικίας].” De resurrectione 21.3. Cf. Leslie W. 
Barnard, “Athenagoras: De resurrectione: The Background and Theology of a Second 
Century Treatise on the Resurrection,” Studia Theologica 30, no. 1 (1976): 16-17. 
119“Τί οὖν; πρῶτα μὲν αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογοι καὶ ἰνδαλματώδεις περὶ τὰς 
δόξας κινήσεις ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλα εἴδωλα τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης ἕλκουσι, τὰ δὲ 
αὑταῖς ἀναπλάττουσιν καὶ κυοῦσιν.” Legatio 27.1. On the Stoic backgrounds of 
this, see Pouderon, 231. 
120“πάσχει δὲ τοῦτο ψυχὴ μάλιστα τοῦ ὑλικοῦ προσλαβοῦσα καὶ 
ἐπισυγκραθεῖσα πνεύματος.” Legatio 27.1. 
121“αἱ οὖν ἄλογοι αὗται καὶ ἰνδαλματώδεις τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις 
εἰδωλομανεῖς ἀποτίκτουσι φαντασίας.” Ibid., 27.2. 
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and susceptible” and who have no experience or knowledge of sound doctrines.122 The 
demons then take advantage of these movements of the soul to take control of one’s 
mind. Once this takes place, the demons “cause to flow into the mind empty visions as if 
coming from the idols and the statues; and when, too, a soul of itself, as being immortal, 
moves conformably to reason, either predicting the future or healing the present, the 
demons claim the glory for themselves.”123 Here Athenagoras connects the soul with the 
mind and attributes the immortal nature of the soul with the ability of the mind to think 
rationally. However, the soul can be moved in such a way that allows demons to control 
it. This then leads it to empty visions of idolatry. 
In a related statement, Athenagoras writes, “But as for those who are persuaded 
that nothing will escape the scrutiny of God, but that even the body which has ministered 
to the irrational impulses of the soul, and to its desires, will be punished along with it, it 
is not likely that they will commit even the smallest sin.”124 Here again, the soul is 
described as having irrational desires which are acted out by the body. 
Athenagoras uses the soul in the context of cleansing or purifying the individual 
of evil. He writes, “Who of them have so purged their souls as, instead of hating their 
enemies, to love them; and, instead of speaking ill of those who have reviled them . . . , to 




δόξαν καρποῦνται οἱ δαίμονες.” Ibid. See below for a futher discussion of 




τι ἁμαρτεῖν.” Legatio 36.2. 
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bless them.”125 Here, the soul seems clearly to be the locus of one’s good or evil 
intentions. In contrast to the picture given of the soul of unbelievers, he concludes his 
document with a description of the soul of believers, referring to them as “pious, gentle 
and temperate in spirit.”126 
In an interesting statement, Athenagoras describes the souls of the giants as the 
wicked demons who wander the earth.127 This idea is elaborated on but one might 
conclude that it is an example of Athenagoras’s belief in the reality of disembodied souls 
which have the ability to interact with living humans. 
In his tirade against the fables of the pagan gods, Athenagoras mockingly writes, 
“Let them have fleshly forms, but let not Aphrodite be wounded by Diomedes in her 
body . . . or by Ares in her soul.”128 Here, Athenagoras allows for a body and soul to be 
attributed to the gods of the pagans, but then questions how such a body and soul could 
be hurt. He notes that the pagans here have attributed body and soul to the gods but worse 
than this, they attributed desire to the gods. He also quotes Tales, the early Greek 
philosopher, as believing that the demons are those with souls and the heroes are “the 
separated souls of men, the good being the good souls, and the bad the worthless.”129  
                                                 
125“οὕτως ἐκκεκαθαρμένοι εἰσὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὡς ἀντὶ τοῦ μισεῖν τοὺς 
ἐχθροὺς ἀγαπᾶν.” Ibid., 11.3. 
126“δὲ ὅτι καὶ θεοσεβεῖς καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς κεκολασμένοι, τὴν 
βασιλικὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπινεύσατε.” Ibid., 37.1. 
127“καὶ αἱ τῶν γιγάντων ψυχαὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν κόσμον εἰσὶ πλανώμενοι 
δαίμονες.” Ibid., 25.1. Some want to connect the giants here with those found in Gen 
6:1-4. See ANF 2:142n3. 
128“ἢ ὑπὸ Ἄρεως τὴν ψυχ.” Legatio 21.3. On the influence on Athenagoras by 
philosophy and other writers of the time, see Barnard, “The Authenticity of Athenagoras’ 






Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Athenagoras seems to connect the soul with the breath of God.130 Though the 
creation account is not mentioned explicitly, and he is speaking in the context of pagan 
philosophers and poets, he does mention the afflatus or breath of God. He writes, “For 
poets and philosophers, as to other subjects so also to this, have applied themselves in the 
way of conjecture, moved, by reason of their affinity with the afflatus from God, each 
one by his own soul, to try whether he could find out and apprehend the truth.”131 
Athenagoras seems to connect one’s soul with the breath received from God in creation 
together with the ability to comprehend truth. He, however, makes it clear that the 
philosophers where not successful in their attempt because they did not learn about God 
from God Himself as the prophets did. Therefore the reader is left unclear exactly what 
connection is to be inferred between the soul, the breath of God, and the innate human 
ability of reason. 
Athenagoras does not connect gender with the soul, the soul being neither male 
nor female. He asks how the command to not commit adultery be “properly addressed to 
souls, or even thought of in such a connection, since the difference of male and female 
does not exist in them, nor any aptitude for sexual intercourse, nor appetite for it.”132 
                                                 
τὰς ἀγαθάς, κακοὺς δὲ τὰς φαύλους.’” Legatio 23.4. 
130Cf. Pouderon, 222. 
131“κινηθέντες μὲν κατὰ συμπάθειαν τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πνοῆς ὑπὸ τῆς 
αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς ἕκαστος ζητῆσαι, εἰ δυνατὸς εὑρεῖν καὶ νοῆσαι τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν.” Legatio 7.2. 
132“οὔτε οὖν τὸ ‘οὐ μοιχεύσεις’ ἐπὶ ψυχῶν λεχθείη ποτ᾽ ἂν ἢ νοηθείη 
δεόντως, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν αὐταῖς τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφορᾶς οὐδὲ 
πρὸς μῖξιν τινὸς ἐπιτηδειότητος ἢ πρὸς ταύτην ὀρέξεως.” De resurrectione 23.4. 




Most of Athenagoras’s treatment of the human person is developed in the context 
of defending the resurrection of the body. He holds to an interpretation of the human 
person in which the body is corruptible and looking forward to incorruption, the soul is 
immortal and yet the human person in its entirety also looks forward to immortality as the 
individual is made of both body and soul.133 Athenagoras begins this explanation in On 
the Resurrection 10.5 while arguing against those who refuse a resurrection of the body. 
No person in his senses will affirm that his soul suffers wrong, because, in speaking 
so, he would at the same time be unawares reflecting on the present life also; for if 
now, while dwelling in a body subject to corruption and suffering, it has had no 
wrong done to it much less will it suffer wrong when living in conjunction with a 
body which is free from corruption and suffering. The body, again, suffers no wrong; 
for if no wrong is done to it now while united a corruptible thing with an 
incorruptible, manifestly will it not be wronged when united an incorruptible with an 
incorruptible.134 
It is important to see the comparison between body and soul before the resurrection and 
after it. The body is the only thing that changes from corruptible to incorruptible. 
Athenagoras here also makes use of the concept of the body as a dwelling place for the 
soul.135 
Athenagoras further supports this concept when he writes that the human person 
consists of body and soul and that after the resurrection, the soul will continue according 
                                                 
Dead (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1956), 20. 
133Gross sees a development from Justin’s and Tatian’s views on the soul to that 
of Athenagoras, finding that Athenagoras has a more nuanced view of the natural 
immortality of the soul than the other Apologists. Jules Gross, The Divinization of the 
Christian, trans. Paul A. Onica (Anaheim, CA: A & C Press, 2002), 140. 
134“οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀδικεῖσθαι φήσει τις σωφρονῶν, ὅτι λήσεταί γε 
ταύτῃ συνεκβάλλων καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωήν.” De resurrectione 10.5. This further 
supports what was mentioned above in commenting on Legatio 27.2 regarding 
Athenagoras’s concept of an immortal soul. 
135See Pouderon, 223. 
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to the nature it was made with, which he describes as ruling over the body and judging 
and measuring those things which happen from time to time.136 The body, however, will 
experience the change of the resurrection. Here Athenagoras reaffirms his description of 
the soul as continuing unchanged in nature and function from before the resurrection to 
after it, remaining in its immortal nature. 
Athenagoras makes clear his assertion that humans are made “of an immortal soul 
and a body.”137 He reiterates this when he writes that “men, in respect of the soul, have 
from their first origin an unchangeable continuance, but in respect of the body obtain 
immortality by means of change.”138 He then continues his insistence that the body is just 
as important for the constitution of a human person as the soul, though one was originally 
made immortal and the other must wait the resurrection to receive its immortality. He 
writes, “The whole nature of men in general is composed of an immortal soul and a body 
which was fitted to it in the creation, and . . . neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor 
to the nature of the body separately, has God assigned such a creation or such a life and 
entire course of existence as this, but to men compounded of the two.”139 Here, then, 
                                                 
136“καὶ τῆς μὲν ψυχῆς οὔσης τε καὶ διαμενούσης ὁμαλῶς ἐν ᾗ γέγονεν 
φύσει καὶ διαπονούσης ἃ πέφυκεν.” De resurrectione 12.8. See Barnard, “The 
Father of Christian Anthropology,” 258, 263. On the connection here to Plato, see 
Pouderon, 221. 
137“καθ᾽ ἣν ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ σώματος.” De 
resurrectione 13.1. For a comparison of this idea with that of Plato, see Crehan, 19-20. 
138“κατὰ μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐχόντων τὴν ἀμετάβλητον 
διαμονήν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα προσλαμ βανόντων ἐκ μεταβολῆς τὴν 









again Athenagoras reaffirms his insistence that God created humans consisting of both an 
immortal soul and a body. The human person is not to be thought of existing apart from 
the conjoining of the two. 
Adding to this previously stated concept, Athenagoras notes that “one living-
being is formed from the two, experiencing whatever the soul experiences and whatever 
the body experiences, doing and performing whatever requires the judgment of the senses 
or of the reason.”140 Again he writes, “there is one harmony and community of 
experience belonging to the whole being, whether of the things which spring from the 
soul or of those which are accomplished by means of the body.”141 Later in this same 
chapter he reiterates this concept, stating that “understanding and reason” belong to the 
whole person, both body and soul, “not the soul by itself.”142 He continues, “Man, 
therefore, who consists of the two parts, must continue for ever. But it is impossible for 
him to continue unless he rise again. For if no resurrection were to take place, the nature 
of men as men would not continue. And if the nature of men does not continue, in vain 
has the soul been fitted to the need of the body and to its experiences; in vain has the 
body been fettered so that it cannot obtain what it longs for, obedient to the reins of the 
soul and guided by it as with a bridle; in vain is understanding, in vain is wisdom, and the 
                                                 
seeking to make the same point, he also speaks of humans as having both body and soul 
stating, “λέγω δὲ συναμφότερον τὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἄνθρωπον.” Ibid., 
18.4. See Fernández Ardanaz, El Mito, 49-50. 
140“πάσχοντος ὁπόσα πάθη ψυχῆς καὶ ὁπόσα τοῦ σώματος 
ἐνεργοῦντός τε καὶ πράττοντος ὁπόσα τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἢ τῆς λογικῆς δεῖται 
κρίσεως.” De resurrectione 15.2. 
141“καὶ τῶν ἐκ ψυχῆς φυομένων καὶ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος 
ἐπιτελουμένων.” Ibid., 15.3. 
142“οὐ ψυχὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν.” De resurrectione 15.6. 
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observance of rectitude.”143 He concludes by arguing that if vanity is excluded from the 
works of God, then the body must be raised so that it can receive judgment along with the 
soul for only as body and soul are united is the human person constituted. This argument 
for the resurrection rests then on the original purpose of God in the creation of humans, 
from which follows the nature of the human as created by God. Only after these have 
been established does Athenagoras directly connect the judgment to the resurrection. 
Athenagoras clarifies his definition of life and death in the context of the 
separation of the soul from the body. He notes that “the separation of the soul from the 
members of the body and the dissolution of its parts interrupts the continuity of life.”144 
But this interruption does not cause life to cease. Instead he adds, “And for this reason, I 
suppose, some call sleep the brother of death.”145 He repeats his definition of life, stating 
“for a time it is interrupted by the separation of the soul from the body”146 and later, in 
describing the person at death, he writes “For both together no longer exist, the soul 
being separated from the body.”147 The close connection he sees between the soul and 




φρόνησις καὶ δικαιοσύνης παρατήρησις.” Ibid., 15.7. 
144“ἐπειδὴ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος μερῶν καὶ μορίων 
διάλυσις τὴν συνεχῆ διακόπτει ζωήν, διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀπογινώσκειν χρὴ τὴν 
ἀνάστασιν.” Ibid., 16.4. Fischer notes that this is the first patristic usage of the phrase 
“χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.” Joseph A. Fischer, Studien zum 
Todesgedanken in der alten Kirche: Die Beurteilung des natürlichen Todes in der 
kirchlichen Literatur der ersten drei Jahrhunderte (Munich: Max Hueber, 1954), 27. 
145De resurrectione 16.4. 
146“κἂν ἐπὶ ποσὸν διακόπτηται τῷ χωρισμῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ 
σώματος.” Ibid., 16.6. Cf. Pouderon, 165. 
147“οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔτι τὸ συναμφότερον χωριζομένης μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.” De resurrectione 18.5. 
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body for the individual is evident. One cannot have a person without both body and 
soul.148 
Athenagoras’s argument for the immortality of the soul is couched in the context 
of his argument for the resurrection of the body. He argues that if it is accepted that the 
soul and the body are both dissolved at death and “the life of men is to be utterly 
extinguished, it is manifest there will be no care for men who are not living, no judgment 
respecting those who have lived in virtue or in vice; but there will rush in again upon us 
whatever belongs to a lawless life, and the swarm of absurdities which follow from it, 
and that which is the summit of this lawlessness—atheism.”149 His argument is as 
follows. If the soul is not immortal, then it is also dissolved at death. If the soul is 
dissolved at death, then there will be no future existence of the human person, whether in 
heaven or in hell. This is a clear instance of the necessity of the doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul tied directly to the reality of a future judgment. The soul functions 
as the principle of personhood or personality, defining who the individual is and thus 
without this, the individual cannot again exist. 
Athenagoras spends a great deal of time dealing with the notion of equity between 
body and soul regarding the judgment and resurrection. It is helpful to follow his 
reasoning as it is carried on in the context of his definition of the human person. He 
reasons that, if good deeds receive a reward and only the soul receives this reward, then 
the body will be slighted as it also shared in the “toils connected with well-doing.” 
Athenagoras continues, the “soul is often excused for certain faults on the ground of the 
                                                 
148Cf. Pouderon, 164. 
149De resurrectione 20.1. 
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body’s neediness and want.”150 and yet the body still receives no reward for the good it 
shared in. Athenagoras then makes the opposite case. If the soul alone is to be punished, 
this also is not equitable. Because, as just stated, the soul often suffers because of the 
appetites and motions of the body and the soul’s own actions carried out willfully on 
behalf of the body.151 
The clear dichotomy described by Athenagoras reinforces the distinction which he 
has between the body and soul. He continues, “How can it possibly be other than unjust 
for the soul to be judged by itself in respect of things towards which in its own nature it 
feels no appetite, no motion, no impulse, such as licentiousness, violence, covetousness, 
injustice, and the unjust acts arising out of these?”152 As described by Athenagoras, the 
soul does not have the desires which are peculiar to the body and its needs. He repeats his 
claim, “How can it be just for the soul alone to be judged in respect of those things which 
the body is the first to be sensible of, and in which it draws the soul away to sympathy 
and participation in actions with a view to things which it wants; and that the appetites 
and pleasures, and moreover the fears and sorrows, in which whatever exceeds the proper 
                                                 
150“καὶ συγγνώμης μὲν τυγχάνειν πολλάκις τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπί τινων 













bounds is amenable to judgment, should be set in motion by the body.”153 He again 
reiterates that the soul “neither needs anything of this sort, nor desires nor fears or suffers 
of itself any such thing as man is wont to suffer.”154 He then pauses, perhaps realizing the 
strict dichotomy which he is creating, and admits that these “affections” should be 
attributed to the whole person, “yet surely we shall not assert that these things belong to 
the soul, if we only look simply at its peculiar nature.”155 He explains that since the soul 
does not get hungry, it can never desire it, nor can it desire money, since this also does 
not pertain to it. Neither can it be afraid of anything which is destructive since it is not 
subject to corruption.156 
In Resurrection of the Dead 22, Athenagoras continues his argument in favor of 
rewards and punishments for the soul and body together.157 He rephrases the argument of 
the previous chapter, instead using the terms virtue and vice. The argument is the same, 
however. Since one does not assert that virtues and vices exist only in the soul and not in 
the entire person, then the soul cannot alone receive the rewards or punishments for 









καθαρῶς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῆς ἐπισκοπῶμεν φύσιν.” Ibid., 21.5. 
156Ibid., 21.6. 
157See Leslie Kline, “The De Resurrectione Mortuorum of Athenagoras,” 
Restoration Quarterly 11, no. 4 (1968): 259. 
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them.158 He argues, based on the previous thesis that the soul is incorruptible, that virtues 
such as courage or fortitude mean nothing to the soul since it has no fear of death; self-
control is not needed as the soul is not hungry nor does have any desire for sexual or 
other pleasures; practical wisdom is useless when it does not do anything; nor is equity 
useful as the soul neither wants nor uses anything.159 
Athenagoras concludes, since laws are set in place to be followed by the entire 
person, then any reward or punishment must also be received by the entire person, body 
and soul.160 He then goes through the Ten Commandments noting that the commands 
against murder, theft, and adultery all pertain to the body, not the soul.161 The command 
to honor one’s father and mother also pertains to the entire person as “souls do not 
produce soul, men produce men.”162 He concludes by stating clearly, “For to an immortal 
nature everything which is desired by the needy as useful is useless.”163 
Athenagoras then shifts from an argument of equity to one based upon the final 
cause. Here, he notes that the end of humans is not the same as it is for the animal world, 
because humans are “possessed of an immortal soul and rational judgment.”164 Neither is 
                                                 
158“ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἶναι γινώσκομεν τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ 
τὴν ταύταις ἀντικειμένην κακίαν οὐ ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένης τοῦ σώματος καὶ 
καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν οὔσης.” De resurrectione 22.1. 
159Ibid., 22.2. 
160Ibid., 23.1. 
161Ibid., 23.2-5.  
162“οὐ γὰρ ψυχαὶ ψυχὰς γεννῶσαι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ τῆς μητρὸς 
οἰκειοῦνται προσηγορίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρώπους ἄνθρωποι.” De resurrectione 23.3. 
163“ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ἀθανάτῳ φύσει πᾶν ὁπόσον τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν ὀρεκτὸν ὡς 





the human person’s final cause found in happiness of soul separated from the body.165 
Rather, Athenagoras will argue, the final cause is found only in the composite person. He 
argues that the human person does not exist when the soul is separated from the body.166 
Thus, the only reasonable solution is to have a resurrection of the body to be joined to the 
same soul to which it had been joined in life.167 
Elsewhere Athenagoras describes the heavenly state of the individual, writing, 
“We are persuaded that when we are removed from the present life we shall live another 
life, better than the present one, and heavenly, not earthly (since we shall abide near God, 
and with God, free from all change or suffering in the soul, not as flesh, even though we 
shall have flesh, but as heavenly spirit), or, falling with the rest, a worse one and in 
fire.”168 Athenagoras seems to connect this heavenly state of the soul with the divine 
attributes of impassibility. Here again Athenagoras seems to confuse his ideas on the soul 
in their “pure” or “theoretical” state with the actual human existence of fused body and 
soul. This seems evident when he appears to describe the state to which the soul reaches 
when it is with God, that is “free from change.” One would expect according to his 
definition in other places that this is already an attribute of the soul. 
                                                 
ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ ψυχῇ καὶ λογικῇ κρίσει χρωμένων.” Ibid., 24.5. 
165“οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μακαριότης ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένης σώματος.” Ibid., 25.1. 
166“οὔτε μὴν ἐν χωρισμῷ τυγχανούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τῷ μηδὲ συνεστάναι 
τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον διαλυθέντος.” Ibid., 25.2. 
167“τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολαβεῖν ἄλλως μὲν ἀδύνατον, 
κατὰ μόνην δὲ τὴν ἀνάστασιν δυνατόν∙ ταύτης γὰρ γενομένης καὶ τὸ τῇ 









Athenagoras uses soul for natural life. He locates the will in the soul. The human 
person is a composite of soul and body. He allows for emotions in the soul, though 
guardedly, and at other times describes the soul as entirely separate from the needs and 
desires of the body. Reason takes place in the soul, with the soul at times experiencing 
fantastic movements that lead to irrational thoughts. The concept of a composite 
individual, having both body and soul, is what causes some degree of mixing in what is 
attributed to the soul.  
Athenagoras connects the human soul with the breath of God, describing the 
human soul as having an affinity for God’s afflatus. The human person does not exist 
without a composite of soul and body. Thus the body must be reunited with the soul at 
the resurrection. Though the soul is intimately connected with the body and desire is in 
the soul, yet, he also argues that because of its immortal nature, the soul does not suffer 
from the desires of the body nor is it subject to the laws that govern the body. This is a 
challenge for some subsequent authors as well. They accept that the soul is where 
decisions are made, for good or evil and yet they also will struggle with allowing that an 
immortal, almost divine entity should struggle with “desires of the flesh.”  
Athenagoras clearly argues for a connection between the need for the soul to have 
an immortal nature and the reality of future judgments. He argues that if the soul were 
dissolved at death, there would be no possibility of a future judgment. He then notes that 




Melito of Sardis 
Melito of Sardis wrote many treatises169 but the remains are mostly fragmentary. 
His sole, extant treatise is titled On the Pascha.170  
 
Usage of Psyche 
Melito writes of the soul as the seat of emotions such as grief. In describing the 
feelings of the Egyptians after the plague of death, he writes, “For all Egypt was in pains 
and disasters, in tears and sounds of mourning, and came to Pharaoh all grief-stricken not 
only in appearance but also in soul.”171 In a similar usage, while describing the same 
event, Melito writes, “And one firstborn, as he clasped dark body in his hand, terrified in 
soul let out a piteous and dreadful cry: ‘Whom does my hand hold? Whom does my soul 
dread?’”172 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Melito views death as a separation of the soul from the body. He writes, 
At these things sin rejoiced, who in the capacity of death’s fellow worker journeys 
                                                 
169For a list and discussion, see Stuart George Hall, Melito of Sardis: On Pascha 
and Fragments (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), xiii-xvii; Othmar Perler, Méliton de 
Sardes: Sur la Pâque et Fragments, Sources chrétiennes 123 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 
1966), 11-15. 
170On authorship and dating, see Hall, xvii-xxii; Perler, 16-24. On the function of 
the document in the church, see Alistair Stewart-Sykes, The Lamb’s High Feast: Melito, 
Peri Pascha and the Quartodeciman Paschal Liturgy at Sardis (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 55-
139.Translations follow Hall’s edition. 
171“ἀφίκετο πρὸς Φαραὼ ὅλη πενθήρης, οὐ μόνον τῷ σχήματι, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ.” De pascha 124. 
172“Εἴ τις πρωτότοκος χειρὶ σκοτεινὸν σῶμα ἐναγκαλισά μενος, τῇ 
ψυχῇ ἐκδειματωθεὶς οἰκτρὸν καὶ φοβερὸν ἀνε βόησεν∙‘Τίνα κρατεῖ ἡ δεξιά 
μου; Τίνα τρέμει ἡ ψυχή μου.’” De pascha 166-168. 
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ahead into the souls of men, and prepares as food for him the bodies of the dead. In 
every soul sin made a mark, and those in whom he made it were bound to die. So all 
flesh began to fall under sin, and every body under death, and every soul was driven 
out of its fleshly dwelling. And what was taken from earth was to earth dissolved, and 
what was given from God was confined in Hades; and there was separation of what 
fitted beautifully, and the beautiful body was split apart. For man was being divided 
by death; for a strange disaster and captivity were enclosing him, and he was dragged 
off a prisoner under the shadows of death, and desolate lay the Father’s image.173 
In this passage, Melito exhibits a clear dichotomous anthropology.174 However it 
is of a different kind than that suggested by other authors. Melito does write of the body 
as the dwelling of the soul. However, this is a much more harmonious relationship than 
what is implied by the tomb metaphor of Plato. Instead of a tomb which holds the soul 
captive only to be freed at death, the soul actually is described as driven from the body, 
implying that it does not desire to leave. This more positive description of the 
relationship is further reinforced by his description of this union as that which “fitted 
beautifully.” 
Melito writes that sin makes a mark on the soul.175 This would indicate that sin 
affects the soul in some real way. In describing the saving effects of Christ along the lines 
of the Israelite exodus from Egypt, Melito writes that “[Christ] marked our souls with his 
own Spirit.”176 This appears as a counterpart to the marking of sin, suggesting that the 







εἰς τὸν ᾅδην κατεκλείετο.” Ibid., 397-402. 
174Fischer, 27. So also Hall, xlii; Perler, 165. 
175Cf. Alois Grillmeier, “‘Das Erbe der Sohne Adams’ in der Homilia de Passione 
Melitos,” Scholastik 20, no. 4 (1949): 492. 
176“καὶ ἐσφράγισεν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς τῷ ἰδίῳ πνεύματι.” De pascha 479. 
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redemptive work of the Spirit takes place in the soul.177 
Death itself, rather than the body, is described as the captor of the soul, and the 
separation forced on the human person by the death event results in the desolation of the 
imago dei. Thus it seems that Melito held that the image of God in humanity is the union of 
the body and soul. Upon death, the soul is held in Hades while the body returns to dust.178 
 
Summary 
Melito makes the soul the seat of the emotions of fear and grief. The union of 
body and soul is the imago dei. The soul is enclosed in the body but is forced to leave at 
the time of death whereupon it is taken captive in Hades. 
Scripture is not used directly to support a doctrine of the soul. However, On the 
Pascha does exhibit a large amount of allusions and quotations of biblical material.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has studied both the general usage of the soul in the second-century 
apologists  as well as the use of Scripture in its doctrinal development. The soul is 
generally used for life as well as the individual. In this period, the idea of the dichotomy 
between body and soul, first mentioned in the previous period in the Epistle to Diognetus, 
is further developed. Philosophical notions such as the principle of life, invisibleness, and 
incorporeality of the soul are mentioned only in passing, with no focus yet on these 
aspects of the soul that will become important in the following sections. The idea of the 
                                                 
177As Melito continues with the description of Christ marking our bodies with his 
blood, this whole connection may be intended only as a metaphor. 
178While Melito does not discuss the reunification of soul and body at the 
resurrection, he does write of raising up the buried and bringing the dead to life, of 
trampling down Hades and carrying man to heaven. De pascha 755-764. 
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soul’s immortality is, however, mentioned and discussed at length. 
Theophilus and Athenagoras find special significance for the soul in the idea of 
the “breath of God” from Gen 2:7. Even when attention is not placed on the idea of God’s 
breath, authors use this verse to draw a connection to its special origin. Though almost all 
authors refrain from calling the soul divine, it is sometimes—based upon these two 
passages—referred to as divine-like. 
The early authors do not write of death as the separation of the soul from the 
body. This begins with Athenagoras and Melito of Sardis at the end of this period. Melito 
argues that the soul is forced from the body by death. Except for Tatian, the soul always 
survives the death of the body. Tatian argues for the soul’s dissolution and then its 
renewal to rejoin the body for the judgment. Melito argues that the souls of both the 
righteous and the wicked go to Hades to await the judgment. The idea of the soul 
rejoining the body to face the judgment is another common motif started in this era. 
Justin defends this notion by citing the words of Jesus in Matt 10:28.  
The idea that the biblical teaching of a future judgment demands an immortal soul 
is introduced and discussed by Justin Martyr, Theophilus of Antioch, and Athenagoras. 
The argument is that the soul must be immortal in order for there to be life after death 
when every person will face the judgment. Justin Martyr and Tatian also discussed the 
eternal punishment of the wicked in the context of the future life of the soul. 
To support the notion of the continued existence of the soul, Justin Martyr cites Ps 
22:20, 31; 1 Sam 28:12-13 (Saul, Samuel, and the Witch of Endor); and Luke 23:46 
(Christ’s death). The use of 1 Sam 28 is one that will be used several more times with 
later authors. 
The idea of the soul experiencing a vision of God is first suggested by 








IRENAEUS, CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND HIPPOLYTUS 
 
The works of Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria dominate this section. While 
Irenaeus’s work is characterized by an anti-heresy tone, Clement begins the work of 
describing the life and education of the gnostic soul. Both authors feature Scripture as a 
large part of their arguments with Scripture texts being offered for many of the ideas that 
have been discussed by earlier Fathers. Hippolytus caps off this section, but is really 
overshadowed by the other two authors on the topic of the soul. 
 
Irenaeus 
Irenaeus of Lyon was a very influential figure in the last half of the second 
century.1 His two surviving documents that are considered authentic are Refutation and 
Overthrow of Knowledge Falsely So-Called, or simply Against Heresies and his 
Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching.2 While Irenaeus wrote in Greek, complete 
                                                 
1For a historical review of Irenaeus’s life and culture, see André Benoit, Saint 
Irénée: introduction à l’étude de sa théologie, ed. R. Mehl (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1960), 47-73; Robert M. Grant, Irenaeus of Lyons (London: Routledge, 1997), 
1-10; Dietmar Wyrwa, “Kosmos und Heilsgeschichte bei Irenäus von Lyon,” in Die 
Welslichkeit des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche, ed. Dietmar Wyrwa (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1997), 443-452. 
2For a history of the texts, see John Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology in 
Irenaeus and Clement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 25-33. For a brief 
discussion of the critical editions, see Benoit, 5. On other attributed works, see Ulrich 
Hamm, “Irenaeus of Lyons,” DECL, 302. 
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manuscripts of the original Greek have not survived. Greek fragments do exist of Against 
Heresies, and The Demonstration is extant in an Armenian translation. 
In Against Heresies, Irenaeus deals with teachings he considers heretical. There 
are many instances, especially in book one, where he discusses the teachings of various 
writers. While one might assume that Irenaeus disagrees with whatever position he is 
describing, this is not always clear. Unless Irenaeus specifically criticizes or agrees with a 
position, rather than simply narrating it, this study does not include that statement. 
 
Usage of Anima 
General Usage 
Irenaeus uses soul for one’s life. In writing of the early martyrs among the 
apostles and early followers of Christ, he writes, “Those, therefore, who delivered up 
their souls to death for Christ’s Gospel—how could they have spoken to men in 
accordance with old-established opinion?”3 He later repeats this usage when discussing 
Matt 16:24, 25. “For these things Christ spoke openly, He being Himself the Savior of 
those who should be delivered over to death for their confession of Him, and lose their 
lives.”4 In another place Irenaeus writes, “Since the Lord thus has redeemed us through 
His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh.”5 Here it is 
                                                 
3“Qui ergo usque ad mortem tradiderunt animas propter Euangelium Christi, 
quomodo poterant secundum insitam opinionem hominibus loqui?” Adversus haereses 
3.12.13. 
4“Haec enim Christus manifeste dicebat, ipse exsistens Saluator eorum qui 
propter suam confessionem in mortem traderentur et perderent animas suas.” Ibid., 
3.18.4. 
5“Suo igitur sanguine redimente nos Domino, et dante animam suam pro nostra 
anima et carnem suam pro nostris carnibus.” Ibid., 5.1.1. This is reminiscent of Clement 
of Rome’s thought. 
 
136 
difficult to determine if Irenaeus simply has anima for life or if he rather has the concept 
of Christ giving His soul in some other manner. While the latter seems implied by the 
parallel with flesh, it does not fit well with any understanding of what or who Christ 
would have given His soul to. 
Irenaeus also seems to use soul to simply refer to the self. In a similar usage, 
while writing about the sin of Cain, Irenaeus writes, “For if any one shall endeavor to 
offer a sacrifice merely to outward appearance, unexceptionably, in due order, and 
according to appointment, while in his soul he does not assign to his neighbor that 
fellowship with him which is right and proper, nor is under the fear of God.”6 Here the 
soul seems to refer to the person itself or possibly one’s inner thoughts. 
 
Powers of the Soul 
Irenaeus locates mental excitement in the soul. In describing women who are 
enabled to prophesy by Marcus, he writes, “She then, vainly puffed up and elated by 
these words, and greatly excited in soul by the expectation that it is herself who is to 
prophesy, her heart beating violently [from emotion], reaches the requisite pitch of 
audacity, and idly as well as impudently utters some nonsense as it happens to occur to 
her, such as might be expected from one heated by an empty spirit.”7 He continues, 
                                                 
6“Si enim quis solummodo secundum quod videtur munde et recte et legitime 
offerre temptaverit, secundum autem suam animam non recte dividat eam quae est ad 
proximum communionem neque timorem habeat Dei.” Ibid., 4.18.3. This notion of 
connecting the soul with moral actions is reiterated by Irenaeus in a quote from Isa 1:16, 
“And inasmuch as they were not by nature so created by God, but had power also to act 
rightly, the same person said to them, giving them good counsel, ‘Wash ye, make you 
clean; take away iniquity from your souls before mine eyes; cease from your iniquities.’” 
Adversus haereses 4.41.3. 
7“Illa autem seducta et elata ab his quae praedicta sunt, concalefaciens animam a 
sus|picione quod incipiat prophetare, cum cor eius multo plus quam oporteat palpitet, 




“Referring to this, one superior to me has observed that the soul is both audacious and 
impudent when heated with empty air.”8 Here one sees that Irenaeus locates attributes of 
boldness and impudence with the soul as well as that part of the individual which 
becomes excited. 
In another place, Irenaeus describes sorrow as an emotion of the soul. “And for 
this cause, upon His entrance into Jerusalem, all those who were in the way recognized 
David their king in His sorrow of soul, and spread their garments for Him.”9 
Elsewhere, Irenaeus writes describing the cries of newborn infants as their souls 
crying out.10 It is not entirely clear from the text if this idea is only that of Marcus, or if 
these are Irenaeus’s words. And if it is attributed to Irenaeus, does soul refer simply to the 
identity of the infant or rather does he associate the separate soul of the infant with these 
“primordial” cries? 
Irenaeus interprets the soul as the seat of reason.11 He describes the soul as an 
artist. “For the body may be compared to an instrument; but the soul is possessed of the 
reason of an artist.”12 Elsewhere he writes, “For the intellect of man—his mind, thought, 
                                                 
calefacta spiritu.” Ibid., 1.13.3. 
8“Sicut melior a nobis de talibus prophetis exsequitur [eo] quod audax et 
inuerecunda anima quae uacuo aere excalefacta est.” Ibid., 1.13.3. 
9“Et propter hoc Hierosolymam introeunte eo, omnes qui erant in via David in 
dolore animae cognoverunt suum Regem et substraverunt ei.” Ibid., 4.11.3. 
10“Ostensionem autem adfert ab his qui nunc nascuntur infantibus, quorum anima 
simul ut de uulua progressa est exclamat uniuscuiusque elementi hunc sonum.” Adversus 
haereses 1.14.8. 
11For a discussion on this and how Irenaeus related to other philosophies on this 
point, see Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 319-321. 
12“Anima autem artificis rationem obtinet.” Adversus haereses 2.33.4. 
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mental intention, and such like—is nothing else than his soul; but the emotions and 
operations of the soul itself have no substance apart from the soul.”13 In describing the 
Sabbath and how Christ kept it, Irenaeus writes, “For the law commanded them to abstain 
from every servile work, that is, from all grasping after wealth which is procured by 
trading and by other worldly business; but it exhorted them to attend to the exercises of 
the soul, which consist in reflection, and to addresses of a beneficial kind for their 
neighbors’ benefit.”14 Here Irenaeus describes for us what the exercises of the soul are, 
namely reflection or sententiam. 
Irenaeus writes, “For, though it is not an easy thing for a soul under the influence 
of error to repent, yet, on the other hand, it is not altogether impossible to escape from 
error when the truth is brought alongside it.”15 Here the soul is the rational agent which 
makes decisions regarding truth and error. In another place, Irenaeus locates faith and 
understanding in the soul. He writes, “Vain also are the Ebionites, who do not receive by 
faith into their soul the union of God and man, . . . and who do not choose to 
                                                 
13“Sensus enim hominis et cogitatio et intentio mentis et ea quae sunt huiusmodi 
non aliud quid praeter animam sunt, sed ipsius animae motus et operationes, nullam sine 
anima substantiam habentes.” Ibid., 2.29.3. On this, see Nathanael Bonwetsch, Die 
Theologie des Irenäus, Beiträge zur förderung christlicher Theologie, ed. D. Schlatter et 
al. (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1925), 72; Ernst Klebba, Die Anthropologie des Hl. 
Irenaeus: Eine dogmenhistorische Studie, Kirchengeschichtliche Studien, vol. 2, no. 3, 
ed. Dr. Knöpfler et al. (Münster: Heinrich Schöningh, 1894), 100. It should be noted that 
this statement is given to contradict the gnostic notion of the soul and body separating 
after death to be received into the Pleroma. 
14“Die sabbatorum continere se quidem jubebat eos lex ab omni opere servili, hoc 
est ab omni avaritia quae per negotiationem et reliquo terreno arte agitatur, animae 
autem opera quae fiunt per sententiam et sermones bonos in auxilium eorum qui proximi 
sunt adhortabatur fieri.” Adversus haereses 4.8.2. 
15“Etenim si non facile est ab errore apprehensam resipiscere animam, sed non 




Irenaeus, in discussing Sophia and her passion, states that the Gnostics are wrong 
for calling the Pleroma spiritual if Sophia was a part of it. “For even a vigorous soul, not 
to say a spiritual substance, would not pass through any such experience.”17 This is in 
response to the Gnostic doctrine that Sophia was “involved in ignorance, and degeneracy, 
and passion.” Assuming only one kind of soul, that is the same for humans and other 
spiritual entities, Irenaeus seems to indirectly argue that souls do not participate in 
ignorance, degeneracy, and passion. 
In this context, Irenaeus argues against the Gnostic teaching that those souls who 
received the seed of the Mother are superior to the rest.18 Assuming that the high priests 
and Herod the king were in this category, he notes that they did not recognize Christ and 
believe in Him and thus cannot be considered to be superior.19 Thus, recognizing Christ 
for who He was constituted an attribute of a superior soul. 
The soul could also be instructed by corporeal objects. “For the law, since it was 
laid down for those in bondage, used to instruct the soul by means of those corporeal 
objects which were of an external nature, drawing it, as by a bond, to obey its 
commandments, that man might learn to serve God. But the Word set free the soul, and 
                                                 
16“Vani autem et Ebionaei, unitionem Dei et hominis per fidem non recipientes in 
suam animam . . . neque intellegere volentes.” Ibid., 5.1.3. 
17“Haec enim ne anima quidem fortis, non dicam spiritalis substantia, percipiet.” 
Ibid., 2.18.2. 
18“In eo quod dicant eas animas quae habuerint a Matre semen meliores reliquis 
fieri.” Adversus haereses 2.19.7. 
19“Non itaque erant meliores tales animae propter seminis depositionem neque 
propter hoc honorificabantur a Demiurgo.” Ibid., 2.19.7. 
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taught that through it the body should be willingly purified.”20 
Irenaeus draws a parallel between one’s power of choice with the possession of 
one’s soul. He writes, “This expression [of our Lord], ‘How often would I have gathered 
your children together, and you would not,’ set forth the ancient law of human liberty, 
because God made man free from the beginning, possessing his own power, even as he 
does his own soul, to obey the behests of God voluntarily, and not by compulsion of 
God.”21 In this quotation of Matt 23:37, Irenaeus compares the possession of one’s soul 
with the possessing of one’s free will, specifically here in relation to one’s obedience to 
the divine commands. Irenaeus also writes, “But the righteous fathers [i.e., Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob and the preceding righteous ones] had the meaning of the Decalogue 
written in their hearts and souls, that is, they loved the God who made them, and did no 
injury to their neighbor.”22 Here again, the soul is described in the context of obedience 
to God’s commands. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Irenaeus is the first to develop a more comprehensive doctrine of the soul. In 
                                                 
20“Etenim lex, quippe servis posita, per ea quae foris erant corporalia animam 
erudiebat, velut per vinculum attrahens eam ad obaudientiam praeceptorum, uti disceret 
homo assentire Deo; Verbum autem liberans animam, et per ipsam corpus voluntarie | 
emundari docuit.” Ibid., 4.13.2. 
21“Illud autem quod ait: Quotiens volui colligere filios tuos et noluisti, veterem 
legem libertatis hominis manifestavit, quia liberum eum Deus fecit, ab initio habentem 
suam potestatem sicut et suam animam, ad utendum sententia Dei voluntarie, et non 
coactum ab eo.” Ibid., 4.37.1. 
22“Quoniam lex non est posita justis; justi autem patres, virtutem decalogi | 
conscriptam habentes in cordibus et animabus suis, diligentes scilicet Deum qui fecit eos 
et abstinentes erga proximum ab iniustitia.” Adversus haereses 4.16.3. There seem to be 
verbal allusions to Deut 4:29; 6: 5-6; 10:12-13; 11:13; 26:16; 30:2, 6, 10; Matt 22:37; 
Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27. 
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doing so, he also uses the Scriptures more than any other previous author. 
 
Origin of the Soul 
Irenaeus turns to the creation story for the origin of the soul. He quotes Gen 2:7 
where it states that “God ‘breathed into the face of man the breath of life, and man 
became a living soul.’”23 From this verse Irenaeus argues that the soul is equal to the “the 
breath of life.”24 
Irenaeus states that the soul originates in the same manner that the body does. 
“But, as each one of us receives his body through the skilful working of God, so does he 
also possess his soul. For God is not so poor or destitute in resources, that He cannot 
confer its own proper soul on each individual body, even as He gives it also its special 
character.”25 Here, no specific biblical passage is adduced to substantiate the statement. 
Rather Irenaeus alludes to the creation story, clearly accepting as proven the notion that 
God created the body and then arguing that if He was capable of doing that, He must not 
be so poor as not to be able to give each body He has made its own soul. 
 
The Human Person and the Soul 
Irenaeus has a dichotomous view of the human person. 26 He writes, “But every 
                                                 
23“Quae sunt ergo mortalia corpora? Numquidnam animae? Sed incorporales 
animae, quantum ad | comparationem mortalium corporum: insufflavit enim in faciem 
hominis Deus flatum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem.” Adversus haereses 
5.7.1. 
24Flatum vitae exsistentem.” Ibid., 5.7.1. 
25“Sed quemadmodum unusquisque nostrum suum corpus per artem Dei sumit, sic 
et suam habet animam. Nec enim sic pauper nec indigens Deus, ut non unicuique corpori 
propriam donaret animam, quemadmodum et proprium characterem.” Adversus haereses 
2.33.5. 




one will allow that we are [composed of] a body taken from the earth, and a soul 
receiving spirit from God.”27 Here, in defending the real incarnation of Christ, Irenaeus 
lays out the dichotomy which makes the human person.28 He does not defend it in any 
way other than calling upon a shared common knowledge, though one can readily see a 
strong allusion to the creation story which he explicitly refers to later. He repeats this 
point. “Now man is a mixed organization of soul and flesh, who was formed after the 
likeness of God, and molded by His hands, that is, by the Son and Holy Spirit, to whom 
also He said, ‘Let Us make man.’”29 Using the expression “likeness of God” and “molded 
                                                 
Subiectio: Zur Anthropologie des Irenäus,” in Kerygma und Logos. Beiträge zu den 
geistesgeschichtlichen Beziehungen zwischen Antike und Christentum, ed. Adolf M. 
Ritter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1979); Ysabel de Andia, Homo vivens: 
incorruptibilité et divinisation de l’homme selon Irénée de Lyon (Paris: Études 
Augustiniennes, 1986); Bonwetsch, 70-81; Antonio Orbe, Antropologia de San Ireneo 
(Madrid, 1969); James G. M. Purves, “The Spirit and the Imago Dei: Reviewing the 
Anthropology of Irenaeus of Lyons,” Evangelical Quarterly 68, no. 2 (1996): 99-120; 
Gustav Wingren, Man and the Incarnation: A Study in the Biblical Theology of Irenaeus, 
trans. Ross Mackenzie (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959); Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis 
bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 301-334. 
27“Nos autem quoniam corpus sumus de terra acceptum et anima accipiens a Deo 
Spiritum, omnis quicumque confitebitur.” Adversus haereses 3.22.1. On Irenaeus’s usage 
of spirit, Mackenzie writes that it is “the bond of the relation between God and 
humanity.” He adds “that in each case, spirit as applied to the human being is not a 
constitutent part of that creation.” Iain M. Mackenzie, Irenaeus’s Demonstration of the 
Apostolic Preaching: A Theological Commentary and Translation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2002), 47. See also Behr, 99-101; Anders-Christian Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man 
according to Irenaeus and Origen,” in Körper und Seele: Aspekte spätantiker 
Anthropologie, ed. Barbara Feichtinger et al. (Munich: K. G. Saur, 2006), 73; Eric F. 
Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 221-225. On 
the question between spirit and Spirit, see Mary Ann Donovan, “Alive to the Glory of 
God: A Key Insight in St. Irenaeus,” Theological Studies 49 (1988): 295-296. 
28For a discussion on the bipartite or tripartite view of the human person, see 
Mackenzie, 48.  
29“Homo est enim temperatio animae et carnis, qui secundum similitudinem Dei 
formatus est et per manus ejus plasmatus est, hoc est per Filium et Spiritum, quibus et 
dixit: Faciamus hominem.” Adversus haereses 4.prol.1. Mackenzie adds, “The perfection 




by His hands,” he introduces his usage of Gen 1:27 and Gen 2:7 which form the basis for 
much of his understanding.30 He also writes, “Now the soul and the spirit are certainly a 
part of the man, but certainly not the man; for the perfect man consists in the 
commingling and the union of the soul receiving the spirit of the Father, and the 
admixture of that fleshly nature which was molded after the image of God.”31 Here, also, 
one detects a strong reference to the first two chapters of Genesis. 
Irenaeus writes further on the relationship of the soul to the body, “For the body is 
not possessed of greater power than the soul, since indeed the former is inspired, and 
vivified, and increased, and held together by the latter; but the soul possesses and rules 
                                                 
ensouled body to God in which they advance towards him in their inseparable unity as 
the entity of the human being.” Mackenzie, 49. Cf. Denis Minns, Irenaeus (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 61. For a discussion of the term image, see 
Jacques Fantino, L’homme image de Dieu chez saint Irénée de Lyon (n.p.: Les Éditions 
du Cerf, 1986); A. G. Hamman, L’homme icône de Dieu: la Genèse relue par l’Église 
des Pères (Paris: Migne, 1998), 18-22; Henri Lassiat, Promotion de l’homme en Jésu-
Christ d’après Irénée de Lyon témoin de la Tradition des Apôtres (Paris: Mame, 1974), 
147-213; Véronique Minet, L’empreinte divine: la théologie du corps chez Saint Irénée 
(Lyon: Profac, 2002), 35-44. 
30On the importance of the creation narrative in Irenaeus’s theology, see Gregory 
T. Armstrong, Die Genesis in der Alten Kirche: Die drei Kirchenväter (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1962), 67-73; Anders-Christian Jacobsen, “The Importance of Genesis 1-3 in the 
Theology of Irenaeus,” Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 8, no. 2 (2005): 299-316. 
31“Anima autem et Spiritus pars hominis esse possunt, homo autem nequaquam: 
perfectus autem homo commixtio et adunitio est animae assumentis Spiritum Patris et 
admixtae ei carni quae est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei.” Adversus haereses 5.6.1. 
Irenaeus reiterates this point a second time later in the chapter. He explains, in the 
meantime, that the Spirit is the Spirit of God, not a third part of the human person. Yet it 
is required to have a perfect person. Here he gives his interpretation of 1 Thess 5:23 and 
Paul’s prayer for the body, soul, and spirit. The Spirit, he says, is God’s and the person is 
to then keep their body and soul “blameless.” It is not clear if this is his entire view as he 
does mention the soul and the spirit together in Adversus haereses 5.4.1. On the 
distinction between the terms image and likeness in Irenaeus, see Hans Boersma, 
“Accommodation to What? Univocity of Being, Pure Nature, and the Anthropology of St 




over the body. It is doubtless retarded in its velocity, just in the exact proportion in which 
the body shares in its motion; but it never loses the knowledge which properly belongs to 
it.”32 The soul gives breath, life, and increase to the body, along with being the bond that 
holds it together. Regarding the notion of the soul holding the body together, mention 
should be made of the role of blood in this process. For Irenaeus, the soul and body are 
held together by the blood. While describing the various parts of the body which God 
created, he writes of “the blood, which is the bond of union between soul and body.”33 
Irenaeus also mentions the principle of movement as a key factor of the soul.34 He 
mentions this slowing of the soul a second time, writing, “So also the soul, by being 
mixed up with the body belonging to it, is in a certain measure impeded, its rapidity being 
blended with the body’s slowness. Yet it does not lose altogether its own peculiar 
powers; but while, as it were, sharing life with the body, it does not itself cease to live.”35 
In describing this connection, Irenaeus describes it as an artist with an instrument. As the 
mind of the artist works in coordination with the instrument, carrying out its actions 
                                                 
32“Non enim est fortius corpus quam anima, quod quidem ab illa spiratur et 
uiuificatur et augetur et articulatur, sed anima possidet et principatur corpori. Tantum 
autem impeditur a sua uelocitate, quantum corpus participat de eius motione; sed non 
amittit suam scientiam.” Adversus haereses 2.33.4. On the relation of soul and the body 
in Irenaeus, see Andia, Homo vivens: incorruptibilité et divinisation de l’homme selon 
Irénée de Lyon, 80-87; Lassiat, Promotion, 157; Minet, 32-33; Antonio Orbe, “La 
definición del hombre en la teología del s. IIº,” Gregorianum 48, no. 3 (1967): 548-549; 
idem, Antropologia de San Ireneo, 17. 
33“Aliud sanguis, copulatio animae et corporis.” Adversus haereses 5.3.2. For a 
discussion of the relationship between the blood and the soul and possible similarites 
with other writers, see Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 306-307. 
34For background in Greco-Roman philosophy, see Ibid., 307. 
35“Sic et anima participans suo corpori modicum quidem impeditur, admixta 
uelocitate eius in corporis tarditate, non amittit autem in totum suas uirtutes, sed quasi 
uitam participans corpori ipsa uiuere non cessat.” Adversus haereses 2.33.4. 
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slowly, so also the mind works much slower because of its conjunction with the body. 
What is clear through this discussion is the insistence upon a clear distinction between the 
soul and the body. 
In defining the human person, Irenaeus insists that “there are three things out of 
which, as I have shown, the complete man is composed—flesh, soul, and spirit. One of 
these does indeed preserve and fashion [the man]—this is the spirit; while as to another it 
is united and formed—that is the flesh; then [comes] that which is between these two—
that is the soul, which sometimes indeed, when it follows the spirit, is raised up by it, but 
sometimes it sympathizes with the flesh, and falls into carnal lusts.”36 He later writes, 
“For their soul, tending towards what is worse, and descending to earthly lusts, has 
become a partaker in the same designation which belongs to these.”37 
While Irenaeus relies on the creation account for much of his understanding of the 
human individual, he also goes to other passages. He writes, “For there had been a 
                                                 
36“Sunt tria ex quibus, quemadmodum ostendimus, perfectus homo constat, carne, 
anima et spiritu, et altero quidem salvante et figurante, qui est Spiritus, altero quod 
salvatur et formatur, quod est caro, altero quod inter haec est duo, quod est anima quae 
aliquando quidem subsequens Spiritum, elevatur ab eo; aliquando autem consentiens 
carni, decidit in terrenas concupiscentias.” Adversus haereses 5.9.1. Donovan writes, 
“The capacity of the soul to follow either the Spirit or flesh inserts a dynamism into the 
human constitution, allowing the possibility of growing into God.” Mary Ann Donovan, 
One Right Reading?: A Guide to Irenaeus (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997), 
147. See also John Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus (London: Epworth 
Press, 1948), 206; Minns, 61; Jan T. Nielsen, Adam and Christ in the Theology of 
Irenaeus of Lyons: An Examination of the Function of the Adam-Christ Typology in the 
Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus, against the Background of The Gnosticism of His Time 
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1968), 20. For a discussion on how Irenaeus uses this 
understanding of the human person in interpreting Paul’s words in 1 Cor 15:50 over and 
against the Gnostics, see Donovan, One Right Reading? A Guide to Irenaeus, 148. 
37“Anima enim ipsorum declinans in peius et in terrenas concupiscentias 
descendens, ejusdem cujus et illa sunt participavit appellationis.” Adversus haereses 
5.12.3. On this, see also Aland, Fides und Subiectio, 24. 
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necessity that, in the first place, a human being should be fashioned, and that what was 
fashioned should receive the soul; afterwards that it should thus receive the communion 
of the Spirit.”38 This clearly separates, chronologically, the appearance of the three parts 
of the human person. In this context, Irenaeus quotes from 1 Cor 15:45 indicating that 
Adam was made a living soul. He then concludes, “He who was made a living soul 
forfeited life when he turned aside to what was evil.”39 In this, Irenaeus again clearly 
states his understanding that, after quoting texts which state that God made Adam a living 
soul, God gave Adam a soul through the breath of life rather than making the formed 
Adam a soul by the breath of life. This discussion has been precipitated by an attempt by 
Irenaeus to interpret 1 Cor 15 in reference only to the body and not the soul. 
Irenaeus interprets Paul’s trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit from 1 Thess 5 as 
follows. “These, then, are the perfect who have had the Spirit of God remaining in them, 
and have preserved their souls and bodies blameless, holding fast the faith of God, that is, 
that faith which is towards God, and maintaining righteous dealings with respect to their 
neighbors.”40 It appears from this that the soul is explained as that which is responsible 
for faith in God while the body is responsible for living rightly with one’s neighbors. 
For Irenaeus, it is clear that the soul’s nature is not fixed but can be moved, either 
towards the spiritual or to the carnal. He writes, “But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, 
he who is such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect 
                                                 
38“Oportuerat enim primo plasmari hominem et plasmatum accipere animam, 
deinde sic communionem Spiritus recipere.” Adversus haereses 5.12.2. 
39“Sicut igitur qui in animam viventem factus est devertens in peius perdidit 
vitam.” Ibid. 
40Adversus haereses 5.6.1. 
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being, possessing indeed the image [of God] in his formation (in plasmate), but not 
receiving the similitude through the Spirit; and thus is this being imperfect.”41 
The soul of Christ is also used in defining the human soul. Irenaeus compares the 
souls of the followers of Carpocrates with the soul of Christ writing, “It is certain, too, 
from the fact that the Lord rose from the dead on the third day, and manifested Himself to 
His disciples, and was in their sight received up into heaven, that, inasmuch as these men 
die, and do not rise again, nor manifest themselves to any, they are proved as possessing 
souls in no respect similar to that of Jesus.”42 This comparison seems predicated on the 
notion discussed earlier regarding the change in nature of which the soul can undergo, 
namely its move toward the good or toward evil. Irenaeus argues from the fact that they 
have not been resurrected as proof that their souls are not similar to Christ’s. 
Irenaeus looks to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus for support of several 
ideas concerning the soul. These ideas are the understanding that souls continue to exist 
after death, that they remember their prior deeds after death, and that souls themselves are 
corporeal.43 “The Lord has taught with very great fullness, that souls not only continue to 
                                                 
41“Si autem defuerit animae Spiritus, animalis est vere qui est talis et carnalis 
derelictus imperfectus erit, imaginem quidem habens in plasmate, similitudinem vero non 
assumens per Spiritum” Ibid. On the image of God in Irenaeus, see Jakob Birrer, Der 
Mensch als Medium und Adressat der Schöpfungsoffenbarung: eine 
dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Frage der Gotteserkenntnis bei Irenäus von 
Lyon (Bern: Peter Lang, 1989), 131-132; Jacobsen, “The Importance of Genesis 1-3 in 
the Theology of Irenaeus,” 306-310. On Irenaeus’s use of plasmo and plasmati, see 
Birrer, 127-129; Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 
70; D. E. Jenkens, “The Make-up of Man according to St. Irenaeus,” Studia Patristica 6 
(1962): 92-94; Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 303. 
42“Et ex hoc autem quod Dominus surrexit a mortuis in tertia die [firmum est] et 
discipulis se manifestauit et uidentibus eis receptus est in caelum, quod ipsi morientes et 
non resurgentes neque manifestati quibusdam, arguuntur in nullo similes habentes Iesu 
animas.” Adversus haereses 2.32.3. See also ibid., 1.25.2. 




exist, not by passing from body to body, but that they preserve the same form as the body 
had to which they were adapted, and that they remember the deeds which they did in this 
state of existence, and from which they have now ceased.”44 He concludes, “By these 
things, then, it is plainly declared that souls continue to exist that they do not pass from 
body to body, that they possess the form of a man, so that they may be recognized, and 
retain the memory of things in this world; moreover, that the gift of prophecy was 
possessed by Abraham, and that each class receives a habitation such as it has deserved, 
even before the judgment.”45 What is clear is that Irenaeus relies on a literal interpretation 
of the parable for his viewpoints.46 This literal interpretation then allows his 
interpretations on the soul. In addition to the above listed ideas, Irenaeus finds in this 
parable the teaching that rewards are experienced by the souls of both the just and the 
unjust before the judgment. In this way, the judgment does not carry much force in regard 
to the soul, being more concerned with the rejoining of the body to the soul. 
While Irenaeus describes the human person as “compound by nature, and 
                                                 
platonic notion of an immaterial soul inhabiting a material body. Wyrwa, 
“Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 311. 
44“Plenissime autem Dominus docuit non solum perseuerare non de corpore in 
corpus transgredientes animas, sed et characterem corporis in quo etiam adaptantur 
custodire eundem, et meminisse eas operum quae egerunt hic et a quibus cessauerunt.” 
Adversus haereses 2.34.1. 
45“Per haec enim manifestissime declaratum est et perseuerare animas, et non de 
corpore in corpus transire, et habere hominis figuram ut etiam cognoscantur et 
meminerint eorum quae sint hic, et propheticum quoque adesse Abrahae, et dignam 
habitationem unamquamque gentem percipere etiam ante |iudicium.” Adversus haereses 
2.34.1. 
46Wyrwa notes that Irenaeus admitedly interprets this parable literally. Wyrwa, 
“Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 311. 
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consist[ing] of a body and a soul,”47 he also writes that the soul itself has form and shape, 
elements of corporeality. He uses the metaphor of water to describe this writing, “Just as 
water when poured into a vessel takes the form of that vessel, and if on any occasion it 
happens to congeal in it, it will acquire the form of the vessel in which it has thus been 
frozen, since souls themselves possess the figure of the body [in which they dwell]; for 
they themselves have been adapted to the vessel [in which they exist], as I have said 
before.”48 
 
Immortality and the Soul 
Though Irenaeus does argue for the corporeal nature of the soul, yet he also, in a 
different context, will argue for the incorporeal nature of the soul. When comparing souls 
with bodies, Irenaeus seems clear that the soul is incorporeal while the body is corporeal. 
He writes, “What, then, are mortal bodies? Can they be souls? Nay, for souls are 
incorporeal when put in comparison with mortal bodies; for God ‘breathed into the face 
of man the breath of life, and man became a living soul.’ Now the breath of life is an 
incorporeal thing.”49 Genesis 2:7 also functions as support for his notion of the 
immortality of the soul. He writes, “And certainly they cannot maintain that the very 
                                                 
47“Et haec quidem in hominibus capit dici, cum sint compositi natura et ex 
corpore et anima subsistentes.” Adversus haereses 2.13.3. 
48“Non enim Angelorum habebit similitudinem et speciem, sed animarum in 
quibus et formatur, quomodo aqua in uas missa ipsius uasi habebit formam et iam, si 
gelauerit in eo, speciem habebit uasculi in quo gelauit, quando ipsae animae corporis 
habeant figuram: ipsi enim adaptatae sunt uaso, quemadmodum praediximus.” Ibid., 
2.19.6. 
49“Quae sunt ergo mortalia corpora? Numquidnam animae? Sed incorporales 
animae, quantum ad | comparationem mortalium corporum: insufflavit enim in faciem 
hominis Deus flatum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem: flatus autem vitae 
incorporalis.” Adversus haereses 5.7.1. 
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breath of life is mortal. Therefore David says, ‘My soul also shall live to Him,’ just as if 
its substance were immortal”50 quoting from Ps 22:29 (LXX). So in comparison with the 
body, Irenaeus holds to the soul’s incorporeality whereas he elsewhere has argued for its 
corporeal nature. In both instances, Irenaeus finds biblical support for his idea. 
Irenaeus clearly wants to argue for the resurrection of the body in this section. 
What he says of the soul may therefore be secondary to his main argument. He does 
make clear, though, other aspects of his understanding of the soul in this comparison. He 
begins by stating concerning the body, “For this it is which dies and is decomposed, but 
not the soul or the spirit.”51 He continues by defining death. “For to die is to lose vital 
power, and to become henceforth breathless, inanimate, and devoid of motion, and to 
melt away into those [component parts] from which also it derived the commencement of 
[its] substance. But this event happens neither to the soul, for it is the breath of life, nor to 
the spirit, for the spirit is simple and not composite, so that it cannot be decomposed, and 
is itself the life of those who receive it.”52 Irenaeus distinguishes here between the breath 
of life which animates the body and the “life-giving spirit which made him spiritual.”53 In 
                                                 
50“Sed ne mortalem quidem possunt dicere ipsum, flatum vitae exsistentem; et 
propter hoc David ait: Et anima mea illi vivet, tamquam immortali substantia ejus 
exsistente.” Ibid. 
51“Haec enim est quae moritur et solvitur, sed non anima neque spiritus.” Ibid. 
52“Mori enim est vitalem amittere habilitatem et sine spiramine in posterum et 
inanimalem et immobilem fieri et deperire in illa ex quibus et initium substantiae habuit. 
Hoc autem neque animae evenit, flatus est enim vitae, neque spiritui, incompositus est 
enim et simplex spiritus qui resolvi non potest et ipse vita est eorum qui percipiunt illum.” 
Adversus haereses 5.7.1. 
53Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 221. Cf. Behr, 109. Irenaeus equates the spirit which 
is life described here and the Spirit of God which the perfect human receives described in 
Adversus haereses 5.6.1. Compare this with Irenaeus’s statement in Adversus haereses 
5.8.1 where he writes that “we do now receive a certain portion of His Spirit, tending 




this description of the differences between the body, soul, and spirit, Irenaeus attributes 
simpleness to the spirit but he does not do this to the soul. The spirit, as discussed 
previously, is the power of God in one’s life. The soul, however, is still contrasted with 
the body, it being noted that the body becomes breathless and inanimate, which obviously 
the soul does not as it is for the soul to animate. 
Since the obvious implication of arguing that the soul has a beginning is that it 
also has an end, Irenaeus also explains that those who believe that they will not exist after 
death should understand that God has willed that they exist into a long series of ages.54 
Here the soul’s continued existence is the direct will of God rather than an innate 
characteristic of the soul itself. Irenaeus argues this on two fronts. First he points to the 
natural world, arguing that as everything in it also had a beginning yet continued for a 
long period of time, so also humans including their soul and spirit, would continue. He 
then quotes Ps 148:5-6, “He spoke, and they were made. . . . He hath established them for 
ever,” which he cites as biblical support for the claim just made from the enduring status 
of the physical creation. Next he quotes Ps 21:4, “‘He asked life for You, and You gave 
him length of days for ever and ever’; indicating that it is through the will of God that life 
is given and that the Father of all who imparts continuance for ever and ever on those 
who are saved. For life does not arise from us or from our own nature.”55 This last 
                                                 
Spirit of God is also the simple, spirit that humans receive, which Irenaeus describes as 
“the life of those who receive it.” He the writes in Adversus haereses 5.8.2 that the 
human person, that is, one’s body and soul, having received the Spirit of God, makes a 
spiritual person. 
54Adversus haereses 2.34.2. Orbe argues that this “will of God” is the key to 
understanding the apparent contradiction between 2.34.4 and 5.4.1. Orbe, Antropologia 
de San Ireneo, 438. 
55Adversus haereses 2.34.3. Cf. Daley, 29. Daley uses this to argue that, from this 
perspective, the soul, for Irenaeus, is not naturally immortal. 
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sentence makes clear Irenaeus’s idea that the soul is not immortal of its own nature. It 
will continue, both for the saved and the lost, as long as God wills this.56 Later, when 
writing on the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, he seems to hint at this point. “For our 
bodies have received unity among themselves by means of that laver which leads to 
incorruption; but our souls, by means of the Spirit. Wherefore both are necessary.”57 
Here, as the laver, presumably of baptism, leads to incorruption, so the reception of the 
Holy Spirit leads to the incorruption of the believer’s soul. The context for this discussion 
of the reception of the Holy Spirit is the biblical discussion of the Spirit descending on 
Christ at His baptism and then a recalling of the promise of living water for the Samaritan 
woman whom Christ calls out of a life of sin. While Irenaeus does not deny immortality 
in this argument, he does make clear that life is made possible by the will of God rather 
than a natural power of the soul. 
In arguing against those who claim that the Creator of the world is different from 
the Father of Jesus, Irenaeus admits that the soul remains immortal. He writes the 
                                                 
56There has been some discussion regarding whether Irenaeus actually held to the 
natural immortality of the soul. For an involved discussion on this, see Henri Lassiat, 
“L’anthropologie d’Irénée,” NRT 100, no. 3 (1978): 399-417; Adelin Rousseau, 
“L’éternité des peines de l’enfer et l’immortalité naturelle de l’âme selon saint Irénée,” 
NRT 99, no. 6 (1977): 834-864. Rousseau argues that Irenaeus does hold to the natural 
immortality of the soul. Lassiat holds that Irenaeus understands the soul only to be 
immortal according to the will of God and that for the wicked, after some long period of 
time, it will dissolve. On this, see also Lassiat, Promotion de l’homme en Jésu-Christ 
d’après Irénée de Lyon témoin de la Tradition des Apôtres, 395-396. Here it should be 
noted that Lassiat uses passages from Irenaeus where he is writing on the notion of 
incorruptibility, though not necessarily in the context of the soul. Donovan seems to side 
more with Rousseau’s interpretation while Minns falls on the side of Lassiat. Mary Ann 
Donovan, “Irenaeus in Recent Scholarship,” Second Century 4, no. 4 (1984): 231-232; 
Minns, 79-80. 
57“Corpora enim nostra per lauacrum illam quae est ad incorruptionem unitatem 
acceperunt, animae autem per Spiritum.” Adversus haereses 3.17.2. 
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following in setting up the argument: “For when they say of things which it is manifest to 
all do remain immortal, such as the spirit and the soul, and such other things, that they are 
quickened by the Father, but that another thing which is quickened in no different manner 
than by God granting to it, is abandoned by life, this proves their Father to be weak and 
powerless, or else envious and malignant.”58 He later adds, “He feigns to be the 
quickener of those things which are immortal by nature, to which things life is always 
present by their very nature.”59 These two taken together suggest that Irenaeus is well 
aware of the general opinion that souls are immortal by nature. This, on the surface, 
seems to contradict what he states elsewhere and which is discussed below. Thus, it may 
be that here, Irenaeus, for the purpose of the argument regarding the ability or desire of 
the Gnostic Demiurge to give life to the body, has accepted the prevailing opinion 
regarding the soul, rather than asserting that he also believes this. In interpreting this 
statement, the point of the argument in which it occurs needs to be kept in mind. This is, 
for Irenaeus, to assert the future existence of the body along with the soul.60 Here, 
Irenaeus, relying on commonly accepted opinions regarding the nature of the soul and the 
body, notes that a God who promises to make people immortal is not doing anything 
especially powerful if all He does is to give immortality to the thing which everyone 
                                                 
58“Cum enim dicant ea quae omnibus sunt manifesta quoniam perseverant 
immortalia, ut puta spiritus et anima et quae sunt talia, quoniam vivificantur a Patre, 
illud autem quod non alias vivificatur nisi Deus illi praestet vitam derelinqui, aut 
impotentem et infirmum ostendit Patrem ipsorum, aut invidum et lividum.” Ibid., 5.4.1. 
59“Qui ea quidem quae sunt natura immortalia, quibus a sua natura adest vivere, 
fingit se vivificare.” Ibid. 
60On the salvation of the body, see E. P. Meijering, “Die ‘Physische Erlösung’ in 
der Theologie des Irenäus,” in God Being History: Studies in Patristic Philosophy 
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1975), 39-51. 
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already agrees is immortal by nature and thus not in need of immortality. Then, where 
power is really needed, that is, in the granting of immortality to the body, he fails to do 
this. Thus, it can be argued that this statement in favor of the natural immortality of the 
soul should be understood in the context in which it is used and not be taken to override 
other statements that Irenaeus makes. 
Irenaeus argues that the soul is not to be equated with life itself. “But as the 
animal body is certainly not itself the soul, yet has fellowship with the soul as long as 
God pleases; so the soul herself is not life, but partakes in that life bestowed upon her by 
God. Wherefore also the prophetic word declares of the first-formed man, ‘He became a 
living soul,’ teaching us that by the participation of life the soul became alive; so that the 
soul, and the life which it possesses, must be understood as being separate existences.”61 
Here Irenaeus argues from Gen 2:7 that life and soul are two separate existences, thus one 
cannot argue that the soul is immortal based upon its nature but that it exists only through 
the will of God. In conclusion, Irenaeus writes, “When God therefore bestows life and 
perpetual duration, it comes to pass that even souls which did not previously exist should 
henceforth endure, since God has both willed that they should exist, and should continue 
                                                 
61“Sicut autem corpus animale ipsum quidem non est anima, participatur autem 
animam quoadusque Deus uult, sic et anima ipsa quidem non est uita, participatur autem 
a Deo sibi praestitam uitam. Vnde et propheticus sermo de protoplasto ait: Factus est in 
animam uiuam, docens nos quoniam secundum participationem uitae uiuens facta est 
anima, ita ut separatim quidem anima intellegatur, separatim autem quae erga eam est 
uita.” Adversus haereses 2.34.4. Weiss argues based on this that Irenaeus believed in the 
doctrine of thnetopsychismus. Weiss, 157. Orbe notes the apparent contradiction between 
this statement and that which Irenaeus makes in Adversus haereses 5.4.1 where he states 
that all agree that the soul is naturally immortal. Orbe, Antropologia de San Ireneo, 438. 
Here Orbe suggests that the proper way to understand Irenaeus’s notion of an immortal 
soul is that it exsists by virture of God’s will. So also Harry A. Wolfson, “Immortality 
and Resurrection in the Philosophy of the Church Fathers,” in Doctrines of Human 
Nature, Sin, and Salvation in the Early Church, ed. Everett Ferguson, Studies in Early 
Christianity, vol. 10 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), 305. 
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in existence.”62 Thus, Irenaeus makes clear the fact that even though souls are not 
immortal, yet they can endure for as long as God wills. His reticence to state that souls 
are immortal does not prevent him from asserting that they are not mortal. In commenting 
on 2 Cor 5:4, he writes, “He uses these words most manifestly in reference to the flesh; 
for the soul is not mortal, neither is the spirit.”63 
 
Death, Judgment and the Soul 
Irenaeus defines death as the separation of the soul from the body. “We must 
therefore conclude that it is in reference to the flesh that death is mentioned; which, after 
the soul’s departure, becomes breathless and inanimate, and is decomposed gradually into 
the earth from which it was taken.”64 
Irenaeus, in arguing against the doctrine of the Gnostics regarding the salvation of 
souls, writes, 
But if souls would have perished unless they had been righteous, then righteousness 
must have power to save the bodies also [which these souls inhabited]; for why 
should it not save them, since they, too, participated in righteousness? For if nature 
and substance are the means of salvation, then all souls shall be saved; but if 
righteousness and faith, why should these not save those bodies which, equally with 
the souls, will enter into immortality? For righteousness will appear, in matters of this 
kind, either impotent or unjust, if indeed it saves some substances through 
participating in it, but not others.65 
                                                 
62“Deo itaque et uitam et perpetuam perseuerantiam donante, capit et animas 
primum non exsistentes dehinc perseuerare, cum eas Deus et esse et subsistere uoluerit.” 
Adversus haereses 2.34.4. 
63“Manifestissime hoc de carne dicens: nec enim anima mortalis, neque Spiritus.” 
Ibid., 5.13.3. 
64“Superest igitur ut circa carnem mors ostendatur, quae, posteaquam exierit 
anima, sine spiratione et inanimalis efficitur et paulatim resolvitur in terram ex qua 
sumpta est.” Adversus haereses 5.7.1. 
65“Si autem animae quae periturae essent inciperent nisi iustae fuissent, iustitia 




Irenaeus’s argument seems clear. Either souls are saved by virtue of their nature, and thus 
all souls will be saved (presumably because all souls have one nature), or they are saved 
by righteousness, in which case, the body will also be saved as it participated in 
righteousness. The final claim is that if this is not the case, then righteousness will be 
impotent or unjust.66 What can be seen from this argument is a repetition of Irenaeus’s 
two-part understanding of the human person. It is on this basis that he can argue that both 
the soul and body participate in any righteousness of the individual. 
Irenaeus elaborates on this charge of the possible impotence of righteousness. He 
writes, “Either, therefore, all souls will of necessity pass into the intermediate place, and 
there will never be a judgment; or bodies, too, which have participated in righteousness, 
will attain to the place of enjoyment, along with the souls which have in like manner 
participated in it.” 67 This argument is significant in that Irenaeus connects the biblical 
notion of a future judgment with his understanding of the natural immortality of the soul. 
If, as some argue, souls are saved by virtual of their nature, then all souls will be saved 
equally as all have the same nature of soul and their immortality is based upon this rather 
than upon any righteous or evil acts committed while in the body. Irenaeus argues for the 
                                                 
iustitiae? Si enim natura et substantia saluat, omnes saluabuntur animae; si autem 
iustitia et fides, quare non saluet ea quae similiter cum animabus in corruptelam cedere 
incipiunt corpora? Aut enim impotens aut iniusta huiusmodi apparebit iustitia, si 
quaedam quidem saluat propter suam participationem, quaedam autem non.” Ibid., 
2.29.1. 
66The claim of injustice is similar to that argued for by Athenagoras in De 
resurrectione 21.4. 
67“Aut uniuersae itaque animae necessarie succedent in Medietatis locum, et 
iudicium nusquam; aut et corpora, quae participauerunt iustitiae, cum animabus quae 
similiter participauerunt obtinebunt refrigerii locum, siquidem potens est iustitia illuc 
transducere ea quae participauerunt ei.” Adversus haereses 2.29.2. 
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second scenario, which then allows him to maintain both the reality of a future judgment 
and, more importantly from his perspective, the reality of the future immortality of the 
body. 
 
Hell and Paradise 
Irenaeus is clear on the state of the soul after death and before the resurrection. In 
addition to the previously mentioned interpretation of the Rich Man and Lazarus parable, 
Irenaeus uses his understanding of Jesus and His crucifixion as pattern for interpreting 
what happens to all believers. He quotes several texts to support that Jesus did not rise to 
heaven upon His death on the cross but was in the place of the dead. He begins with a 
quote which is in one place attributed to Isaiah and in another to Jeremiah. “But the case 
was, that for three days He dwelt in the place where the dead were, as the prophet says 
concerning Him: ‘And the Lord remembered His dead saints who slept formerly in the 
land of sepulture; and He descended to them, to rescue and save them.’”68 He also quotes 
Matt 12:40 regarding Jesus being in the heart of the earth three days and three nights as 
Jonah did. He also quotes Eph 4:9 and Ps 86:13, and ends with Christ’s words to Mary in 
John 20:17 to not touch Him. Using Ps 23:4, Irenaeus writes, “For as the Lord ‘went 
away in the midst of the shadow of death,’ where the souls of the dead were, yet 
afterwards arose in the body, and after the resurrection was taken up, it is manifest that 
the souls of His disciples also, upon whose account the Lord underwent these things, 
shall go away into the invisible place allotted to them by God, and there remain until the 
                                                 
68Irenaeus attributes this quote to Isaiah in Adversus haereses 3.20.4 and to 
Jeremiah in ibid. 4.22.1. Justin, in Dial. cum Trypho 72, also uses it. It is not found in any 
ancient versions of the HB however. 
 
158 
resurrection, awaiting that event.”69 This argument is given against the suggestion that the 
souls of the righteous go directly to heaven after death.  
Irenaeus argues for a resurrected person composed of soul and body, just as in the 
original creation. He writes, “And therefore, when the number is completed, which He 
had predetermined in His own counsel, all those who have been enrolled for life shall rise 
again, having their own bodies, and having also their own souls, and their own spirits, in 
which they had pleased God.”70 He notes also that the wicked shall go to punishment 
with their body and soul. In another place, Irenaeus describes the complete or perfect 
person which is to receive salvation as the soul and body.71 
Irenaeus also argues against the transmigration of the soul from body to body.72 In 
addition to the previous argument mentioned in discussing the parable of the Rich Man 
and Lazarus, he writes, “We may subvert their doctrine as to transmigration from body to 
body by this fact, that souls remember nothing whatever of the events which took place in 
                                                 
69“Cum enim Dominus in medio umbrae mortis abierit, ubi animae mortuorum 
erant, post deinde corporaliter resurrexit et post resurrectionem assumptus est, 
manifestum est quia et discipulorum ejus propter quos et haec operatus est Dominus 
animae abibunt in invisibilem locum definitum eis a Deo et ibi usque ad resurrectionem 
commorabuntur sustinentes resurrectionem.” Adversus haereses 5.31.2. Cf. also 
Irenaeus’s anti-Gnostic argument for an intermediate place in ibid. 2.29. On the idea of 
separate locations for the soul of the good and the evil, see Joly, Christianisme et 
philosophie, 51. 
70“Et ideo adimpleto numero quem ipse apud se ante definiit, omnes quicumque 
sunt scripti in uitam resurgent, sua corpora et suas habentes animas et suos Spiritus in 
quibus placuerunt Deo; qui autem poena sunt digni abibunt in eam, et ipsi suas habentes 
animas et sua corpora in quibus abstiterunt a Dei bonitate.” Adversus haereses 2.33.5. 
71“Et eandem salutem totius hominis, hoc est animae et corporis, sustinentibus.” 
Ibid., 5.20.1. 
72For an overview of this teaching in connection with Irenaeus’s thought, see 
Hoheisel, 38-39; Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 314-315. 
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their previous states of existence.”73 He states that the joining of a soul with a body is not 
enough to erase the memory which the soul should have had from its prior existence. 
Here he does not resort to a biblical defense but rather an argument from experience. He 
notes that when the body is asleep, it dreams and these are not lost to the body when it 
wakes up. “For if that which is seen only for a very brief space of time, or has been 
conceived of simply in a phantasm, and by the soul alone, through means of a dream, is 
remembered after she has mingled again with the body, and been dispersed through all 
the members, much more would she remember those things in connection with which she 
stayed during so long a time, even throughout the whole period of a bypast life.”74 This is 
further enforced when he writes, “If, therefore, the soul remembers nothing of what took 
place in a former state of existence, but has a perception of those things which are here, it 
follows that she never existed in other bodies, nor did things of which she has no 
knowledge, nor [once] knew things which she cannot [now mentally] contemplate.”75 
In addition to the argument from dreams, Irenaeus also introduces the biblical 
references to the dreams and visions of the prophets. “But the prophets also, when they 
were upon the earth, remembered likewise, on their returning to their ordinary state of 
mind, whatever things they spiritually saw or heard in visions of heavenly objects, and 
                                                 
73“De corpore autem in corpus transmigrationem ipsorum subuertamus ex eo quo 
nihil omnino eorum quae ante fuerint meminerint animae.” Adversus haereses 2.33.1. 
74“Si enim hoc quod in breuissimo tempore uisum est uel in phantasmate 
conceptum est ab ea sola per somnium, posteaquam commixta sit corpori et in uniuersum 
membrum dispersa, commemoratur, multo magis illorum reminisceretur in quibus 
temporibus tantis et uniuerso praeteritae uitae saeculo immorata est.” Ibid. 
75“Si itaque nullius praeteritorum meminit sed exsistentium scientiam hic percipit, 
non igitur in aliis corporibus fuit aliquando, nec egit quae ne quidem agnoscit, neque 
nouit quae quidem nec uidet.” Adversus haereses 2.33.5. 
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related them to others. The body, therefore, does not cause the soul to forget those things 
which have been spiritually witnessed; but the soul teaches the body, and shares with it 
the spiritual vision which it has enjoyed.”76 
 
Summary 
Irenaeus uses soul for natural life. The soul holds the body together through the 
blood. It gives it life and rules over it. It is also the principle of movement. The soul can 
become mentally excited and impudent and bold. Sorrow is experience in the soul and the 
souls of infants can cry out. The seat of reason is in the soul, and mind and thought at 
times are other terms for the soul. Free will is found in the soul also. The soul, thus, is 
also where obedience or disobedience to God takes place. 
The soul originates with the creation of the body, both of which are made by God. 
The soul is connected with the breath of God. As such, it is immortal, though at times he 
argues that this is not based upon innate nature but upon the will of God. It survives the 
body’s death and awaits the judgment after which it will be reunited with the body to 
receive rewards or punishment. The natural immortality of the soul is tangentially 
connected to the doctrine of a future judgment in his argument with the Gnostics on this 
point. 
Irenaeus, more than any previous writer, explicitly looks to the Scriptures for 
support for his understanding of the soul.77 He turns to 1 Cor 15:45 to argue that Adam 
                                                 
76“Sed et prophetae ipsi, cum essent in terra, quaecumque spiritaliter secundum 
uisiones caelestium uident uel audiunt ipsi quoque meminerunt, in hominem conuersi, et 
reliquis adnuntiant; et non corpus obliuionem efficit animae eorum quae spiritaliter uisa 
sunt, sed anima docet corpus et participat de spiritali ei facta uisione.” Ibid., 2.33.3. 
77Some scholars are inclined to minimize the objectivity which Irenaeus had in 
quoting from the Bible. Wyrwa describes the influence of Irenaeus’s world view on his 




was made a living soul. He looks to Gen 1:27; 2:7 to describe the soul and its relationship 
to the imago dei and to argue for the incorporeal nature of the soul. He uses Ps 22:29 
(LXX) to argue for the immortal nature of the soul. He also looks to Pss 21:4; 148:5, 6 to 
argue for the enduring status of the physical creation, which then supports his notion of 
the enduring status of the soul. On the continued existence of souls after death, Irenaeus 
also turns to Christ’s death for support. He quotes from Matt 12:40; Eph 4:9; Ps 86:23; 
John 20:17; Ps 23:4 to support the notion that Christ appeared to the souls of the dead to 
preach salvation to them who had died before. Most authors will tend to look to 1 Pet 
3:19 for this argument. Though Irenaeus sees plenty of scriptural support for the idea, he 
does not mention the Petrine text. 
Luke 16:19-31, the story of the Rich Man and Lazarus, is used to argue for 
several different notions regarding the soul. First and foremost, it is further support for 
the continued existence of souls after death. Beyond this, it also is an indicator of their 
corporeal nature and is used to argue that souls retain memory of events which happened 
while in the body. Finally it also is used to argue regarding two different places for the 
souls of the righteous and the wicked before the judgment. As is consistent with most 
authors, save the later Latin Fathers, Irenaeus supports the rejoining of the soul with the 
body at the resurrection. 
 
Clement of Alexandria 
Clement was a teacher at Alexandria. His three main works are the Exhortation to 
                                                 
body soul dichotomy of the Greco-Roman philosophy. Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei 
Irenäus von Lyon,” 303. He also points to the notion of the soul as the principle of 
movement from the same source as being used by Irenaeus in his interpretation of 
Scripture. Ibid., 307. Wyrwa also points out his usage of the two philosophical notions of 
an incorporeal and immortal soul. Ibid., 309. 
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the Heathen, the Instructor, and the Miscellanies. Other extant treatises are On the 
Salvation of the Rich Man, Excerpts of the Prophets, and Extracts from Theodotus.78 
Clement introduces the hermeneutical technique of allegorizing the soul.79 This 
adds some degree of difficulty in determining the author’s exact meaning. For example, 
he refers to the Stromata as a “sketch of the soul.”80 Another example is when he uses the 
soul in an allegorical interpretation on a Jewish law from Deut 20:19-20. He writes that 
the Word “teaches that neither is it right to cut down cultivated trees, . . . nor that 
cultivated fruit is to be destroyed at all—either the fruit of the soil or that of the soul: for 
it does not permit the enemy’s country to be laid waste.”81 Mosaic commands for 
sacrifice are described as the cleansing of the irrational part of the soul.82 This 
hermeneutical method of allegorizing becomes more prominent with Clement’s successor 
at Alexandria Origen. 
 
                                                 
78See Cross, The Early Christian Fathers, 118-120; Moreschini and Norelli, 251-
267; Dietmar Wyrwa, “Clement of Alexandria,” DECL, 131. On the lost works of 
Clement, see John Ferguson, Clement of Alexandria (New York: Twayne Publishers, 
1974), 179-191. For a study on the Greco-Roman backgrounds to Clement’s thought, see 
Salvatore R. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and 
Gnosticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
79See David Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient 
Alexandria (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 183-234; C. W. Macleod, 
“Allegory and Mysticism,” in Personalities of the Early Church, ed. Everett Ferguson 
(New York: Garland, 1993). 
80Stromata 1.1.12.1. 
81“μηδὲ συνόλως καρπὸν ἥμερον διαφθείρειν μήτε τὸν γῆς μήτε τὸν 
τῆς ψυχῆς.” Stromata 2.18.95.2. 
82“ἡ περιστερὰ ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν προσφερόμεναι τὴν ἀποκάθαρσιν τοῦ 
ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς προσδεκτὴν μηνύουσι τῷ θεῷ.” Ibid., 7.6.32.7. 
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Usage of Psyche 
General Usage 
Clement uses soul for natural life. He describes Jesus’ death on the cross as giving 
His life.83 In another place, Clement urges that as Christ gave His life for us, so we 
should give ours for others.84 He also relates the story of the Apostle John in which John 
stated that he would give his life for another person.85 However, soul for life is not 
restricted to humans, in Clement. He also uses soul for life in reference to an animal. 
Writing regarding the pig, he states, “For life was given to this animal for no other 
purpose than that it might swell in flesh.”86 
In another place, Clement seems to purposefully play on the interchange of 
meaning between soul and life. He writes, “For if you would lose, and withdraw, and 
separate (for this is what the cross means) your soul from the delight and pleasure that is 
in this life, you will possess it, found and resting in the looked-for hope.”87 He also 
writes, “Seek God, and your soul shall live.”88 It is not clear here if Clement has only in 
                                                 
83“μεγαλόδωρος οὖν ὁ τὸ μέγιστον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ, 
ἐπιδιδούς.” Paedagogus 1.9.85.2. See also Quis dives salvetur 37.4. 
84“ταύτην ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων ἀνταπαιτεῖ. εἰ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ὀφείλομεν 
τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, καὶ τοιαύτην τὴν συνθήκην πρὸς τὸν σωτῆρα 
ἀνθωμολογήμεθα.” Ibid., 37.5. 
85“ὑπὲρ σοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀντιδώσω τὴν ἐμήν.” Ibid., 42.13. 
86“δεδόσθαι γὰρ τῷδε τῷ ζῴῳ ψυχὴν πρὸς οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ ἕνεκα τοῦ 




ἀναπεπαυμένην.” Ibid.,  2.20.108.4. 
88“ἐκζητήσατε τὸν θεόν, καὶ ζήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ ὑμῶν.” Protrepticus 10.100.2. 
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mind the soul as a distinct psychological entity or rather is simply referring to the 
individual. He also writes of the martyr who “confesses to salvation that he may save his 
soul.”89 
Clement uses soul in the context of breath. In arguing against idols, Clement 
writes, “For I hold it wrong to entrust my spirit’s hopes to things destitute of the breath of 
life.”90 Here Clement plays on ψυχή and ἀψυχή. It is wrong for things with a soul to 
place their hope in things without a soul. 
The nature of the soul, according to Clement, is “to move of itself.”91 He also 
writes regarding God that He does not judge “the soul from movement, as we men.”92 In 
another description of the soul he describes it as “invisible,”93 even those of irrational 
animals. 
Clement views the souls of men and women as the same. He writes, “As then 
there is sameness, as far as respects the soul, she will attain to the same virtue.”94 
                                                 
89“ἵνα σώσῃ τὴν ψυχήν.” Stromata 4.7.43.1. 
90“οὐ γάρ μοι θέμις ἐμπιστεῦσαί ποτε τοῖς ἀψύχοις τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἐλπίδας.” Protrepticus 4.56.6. 
91“αὕτη οὖν φύσις ψυχῆς ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ὁρμᾶν.” Stromata 6.12.96.2. See 
Santiago Fernández Ardanaz, Genesis y Anagennesis: Fundamentos de la antropología 
cristiana según Clemente de Alejandría (Vitoria: Editorial Eset, 1990), 351. Fernandez 
Ardanaz notes that here Clement is suggesting that the soul is not yet immortal but has 
movement towards it. 
92“οὐκ ἐκ κινήματος ψυχῆς τεκμαιρόμενον καθάπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ 
ἄνθρωποι.” Stromata 6.12.101.5. 
93“ψυχαὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀόρατοι, οὐ μόνον αἱ λογικαί, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν 
ἀλόγων ζῴων.” Ibid., 6.18.163.1. 
94“εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἦν τὸ διάφορον ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν 
ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἔδρα τε καὶ ἔπασχεν. ᾗ μὲν τοίνυν ταὐτόν ἐστι, καθὸ ψυχή, 
ταύτῃ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀφίξεται ἀρετήν.” Ibid., 4.8.60.1. 
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Elsewhere he adds, “For souls, themselves by themselves, are equal. Souls are neither 
male nor female.”95 He places the distinctions between them only in regard to the 
difference in their bodies. This is in line with Athenagoras’s argument. Later, however, 
Methodius will argue that there is a difference between the sexes. 
 
Powers and Divisions of the Soul 
Clement sees a three-fold division of the soul.96 The intellect “which is called the 
reasoning faculty, is the inner man, which is the ruler of this man that is seen.”97 This 
ruling faculty of the soul is listed as ninth of the human powers by Clement.98 There is 
also the part which becomes angry along with the appetite part.99 Clement, in an 
interesting statement on the rational soul, writes, “Reason, the governing principle, 
remaining unmoved and guiding the soul, is called its pilot. For access to the Immutable 
is obtained by a truly immutable means.”100 Regarding the rational soul, Clement writes, 
                                                 
95“αὐταὶ γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἐπ᾽ ἴσης εἰσὶ ψυχαὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ οὐθέτεραι, οὔτε 
ἄρρενες οὔτε θήλειαι.” Ibid., 6.12.100.3. Cf. ibid., 3.13.93.3. 
96Cf. Plato Republic 4.435-441. For a fuller picture of Clement’s usage of the 
Platonic divisions of the soul, see Lilla, 80-84. Cf. Karpp, Probleme, 93-96; Alexandros 
K. Koffas, Die Sophia-Lehre bei Klemens von Aldeandrien: eine pädagogisch-
anthropologische Untersuchung (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1982), 119-124. 
Besides the statement of Clement to this fact in Paedagogus 3.1.1.2, Lilla also suggests 
this notion may be seen in Stromata 3.68.5 and 5.12.80.9, though in each of these, it 
seems more allusion to the notion than a reference to it as established fact. On Clement’s 
Platonizing in general, see Dietmar Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneignung in den 
Stromateis des Clemens von Alexandrien (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983). 
97“Τριγενοῦς οὖν ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ νοερόν, ὃ δὴ λογιστικὸν 
καλεῖται, ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ ἔνδον, ὁ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦδε ἄρχων 
ἀνθρώπου.” Paedagogus 3.1.1.2. 
98“ἔνατον δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς.” Stromata 6.16.134.2. 





“And Christian conduct is the operation of the rational soul in accordance with a correct 
judgment and aspiration after the truth, which attains its destined end through the body, 
the soul’s consort and ally.”101 He also writes, “The reasoning faculty, [is] peculiar to the 
human soul.”102 Perhaps it is to the rational element that Clement appeals when he writes, 
“But words are the progeny of the soul.”103 In another place, Clement writes of only a 
rational and irrational part of the human person. It is this part that Clement refers to when 
he writes, “For luxury, that has dashed on to surfeit, is prone to kick up its heels and toss 
its mane, and shake off the charioteer, the Instructor; who, pulling back the reins from 
far, leads and drives to salvation the human horse—that is, the irrational part of the 
soul—which is wildly bent on pleasures, and vicious appetites, and precious stones, and 
gold, and variety of dress, and other luxuries.”104 
Clement seems to not clearly define the difference in the individual person 
                                                 
τῆς ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης αὐτῆς εἴρηται∙ ὄντως γὰρ ἀτρέπτῳ πρὸς τὸ ἄτρεπτον ἡ 
προσαγωγή.” Ibid., 2.11.51.6. On the relationship between reason and the soul in 
Clement, see Laura Rizzerio, “Le problème des parties de l’âme et de l’animation chez 
Clément d’Alexandrie,” NRT 111 (1989): 400-402. Rizzerio describes a tripartite soul in 
Clement’s understanding divided into the pneuma somatikon, which rules the sensitive 
faculties and is the base for the development of thought and intelligence, the pneuma 
hegemonikon, which acts as a guide, and the pneume pneumatikon which is infused by 
the Holy Spirit and enables the restoration of the image of God. Cf. SVF 1.202, 2.836-9 
for similar thought in Stoicism where the hegemonikon is the authoritative part of the 
soul. See also Fernández Ardanaz, Genesis y Anagennesis, 108-113. 
101“καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μὲν πρᾶξις ἡ τοῦ Χριστιανοῦ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια λογικῆς 
κατὰ κρίσιν ἀστείαν καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀληθείας διὰ τοῦ συμφυοῦς καὶ 
συναγωνιστοῦ σώματος ἐκτελουμένη.” Paedagogus 1.13.1024.3. 
102“ἡ λογικὴ δὲ δύναμις, ἰδία οὖσα τῆς ἀνθρωπείας ψυχῆς.” Stromata 
2.20.111.2. 
103“ψυχῆς δὲ ἔγγονοι οἱ λόγοι.” Stromata 1.1.1.2. 
104“τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς.” Paedagogus 3.11.53.2. 
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between these irrational desires which need to be led to salvation by Christ and the 
rational element of the soul, which apparently does not need this salvation. In describing 
the peculiar function of humans, Clement writes, “He is like, it appears to me, the 
Centaur, a Thessalian figment, compounded of a rational and irrational part, of soul and 
body.”105 Here, the soul is considered rational while the body is the irrational. This 
blurring also seems evident when Clement writes that “the vital force, in which is 
comprehended the power of nutrition and growth, and generally of motion, is assigned to 
the carnal spirit . . . and passes in all directions through the senses and the rest of the 
body.”106 Elsewhere, he writes of the Gnostic soul who “withstands the corporeal soul, 
putting a bridle-bit on the restive irrational spirit.”107 
In discussing the different parts of the soul, Clement shows similarities to the 
division of the ruling classes used by Plato in the Republic.108 He writes, “And there is a 
second kind of royalty, inferior to that administration which is purely rational and divine, 
which brings to the task of government merely the high mettle of the soul.”109 Here 
Clement differentiates between the rational and passionate elements of the soul. Clement 
                                                 
105“ἔοικεν δ᾽ οἶμαι, κενταύρῳ, Θετταλικῷ πλάσματι, ἐκ λογικοῦ καὶ 
ἀλόγου συγκείμενος, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος.” Stromata 4.3.9.4. 
106Ibid., 6.16.135.3. 
107“καὶ τῆς σωματικῆς ψυχῆς κατεξανίσταται, στόμιον ἐμβαλὼν 
ἀφηνιάζοντι τῷ ἀλόγῳ πνεύματι.” Ibid., 7.12.79.6. 
108For a discussion on the notion of virtue in Clement in comparison to that of 
earlier philosphers, see Lilla, 61-84. Lilla notes Clement’s usage of the Platonic 
definition of virtue as the “harmony of the soul.” 
109“δεύτερον δέ ἐστιν εἶδος βασιλείας μετὰ τὴν ἀκραιφνῶς λογικὴν καὶ 
θείαν διοίκησιν τὸ μόνῳ τῷ θυμοειδεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς βασιλείαν 
συγχρώμενον.” Stromata 1.24.158.3. 
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also describes the soul as having a high spirit, writing that “the love of good is 
characteristic of a soul which uses its high spirit for noble ends.”110 
But the instrument of regal sway—the instrument at once of that which overcomes by 
virtue, and that which does so by force—is the power of managing (or tact). And it 
varies according to the nature and the material. In the case of arms and of fighting 
animals the ordering power is the soul and mind, by means animate and inanimate; 
and in the case of the passions of the soul, which we master by virtue, reason is the 
ordering power, by affixing the seal of continence and self-restraint, along with 
holiness, and sound knowledge with truth, making the result of the whole to terminate 
in piety towards God.111 
For Clement, knowledge plays an important part in understanding the soul. It “is a 
kind of divine understanding; it is that light engendered in the soul from obedience to the 
commandments which makes everything clear and enables a person to know what is in a 
state of change, to know his own humanity, to know himself, and teaches him to establish 
himself within reach of God.”112 It is responsible for restoring “the pure in heart to the 
crowning place of rest; teaching to [them] to gaze on God, face to face, with knowledge 
and comprehension. For in this consists the perfection of the Gnostic soul.”113  










ἐπήβολον καθίστα.” Stromata 3.5.44.3. Cf. ibid., 6.3.34.1; 7.10.57.1. 
113“τὸν καθαρὸν τῇ καρδίᾳ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον ἐπιστημονικῶς 
καὶ καταληπτικῶς τὸν θεὸν ἐποπτεύειν διδάξασα. ἐνταῦθα γάρ που τῆς 
γνωστικῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τελείωσις.” Ibid., 7.10.57.2. On perfection and the soul in 
Clement and its Platonic overtones, see Jelle Wytzes, “The Twofold Way: Platonic 




Clement distinguishes between two types of knowledge. One he refers to is 
common to all, that is the knowledge of individual objects. The superior knowledge is 
based on “rational cognitions alone, applying purely to objects of thought, and resulting 
from the bare energy of the soul.”114 “Knowledge,” Clement writes, “is the purification of 
the leading faculty of the soul.”115 
Clement argues for self-knowledge of the soul when he writes, “For what is useful 
and necessary to salvation, such as the knowledge of the Father, and Son, and Holy 
Spirit, and also of our own soul, are wholly requisite; and it is at once beneficial and 
necessary to attain to the scientific account of them.”116 Here, the knowledge of one’s 
own soul is required of the Gnostic on the same level as the knowledge of God is as 
necessary for salvation. 
For Clement, the soul is very much related to clear thinking. This is clear from his 
use of the expression “rational soul.”117 He also writes, “For it was difficult for the soul 
not to be seduced and ruined by the luxuries and flowery enchantments that beset 
remarkable wealth; but it was not impossible, even surrounded with it, for one to lay hold 
                                                 
114“αἱ τοῖς νοητοῖς κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν εἰλικρινῶς 
ἐπιβάλλουσαι.” Stromata 6.1.3.3. Gross notes that this should be understood to mean 







τυγχάνειν.” Eclogae propheticae 29.1. 
117“ψυχὴν τὴν λογικὴν.” See Stromata 5.6.36.4; 5.14.94.6; 6.6.48.6; 6.8.68.3; 
6.8.69.2 among others. 
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of salvation, provided he withdrew himself from material wealth, to that which is grasped 
by the mind and taught by God.”118 Here the soul must turn from the physical world to 
that which is grasped only by the mind. 
Wisdom, for Clement, is “rectitude of soul and of reason, and purity of life.”119 
“Wise souls” are those who kindle “their light for the contemplation of things.”120 
Knowledge is “an attribute of the rational soul, which trains itself for this, that by 
knowledge it may become entitled to immortality. For both are powers of the soul both 
knowledge and impulse. And impulse is found to be a movement after an assent.”121 Here 
knowledge is connected with immortality. It seems that here, immortality should be 
understood to refer to the blessings which the righteous receive as he elsewhere argues 
for the immortality of the soul in regard to the wicked who receive punishment. Impulse 
is then affirmed to be the movement that follows knowledge. It is important here to point 
                                                 
118“καταστράπτεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν προσόντων ἁβρῶν τῷ 
προδήλῳ πλούτῳ καὶ ἀνθηρῶν γοητευμάτων, οὐκ ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν 
τούτῳ λαβέσθαι σωτηρίας.” Quis dives salvetur 20.2.2. 
119“ἡ φιλοσοφία, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ὀρθότητος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς τοῦ 
βίου καθαρότητος.” Stromata 6.7.55.1. On the connection between a pure soul and 
pure life for Clement, see Juan J. Sanguineti, La antropología educativa de Clemente 
Alejandrino: el giro del paganismo al cristianismo (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de 
Navarra, 2003), 417-422. 
120“τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀνάπτουσαι φῶς εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων θεωρίαν, 




συγκατάθεσιν κίνησις οὖσα.” Stromata 6.8.68.3. This notion of becoming entitled to 
immortality that appears at times in Clement’s writings has led some to conclude that he 




out that movement, in regard to the soul, is to be understood as “self-originating.”122 
Clement assumes that “knowledge is essentially a contemplation of existences on the part 
of the soul, either of a certain thing or of certain things, and when perfected, of all 
together.”123 
It is clear that for Clement, education takes place in the soul.124 He writes “that 
the word that is sown is hidden in the soul of the learner.”125 This was written in the 
context of Clement defending his right to pass on wisdom as a means of educating the 
young. This process of educating he describes as “soul . . . joined with soul.”126 He writes 
that humanity needs “a divine teacher” since “the soul became too enfeebled for the 
apprehension of realities.”127 
The Scriptures play a key role in education. He writes of “those who study the 
oracles of God night and day, and ruminate them in the soul’s receptacle for 
instructions”128 He adds, “The distinction of names and things also in the Scriptures 
                                                 
122“ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινεῖται ἡ ψυχή.” Eclogae propheticae 22.1. 
123“γνῶσις δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, θέα τίς ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ὄντων ἤτοι τινὸς 
ἢ τινῶν, τελειωθεῖσα δὲ τῶν συμπάντων.” Stromata 6.8.69.3. 
124Cf. ibid., 1.1.7.3; 1.1.11.2. 
125“σπειρόμενον τὸν λόγον κρύπτεσθαι μηνύει καθάπερ ἐν γῇ τῇ τοῦ 
μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ.” Ibid., 1.1.2.1. 
126“ψυχὴ γάρ, οἶμαι, ψυχῇ.” Ibid. 
127“ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἠσθένει πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ὄντων ἡ ψυχή, θείου 
διδασκάλου ἐδεήθημεν.” Stromata 5.1.7.8. 
128“τῶν ‘τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ’ ‘νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν μελετώντων’ καὶ 
ἀναπεμπαζομένων ἐν τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν μαθημάτων δοχείῳ.” Ibid., 7.18.109.2. 
Cf. Quis dives salvetur 7.1. 
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themselves produces great light in men’s souls.”129 Later, he writes, “The Scripture 
kindles the living spark of the soul and directs the eye suitably for contemplation.”130 
Clement also lays out a plan of the soul’s education beyond the Scriptures. 
Included in this program is astronomy, which he specifically mentions as able to lead 
“the soul nearer to the creative power” and to make it “in the highest degree observant, 
capable of perceiving the true and detecting the false.”131 
“Understanding,” Clement urges, is “a faculty of the soul, capable of studying 
existences,—of distinguishing and comparing what succeeds as like and unlike,—of 
enjoining and forbidding, and of conjecturing the future.”132 Clement states that the “soul, 
which is ever improving in the acquisition of virtue and the increase of righteousness, 
should obtain a better place . . . as tending in each step of advancement towards the habit 
of impassibility.”133 He adds, “Now everything that is virtuous changes for the better; 
having as the proper cause of change the free choice of knowledge, which the soul has in 
                                                 
129“ἡ διαστολὴ δὲ τῶν τε ὀνομάτων τῶν τε πραγμάτων κἀν ταῖς 
γραφαῖς αὐταῖς μέγα φῶς ἐντίκτει ταῖς ψυχαῖς.” Stromata 6.10.82.3. 
130“συνεξάπτει δὲ ἡ γραφὴ τὸ ζώπυρον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ συντείνει τὸ 















its own power.”134 Clement relates the soul to virtue writing, “For virtue itself is a state of 
the soul rendered harmonious by reason in respect to the whole life.”135 The virtues come 
when the Holy Spirit adorns the soul.136 Clement states that one is happy who “is adorned 
in his soul with virtue.”137 In describing the virtue of the soul, he writes, “Salvation does 
not depend on external things . . . ; but on the virtue of the soul, on faith, and hope, and 
love, and brotherliness, and knowledge, and meekness, and humility, and truth, the 
reward of which is salvation.”138 He also describes asceticism as “a virtue of the soul.”139 
This asceticism, or self-control, did not apply only to one’s sexual desires, “but the other 
objects which our soul self-indulgently desires, not content with bare necessities but 
making a fuss about luxury.”140 It is also those souls who have chosen virtue who “come 
to the Good itself, to the Father’s vestibule, so to speak, close to the great High Priest.”141 
                                                 
134“τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν τὴν αἵρεσιν τῆς γνώσεως ἔχον, ἣν 
αὐτοκρατορικὴν ἐκέκτητο ἡ ψυχή.” Ibid., 7.2.12.5. 
135“Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτὴ διάθεσίς ἐστι ψυχῆς σύμφωνος τῷ λόγῳ περὶ 









ὧν ἆθλον ἡ σωτηρία.” Quis dives salvetur 18.1. 
139“οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ.” Stromata 3.6.48.3. 
140“ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα σπαταλῶσα ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ 






“Salvation,” Clement writes, “is the privilege of pure and passionless souls.”142 
In accord with his views on education, Clement’s view of the soul is one that 
involves development.143 For him, the soul can be in one of three states. “Ignorance, 
opinion, knowledge—those who are in ignorance are the Gentiles, those in knowledge, 
the true Church, and those in opinion, the Heretics.”144 He writes regarding Christ’s 
words in Matt 23:37 where Christ describes Himself as a hen gathering her chicks as 
giving a graphic and mystical description of the soul in childhood.145 He writes that the 
soul needs “training . . . and an accustoming it to assume a right attitude to the judgments 
to come.”146 The study of philosophy rouses and trains “the soul to intellectual 
objects.”147 In describing the truth which the Greeks have and which they teach, Clement 
states that “those [Greek philosophers], to whom we refer, influence souls not in the way 
                                                 
προσεχεῖς τῷ μεγάλῳ ἀρχιερεῖ γενόμεναι.” Ibid., 7.7.45.3. 
142“ἀπαθῶν γὰρ καὶ καθαρῶν ψυχῶν ἐστιν ἡ σωτηρία.” Quis dives 
salvetur 20.6. He elswhere states that the passions are a perturbation in the soul contrary 
to nature. See Stromata 2.13.59.6. 
143Cf. Sanguineti, 114-128. 
144“Καὶ δὴ τριῶν οὐσῶν διαθέσεων τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀγνοίας, οἰήσεως, 
ἐπιστήμης, οἳ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ τὰ ἔθνη, οἳ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἡ 
ἀληθής, οἳ δὲ ἐν οἰήσει οἱ κατὰ τὰς αἱρέσεις.” Ibid., 7.16.100.7. Regarding heretics, 
see Clement’s comment in ibid., 7.16.99.1. 
145“θαυμαστῶς πάνυ καὶ μυστικῶς τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἁπλότητα τῆς ψυχῆς 
εἰς ἡλικίαν ὑπογραφομένου παιδικήν.” Paedagogus 1.5.14.5. 
146“τρίτον ἡ ἄσκησις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ὁ ἐθισμὸς πρὸς <τὸ> τοῖς κριθεῖσιν 
ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἀκολουθεῖν δύνασθαι.” Stromata 7.16.98.5. See also ibid., 7.16.100.5. 
147“συνεργεῖν δὲ πρὸς τὸ διεγείρειν καὶ συγγυμνάζειν πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ 
τὴν ψυχήν.” Ibid., 1.19.93.5. Cf. ibid., 6.11.91.2 where he suggests that the soul must 
be prepared and exercised. In Eclogae propheticae 28.3, Clement asserts that knowledge 
(γνῶσις) is necessary for this training. 
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we do, but by different teaching.”148 In commenting on a saying by Thespis, Clement 
states that the libation being described is “the soul’s first milk-like nutriment of the four-
and-twenty elements, after which solidified milk comes as food.”149 He elsewhere 
explains that the milk of the soul is catechetical instruction.150 Clement also glorifies God 
who gives a “perpetual supply of the food necessary for the growth of the body and of the 
soul.”151 
Clement writes, “The service of God, then, in the case of the Gnostic, is his soul’s 
continual study and occupation”152 and “the improvement . . . of the soul of 
philosophy.”153 The Gnostic soul embraces “the divine vision not in mirrors . . . but in the 
transcendently clear and absolutely pure insatiable vision which is the privilege of 
intensely loving souls.”154 The Gnostic “exercises moderation in the calmness of his 
soul.”155 The Gnostic soul apprehends “essences and things through the words he brings 
                                                 
148“ἔνθεν οὐδ᾽ ὡσαύτως κινοῦσι τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ διαφόρῳ 






πεπορισμένους.” Ibid., 6.11.90.1. 
152“Θεραπεία τοίνυν τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ συνεχὴς ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ 
γνωστικῷ.” Ibid., 7.1.3.1. 
153“φιλοσοφία δὲ ψυχῆς βελτιωτική.” Stromata 7.1.3.2. 
154“οὐκ ἐν κατόπτροις ἢ διὰ κατόπτρων ἔτι τὴν θεωρίαν ἀσπαζομένας 
τὴν θείαν, ἐναργῆ δὲ ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα καὶ ἀκριβῶς εἰλικρινῆ τὴν ἀκόρεστον 





his soul.”156 It is compared to an athlete, “in a condition of extreme health and 
strength.”157 In a final accolade, Clement states that “the Gnostic soul, adorned with 
perfect virtue, is the earthly image of the divine power; its development being the joint 
result of nature, of training, of reason, all together.”158 Elsewhere he writes of that 
“crowning step of advancement the Gnostic soul receives, when it has become quite pure, 
reckoned worthy to behold everlastingly God Almighty, ‘face,’ it is said, ‘to face.’ For 
having become wholly spiritual, and having in the spiritual Church gone to what is of 
kindred nature, it abides in the rest of God.”159 In order to reach this pinnacle of the 
image of the divine, Clement urges that “we must as much as possible subject the soul to 
varied preparatory exercise, that it may become susceptible to the reception of 
knowledge.”160 As he also states, “ignorance is the starvation of the soul, and knowledge 
its sustenance.”161 
                                                 
156“οὐσίας τοίνυν καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ παραλαβὼν διὰ τῶν λόγων 









ὁρᾶν ἀιδίως καταξιουμένη τὸν παντοκράτορα θεόν.” Ibid., 7.11.68.4.3. 
160“Ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν γε ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα προγυμναστέον ποικίλως τὴν ψυχήν, 
ἵνα εὐεργὸς γένηται πρὸς τὴν τῆς γνώσεως παραδοχήν.” Stromata 7.12.71.1. Cf. 
Ferguson, Clement of Alexandria, 111. On the notion of apotheosis in Clement, see 
Russell, 121-140. 
161“ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀτροφία μὲν ἡ ἄγνοια τῆς ψυχῆς, τροφὴ δὲ ἡ 
γνῶσις.” Stromata 7.12.72.4. 
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Clement also seems to allow that different souls have varying capacities for 
improvement. He writes, “But the man whose soul is destitute of the ability to reach to 
acquaintance with many subjects of study, will select the principal and better subjects 
alone.”162 
Faith is an important element in the soul’s acquisition of knowledge. 163 In 
describing this, Clement uses a metaphor which seems to draw on the Old Testament 
connection between soul and blood. In the context of faith and the acquisition of 
knowledge, he notes that some approach this with “souls already preoccupied … [which] 
have not been previously emptied.”164 He writes, “For in reality the blood of faith is hope, 
in which faith is held as by a soul.”165 Elsewhere he writes that studying true philosophy 
implants true faith in the soul166 and purifies it from “sensible things” and excites it so 
that it is “able to see truth distinctly.”167 Clement also seems to argue for faith being “the 
                                                 
162“ὅτῳ δὲ ἀσθενεῖ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὴν πολυμαθῆ 
ἐμπειρίαν, τὰ προηγούμενα καὶ βελτίω αἱρήσεται μόνα.” Ibid., 6.18.162.3. 
163See André Méhat, Étude sur les ‘Stromates’ de Clément d’Alexandrie, 
Pastristica Sorbonensia 7 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), 314-317. 
164“τοῖς προκατειλημμένοις ἤδη τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μὴ προκεκενωμένοις.” 
Stromata 1.1.8.1. Davison argues that Clement does not absolutely distinguish between 
knowledge and faith. James E. Davison, “Structural Similarities and Dissimilarities in the 
Thought of Clement of Alexandria and the Valentinians,” Second Century 3, no. 4 
(1983): 210. 
165“Τῷ γὰρ ὄντι αἷμα τῆς πίστεως ἡ ἐλπίς, ὑφ᾽ ἧς συνέχεται, καθάπερ 
ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, ἡ πίστις.” Paedagogus 1.6.38.3. This is remeniscent of Irenaeus who also 
held that the soul in the blood held together the body. Cf. Denise K. Buell, Making 
Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 143-145. For further discussion regarding possible 
backgrounds to the connection between blood and the soul in ancient times, see Buell, 
154-156. 
166“ὁ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποδείξεων λόγος ἀκριβῆ πίστιν ἐντίθησι τῇ ψυχῇ 
τοῦ παρακολουθοῦντος.” Stromata 1.6.33.2. 
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rational assent of the soul exercising free-will.”168 The soul is also trained “to be willing 
to select what is noblest.”169 Clement writes, “Now to will is the act of the soul.”170 
Clement proposes an etymological explanation for knowledge (έπιστημη) which 
he connects with the soul. He connects knowledge with the notion of settling. He writes, 
“For our soul, which was formerly borne, now in one way, now in another, it settles in 
objects.”171 He then proceeds to note that this also works for faith which is “the settling 
of our soul respecting that which is.”172 
The principle of demonstration is key when relating the soul to knowledge and 
faith. Clement writes, “In strict propriety, then, that is called demonstration which 
produces in the souls of learners scientific belief.”173 This is contrasted to that 
demonstration that is based only on hope and leads only to opinion. In another place 
Clement writes, “For the highest demonstration, to which we have alluded, produces 
intelligent faith by the adducing and opening up of the Scriptures to the souls of those 




πίστιν.” Ibid., 5.1.3.2. Cf. ibid., 5.13.86.1. 
169“μαθήσει παιδευθείσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἐθέλειν αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ κάλλιστον.” 
Ibid., 1.6.35.1. Cf. ibid., 7.16.98.5. 
170“ἔργον δὲ τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 2.6.26.5. Cf. Fernández 
Ardanaz, Genesis y Anagennesis, 112-113. 
171“‘ὅτι ἵστησιν ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχήν’, ἄλλοτε ἄλλως 




ἐντιθεῖσα ταῖς τῶν μανθανόντων ψυχαῖς.” Ibid., 8.3.5.3. See also ibid., 8.3.7.7. 
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who desire to learn; the result of which is knowledge (gnosis).”174 
He also insists that faith, which the Greeks disparage, is necessary for the soul to 
understand. “For how ever could the soul admit the transcendental contemplation of such 
themes, while unbelief respecting what was to be learned struggled within?”175 In this 
context, he asserts, “But we ought to direct the visual faculty of the soul aright to 
discovery, and to clear away obstacles.”176 Greek philosophy only “purges the soul, and 
prepares it beforehand for the reception of faith.”177  
As the soul is capable of faith, so it is capable of unbelief. Clement writes, “But as 
for him into whose ears instruction has been poured, and who deliberately maintains his 
incredulity in his soul, the wiser he appears to be, the more harm will his understanding 
do him.”178 
The Stoics claimed that joy and sorrow were passions in the soul. Clement argues 
otherwise, wanting to preserve the feeling of joy as legitimate for a saved person to 
feel.179 Clement also argues that the soul can experience unhappiness. “But since they 
wish their wives to be unhappy in mind, let the latter, if they would be chaste, make it 
                                                 
174“καὶ διοίξεως ταῖς τῶν μανθάνειν ὀρεγομένων ψυχαῖς, ἥτις ἂν εἴη 
γνῶσις.” Ibid., 2.11.49.3. 
175“πῶς γὰρ τούτων ὑπερφυᾶ θεωρίαν χωρήσαι ποτ᾽ ἂν ψυχὴ 
διαμαχομένης ἔνδον τῆς περὶ τὴν μάθησιν ἀπιστίας.” Ibid., 2.2.8.3. 
176“ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν διορατικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποτείνειν πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν 
χρὴ.” Ibid., 5.1.11.4. 
177“φιλοσοφία δὲ ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ οἷον προκαθαίρει καὶ προεθίζει τὴν 
ψυχὴν εἰς παραδοχὴν πίστεως.” Ibid., 7.3.20.2. Cf. ibid., 7.3.19.4; 7.4.27.6. 
178“ὁ δὲ εἰς ὦτα βαλόμενος καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ <παρακούσας> παρὰ τῆς 




their aim to allay by degrees the irrational impulses and passions of their husbands.”180 
Clement writes that the soul is the seat of desire. As noted earlier, this idea 
connects directly with education and knowledge as the goal of these is to attain the 
passionless state of the divine. Clement writes of one who, “having got an inkling of the 
subject, kindles it within his soul by desire and study, he sets everything in motion 
afterwards in order to know it.”181 This is in the context of responding to the call of God 
to righteousness. Desire is important in understanding the passions. “Passion is an 
excessive appetite exceeding the measures of reason, or appetite unbridled and 
disobedient to the word. Passions, then, are a perturbation of the soul contrary to nature, 
in disobedience to reason.”182 He also writes, “The simple word, then, of our philosophy 
declares the passions to be impressions on the soul that is soft and yielding, and, as it 
were, the signatures of the spiritual powers with whom we have to struggle.”183 He adds, 
“The powers, then, of which we have spoken hold out beautiful sights, and honors, and 
adulteries, and pleasures, and such like alluring fantasies before facile spirits. . . . And 
each deceit, by pressing constantly on the spirit, impresses its image on it; and the soul 
unwittingly carries about the image of the passion, which takes its rise from the bait and 














our consent.”184 “For as the exhalations which arise from the earth, and from marshes, 
gather into mists and cloudy masses; so the vapors of fleshly lusts bring on the soul an 
evil condition, scattering about the idols of pleasure before the soul.”185 He continues, 
“Accordingly they spread darkness over the light of intelligence, the spirit attracting the 
exhalations that arise from lust, and thickening the masses of the passions by persistency 
in pleasures.”186 Clement states that it does not require many words to explain “how . . . 
the powers of the devil, and the unclean spirits, sow into the sinner’s soul.”187 After 
quoting a passage from the Epistle of Barnabas 16.7-9, Clement is quick to clarify this by 
stating, “He [Barnabas] says, then, that sinners exercise activities appropriate to demons; 
but he does not say that the spirits themselves dwell in the soul of the unbeliever.”188 The 
result of indulging in pleasure is a soul “buried in the mire of vice.”189 






ἡμῶν συγκαταθέσεως γινομένης.” Ibid., 2.20.111.3-4. See also ibid., 6.14.112.3. 
185“οὕτως αἱ τῶν σαρκικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀναδόσεις καχεξίαν 
προστρίβονται ψυχῇ, κατασκεδαννύουσαι τὰ εἴδωλα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπίπροσθε 
τῆς ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 2.20.115.3. Cf. Quis dives salvetur 41.3. 
186“ἐπισκοτοῦσι γοῦν τῷ φωτὶ τῷ νοερῷ ἐπισπωμένης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς ἐκ 
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀναδόσεις καὶ παχυνούσης τὰς συστροφὰς τῶν παθῶν 






189“ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν βορβόρῳ κακίας κατορώρυκται.” Ibid., 2.20.118.5. 
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Clement writes concerning pain, “When pain is present, the soul appears to 
decline from it, and to deem release from present pain a precious thing. At that moment it 
slackens from studies.”190 “The same holds good also in the case of poverty. For it 
compels the soul to desist from necessary things, I mean contemplation and from pure 
sinlessness, forcing him, who has not wholly dedicated himself to God in love, to occupy 
himself about provisions; as, again, health and abundance of necessaries keep the soul 
free and unimpeded.”191 Clement concludes by asserting that “these things, then, are to be 
abstained from, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of the body; and care for the 
body is exercised for the sake of the soul, to which it has reference.”192 
 
The Corporeal and the Soul 
“Self-discipline applies, not just to sexual matters, but to everything else for 
which the soul lusts improperly.”193 The passions are considered by Clement to be 
diseases of the soul. “The birth of these means decay in the soul.”194 “The ascetic,” he 
                                                 
190“Ἔοικε δέ πως παρούσης ἀλγηδόνος ἡ ψυχὴ νεύειν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ 






εὖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι γινώσκουσαν.” Ibid., 4.5.21.1. 
192“τούτων οὖν ἀνθεκτέον οὐ δι᾽ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ δὲ τοῦ 
σώματος ἐπιμέλεια διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται, ἐφ᾽ ἣν ἡ ἀναφορά.” Ibid., 4.5.22.1. 
193“ἐγκράτεια τοίνυν σώματος ὑπεροψία κατὰ τὴν πρὸς θεὸν 
ὁμολογίαν. οὐ μόνον γὰρ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ 
ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ.” Stromata 3.1.4.1. Translation FC. On the place of self-restraint and 
the soul, see Hamilton B. Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists and Greek Philosophy 
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973), 75-77. 




writes, “is freeing his soul from passions.”195 He also writes, “By trusting in God’s own 
charm, be delivered from passions which are the diseases of the mind, and rescued from 
sin?”196 It is in this context that the work of the Instructor is described. He writes, “Hence 
accordingly ensues the healing of our passions, in consequence of the assuagements of 
those examples; the Paedagogue strengthening our souls, and by His benign commands, 
as by gentle medicines, guiding the sick to the perfect knowledge of the truth.”197 Here 
again the soul is healed from passions and then led to truth. Clement speaks of things 
which the law prohibits being “adultery, uncleanness, pederasty, ignorance, wickedness, 
soul-disease, death (not that which severs the soul from the body, but that which severs 
the soul from truth).”198 Here soul disease seems to be a phrase that encompasses the 
previous vices rather than a specific vice itself. Death is to be understood, not in the 
                                                 
and Platonic background to Clement’s concept of the diseased soul, see Kamala Parel, 
“The Disease of the Passions in Clement of Alexandria,” Studia Patristica 36 (2001): 
449-455. 
195“ὁ δὲ σώφρων τὴν κυρίαν τοῦ σώματος ψυχὴν ἐλευθεροῖ τῶν 
παθῶν.” Stromata 3.5.41.3. Translation FC. 
196“καὶ τῇ ἐπῳδῇ τοῦ θεοῦ πιστεύσαντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι μὲν παθῶν, ἃ 
δὴ ψυχῆς νόσοι, ἀποσπασθῆναι δὲ ἁμαρτίας.” Protrepticus 11.115.2. Cf. 
Paedagogus 1.8.65.2 where admonition is the regimen of the diseased soul. For a 
discussion on the diseased soul in Stoicism, see Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer 
geistigen Bewegung, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), 142-143. See 




γνῶσιν τοὺς κάμνοντας διαιτωμένου.” Paedagogus 1.1.3.1. Cf. 1.1.3.3; 1.2.6.1. 
Clement also ascribes regenerative power to God the Father. See Stromata 7.16.93.5. For 
a recent monograph on Christ as instructor in Clement’s anthroplogy, see Sanguineti. 
198“ἀποφεύγειν προστάττει, μοιχείαν, ἀσέλγειαν, παιδεραστίαν, 
ἄγνοιαν, ἀδικίαν, νόσον ψυχῆς, θάνατον, οὐ τὸν διαλύοντα ψυχὴν ἀπὸ 
σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸν διαλύοντα ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ἀληθείας.” Stromata 2.7.34.2. 
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normal way of separation of soul from body, but rather by the separation of the soul from 
truth. 
Clement also writes of divine reproof as “the surgery of the passions of the 
soul . . . which must be cut open by an incision of the lancet of reproof.”199 “Reproof and 
rebuke . . . are the stripes of the soul.”200 “And punishment, in virtue of its being so, is the 
correction of the soul.”201 In this context, Clement asks if we should not submit, “for the 
soul’s sake, to either banishment, or punishment, or bonds, provided only from 
unrighteousness we shall attain to righteousness?”202 The soul is also conceived of as 
apathetic and in need of rebuke, a wound not to death but for life.203 He urges believers 
that while they are still in the body, they should “enjoy impassibility and tranquility of 
soul.”204 
In the context of the work of the Instructor, Clement also speaks of the health of 
                                                 
199“Ἔστι δὲ οἱονεὶ χειρουργία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ὁ ἔλεγχος, . . . ἃ 
χρὴ διελέγχειν διαιροῦντα τῇ τομῇ.” Paedagogus 1.8.64.4. Cf. 1.8.65.3. 
200“Ἔλεγχος γὰρ καὶ ἐπίπληξις, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τοὔνομα αἰνίττεται, 
αὗται πληγαὶ ψυχῆς εἰσι.” Ibid., 1.9.82.2. Clement defends this concept both from the 
Scriptures by quoting Prov 23:13-14 and from Plato Soph. 230 DE. 
201“κόλασις δὲ <δικαία> οὖσα διόρθωσίς ἐστι ψυχῆς.” Stromata 1.26.168.3. 
202“τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἕνεκα οὐχ ὁμοίως ὑποστησόμεθα.” Ibid., 1.27.171.3. 
203“Εἰ γὰρ ψέξαι χρή, καὶ λοιδορεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἔνθα τὴν ἀπηλγηκυῖαν 
ψυχὴν καιρός ἐστι τρῶσαι, οὐ θανασίμως, ἀλλὰ σωτηρίως, ὀλίγης ἀλγηδόνος 
ἀίδιον κερδάναντα θάνατον.” Paedagogus 1.8.74.2. Here the soul is described as 
capable of experiencing pain. On the Stoic notion of apatheia, see Ernst Hoffmann, 
Leben und Tod in der stoischen Philosophie (Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle, 1946), 12-19; 
Raoul Mortley, Connaissance religieuse et herméneutique chez Clément d’Alexandrie 
(Leiden: Brill, 1973), 157; John M. Rist, Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and 
Origen, Phoenix Journal of the Classical Association of Canada Supplementary Volume 
6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 197; Wytzes, 239-245. 
204“ἀπάθειαν ψυχῆς καὶ ἀταραξίαν καρπούμενοι.” Stromata 4.7.55.4. 
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the soul. He writes regarding Christ, “From which Word springs the true health of the 
soul, and its eternal happy temperament.”205 He also writes regarding the help the rich 
receive “by the grace of the Savior healing their souls, enlightening them and leading 
them to the attainment of the truth.”206 
The wounds of the soul, for Clement, are the “fears, lusts, passions, pains, deceits, 
pleasures” for which the only cure is the blood of Jesus, who has “poured wine on our 
wounded souls.”207 Clement writes regarding adolescents who drink alcohol, that upon so 
doing, “the breasts and organs of generation, inflamed with wine, expand and swell in a 
shameful way, already exhibiting beforehand the image of fornication; and the body 
compels the wound of the soul to inflame, and shameless pulsations follow abundance, 
inciting the man of correct behavior to transgression.”208 
The drunkard reveals the “shame of the soul”209 and by only drinking when 
necessary, the “soul shall be pure, and dry, and luminous; and the soul itself is wisest and 
best when dry.”210 Those who have been given over to excess possess a “soul even before 
                                                 
205“ἐξ οὗ λόγου ἡ ἀληθὴς τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγεία.” Paedagogus 1.11.96.2. 
206“τοῦτο δὲ λόγῳ διὰ τῆς χάριτος τοῦ σωτῆρος ἰωμένους τὰς ψυχὰς 
αὐτῶν.” Quis dives salvetur 1.4. 
207“τὸ αἷμα τῆς ἀμπέλου τῆς Δαβίδ, ἐκχέας ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τὰς τετρωμένας 




εἰς παρανομίας ἐκκαλούμενοι τὸν κόσμιον.” Paedagogus 2.2.20.4. In this context, 
Clement also refers to a burning or smoldering soul (καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τυφομένην ἤδη 
καθέξει). 
209“δι᾽ ὧν ἡ αἰσχύνη ἔνδοθεν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθεωρεῖται.” Ibid., 2.2.27.3. 
210“Οὕτω δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν ὑπάρξαι καθαρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ 
φωτοειδής, ‘αὐγὴ δὲ ψυχὴ ξηρὰ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη.’” Ibid., 2.2.29.3. 
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drunkenness [which] is insane in its desires.”211 Drunkenness affects even reason in the 
soul. He writes, “Reason, weighed down in the soul itself by drunkenness, is lulled to 
sleep.”212 
Evil speech also has the ability to injure the soul. The Instructor, Clement says, 
arrays believers with ear-muffs “so that the pulsation of fornication may not penetrate to 
the bruising of the soul.”213 On the other hand, good “discourse refreshes the soul and 
entices it to nobleness.”214 
The sense of smell along with sight is also an avenue for the soul to be corrupted. 
“And as we have abandoned luxury in taste, so certainly do we renounce voluptuousness 
in sights and odors; lest through the senses, as through unwatched doors, we 
unconsciously give access into the soul to that excess which we have driven away.”215 
Music also can have a corrupting influence on the soul. He writes, “But we must reject 
superfluous music, which enervates men’s souls, and leads to variety,—now mournful, 
and then licentious and voluptuous, and then frenzied and frantic.”216 





μέθῃ.” Ibid., 2.5.48.3. 
213“ὡς μὴ δύνασθαι ἐξικνεῖσθαι εἰς θραῦσιν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κροῦμα τῆς 
πορνείας.” Ibid., 2.6.49.2. 
214“ἀνακτᾶται γοῦν καὶ ὁ λόγος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐπὶ καλοκἀγαθίαν 









Money also has the power to affect the soul. Clement writes in the context of 
chastising those who praise the wealthy that “wealth is of itself sufficient to puff up and 
corrupt the souls of its possessors.”217 
Clement is very clear that practices which the body undertakes influence the soul 
for ill or good.218 In addition to those just mentioned, unhealthful dietary practices 
influence the soul negatively. Clement writes, “But let our diet be light and digestible. . . .  
The diet which exceeds sufficiency injures a man, deteriorates his spirit, and renders his 
body prone to disease.”219 He also writes that “full feeding begets in the soul uneasiness, 
and forgetfulness, and foolishness.”220 Food offered to idols and the fine fare consumed 
at vulgar parties also damages the soul. Concerning this he writes, “The fumes arising 
from them being dense, darken the soul.”221 As support for this concept, Clement quotes 
                                                 
ποικιλίαν ἐμβάλλουσα τοτὲ μὲν θρηνώδη, τοτὲ δὲ ἀκόλαστον καὶ ἡδυπαθῆ, 
τοτὲ δὲ ἐκβακχευομένην καὶ μανικήν.” Stromata 6.11.90.2. 
217“αὐτῆς τῆς περιουσίας καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἱκανῆς οὔσης χαυνῶσαι τὰς 
ψυχὰς τῶν κεκτημένων.” Quis dives salvetur 1.3. 
218See Stromata 7.7.36.4; 8.4.14.4. See Pelikan, The Shape of Death, 39. Cf. 
Michel Spanneut, Le stoïcisme des pères de l’Église, de Clément de Rome à Clément 
d’Alexandrie (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957), 133. He suggests that Clement understands 
a certain materialness in the soul. For a discussion on the “regimen” described by 
Clement in the context of ascetisism, see Behr, 160-166. On the discussion of the body 
and health in Clement, see Augidius Decker, Kenntnis und Pflege des Körpers bei 
Clemens von Alexandria (Innsbruck: Felizian Rauch, 1936). 
219“ἡ δὲ ὑπερβλύζουσα τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δίαιτα τὸν ἄνθρωπον κακοῖ, 
νωθῆ μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ εἰς νόσον ἐργαζομένη τὸ σῶμα.” 
Paedagogus 2.1.7.3. Note that neither ANF nor FC translates ψυχή as soul choosing 
instead spirit or mind. 
220“δυσπάθειαν δὲ καὶ λήθην καὶ ἀφροσύνην ἡ πολυτροφία ἐντίκτει τῇ 
ψυχῇ.” Ibid., 2.1.17.3. 
221“καὶ ἡ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀναθυμίασις θολωδεστέρα οὖσα ἐπισκοτεῖ τῇ 
ψυχῇ.” Ibid., 2.1.11.1. 
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from 1 Cor 5:11 and Rom 14:21 and acknowledges that the Pythagoreans also believe 
likewise. Not burdening one’s soul by eating flesh gives one the “advantage of a rational 
reason.”222 
Just as eating influences the soul, so also does fasting. Clement suggest that 
fasting is especially suited for the purpose of emptying the soul.223 He writes, “Especially 
does fasting empty the soul of matter, and make it, along with the body, pure and light for 
the divine words.”224 
Sleep even has the potential for disturbing the soul. All the ills suffered during the 
daytime contribute to maladies at night which affect the soul. “But the hiccupping of 
those who are loaded with wine, and the snortings of those who are stuffed with food, and 
the snoring rolled in the bed-clothes, and the rumblings of pained stomachs, cover over 
the clear-seeing eye of the soul, by filling the mind with ten thousand fantasies.”225 Sleep 
itself, Clement insists relying on Plato, is not to be over-indulged in. “For much sleep 
brings advantage neither to our bodies nor our souls.”226 And as if to push the point 
further, if one is tired as a result of not sleeping enough, they should not take a nap during 
                                                 
222“εἰ δέ τις τῶν δικαίων οὐκ ἐπιφορτίζει τῇ τῶν κρεῶν βρώσει τὴν 
ψυχήν, λόγῳ τινὶ εὐλόγῳ χρῆται.” Stromata 7.6.32.8. Cf. 7.6.32.9. 
223Clement draws the “emptying” imagery from Christ’s parable on the one who 
cleaned and swept his house and then suffered from the evil spirits returning to take up 
residence once again because it had not been filled. 
224“ἄλλως τε κενοῖ τῆς ὕλης τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ νηστεία καὶ καθαρὰν καὶ 
κούφην σὺν καὶ τῷ σώματι παρίστησι τοῖς θείοις λόγοις.” Eclogae propheticae 
14.2. 
225“τὸ διορατικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς κατέχωσαν ὄμμα φαντασιῶν μυρίων τῆς 
διανοίας ἐμπιμπλαμένης.” Paedagogus 2.9.81.1. 
226“Ὕπνος γὰρ δὴ πολὺς οὔτε τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν 
ὠφέλειαν ἐπιφέρων.” Ibid., 2.9.81.2. Clement here quotes Plato Laws 8.808BC. 
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the day as “fits of uselessness, and napping and stretching one’s self, and yawning, are 
manifestations of frivolous uneasiness of soul.”227 
Clement urges that the soul be a place of beauty. Riches, like beauty, exist only in 
the soul, and the fruit of the soul is generosity.228 Those who succumb to the pleasures of 
gaudy dress are likely to find that “a fornicator and adulteress has occupied the shrine of 
the soul.”229 “Cosmetics and dyes indicate that the soul is deeply diseased.”230 In support 
of this concept, Clement cites 1 Kgs 16:7 where God tells Samuel that he looks not on the 
outward appearance but upon the heart. Clement concludes that God places more 
importance on the beauty of the soul than that of the body.231 In response to those men 
who do their hair as women, Clement remarks that the soul does not show truth if it has a 
fraudulent head.232 He even argues that bathing too much is not good. It is our souls that 
need to be cleansed in the Word.233 
                                                 
227“Ἄλυες <δὲ> καὶ νυσταγμοὶ καὶ διεκτάσεις καὶ χάσμαι δυσαρεστίαι 
ψυχῆς εἰσιν ἀβεβαίου.” Paedagogus 2.9.81.5. 
228“καρπὸς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ εὐμετάδοτον∙ ἐν ψυχῇ ἄρα τὸ πλούσιον.” Ibid., 
3.6.36.1. See Méhat, 343-345. See also Clement’s discussion of the rich young ruler in 








κεφαλήν.” Ibid., 3.3.17.1. 
233“Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄριστον λουτρὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποσμήχει τὸν ῥύπον καί 
ἐστι πνευματικόν.” Ibid., 3.9.48.2. 
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Clement compares the need for modesty in the soul with that of the light of 
reason. In discussing marriage and sexuality in it, he writes that married couples “must 
not forget modesty at night time under the pretext of the cover of darkness; like the light 
of reason, modesty must ever dwell in their souls.”234 
Along with the practical remarks on the soul and sleep, Clement seeks to make 
clear that the soul itself does not need sleep. “The need of sleep is not in the soul. For it is 
ceaselessly active. But the body is relieved by being resigned to rest, the soul whilst not 
acting through the body, but exercising intelligence within itself.”235 Activity for the soul 
is key to existence. Clement concludes by stating, “For the soul to cease from activity 
within itself, were destruction to it.”236 
Dreams, for Clement, are how the mind keeps active during sleep. They “are the 
thoughts of a sober soul, undistracted for the time by the affections of the body, and 
counseling with itself in the best manner.”237 Clement notes that at night, “the soul, 
released from the perceptions of sense, turns in on itself and has a truer hold of 
intelligence.”238 





σωματικῶς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐννοουμένης.” Ibid., 2.9.82.1. While 
Clement notes that the soul does not need sleep, yet he can speak of it being weary from 
false acts and words happening around it. Ibid., 3.4.27.2. 





αὑτὴν καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχει τῆς φρονήσεως.” Stromata 4.22.140.1. 
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There is a similarity between the soul at night and at death. He writes, “And as to 
what, again, they say of sleep, the very same things are to be understood of death. For 
each exhibits the departure of the soul, the one more, the other less.”239 Thus, the soul is 
understood to be separate from the body at night.240 In another discussion of dreams, 
Clement notes that dreams had during sleep are assented to by the soul. However, dreams 
had while one is awake are lust.241 
It is of note that Clement can write to such length on the connection between the 
deeds of the body and the diseases of the soul and then turn to the Stoic thought that there 
is no connection between the two.242 He writes, “Fit objects for admiration are the Stoics, 
who say that the soul is not affected by the body, either to vice by disease, or to virtue by 
health.”243 This is understood better when one notes that it is written immediately after a 
discussion on martyrdom and leading into a discussion on pain with the first example 
given by looking at the sufferings of Job. Thus, the sufferings of Job in the flesh were not 
able to affect the virtue of his soul. 
Clement discusses the concept of the eye of the soul.244 He writes, “For the sun 
                                                 
239“ὅσα δ᾽ αὖ περὶ ὕπνου λέγουσι, τὰ αὐτὰ χρὴ καὶ περὶ θανάτου 
ἐξακούειν. ἑκάτερος γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὃ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὃ δὲ 
ἧττον.” Ibid., 4.22.141.1. 
240See ibid., 4.22.140.3. 
241Ibid., 4.18.116.1. 
242Compare his statement in Stromata 6.12.103.5 where he writes that the body 




ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας.” Ibid., 4.5.19.1. 
244Cf. Plato Republic 7.533D. 
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never could show me the true God; but that healthful Word, that is the Sun of the soul, by 
whom alone, when He arises in the depths of the soul, the eye of the soul itself is 
irradiated.”245 Here, Christ is described as the one who can shine in the eye of the 
mind.246 In a similar way, he writes, “For how can it be other than desirable, since it has 
filled with light the mind which had been buried in darkness, and given keenness to the 
‘light-bringing eyes’ of the soul?”247 In commenting on the sin of Israel, he writes, “He 
[God] shows their offence to be clearer, by declaring that they understood, and thus 
sinned willfully. Understanding is the eye of the soul.”248 He also writes that the believer 
must purge the “eye of the soul.”249 In a different analogy, Clement describes “faith” as 
“the ear of the soul.”250 
Clement also has an interesting expression, the face of the soul.251 He uses it in 
discussing the meaning of the cherubim in the Mosaic sanctuary.252 Comparing the true 
Gnostic with Moses, Clement writes, that he is revealed in righteousness, “as Moses, 
                                                 
245“οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥλιος ἐπιδείξει ποτ᾽ ἂν τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἀληθῆ, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ 
ὑγιής, ὅς ἐστιν ἥλιος ψυχῆς, δι᾽ οὗ μόνου ἔνδον ἀνατείλαντος ἐν τῷ βάθει τοῦ 
νοῦ αὐτοῦ καταυγάζεται τὸ ὄμμα.” Protrepticus 6.68.4. Cf. Stromata 3.12.84.4. 
“The children are holy when the Lord’s words have brought the soul to God as a bride.” 





248“Καὶ ἡ σύνεσις ὄψις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς.” Paedagogus 1.9.77.2. 
249“τὸ ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐκκαθαίρειν.” Ibid., 2.1.1.2. Cf. Stromata 1.1.10.1. 
250“πίστις δὲ ὦτα ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 5.1.2.1. See also 7.16.103.3. 
251“τὸ πρόσωπον ψυχῆς.” 
252“σύμβολον δ᾽ ἐστὶ λογικῆς μὲν τὸ πρόσωπον ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 5.6.36.4 
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glorified in the face of the soul.”253 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Origin of the Soul 
Clement states that the soul is given by God to each person. He writes of “men 
who are God’s handiwork, who have received [their] souls from Him.”254 Later, 
commenting on creation he asks, “Who breathed soul into the lifeless form?”255 He also 
adds, “Rightly then Moses says, that the body which Plato calls ‘the earthly tabernacle’ 
was formed of the ground, but that the rational soul was breathed by God into man’s 
face.”256 Clement clearly relies here on Gen 2:7.  
Despite its origin in the breath of God, Clement does not view the soul as divine. 
He is clear that the soul has not descended to the material world after a higher existence. 
                                                 
253“δεδοξασμένος ἤδη κἀνθένδε καθάπερ ὁ Μωυσῆς τὸ πρόσωπον [τῆς 
ψυχῆς].” Ibid., 6.12.103.5. In this context, Clement describes the “divine power of 
goodness clinging to the righteous soul in contemplation and in prophecy, and in the 
exercise of the function of governance” and impressing “on it something, as it were, of 
intellectual radiance, like the solar ray, as a visible sign of righteousness, uniting the soul 






255“Τίς ἐνεφύσησε ψυχήν.” Protrepticus 10.98.2. On the soul as the imago dei 
for Clement, see Mortley, 153. 
256“εἰκότως ἄρα ἐκ γῆς μὲν τὸ σῶμα διαπλάττεσθαι λέγει ὁ Μωυσῆς, ὃ 
γήινόν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων σκῆνος, ψυχὴν δὲ τὴν λογικὴν ἄνωθεν 
ἐμπνευσθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς πρόσωπον.” Stromata 5.14.94.3. On Clement’s 
use of Plato here, see Daniel Ridings, The Attic Moses: The Dependency Theme in Some 
Early Christian Writers (Göteborg, Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995), 
101. Ridings points out that Clement argues that Gen 2:7 was behind both the 
Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. Ibid., 105-106. 
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He writes that God “would never drive the soul down from a better home to a worse.”257 
In this argument, he is against what Origen will later posit, the prior existence of souls 
before the earthly creation. He also writes, “The soul is not then sent down from heaven 
to what is worse. For God works all things up to what is better.”258 This, he notes, is in 
contrast to the Platonists who “hold that mind is an effluence of divine dispensation in the 
soul.”259 In this context Clement admits that while Christians believe “that the Holy Spirit 
inspires him who has believed,” he also states that “it is not as a portion of God that the 
Spirit is in each of us.”260 To further emphasize the fact that the soul is not divine, 
Clement writes that “it was through birth that the universe was constituted, so too the 
substances, the creatures, the angels, the powers, the souls, the commandment, the Law, 
the gospel, the revealed knowledge of God.”261 
In spite of this stance regarding the soul’s nature in contrast to the divine, 
Clement, while describing how God hears the prayers of the believer, suggests that this is 
possible “since assuredly soul hears soul, and mind, mind?”262 Here there seems to be a 




γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀμείνω πάντα ἐργάζεται.” Ibid., 4.26.167.4. 
259“ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς μὲν τῷ πεπιστευκότι προσεπιπνεῖσθαι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμά 
φαμεν, οἳ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ θείας μοίρας ἀπόρροιαν 
ὑπάρχοντα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι κατοικίζουσιν.” Ibid., 5.13.88.2. 
260Stromata 5.13.88.6. Chadwick argues that this also implies that the soul is not 
immortal in Clement’s understanding. Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the 
Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1966), 49. 
261“δι᾽ ἣν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν, δι᾽ ἣν αἱ οὐσίαι, δι᾽ ἣν αἱ φύσεις . . . δι᾽ 
ἣν ψυχαί.” Stromata 3.17.103.1. 




clear analogy between the soul and mind of humans and that of the divine. This is further 
illustrated in his discussions on peace and the soul. He writes, “So, then, what is really 
good is seen to be most pleasant, and of itself produces the fruit which is desired—
tranquility of soul.”263 This Clement connects with becoming like God. He concludes, 
“On this wise it is possible for the Gnostic already to have become God.”264 Elsewhere he 
writes, “For the Word of God is intellectual, according as the image of mind is seen in 
man alone. Thus also the good man is godlike in form and semblance as respects his soul. 
And, on the other hand, God is like man. For the distinctive form of each one is the mind 
by which we are characterized.”265 Clement also describes a “boastful soul” which claims 
that it will not be “caught doing evil.” This soul, Clement describes as pure by “receiving 
the Lord’s power, [it] studies to be God.”266 He concludes by stating that “such a soul is 
never at any time separated from God.”267  
 
                                                 
Clement remarks elsewhere that a certain state of the soul is necessary. “Wherefore also 
he who holds converse with God must have his soul immaculate and stainlessly pure, it 
being essential to have made himself perfectly good.” Ibid., 7.7.49.1. 
263“ὅτῳ τοίνυν <τὰ> τῷ ὄντι καλὰ φαίνεται ἥδιστα, παρ᾽ αὑτοῦ 
πορίζεται ὃν ποθεῖ καρπόν, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐστάθειαν.” Ibid., 4.23.149.8. Cf. 













The Human Person and the Soul 
Clement writes that the soul is “most precious to God,”268 though both the soul 
and body are to be sanctified.269 However, Clement does remind us that “the soul of man 
is confessedly the better part of man, and the body the inferior. But neither is the soul 
good by nature, nor, on the other hand, is the body bad by nature.”270 However, the true 
Gnostic soul sees itself as only “sojourning in the body.”271 The soul also rules over the 
body. In discussing the value of asceticism, he writes that “the soul has authority over the 
body.”272 In discussing proper dress, Clement writes, “The covering ought, in my 
judgment, to show that which is covered to be better than itself, as the image is superior 
to the temple, the soul to the body, and the body to the clothes.”273 In a similar context, 
Clement notes that “in the soul alone are beauty and deformity shown.”274 This, of 
                                                 
268“ὅθεν ἐπιδεκτικὸν γίνεται τῆς τιμιωτάτης τῷ θεῷ ψυχῆς τὸ 
οἰκητήριον.” Ibid., 4.26.163.2. 
269“ὅθεν ἐπιδεκτικὸν γίνεται τῆς τιμιωτάτης τῷ θεῷ ψυχῆς τὸ 
οἰκητήριον τοῦτο καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος 
ἁγιασμὸν καταξιοῦται.” Ibid., 4.26.163.2. 
270“κρεῖττον μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὡμολόγηται ἡ ψυχή, ἧττον δὲ τὸ σῶμα. 
ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει οὔτε αὖ κακὸν φύσει τὸ σῶμα, οὐδὲ μὴν ὃ μή 
ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο εὐθέως κακόν.” Ibid., 4.26.164.3. See H. Chadwick, Early 
Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, 48; Koffas, 116-119; Sanguineti, 114. 
271“αὐτίκα ἡ τοῦ σοφοῦ τε καὶ γνωστικοῦ ψυχή, οἷον ἐπιξενουμένη τῷ 
σώματι.” Stromata 4.26.165.2. 
272“ὁ δὲ σώφρων τὴν κυρίαν τοῦ σώματος ψυχὴν ἐλευθεροῖ τῶν 
παθῶν.” Ibid., 3.5.41.3. Méhat sees here a similarity with the Pythagorean and Platonic 
notion of purification of the soul. Méhat, 369-370. 
273“Δεῖ δὲ τὴν σκέπην, οἶμαι, αὐτὸ αὑτῆς κρεῖττον ἀποφαίνειν τὸ 
σκεπόμενον, ὡς τὸ ἄγαλμα τοῦ νεὼ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς 





course, is in contrast to the body. However, in discussing Christ, Clement writes that in 
Him were exhibited “the true beauty of both soul and body,” the beauty of the soul being 
“beneficence,”275 or “goodness.”276 
Clement describes the human person as “composed of body and soul, . . . a 
universe in miniature.”277 He adds, regarding the constitution of the human person, that it 
was “necessarily composed of things diverse, but not opposite—body and soul.”278 Later, 
he notes that the Instructor “cares for the whole nature of His creature” and thus “heals 
both body and soul.”279 One who partakes of the Eucharist is “sanctified both in body and 
soul.”280 
Clement outlines the process that takes place for a soul to enter a body. Citing an 
ancient authority, he writes that “the soul entering into the womb after it has been by 
                                                 
275“τὸ δὲ ἀληθινὸν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐνεδείξατο κάλλος, 




Protrepticus 1.5.3. On the body-soul relationship in Clement, see Olivier Prunet, La 
morale de Clément d’Alexandrie et le Nouveau Testament (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1966), 140-141; Sanguineti, 234-238.  
278“ἐχρῆν δὴ οὖν τὴν σύνθεσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν αἰσθητοῖς γενομένην 
ἐκ διαφόρων συνεστάναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐξ ἐναντίων, σώματός τε καὶ ψυχῆς.” 
Stromata 4.26.165.1. Cf. 5.10.61.3 where Clement also insists that the whole man 









cleansing prepared for conception, and introduced by one of the angels who preside over 
generation, and who knows the time for conception, moves the woman to intercourse; 
and that, on the seed being deposited, the spirit, which is in the seed, is, so to speak, 
appropriated, and is thus assumed into conjunction in the process of formation.”281 The 
ancient writer supports this statement by referencing Luke 1:41, 44 where the unborn 
child in the formerly barren Elizabeth leapt for joy at hearing Mary’s voice. 
In discussing the creation of man, Clement writes, “But the individual man is 
stamped according to the impression produced in the soul by the objects of his choice.”282 
Clement recognizes the implications of free will to his understanding of salvation. He 
thus also asserts that the nature of the soul is such that “it is not without eminent grace 
that the soul is winged, and soars, and is raised above the higher spheres.”283 In another 
place he writes, “For the soul wishes to be its own good; which the Lord, however, gives 
it.”284 He then adds, “Wherefore God has endowed the soul with free choice, that He may 
show it its duty, and that it choosing, may receive and retain.”285 He states that whether 




πρὸς.” Eclogae propheticae 50.1. On this concept in Clement, see Buell, 25-26; 
Rizzerio, 408. 
282“ὁ δέ τις ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τύπωσιν τὴν ἐγγινομένην τῇ ψυχῇ ὧν ἂν 






κύριος.” Eclogae propheticae 22.1. 
285“διὰ τοῦτο [ἐπὶ] τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ θεὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν δέδωκεν, ἵνα αὐτὸς μὲν 
μηνύσῃ τὸ δέον, ἣ δὲ ἑλομένη δέξηται καὶ κατάσχῃ.” Ibid., 22.3. 
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God draws a soul to Himself or the soul’s free-will is at work, yet grace is required. Thus 
it is not entirely clear what the soul can attain to by nature in Clement’s understanding. 
In a brief reference to the tripartite division of the human person, Clement 
allegorizes Matt 18:20 and remarks that a possible interpretation of this is the “flesh, soul, 
and spirit” of 1 Thess 5:23.286 Clement also references the tripartite soul in an allegorical 
interpretation of Matt 13:33 about the kingdom of heaven being like a woman who hid 
leaven in three measures.287 
The Gnostic Christian is also used in helping others. Clement writes of 
“‘removing the mountains’ of his neighbors, and putting away the irregularities of their 
soul.”288 In this the Gnostic is called to benefit those around him. He also speaks, 
however, of the work the individual must do in this process. He writes of the “depravity 
of soul” as “accompanied with want of restraint; and he who acts from passion, acts from 
want of restraint and depravity.”289 Elsewhere he writes, “For he who has not formed the 
wish to extirpate the passion of the soul, kills himself.”290 He writes regarding the person 
who has realized that he/she must turn from outward things to “what is proper and 
peculiar to man—to purge the eye of the soul, and to sanctify his flesh.”291 Clement also 
                                                 
286“σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ πνεῦμα.” Stromata 3.10.69.1. 
287Ibid., 5.12.80.9. 
288“ὠφελῶν τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους, τὰ ‘ὄρη μεθιστὰς’ τῶν πλησίον καὶ τὰς 
τῆς ψυχῆς.” Stromata 7.12.77.5. See also 7.14.86.5. 
289“πᾶσα γὰρ μοχθηρία ψυχῆς μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ διὰ πάθος 




ἁγνίζειν δὲ καὶ τὴν σάρκα αὐτήν.” Paedagogus 2.1.1.2. 
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writes, “For where but in a soul that is wise can you write truth? where love? where 
reverence? where meekness?”292 He also writes, “The heavenly and truly divine love 
comes to men thus, when in the soul itself the spark of true goodness, kindled in the soul 
by the Divine Word, is able to burst forth into flame.”293 This gives the notion that the 
soul itself has qualities which must be present for truth to be instilled or in order to be 
kindled by the Divine Word. 
This notion of individual responsibility and the capabilities of the soul are further 
elaborated on by Clement in his notion of free will. He writes of the “self-determination 
of the human soul, and its incapability of being treated as a slave in what respects the 
choice of life.”294 Clement finds this in the story of God speaking to Pharaoh through 
Moses in Exod 3:18-19. Commenting he writes, “For He [God] shows both things: both 
His divinity in His foreknowledge of what would take place, and His love in affording an 
opportunity for repentance to the self-determination of the soul.”295 In the story of the 
rich young ruler, Clement also finds an indication of the “self-determination of the 
soul.”296 The soul is that which says yes or no,297 where judgments are made. 
                                                 
292“Ποῦ γὰρ ἀλλαχόθι ἢ ἐν σώφρονι ψυχῇ δικαιοσύνην ἐγγραπτέον; 
Ποῦ ἀγάπην; αἰδῶ δὲ ποῦ; πραότητα δὲ ποῦ.” Protrepticus 10.107.1. See also 
10.107.2; Paedagogus 3.11.58.3. 
293“Ὅ γέ τοι οὐράνιος καὶ θεῖος ὄντως ἔρως ταύτῃ προσγίνεται τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῇ που τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ ὄντως καλὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου λόγου 
ἀναζωπυρούμενον ἐκλάμπειν δυνηθῇ.” Protrepticus 11.117.2. 
294“τὸ αὐθαίρετον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς καὶ ἀδούλωτον πρὸς ἐκλογὴν 
βίου.” Stromata 7.3.15.2. See also 7.2.12.5. 
295“Ἐμφαίνει γὰρ ἄμφω, καὶ τὸ θεῖον προειδὼς τὸ ἐσόμενον, καὶ τὸ 
φιλάνθρωπον τὸ αὑτοῦ τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφορμὰς μετανοίας 
χαριζόμενος.” Paedagogus 1.9.76.4. 
296“τὸ ‘εἰ θέλεις’ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τῆς προσδιαλεγομένης αὐτῷ ψυχῆς 




Passion, Purity, and the Soul 
For Clement, Christ’s soul is devoid of passion.298 In comparing the human soul 
and Christ’s soul, Clement writes, “He is to us a spotless image; to Him we are to try with 
all our might to assimilate our souls.”299 The true Gnostic will be the same. “To him the 
flesh is dead; . . . having turned towards God the old sinful soul. Such a one is no longer 
continent, but has reached a state of passionlessness.”300 Clement also describes this soul 
as “inflexible”301 and as having “transcended the whole life of passion.”302 
In describing the work of Christ for the human soul, Clement writes, “And 
regarding him as its greatest work, regulated his soul by wisdom and temperance.”303 
Thus the virtues are used in the healing of the soul by Christ. Righteousness is described 
as “the concord of the parts of the soul.”304 However, “Haughtiness is a vice of the soul, 
                                                 
297See Stromata 1.17.83.5; 1.17.84.1. Cf. 5.14.141.3. 
298“ἀπαθὴς τὴν ψυχήν.” Paedagogus 1.2.4.1. 
299“οὗτος ἡμῖν εἰκὼν ἡ ἀκηλίδωτος, τούτῳ παντὶ σθένει πειρατέον 
ἐξομοιοῦν τὴν ψυχήν.” Ibid., 1.2.4.2. 
300“τούτῳ τέθνηκεν ἡ σάρξ. . . . τὴν παλαιὰν ἁμαρτητικὴν ψυχὴν 
ἐπιστρέψας πρὸς θεόν. οὐκ ἐγκρατὴς οὗτος ἔτι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἕξει γέγονεν 
ἀπαθείας.” Stromata 4.22.138.1. In this context, Clement also writes of “assimilation to 
God” as “preserving the mind in its relation to the same things.” Ibid., 4.22.139.4. Cf. 
6.9.72.1-2; 6.9.75.3; 7.7.45.3. 




καὶ σωφροσύνῃ.” Paedagogus 1.2.6.6. 
304“δικαιοσύνη δὲ συμφωνία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν” Stromata 4.26.163.5. 
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of which, as of other sins, He [God] commands us to repent.”305 Clement writes often 
regarding the work of the Instructor to wound in order to heal the passions of the soul.306 
“His aim is thus to improve the soul, not to teach, and to train it up to a virtuous, not to an 
intellectual life.”307 Thus virtue is more important than intellect as a theoretical study. 
The Instructor, Christ, “heals both our body and soul.”308 He also adds, “The Savior, who 
withdraws, by the divine word, the gloom of ignorance arising from evil training, which 
had overspread the eye of the soul.”309 
Faith functions in relation to purity as well. Describing this, he writes, “faith, 
which from instruction is compacted into a foundation, which, being more substantial 
than hearing, is likened to meat, and assimilates to the soul itself nourishment of this 
kind.”310 This is part of his interpretation of 1 Cor 3:2. For Clement, faith is also a 
prerequisite to knowledge. Thus he writes, “Faith, therefore, and the knowledge of the 
truth, render the soul, which makes them its choice, always uniform and equable.”311 The 
                                                 
305“ἀλαζονεία γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐστι κακία.” Ibid., 2.19.97.3. 
306The passions themselves, which he defines in Quis dives salvetur 16.1, are 
external things used badly. 
307“καὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ βελτιῶσαι τὴν ψυχήν ἐστιν, οὐ διδάξαι, 
σώφρονός τε, οὐκ ἐπιστημονικοῦ καθηγήσασθαι βίου.” Paedagogus 1.1.1.4. Cf. 
Stromata 5.3.17.3 where the wise soul waits for the appearance of the teacher. 




ἀχλυώδη.” Ibid., 1.28.178.1. 
310“ἐν αὐτῇ σωματοποιουμένη τῇ ψυχῇ.” Paedagogus 1.6.38.2. Buell states 
that, here, faith is to be understood as “providing the ‘body’ for the soul.” Buell, 142. Cf. 





soul, then, must have faith and truth in order to be unchanging. The lack of faith, or 
unbelief, can also be present in the soul. In response to Christ’s statement, “Blessed are 
the meek for they shall inherit the earth,” Clement writes, “The meek are those who have 
quelled the battle of unbelief in the soul, the battle of wrath, and lust, and the other forms 
that are subject to them.”312 
A pure soul, according to Clement, is one that is free from sin. To be as a little 
child is to be “pure in flesh, holy in soul by abstinence from evil deeds.”313 He describes 
the righteous soul as one in which all pain is gone and only good remains.314 This 
“incorruptibility of body and soul” he allegorizes from the statement regarding Rebecca 
that “the virgin was fair, and man had not known her.”315 He also allegorizes the 
statement in Isa 1:2 where the prophet writes, “Hear, O heaven; and give ear, O earth,” 
referring to one “who has applied himself to the contemplation of heaven and divine 
things, and in this way has become an Israelite.”316 Clement speaks of the Gnostic soul 





εἰδῶν.” Ibid., 4.6.36.2. 
313“καθαροὶ μὲν τὴν σάρκα ἅγιοι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ ἀποχὴν κακῶν 





αὐτήν’.” Ibid., 4.25.161.1. 
316“καὶ οὐρανὸν τὴν τοῦ γνωστικοῦ ψυχὴν τὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν θείων 
θέαν ἐπανῃρημένου καὶ ταύτῃ Ἰσραηλίτην γεγονέναι.” Ibid., 4.26.169.1. 
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who has been sanctified “through withdrawal from earthy fires.”317 He adds, “Why, then, 
should we any longer change grace into wrath, and not receive the word with open ears, 
and entertain God as a guest in pure souls?”318 
While Clement urges that the body, as well as the soul, should be purified, yet he 
also calls for the soul to be free from the body, referring to the desires of the body. “The 
Gnostic soul must be consecrated to the light, stripped of the integuments of matter, 
devoid of the frivolousness of the body and of all the passions, which are acquired 
through vain and lying opinions, and divested of the lusts of the flesh.”319 Elsewhere, in 
describing the true Gnostic, Clement writes, “For passion being cut away and stripped off 
from the whole soul, he henceforth consorts and lives with what is noblest, which has 
now become pure, and emancipated to adoption.”320 Very similar language is used 
describing the rich young ruler and Christ’s command to sell all he had, which Clement 
describes as a “stripping off of the passions of the soul.”321 This command was not to be 
                                                 
317“ἡ γνωστικὴ ψυχὴ ἁγιάζηται κατὰ τὴν ἀποχὴν τῶν γεωδῶν 
πυρώσεων.” Ibid., 6.7.60.1. 
318“τί δὴ οὖν ἔτι τὴν χάριν εἰς ὀργὴν μεταλλάσσομεν καὶ οὐχὶ 
ἀναπεπταμέναις ταῖς ἀκοαῖς καταδεχόμενοι τὸν λόγον ἐν ἁγναῖς 




φωτὶ καθιερωθῆναι.” Stromata 5.11.67.4. 
320“τοῦ γὰρ ἐμπαθοῦς παντὸς περιτμηθέντος καὶ περιαιρεθέντος 
ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κρατίστῳ, καθαρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ ἠλευθερωμένῳ εἰς 
υἱοθεσίαν, τοῦ λοιποῦ σύνεστίν τε καὶ βιοῖ.” Eclogae prophetica 31.3. 
321“τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν γυμνῶσαι τῶν ὑπόντων 
παθῶν.” Quis dives salvetur 12.1. 
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understood as focused on the man’s wealth but on the passions of the soul.322 
The Holy Spirit also plays a role in Clement’s doctrine. He writes in a discussion 
on lustful dreams of a person who “in chaste love looks on beauty, thinks not that the 
flesh is beautiful, but the spirit, admiring . . . the body as an image, by whose beauty he 
transports himself to the Artist, and to true beauty.”323 This “thinking” about the spirit, 
Clement writes, is “the unction of acceptance, the quality of disposition which resides in 
the soul that is gladdened by the communication of the Holy Spirit.”324 In discussing the 
metaphor of grafting trees which Paul uses, Clement suggests it be understood as grafting 
“one’s faith in the soul itself. For also the Holy Spirit is thus somehow transplanted by 
distribution, according to the circumscribed capacity of each one.”325 Elsewhere, the soul 
is described only as “a temple of the Holy Spirit, when it acquires a disposition in the 
whole of life corresponding to the Gospel.”326 Thus it is unclear when the Spirit is 
understood to dwell in the soul, at the beginning of the journey or at its completion. 
                                                 
322Clement defends this concept by pointing out that the riches can be used in a 
positive way and thus in themselves are neither good nor evil. Thus the command to sell 




παραπέμπει.” Stromata 4.18.116.2. 
324“τὸ χρῖσμα τῆς εὐαρεστήσεως λέγω, τὴν ποιότητα τῆς διαθέσεως τὴν 
ἐπικειμένην τῇ ψυχῇ κατ᾽ ἐπιχώρησιν τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος γεγανωμένῃ.” 
Stromata 4.18.116.2. See also 4.22.139.4. On this conception of a quality in the soul that 
welcomes the Holy Spirit, see Fernández Ardanaz, Genesis y Anagennesis, 318. 
325“ἄμεινον δὲ τὴν ἑκάστου πίστιν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐγκεντρίζεσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ 
γὰρ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ταύτῃ πως μεταφυτεύεται διανενεμημένον κατὰ τὴν 
ἑκάστου περιγραφὴν ἀπεριγράφως.” Stromata 6.15.120.2. 
326“‘νεὼς’ γίνεται ‘τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος’ ὅταν διάθεσιν 
ὁμολογουμένην τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ κατὰ πάντα κτήσηται τὸν βίον.” Ibid., 7.11.64.7. 
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Clement also writes of one who “integrates soul and spirit in obedience to the 
Word,”327 which then leads to Paul’s “no male or female among you” from Gal 3:28. 
Thus, soul “stands aside from mere appearance of shape . . . and is transformed into 
unity.”328 Clement also speaks of how “the Lord’s word remains firm and anoints the soul 
and makes it one with the Spirit.”329 
Elsewhere Clement connects spirit with soul, seeming to use them as synonyms. 
“Wherefore this exhortation of the truth alone, like the most faithful of our friends, abides 
with us till our last breath, and is to the whole and perfect spirit of the soul the kind 
attendant on our ascent to heaven.”330 Here the soul is described as ascending to heaven 
after death, accompanied by truth. Clement does make it clear what is behind his idea of 
the ascent of the soul, though one could easily find this in his notion of the Gnostic soul’s 
final vision of the divine. This is further suggested when he writes allegorically of the 
High Priest: “Thus the high priest showed the laying aside of the body, which, like the 
                                                 
327“καταισχυνθεὶς πνεῦμα καὶ ψυχὴν ἑνώσῃ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου 
ὑπακοήν.” Ibid., 3.13.93.2. Translation FC. 
328“ἀποστᾶσα γὰρ τοῦδε τοῦ σχήματος, ᾧ διακρίνεται τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ 








11.117.3. On death in Clement, see Fischer, 113; Klaus Schmöle, Läuterung nach dem 
Tode und pneumatische Auferstehung bei Klemens von Alexandrien (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1974), 41-47. On the soul’s ascent, see Everett Procter, Christian 
Controversy in Alexandria: Clement’s Polemic against the Basilideans and Valentinians, 
American University Studies Series 7, Theology and Religion Vol. 172 (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1995), 105-106. 
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gold plate, has become pure and light through the purification of the soul.”331 In this 
context, he writes of “the uncovered soul, which is in the power of the mind, and which 
has become like a body of the power, passes over into spiritual things. The soul now has 
become truly rational . . . because it is directly animated, so to speak, by the Logos.”332  
Clement also writes of unclean spirits and the soul in the context of baptism. “It 
[baptism] is accordingly a sign of the sanctifying of our invisible part, and of the straining 
off from the new and spiritual creation of the unclean spirits that have got mixed up with 
the soul.”333 
Clement addresses the issue of God knowing the thoughts of the soul. He writes 
of “the power which reaches the soul’s consciousness, by ineffable power and without 
sensible hearing, know all things at the moment of thought”334 and that “the divine 
power, with the speed of light, sees through the whole soul.”335 In describing inspiration, 
                                                 
331“καθάπερ πετάλου χρυσοῦ καθαροῦ γενομένου καὶ κούφου διὰ τὴν 
κάθαρσιν [τοῦ ὥσπερ σώματος] τῆς ψυχῆς [ἀπόθεσιν].” Excerpta ex Theodoto 
1.27.1.9. Translations of the Excerpta are by Procter. He, along with earlier scholars, 
suggests that Excerpta ex Theodoto 27 is a response by Clement against the Valentinian 
doctrine of “spiritual seeds ascending into the Pleroma.” Procter, 105-106.  Cf. Lilla who 








καινῆς τε καὶ πνευματικῆς.” Eclogae propheticae 7.3. 
334“τοῦ συνειδότος ἐπαφωμένη τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις δυνάμει τινὶ ἀρρήτῳ 
καὶ ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθητῆς ἀκοῆς ἅμα νοήματι πάντα γινώσκει.” Stromata 7.7.37.2. 
335“φθάνει δὲ ἡ θεία δύναμις, καθάπερ φῶς, ὅλην διιδεῖν τὴν ψυχήν.” 
Ibid., 7.7.37.4. See also 7.7.37.6. 
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Clement writes that “the thoughts of virtuous men are produced through the inspiration of 
God; the soul being disposed in the way it is, and the divine will being conveyed to 
human souls.”336 
Clement argues for the separation of the soul from the body in the present life. 
Interpreting Christ’s command to watch, Clement suggests that this means, “Study how 
to live, and endeavor to separate the soul from the body.”337 Elsewhere he simply states 
that “death is,” in fact, “the separation of the soul from the body.”338 Speaking of the 
Gnostic soul, he writes, “Cleansed, so to speak, from all the stains of the soul, he knows 
right well that it will be better with him after his departure.”339 
Clement finds the call for the soul to separate from the body even during this life 
in the teaching of Christ. He writes, “And, in fine, the Lord’s disciplines draw the soul 
away gladly from the body, even if it wrench itself away in its removal.”340 Christ is 
described as the one who “trains the soul.”341 This is supported by Christ’s words from 
Matt 10:39, “For he that loves his life shall lose it, and he that loses his life shall find it.” 
                                                 
336“ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἐναρέτων ἀνθρώπων ἐπίνοιαι κατὰ ἐπίπνοιαν 
θείαν γίγνονται, διατιθεμένης πως τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ διαδιδομένου τοῦ θείου 
θελήματος εἰς τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχάς.” Ibid., 6.17.157.4. 
337“‘γρηγορεῖτε,’ οἷον μελετᾶτε ζῆν καὶ χωρίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ 
σώματος πειρᾶσθε.” Ibid., 5.14.106.1. Cf. Schmöle, 43. 









Clement finishes this quote of Christ’s words with the statement, “If we only join that 
which is mortal of us with the immortality of God.” It is unclear if Clement is writing 
here of the mortal body being joined with the immortality of God or rather the unpurified 
soul being joined with the immortality of God. Based on what follows, it appears that the 
latter is the better interpretation. 
Clement continues, “He therefore, who, in accordance with the word of 
repentance, knows his life (soul) to be sinful will lose it—losing it from sin, from which 
it is wrenched. This, then, is what it is “to find one’s life,” “to know one’s self.”“342 Thus 
the unrepentant soul is considered sinful and can be spoken of by Clement as mortal. 
Repentance from evil actions provides a foundation for faith for the soul. “There is 
forthwith proposed to those who have been called, the repentance which cleanses the seat 
of the soul from transgressions, that faith may be established.”343 In regard to repentance, 
Clement speaks of two kinds. “That which is more common is fear on account of what is 
done; but the other which is more special, the shame which the spirit feels in itself arising 
from conscience.”344 Baptism also has a cleansing function. In speaking about 
regeneration by water and spirit, he writes, “It is not the body only, but the soul, that we 
cleanse.”345 
                                                 
342“ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιγινώσκων κατὰ τὸν τῆς μετανοίας λόγον ἁμαρτωλὸν 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολέσει αὐτὴν τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἧς ἀπέσπασται, . . . τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐστι 











Clement speaks of the soul of the Christian philosopher who has given his life for 
Christ as follows, “Hearing from our Savior the words of poetry, ‘Dear brother,’ by 
reason of the similarity of his life.”346 The soul, in this case, hears words from the Savior 
though it is disassociated from the body. He also writes, “If the confession to God is 
martyrdom, each soul which has lived purely in the knowledge of God, which has obeyed 
the commandments, is a witness both by life and word, in whatever way it may be 
released from the body,—shedding faith as blood along its whole life till its departure.”347 
Here again Clement highlights the call for the soul to prepare for its departure from the 
body. 
Clement interprets the heart for the soul in Ps 22:26 when he writes that those 
who seek God shall receive true knowledge from Him and thus their “souls shall live.”348 
It is difficult to determine from this text alone if Clement believes that without this 
knowledge, the soul will die, but that is a distinct possibility. 
Clement brings the soul into his discussion on the proper dress for a Christian. In 
this context he writes that believers should manage the “body by the soul” and quotes 
Christ disciplining the soul by citing Luke 12:22-23, “Take no thought for your life what 
                                                 








ἀπαλλάττεται.” Stromata 4.4.15.3. 
348“καὶ ζήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτῶν∙ καρδία γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλληγορεῖται ἡ τὴν 
ζωὴν χορηγήσασα.” Ibid., 5.1.12.2. 
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ye shall eat; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on; for the life is more than meat, 
and the body more than raiment.”349 Also in the context of clothing, Clement speaks of 
the body obtaining immortality by the “immortal vesture of the Spirit.”350 
Clement speaks of the natural powers of the soul in the context of desire and the 
commandments. “The person who makes proper use of the natural powers of the soul has 
a desire for appropriate objects but hates all that would injure, as the commandments 
prescribe.”351 When he speaks of the law, Clement notes that “the true legislator is he 
who assigns to each department of the soul what is suitable to it and to its operations.”352 
In an interesting description of just what one should hate, Clement writes, “Whether 
hand, or foot, or soul, hate it.”353 
In discussing wrong actions committed unintentionally, Clement refers to an 
irrational passion of the soul. “For, in reality, he that cannot contain the generative word 
is to be punished; for this is an irrational passion of the soul approaching garrulity.”354 








προστάττουσιν.” Stromata 3.10.69.2. 
352“ὁ νομοθετικὸς δέ ἐστιν ὁ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ 
τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις ἀπονέμων.” Ibid., 1.26.167.3. 
353“κἂν χεὶρ κἂν ποὺς κἂν ἡ ψυχή, μίσησον αὐτήν.” Quis dives salvetur 
24.2. 
354“τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κολαστέος ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ γονίμου λόγου, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ 
πάθος ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἄλογον, ἐγγὺς ἀδολεσχίας ἰόν.” Stromata 2.14.61.2. 
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Clement also speaks of wronging one’s own soul. “If we will have nothing to do, by 
abandoning ourselves wholly to lust, we shall sin, nay rather, wrong our own soul.”355 
 
Immortality and the Soul 
Though Clement argues against the divine origin of the soul and argues for its 
creation at the time of conception, he does support the concept of the immortality of the 
soul. This appears in Stromata 5.14. In this chapter, Clement presents beliefs which he 
asserts were taken by Greek philosophers and poets from the Hebrew Scriptures. He lists 
ideas from among the Greeks which both agree and disagree with the Old Testament 
authors. If an idea is the same, Clement attributes it to copying. If it is different, he 
suggests a misunderstanding took place. In this context, Clement discusses the 
immortality of the soul immediately after suggesting that Plato believed in a penal 
punishment by fire as found in the HB. He quotes from Republic 10.615e4-616a2. “Then 
these men fierce and fiery to look on, standing by, and hearing the sound, seized and took 
some aside and binding Aridaeus and the rest hand, foot, and head, and throwing them 
down, and flaying them, dragged them along the way, tearing their flesh with thorns.” 
Then he quotes Ps 104:4, “Who makes His angels spirits; His ministers flaming fire.” He 
asserts that Plato’s fiery men are referring to the angels. After making this connection, 
Clement then argues that “it follows from this that the soul is immortal. For what is 
tortured or corrected being in a state of sensation lives, though said to suffer.”356 Here 
Clement connects the doctrine of a future judgment to the doctrine of an immortal soul. 




ἢ παιδευόμενον ἐν αἰσθήσει ὂν ζῇ, κἂν πάσχειν λέγηται.” Stromata 5.14.91.1. 
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He argues that the soul must be immortal as it is still capable of sensation after the death 
of the body. 
It is helpful to see Clement’s understanding of the relationship between the body 
and soul to help elucidate his argument for the soul’s immortality. He declares that the 
body is the “soul’s tomb.”357 This, he states, is clear from Rom 8:10, “The body is a dead 
thing because of sin.” He also writes that it is necessary “in investigating the nature of the 
body and the essence of the soul, to apprehend the end of each, and not regard death as an 
evil.”358 Thus, to understand the soul and the body, one must understand what the end of 
each is. As the end of the soul is to either receive punishment or reward, it follows that it 
must survive the separation from the body. 
Clement argues for the soul’s immortality from another point of view also. In 
discussing the connection between sleep and death, Clement notes that though the body 
sleeps, the soul does not. Were the soul to sleep, that would be its destruction. Since the 
soul does not sleep, it is “always contemplating God, and by perpetual converse with Him 
inoculating the body with wakefulness, it raises man to equality with angelic grace, and 
from the practice of wakefulness it grasps the eternity of life.”359 
 
Death and the Soul 
Clement finds two senses of humans used in the Scriptures, “the visible and the 
                                                 
357“τάφος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔτι τῆς ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 3.11.77.3. 
358“δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικε, τήν γε τοῦ σώματος φύσιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς 
οὐσίαν πολυπραγμονήσαντας τὸ ἑκατέρου τέλος καταλαβέσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν 
θάνατον ἡγεῖσθαι κακόν.” Stromata 4.3.11.2. 
359Paedagogus 2.9.82.3. See above discussion on Clement, the soul, and sleep. 
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spiritual, one subject to salvation and one not. Sin is called the death of the soul.”360 Here 
the spiritual clearly refers to the soul. For Clement, the visible, or the body, is not even 
subject to salvation. Thus sin is death not to the visible body but rather to the invisible 
soul. This sets up his quotation from Rom 5:12, 14 where sin enters the world through 
one human person and then spreads to all. In this context, he also talks about death as the 
separation of the soul from the body. In discussing the entrance of sin into the world, he 
writes, “Death follows birth, and the union of soul and body is followed by their 
dissolution.”361 Here he fails to follow the connection that Paul makes between sin and 
death and rather inserts the notion that this is a divine arrangement.362 Death, here, is not 
to be understood as something evil. He writes that it is necessary “in investigating the 
nature of the body and the essence of the soul, [to] apprehend the end of each, and not 
regard death as an evil.”363 He further adds, “The assertion, then, may be hazarded, that it 
has been shown that death is the fellowship of the soul in a state of sin with the body; and 
life the separation from sin.”364 Here it should be noted that he appears to admit that this 
                                                 
360“ἄνθρωπον δὲ καλεῖ ἡ γραφὴ διχῶς, τόν τε φαινόμενον καὶ τὴν 
ψυχήν, πάλιν τε αὖ τὸν σῳζόμενον καὶ τὸν μή. καὶ θάνατος ψυχῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία 
λέγεται.” Stromata 3.9.64.1. Translation FC. Cf. Philo’s statement that the loss of virtue 
is the death of the soul. Philo Leg. 1.105. See also Wis 1:11. 
361“φυσικῇ δὲ ἀνάγκῃ θείας οἰκονομίας γενέσει θάνατος ἕπεται, καὶ 
συνόδῳ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἡ τούτων διάλυσις ἀκολουθεῖ.” Stromata 3.9.64.2. 
See also 6.17.153.3. Cf. Plato Phaedrus 67 D. 
362Fritz Buri, Clemens Alexandrinus und er paulinische Freiheitsbegriff (Zürich: 
Max Niehans, 1939), 78-79. 
363“δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικε, τήν γε τοῦ σώματος φύσιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς 
οὐσίαν πολυπραγμονήσαντας τὸ ἑκατέρου τέλος καταλαβέσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν 






is a position which “may be hazarded” but not definitively proven. He concludes by 
stating, “The severance, therefore, of the soul from the body, made a life-long study, 
produces in the philosopher Gnostic alacrity, so that he is easily able to bear natural 
death, which is the dissolution of the chains which bind the soul to the body.”365 Clement 
here quotes Rom 6:20-23 as his support for the notion that death is when the soul, in a 
state of sin, is combined with the body. It appears here that Clement wants to take an 
allegorical interpretation of death by Paul and uses it to make a literal definition of death. 
Why he does this is not clear. He has elsewhere clearly dealt with sin and its effects on 
the soul. Here, he wants to say that death is the soul in sin when he has just quoted Paul 
as stating that death is the wages of sin, not sin itself. He also supports this notion with 
quotes from the words of Christ. “For what should it profit a man, if he shall gain the 
whole world, and lose his own soul”;366 “Take no thought for your life . . . for your life is 
more than meat”;367 “Seek you first the kingdom of heaven and its righteousness.”368 
Here, though, Clement is again slipping between the metaphorical using of the soul 
separating from the body in becoming a true Gnostic and the literal separation of the soul 
from the body in death. 
 




τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμῶν.” Ibid., 4.3.12.5. 
366Matt 16:26. 
367Matt 6:31; Luke 12:22-23. 
368Matt 6:32-33; Luke 12: 30-31. 
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Hell and Paradise 
Clement makes clear that the souls of the righteous and the souls of the sinners 
are not in the same place after death. He writes, “For who in his senses can suppose the 
souls of the righteous and those of sinners in the same condemnation, charging 
Providence with injustice?”369 This general argument based upon a sense of justice is 
then coupled with an interpretation of 1 Pet 3:19-20 to develop the concept that the souls 
of the unrighteous had the gospel preached to them by Christ.370 Those of the Gentiles 
who had not heard the gospel are thus able to be saved. This point is further supported by 
Clement’s claim that “souls, although darkened by passions, when released from their 
bodies, are able to perceive more clearly, because of their being no longer obstructed by 
the paltry flesh.”371 This is combined with support from Hermas 3.6.49 and the statement 
from Matt 27:52 regarding the resurrection of bodies at Christ’s resurrection. Clement 
also quotes Isa 1:19-20 and David’s words from Ps 16:9-11, “My heart was glad. . . . For 
You shall not leave my soul in hell, nor will You give Your holy one to see corruption.” 




370On Christ’s descent into Hell in early Jewish-Christian theology, see Jean 
Daniélou, The Theology of Jewish Christianity, trans. John A. Baker, vol. 1 of The 
Development of Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1964), 233-248. 
371“καὶ ταῦτα καθαρώτερον διορᾶν δυναμένων τῶν σωμάτων 
ἀπηλλαγμένων ψυχῶν, κἂν πάθεσιν ἐπισκοτῶνται, διὰ τὸ μηκέτι 
ἐπιπροσθεῖσθαι σαρκίῳ.” Stromata 6.6.46.3. See also 6.6.47.3; 6.6.48.6; 6.6.49.3. On 
the interpretation of the Petrine text, see Hans Küng, Eternal Life?  Life After Death as a 
Medical, Philosophical, and Theological Problem, trans. Edward Quinn (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday, 1984), 125-129; Alfred Stuiber, Refrigerium Interim: Die Vorstellungen 




These are used in support of his concept that the Gentiles who died before Christ were 
preached to and given an opportunity to repent when Christ preached to them after His 
death on the cross. 
In further support of this, Clement, in writing regarding the deaths which occurred 
as a result of the flood, writes, “Then, too, the more subtle substance, the soul, could 
never receive any injury from the grosser element of water, its subtle and simple nature 
rendering it impalpable, called as it is incorporeal. But whatever is gross, made so in 
consequence of sin, this is cast away along with the carnal spirit which lusts against the 
soul.”372 Clement also speaks of fire purifying the soul.373 Some might argue for an early 
concept of purgatory, but as this is undeveloped, it seems speculative. 
Clement speaks in several places about the soul moving towards God. He writes, 
“The soul is raised to God.”374 He also writes of the soul being brought to God as a 
bride.375 The Gnostic soul also becomes like God. Clement writes, “For pre-eminently a 
divine image, resembling God, is the soul of a righteous man.”376 Elsewhere he writes, 





πνεύματι τῷ κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμοῦντι.” Stromata 6.6.52.1-2. 
373“ἀλλὰ τὰς ἁμαρτωλοὺς ψυχάς, πῦρ οὐ τὸ παμφάγον καὶ βάναυσον, 
ἀλλὰ τὸ φρόνιμον λέγοντες, τὸ ‘διικνούμενον διὰ ψυχῆς’ τῆς διερχομένης τὸ 
πῦρ.” Ibid., 7.6.34.4. On this, see Daley, 4647; Schmöle, 48-128. Daley argues that 
Clement’s use of fire, whether before or after death, demonstrates that he is the first to 
develop the notion of purgatory. 
374“τέταται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.” Stromata 4.3.9.5. 
375“αἱ εὐαρεστήσεις, τῷ θεῷ τῶν κυριακῶν λόγων νυμφευσάντων τὴν 
ψυχήν.” Ibid., 3.12.84.4. 
376“μάλιστα γὰρ ἄγαλμα θεῖον καὶ θεῷ προσεμφερὲς ἀνθρώπου 
δικαίου ψυχή.” Ibid., 7.3.16.5. See Sanguineti, 238-241. 
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“Here, too, we shall find the divine likeness and the holy image in the righteous soul.”377 
Clement is clearly against the transmigration of souls. He writes, “But with 
reference to these dogmas, whether the soul is changed to another body, also of the devil, 
at the proper time mention will be made.”378 He does mention that abstaining from meat 
influences the soul but not “as Pythagoras and his followers dream of the transmigration 
of the soul.”379 
 
Summary 
Clement does not often use soul for natural life as did previous authors. He much 
more often uses it in the context of referring to a separate entity from the body. The soul 
is invisible and the source of movement. It also has a tripartite division, resembling that 
of Plato. Along with Justin Martyr, Clement attributes simpleness to the soul. 
Clement closely connects the soul with education and knowledge, the purpose of 
which is to rid the soul of passion, which has entered the soul, contrary to its nature. 
When the process is complete, the soul can then behold God. The Scriptures play an 
important role in this education by kindling a spark in the soul to life and by directing the 
soul in its study. The soul’s program of study goes beyond the Scriptures however. It also 
                                                 
377“τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἅγιον ἄγαλμα, ἐν τῇ δικαίᾳ ψυχῇ.” Stromata 7.5.29.6. 
Parel argues that Clement sees the soul as created in the image of God. However there 
does not seem to be evidence to support this. Rather, the gnostic soul is what is referred 
to as the image of God. Kamala Parel, “The Theological Anthropology of Clement of 
Alexandria” (Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge, 1995), 71. 
378“ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὰ δόγματα ἐκεῖνα, εἰ μετενσωματοῦται ἡ ψυχή, καὶ 
περὶ τοῦ διαβόλου κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους λεχθήσεται καιρούς.” Stromata 4.12.85.3. 
See Hoheisel, 40-41. 
379“οὐχ ᾧ Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τὴν μετένδεσιν 
ὀνειροπολοῦντες τῆς ψυχῆς.” Stromata 7.6.32.9. 
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includes much of the Greek mode of thinking and includes areas of study such as 
philosophy, geometry, and astronomy. Male and female souls, alike, are called to this 
education. Both implicitly and explicitly contained in this notion of the soul’s education 
is that the soul is called to develop itself. 
Clement, in contrast to earlier authors, is quite explicit in arguing that the actions 
of the body affect the soul. He argues that drinking, eating, and sleeping all have an effect 
on the soul. He gives varied and detailed advice to be followed so that the impact of these 
actions on the soul is positive and not negative. The human person is composed of both 
soul and body, and Christ, the Paedagogos, can be said to heal both in places, and in 
others, only the soul is described as being saved. 
Salvation for the soul is based upon its attainment of virtue. He describes virtue as 
reason leading to a harmonious state of the soul. The soul that attains virtue is the one 
that can come to God. This happens only to those souls that have devoided themselves of 
passion. Faith plays an important role in regard to the soul as well. The soul is capable of 
both faith and unbelief. The one who disparages faith, as the Greeks do, will appear wise 
only in one’s own eyes. Philosophy prepares the way in the soul only for the reception of 
faith. 
The soul is given by God to each person. Drawing on Gen 2:7, Clement argues 
that the soul is given by the breath of God. He also draws on non-biblical sources in 
describing the actual process that takes place at conception in the mother’s womb. This 
divine origin is the basis for it being understood as a rational soul. Its origin, however, 
does not give it a divine status of its own. It does lead, though, to several comparisons 
and analogies between the divine and the human. Most significantly, he rejects a platonic 




Clement supports his notion of the soul being entombed in the body by quoting 
Rom 8:10. He calls for the soul to be pure as a “little child.” To this end, the soul is called 
upon to exercise its free will in “self-determination.” This is indicated in the Bible by the 
interaction of God with Pharaoh at the time of the Exodus and also the parable of the 
Rich man and Lazarus. In this context, the soul is called upon to exercise it powers to 
regulate its desires, both for appropriate and inappropriate objects. 
While Clement does say that the body is not evil, yet he also quotes Rom 5:12-14; 
6:20-23; 8:10 for support of his interpretation of death as the soul’s entombment in the 
body in a state of sin. He even refers to death as when the soul is joined to the body. He 
also quotes from Matt 16:26 for support of this idea. The usage of these verses in 
discussing the soul is new with Clement of Alexandria. The notion of the entombment of 
the soul in the body is previously mentioned in the Epistle to Diognetus and by 
Athenagoras, but without any scriptural support. 
As the soul is separated from the body at death, so should the Gnostic soul seek to 
separate itself from the body during life. Asceticism is called for in this context and is 
supported by Luke 12:22-23. This is what Christ aids the soul in doing through His work 
as the Paedegogos. Clement allegorically supports this statement with Christ’s words in 
Matt 10:39. A believer’s martyrdom also can be seen as a way for the soul to separate 
from the body. 
Clement looks to 1 Pet 3:19-20 for support of the notion of the soul’s existence 
after death. He thus argues that Christ preached to the souls of people who had died 
before His incarnation and not had the opportunity to hear His preaching. The soul is 
helped in this process by no longer being darkened by the body. This is the first usage of 
this passage in the development of the doctrine of the soul. Its usage in this manner 
becomes more frequent with subsequent authors and will prove to be a pivotal passage in 
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the statement of this doctrine. 
The soul’s movement toward God is key to Clement’s understanding of salvation. 
In this, he is against the transmigration of souls. The soul is, through purification and the 
avoidance of sin, to take the Holy Spirit into itself. This is the beginning of its deification. 
Clement connects the immortality of the soul with the doctrine of a future 
judgment, based on his interpretation of Ps 104:4. He argues that since there is a future 
judgment, then the soul must be immortal. This connection between a future judgment 
and the immortal nature of the soul is a key idea. He also states that should the soul sleep, 
that would be its destruction. 
 
Hippolytus 
The writings attributed to Hippolytus are many and varied.380 Eusebius gives the 
list as On the Hexaemeron, On What Follows the Hexaemeron, Against Marcion, On the 
Song of Songs, On Sections of Ezekiel, On Easter, and Against All the Heresies. Jerome 
adds twelve other books to this list including On Daniel, On the Antichrist, and On the 
Resurrection. Other manuscripts include Against Noetus, On the Universe, and The 
Apostolic Tradition. There is still much current debate regarding exactly who Hippolytus 
was and which documents are to be attributed to him.381 
                                                 
380See Altaner, 183-188; Moreschini and Norelli, 232-237; Beate R. Suchla, 
“Hippolytus,” DECL, 287. 
381See for example Paul F. Bradshaw, Maxwell E. Johnson, and L. Edward 
Phillips, The Apostolic Tradition: A Commentary, Hermeneia (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2002), 1-6; Allen Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third 
Century: Communities in Tension before the Emergence of a Monarch-Bishop (Leiden: 
Brill, 1995); Robert Butterworth, Hippolytus of Rome: Contra Noetum (London: 
Heythrop Monographs, 1977), 7-33; J. A. Cerrato, Hippolytus between East and West: 
The Commentaries and the Provenance of the Corpus, Oxford Theological Monographs 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Ronald E. Heine, “Hippolytus, Ps.-Hippolytus 





Usage of Psyche 
In describing some biblical passages that he is going to interpret, Hippolytus 
writes, “For these are truly divine and glorious things, and things well calculated to 
benefit the soul.”382 Thus Scripture is seen as prepared to do positive things for the soul. 
This seems to be more in line with understanding the soul as a separate existence from 
the body rather than speaking about life itself. Being divine and glorious seems to be the 
focus, which could indicate themes that are specifically calculated to “benefit the soul.” 
Hippolytus speaks of prophets using signs and symbols at times “lest they should 
disquiet the souls of men.”383 Thus, in the same way that certain themes could benefit the 
soul, other themes needed to be veiled in order not to cause undue concern to the soul. 
Thus souls are described as having the capacity of negative emotions. 
Hippolytus writes of “all that the soul perceives.”384 He also speaks of the eyes of 
the soul. He writes in regard to the Jews, “And surely ye have been darkened in the eyes 
of your soul with a darkness utter and everlasting.”385 Here he uses the philosophical 
notion of the perception of the soul in contrast to that of the body. 
                                                 
Frances Young et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Charles E. Hill, 
“Hippolytus and Hades: The Authorship of the Fragment De Universo,” Studia Patristica 
21 (1989): 254-259; Miroslav Marcovich, Hippolytus: Refutatio omnium haeresium 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 9-17; Marcel Richard, Kommentar zu Daniel, GCS 





384“ὅσα ψυχὴ διανοεῖται.” De theophania 1.2. 
385385“ἀλλ᾽ ἐσκοτίσθητε τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμοῖς σκοτισμὸν ἀφεγγῆ 




Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Hippolytus uses the body and soul composite to refer to the human person. He 
writes in describing his work of writing as “laboring with every energy of body and 
soul.”386 In describing Christ’s birth and incarnation, Hippolytus writes of him “taking 
the flesh from her [Mary], and assuming also a human, by which I mean a rational soul, 
and becoming thus all that man is.”387 This shows his composite understanding of the 
human person of flesh, or body, and soul. 
Hippolytus, in commenting on the Platonic notion of the immortality of the soul, 
writes that the soul is made of the same substance as the body. “For if ye believe that the 
soul is originated and is made immortal by God, according to the opinion of Plato, in 
time, ye ought not to refuse to believe that God is able also to raise the body, which is 
composed of the same elements, and make it immortal.”388 
Hippolytus writes of baptized people being immortal. He notes that Christ 
“begetting us again to incorruption of soul and body, breathed into us the breath (spirit) 
of life, and endued us with an incorruptible panoply.”389 This seems to clearly play on 
                                                 
386“ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ πάσῃ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι ἐργαζόμενοι.” Refutatio omnem 
haeresium 1.prol.6.6. 
387“ἵνα σαρκωθεὶς ἐξ αὐτῆς, λαβὼν δὲ καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν, 











Gen 2:7. Here again, though, Hippolytus is following the custom of the time to insist on 
the immortal nature of both soul and body. 
Hippolytus mentions Christ preaching to the souls of the saints.390 This is a 
popular notion based upon an interpretation of 1 Pet 3:19. Hippolytus also describes John 
the Baptist doing the same thing. He writes, “He also first preached to those in Hades, 
becoming a forerunner there when he was put to death by Herod, that there too he might 
intimate that the Savior would descend to ransom the souls of the saints from the hand of 
death.”391 
Hippolytus remarks, in commenting on the raising of Lazarus from the dead, that 
his “soul rose out of the under-world.”392 This under-world elsewhere he refers to as 
Hades “in which the souls both of the righteous and the unrighteous are detained.”393 He 
describes it as a “guard-house for souls.”394 Here the righteous souls have rest while the 
wicked behold the lake of fire which is prepared for them. 
Hippolytus writes regarding the resurrection that there will be “a resurrection of 
                                                 
390“καὶ ἐν νεκροῖς κατελογίσθη, εὐαγγελιζόμενος τὰς τῶν ἁγίων 




θανάτου.” De antichristo 45.10. 
392“ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν καταχθονίων ἀνασπαστὸς ἐγίνετο.” In evangelium 
Ioannis et de resurrectione Lazari 227.10. 
393“περὶ δὲ ᾅδου ἐν ᾧ συνέχονται ψυχαὶ δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων 
ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν.” De universo 2. See also 47. 
394“τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὡς φρούριον ἀπενε μήθη ψυχαῖς.” Ibid., 7. On 
Hippolytus’s understanding of the interim state, see Daley, 39-40. 
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all, not by transferring souls into other bodies, but by raising the bodies themselves.”395 
Later he adds, “And to every body its own proper soul will be given again; and the soul, 
being endued again with it, shall not be grieved, but shall rejoice together with it, abiding 
itself pure with it also pure.”396 
 
Summary 
Hippolytus uses soul to refer to a separate entity from the body. He views the 
human person as a composite of body and soul. The soul can be affected by the 
Scriptures for good. He also notes that the prophets used signs to avoid disconcerting the 
souls of people. 
Hippolytus relies on 1 Pet 3:19-20 for support of Christ preaching to those souls 
kept in Hades. This is clearly the continuation of a trend in understanding the soul. In a 
unique way, he also describes John the Baptist as doing this as well. He also looks to the 
story of the Rich Man and Lazarus in Luke 16:19-31 for demonstration of the sentient 
nature of the soul after the death of the body. Hippolytus taught that the substance of the 
body was immortal in the same manner that the soul was. He taught that at the 
resurrection of the body it would be rejoined with its original soul. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has studied both the general usage of the soul in the late-second-
century Greek Fathers as well as the use of Scripture in its doctrinal development. Both 
                                                 
395“ἀνάστασιν τότε πάντων ποιησάμενος, οὐ ψυχὰς μετενσωματῶν 
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα ἀνιστῶν.” De universo 49. 
396“ὡς ἑκάστῳ σώματι ἡ ἰδία ψυχὴ ἀποδοθήσεται καὶ τοῦτο 
ἐπενδυσαμένη οὐκ ἀνιαθήσεται ἀλλὰ συγχαρήσεται καθαρὰ καθαρῷ 
παραμείνασα.” Ibid., 68. 
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Irenaeus and Clement use soul to describe natural life, though this usage declines 
somewhat with the latter as he more often uses it to denote a separate entity from the 
body. The soul is described by both Irenaeus and Clement as the principle of movement 
for the body. Both also describe the soul as incorporeal, with Irenaeus also describing the 
soul as invisible. In addition, both connect the soul to the blood. They do not cite Lev 
17:14 for support of this, leaving this to the later work of Origen, although it is unclear 
where else they may have found support for this idea. 
Clement describes the body as the tomb of the soul, continuing this idea that has 
been suggested by a few previous authors. He turns to Rom 8:10; 5:12-14; 6:20-23 for 
support of this thesis. In addition, he adds to this soul/body relationship by introducing 
the idea that the actions of the body directly impact the soul. Thus bodily fasting is 
argued to be good for the soul. This idea will be further developed by later authors. 
With Irenaeus and Clement, the soul is clearly the seat of knowledge and reason. 
As such, the education of the soul is vital for Clement. For him, it also develops and is 
not the same in everyone. In this context, free will also becomes closely associated with 
the soul, both for Irenaeus and Clement. It is also the seat of emotions. Interestingly, it is 
described by both Irenaeus and Clement as pleasureless at times and then in other places, 
the soul is described as having both positive and negative emotions. Clearly, however, the 
notion of an impassible soul is developing. 
The breath of God from Gen 2:7 plays an important role for all three authors. This 
idea is put to more use in this era, with Irenaeus using it to attribute both incorporeality 
and immortality to the soul. In another place, however, Irenaeus, based upon Luke 16:19-
31, will argue that the soul is corporeal. 
For Clement and Hippolytus, death is defined as the separation of the soul from 
the body. Clement turns to Matt 6:25; 10:39; 16:16; Rom 6:20-23; 8:10 for support of this 
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view. The general view among these authors is that death allows the soul to escape the 
confines of the body. All authors agree that the body and soul will be reunited at the 
judgment to share either in the rewards or punishments of God, though none mention 
eternal punishment in the context of the soul. 
For all three authors, the soul survives the death of the body with the soul being 
described as immortal. Clement introduces a new Scripture text for support of this view. 
He cites 1 Pet 3:19-20 for the idea of the descent of Christ’s soul to preach to the souls of 
the unrighteous. This was seen as a parallel to the existence of all souls after the death of 
the body. Hippolytus also uses this Scripture text as support for the same idea. Both 
Irenaeus and Clement continue the earlier practice of citing the biblical teaching of a 
future judgment as a reason for defending the doctrine of an immortal soul. Clement 
argues this based on his interpretation of Ps 104:4. Irenaeus uses Pss 21:4; 22:29; 148:5-
6; and Luke 16:19-31 (Rich Man and Lazarus) for support of this idea. Hippolytus also 
uses Luke 16:19-31 in a similar fashion. 
Irenaeus uses Luke 16:19-31 along with several other verses to argue that the 
souls of the righteous and the unrighteous are not in the same place after death. He argues 
that the righteous are in a better part of Hades than the unrighteous, awaiting the 
resurrection to go to heaven. The goal of the soul in experiencing a vision of God is 








ORIGEN AND HIS FOLLOWERS 
 
No other author of this time period can compare with Origen, either in breadth or 
depth of focus on the soul. The life of the soul was everything in the writings of this 
monumental figure and he, more than any prior author, probed the Scriptures and the 
ideas of prior thinkers in his efforts to develop a thorough picture of what might be 
understood concerning the soul. Such was his effect that the following two authors, 
Gregory Thaumaturgos and Methodius, write almost exclusively in direct conversation 
with him. The former is completely in agreement and the latter generally opposed, though 
on the concept of the soul, they are in general agreement. While, ultimately, many of 
Origen’s developments were set aside by later authors, a few of his ideas did ultimately 
stick and find their way to the present day. 
 
Origen 
Origen was one of the most prolific writers of the early Church Fathers.1 His 
                                                 
1On his works, see Moreschini and Norelli, 268-303; Quasten, 2:43-75; Hermann 
J. Vogt, “Origen,” DECL, 445-447; Rowan Williams, “Origenes,” Theologische 
Realsenzyklopädie, 25:403-407. A major issue in understanding Origen and his works is 
whether to see him as a philosopher or a biblical exegete. Dillon notes that Origen “is 
indeed a philosopher, but one who, rather than adopting Platonism or the doctrine of any 
other Hellenic school, has forged a system of his own out of the Christian Scriptures and 
tradition, to which he lays Platonism in tribute for concepts and formulations which he 
finds useful, without surrendering to the Greeks any principle whatever.” John Dillon, 
“Origen and Plotinus: The Platonic Influence on Early Christianity,” in The Relationship 
between Neoplatonism and Christianity, ed. Thomas Finan et al. (Dublin: Four Courts 
Press, 1992), 8. 
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known writings are around eight hundred with some early sources claiming between two 
and six thousand. He is a Greek Father, writing in Greek, but much of his work was 
destroyed as a result of the later controversy over his theology. Many of his writings 
which remain are works that were translated into Latin by others such as Rufinus and 
Jerome.2 Thus, this study looks at both psyche and anima in his works.3 His works 
included a great many exegetical and homiletic treatises on Scripture, his famous 
dogmatic work On First Principles, the apologetic treatise Against Celsus, practical 
works, along with other miscellaneous writings. 
Origen presents a special challenge with his usage of soul.4 He himself notes that 
“the doctrine of the soul is vast and difficult to interpret, being gathered from words 
occurring here and there in the Scriptures.”5 This difficulty, as it pertains specifically to 
Origen, is directly related to his hermeneutic for interpreting Scripture.6 Doutreleau notes 
                                                 
2On the issue of Origen’s translators, see Jean Daniélou, Origen, trans. Walter 
Mitchell (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955); Pierre Nautin, Origène: sa vie et son 
oeuvre (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), 150-153, 227-241; Monica Wagner, “Rufinus the 
Translator: A Study of His Theory and Practice as Illustrated in His Version of the 
Apologetica of S. Gregory Nazianzen” (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 
1945), x-xii; F. Winkelmann, “Einige Bemerkungen zu den Aussagen des Rufinus von 
Aquileia und des Hieronymus über ihre Übersetzungstheorie und methode,” in Kyriakon: 
Festschrift Johannes Quasten, ed. Patrick Grandfield et al. (Münster: Verlag 
Aschendorff, 1970). 
3On his works, see Moreschini and Norelli, 268-303; Quasten, 2:43-75; Vogt, 
“Origen,” 445-447; R. Williams, “Origenes,” DECL, 25:403-407. 
4Thümmel argues that in Origen’s anthropology, soul moves into the background 
to make room for the logos concept. Thümmel, 246. On the relation of soul and logos, see 
Robert M. Berchman, “Self-knowledge and Subjectivity in Origen,” in Origeniana 
Octava, ed. L. Perrone (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003). 
5Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 6.14.87. 
6For a discussion on the difficulties in dealing with Origen specifically relating to 
his exegetical works, see Jean Daniélou, “Origène comme exégète de la Bible,” Studia 
Patristica 1 (1957): 280-281. 
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that for Origen, all Scripture relates to the soul.7 Thus, Origen seems sometimes prone to 
searching for anything to apply to the soul, especially in his commentaries and homilies 
on the books of Scripture. For example, Origen writes of the “soul of Scripture.”8 He also 
writes of the “soul and body and spirit of Scripture.”9 Interpreting this, he writes, “the 
body certainly for those who were before us, the soul for us, but the spirit for those who 
‘will attain the inheritance of eternal life in the future,’ through which they come to the 
heavenly kingdom.”10 This “soul of Scripture” he also appears to refer to as the “spirit of 
the law.”11 
Because Origen makes wide use of the mystical, “third interpretation” of 
Scripture,12 and because Origen’s references to the soul that are based on this mystical 
                                                 
7Louis Doutreleau, Origen: Homélies sur les Nombres, 415 (Paris: Éditions du 
Cerf, 1996), 32n1. 
8“Scripturae anima aedificentur.” De principiis 4.2.4. 
9“Qui fecit Scripturae animam et corpus et spiritum.” In Leuiticum homiliae 5.1. 
10“Corpus quidem his, qui ante nos fuerunt, animam vero nobis, spiritum autem 
his, qui ‘in futuro haereditatem vitae aeternae consequentur’, per quam perveniant ad 
regna coelestia.” Ibid. 
11“Legis animam.” Ibid. 
12See ibid., 5.7. On Philo’s influence on Origen’s hermeneutics, see Daniélou, 
Origen, 178-191; Fearghus O. Fearghail, “Philo and the Fathers: The Letter and the 
Spirit,” in Scriptural Interpretation in the Fathers: Letter and Spirit, ed. Thomas Finan et 
al. (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1995), 55-57. On Origen’s hermeneutic in general, see 
Daniélou, Origen, 139-173; David Dawson, “Allegorical Reading and the Embodiment 
of the Soul in Origen,” in Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community, ed. 
Lewis Ayres et al. (London: Routledge, 1998); Elizabeth Dively Lauro, The Soul and 
Spirit of Scripture within Origen’s Exegesis (Boston: Brill, 2005), 131-194; Henri de 
Lubac, Histoire et esprit: l’intelligence de l’Écriture d’après Origène (Paris: Aubier, 
1950), 346-355; Karen Torjesen, “‘Body,’ ‘Soul, and ‘Spirit’ in Origen’s Theory of 
Exegesis,” Anglican Theological Review 67, no. 1 (1985): 19-22; Gerard Watson, 
“Origen and the Literal Interpretation of Scripture,” in Scriptural Interpretation in the 
Fathers: Letter and Spirit, ed. Thomas Finan et al. (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1995); 




hermeneutic often do not have much that is helpful in further understanding of Origen’s 
doctrine of the soul, this study does not present each of these. Various examples are used 
when they are deemed useful in clarifying Origen’s doctrinal position on the soul. It must 
be admitted at the outset that making the distinction between helpful and not helpful is 
not always easy.13 When one tries to analyze these interpretations in order to help 
elucidate Origen’s doctrine of the soul, it sometimes appears that it has nothing to do with 
the soul at all. Once looked at in the context of Origen’s hermeneutic, several ideas are 
apparent however. First, whenever Origen discusses a person in the context of faith or 
lack thereof, he most often uses the term soul rather than any other word to denote the 
individual person. Secondly, almost every historical event described in the Old Testament 
can be interpreted in such a way as to discuss the soul’s experience with God, either for 
                                                 
Interpretation, ed. Alan J. Hauser et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 1:334-354. 
On Philo’s exegetical method, see Peder Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria as Exegete,” in A 
History of Biblical Interpretation, ed. Alan J. Hauser et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2003), 1:114-143. 
13See David Dawson, “Plato’s Soul and the Body of the Text in Philo and 
Origen,” in Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period, ed. Jon 
Whitman (Boston: Brill, 2003). As an example, take Origen’s mystical interpretation of 
the pregnant woman who experiences premature delivery of her fetus as a result of being 
struck by two quarelling men. He writes, “The soul which has just conceived the word of 
God is said to be a woman with child.” He adds further to this interpretation writing, 
“Those, therefore who conceive and immediately give birth are not to be considered 
women, but men, and perfect men. . . . They, therefore, are perfect men and strong who 
immediately when they conceive give birth, that is, who bring forth into works the word 
of faith which has been conceived.” Thus the soul which conceives and gives birth 
immediately is a perfect man, for Origen. However, he adds, “The soul, however, which 
has conceived and retains the word in the womb and does not give birth is called woman. 
. . . This soul, therefore, which is now called a woman because of its weakness, is 
stricken and made to stumble by two men quarreling between themselves.”13 In Exodum 
homiliae 10.3. Origen then concludes that the man who was fighting and caused the soul 
which had conceived to prematurely give birth is at fault. Thus the law is not about literal 
men fighting with one of them striking a pregnant woman but about someone who has 
just received the word of God and either puts the faith received into works or loses it 
because of the fighting of others. 
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good or bad.14 But even these two general observations provide little in the way of 
helpful information that can be used to understand more clearly Origen’s view of the 
soul. 
 
Usage of Anima and Psyche 
General Usage 
When Origen uses soul, it is not always clear whether he is referring to nature life 
or to a separated, sentient, psychological entity. For instance, he writes that “regarding 
the sun, moon, and stars, whether they are living beings or without soul, there is no 
distinct deliverance.”15 Here soul would seem to refer to natural life. Similarly he writes 
                                                 
14Though Origen does discuss in other places “female fragility” (see, for example, 
In Leuiticum homiliae 1.2.8; 8.9.), it does not seem that he applies gender to the soul. 
Rather, the woman is generally a symbol of weakness. For instance, he writes while 
discussing the creation of male and female in Gen 1, that “our inner man consists of spirit 
and soul. The spirit is said to be male; the soul can be called female” (Interior homo 
noster ex spiritu et anima constat. Masculus spiritus dicitur, femina potest anima 
nuncupari. In Genesim homiliae 1.15). Origen also mentions a “manly soul” (virilem 
animam. In Genesim homiliae 5.6). He writes, “So the things after the manner of women 
should cease also in your soul and you no longer have anything womanish or effeminate 
in your soul but ‘you act manfully’ (ut nihil iam muliebre et effeminatum habeas in 
anima tua, sed ‘viriliter agas’ et viriliter ‘praecingas lumbos tuos’, si sit pectus tuum 
‘thorace iustitiae munitum, si galea salutari et gladio spiritus accingaris’). Origen, in In 
Ieremiam 5.7.13, also writes of “children of the soul” indicating “that the thoughts are the 
sons and the works and deeds are the daughters through the body” (Πολλάκις εἴπομεν 
τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς γεννήματα, ὅτι τὰ νοήματα μέν εἰσιν υἱοί, τὰ δὲ ἔργα καὶ αἱ 
πράξεις αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος θυγατέρες). Cf. C. P. Hammond Bammel, “Adam in 
Origen,” in Making of Orthodoxy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 71; 
Elena Giannarelli, “Christian Thought and Alexandrian Methodology: Origen on Sarah, 
Rebecca, Rachel,” in Origeniana Quinta, ed. Robert J. Daly (Leuven: Leuven University 
Press, 1992), 129. 
15“De sole autem et luna et stellis, utrum animantia sint an sine anima, manifeste 
non traditur.” De principiis 1.praef.10. On the notion of stars and immortality, see Alan 
F. Segal, “Heavenly Ascent in Hellenistic Judaism, Early Christianity and Their 




of “rational beings and in dumb animals; nay, even in those things which are without life, 
and in all things universally which exist.”16 Origen several times uses soul for natural life 
in discussing the Mosaic law of “life for life” but this seems to be based on texts which 
also uses soul for life rather than an intentional usage of the word.17 One might think that 
he uses soul for life in commenting on Jesus’ words, “For whosoever would save his own 
life shall lose it.”18 However, he is quick to explain and interpret these words to mean, 
“Let each one therefore lose his own sinning life,” meaning one’s sinful soul, not one’s 
bodily life.19 Here Origen uses soul to refer not to life, in contrast to death, but rather to a 
psychological entity, apart from the body, which makes up the human person. Elsewhere 
he writes of those who “are not ready to come into His [God’s] service, and to prepare 
their souls for trial.”20 
Origen often writes of someone’s soul. It is difficult in many of these cases, 
however, to determine in just what senses he does so. He can write of “the souls of 
children [who] are not yet old enough to be numbered.” He also writes of “the soul who 
does not remember God”21 and the “souls of the believers.”22 In commenting on the 
                                                 
16“Quae sine anima sunt.” De principiis 1.3.5. 
17In Exodum homiliae 10. 
18Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 12.26-28. 
19“ἀπολλύτω οὖν ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτάνουσαν ψυχήν.” 
Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 12.27.30. 
20“Qui nondum se tanta constantia neque tanto affectu offerunt deo neque parati 
sunt accedentes ad servitutem dei praeparare animas suas ad temptationem.” De 
principiis 3.1.12. 
21“Non mihi videtur huiusmodi anima habere memoriam Dei.” In Numeros 
homiliae 11.2. 
22“Animas credentium.” Ibid., 11.4. 
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spread of Christianity, he writes that Christ had “convened countless numbers of souls to 
His religion.”23 He adds, “That so by this means the souls of others might be assisted in 
the work of enlightenment.”24 In these examples, it is not clear that these should 
necessarily refer simply to a person instead of a separate soul. 
Origen uses soul as a way of referring to people. He writes regarding the seventy 
people who went down to Egypt with Jacob: “They grow from being seventy souls to be 
an important people, and as the ‘sand by the sea-shore innumerable.’”25 This type of 
usage is very common in Origen’s Homilies and Commentaries on various books of the 
Bible. Because the mystical or “third interpretation” of Scripture is quite important for 
Origen,26 and this can only apply to souls as distinct from the material world, he speaks 
of souls quite often where one might have expected people. For example, he writes of 
women as “those souls who cannot become the head of another, but are themselves 
subordinated to others as to a head.”27 He writes of the Jordan River as able “to water and 
irrigate thirsty souls, and the senses that are adjacent to it.”28 In commenting on the Bride 
                                                 
23“μετεποίησε μυρίας ὅσας ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν θεοσέβειαν.” 
Contra Celsum 1.27.11. See also 1.27.17 where he describes the Christian religion as that 
“which reaches to every soul under the sun.” 
24“Ut per eos ceterae animae inluminatae iuvarentur.” De principiis 4.3.12. 
25“Ex ipsis septuaginta animabus fiunt aliqui et ‘sicut arena, quae est ad oram 
maris innumerabilis.’” De principiis 4.3.11. It should be noted that in this context, Origen 
is defining his understanding of nations and is in this section fond of using soul for the 
inhabitants of a country, whether a literal or a spiritual one. 
26Dively Lauro, 191-194. 
27“Pueriles namque animae nondum tempus habent ex divino praecepto numerari, 
sed ne illae quidem animae, quae non possunt fieri alterius caput.” De principiis 4.3.12. 
28“Rigare et inundare animas sitientes et sensus adiacentes sibi.” Ibid. 
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of Solomon, he writes that she “represents the Church gathered from among the Gentiles; 
but the daughters of Jerusalem to whom she addresses herself are the souls who are 
described as being most dear because of the election of the fathers, but enemies because 
of the Gospel.”29 The Church is called “the aggregate of many souls.”30 He writes in 
commenting on Lev 4:27, “For who would doubt that the things the Law says were 
spoken to souls or to the people.”31 
Similarly, Origen describes “a race of souls” which is called Israel.32 These are 
those who will accept God. Elsewhere, in commenting on Jesus’ encounter with a 
Canaanite woman, he writes describing the lost sheep of Israel as “a lost race of souls 
possessed of clear vision.”33 He also speaks of the “the souls . . . called Egyptians, 
Babylonians, Tyrians, and Sidonians.”34 These souls are in a sort of captivity. He writes 
that prophecies made against the named nations are rather to be understood as happening 
                                                 
29“Haec sponsa, quae loquitur, ecclesiae personam tenet ‘ex gentibus’ 
congregatae; ‘filiae’ vero ‘Hierusalem’, ad quas ei sermo est, illae sunt animae, quae 
‘carissimae quidem dicuntur propter electionem patrum, inimicae autem propter 
evangelium.’” Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 2.113. On the soul and its 
marriage to God in Origen, see Marie Joseph Pierre, “L’âme dans l’anthropologie 
d’Origène,” Proche Orient chrétien 34, no. 1-2 (1984): 37-55. 
30“Ex multis animabus congregata est ecclesia.” Commentarium in Canticum 
canticorum 2.153. 
31“Quis enim dubitaret quod ea, quae dicit lex, ad animas vel ad populum.” In 
Leuiticum homiliae 2.5. Here Origen seems forced, however, by the wording of the text 
itself. This usage is not found elsewhere. 
32“Sed intellegimus genus esse animarum, quae Israhel nominantur.” De 
principiis 4.3.8. 
33“γένος ψυχῶν διορατικῶν ἀπολωλός.” Commentarium in evangelium 
Matthaei 11.17.33. 
34“Animae, si quae in illis habitant locis, Aegyptii et Babylonii et Tyrii ac Sidonii 
appellentur.” De principiis 4.3.9. 
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“to those nations of souls who inhabit that heaven which is said to pass away, or who 
even now are supposed to be inhabitants of it.”35 As this is couched in his interpretation 
of Scriptures, it is not surprising that Origen acknowledges that this view is not readily 
apparent in Scripture. 
Origen seems to use soul for mind when he refers to heretics who hold some 
doctrines “according to the vain and fanciful suggestions of their own soul.”36 Elsewhere, 
in describing his theory of hermeneutics, he adds, “Each one, then, ought to describe in 
his own soul, in a threefold manner, the understanding of the divine letters.”37 
 
The Essence of the Soul 
Origen defines a soul as “a substance φανταστική and ὁρμητική, which may 
be rendered into Latin, although not so appropriately, sensibilis et mobilis.”38 As 
Butterworth notes, this definition is drawn from Aristotle where “the soul of living 
creatures is defined by its two powers, that of discernment, which is a function of thought 
and perception, and that of movement in space.”39 He also writes, “Nor can any rational 
                                                 
35“Magis ista conveniant illis gentibus animarum, quae in caelo isto, quod 
‘transire’ dicitur, habitabant vel etiam nunc habitare putandae sunt.” De principiis 
4.3.10. 
36“Prout eis animae suae fantasia vanitas que suggesserit.” De principiis 4.2.1. 
37“Tripliciter ergo describere oportet in anima sua unumquemque divinarum 
intellegentiam litterarum.” Ibid., 4.2.4. 
38“Definitur namque anima hoc modo, quia sit substantia φανταστική et 
ὁρμητική, quod latine, licet non tam proprie explanetur, dici tamen potest ‘sensibilis et 
mobilis.’” Ibid., 2.8.1. In De oratione 8.2.10 while describing prayer, Origen writes of 
God knowing “the motions in the secret part of our soul” (κατανοοῦντος τὰ ἐν τῷ 
ἀδύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα). 




and sentient being, i.e., a mind or soul, exist without some movement either good or 
bad.”40 
In further defining the soul, Origen concludes that the notion “there are souls in 
all living things . . . is, I suppose, doubted by no one.”41 He notes regarding things that 
move that some “have the cause of motion in themselves, as animals, or trees, and all 
things which are held together by natural life or soul.”42 He notes that when the soul is 
inserted into the body, it “moves all things in it, and exerts its force over everything on 
which it operates.”43 He quotes Gen 1:21 as scriptural support for creatures in the sea and 
Gen 1:24 for land creatures and asserts that without Scripture the same must be true of 
the birds. He quotes Lev 17:14 as support for life being in the blood of living creatures 
and notes that this verse “intimates most clearly that the blood of every animal is its 
life.”44 Origen connects the soul with the heart, also writing that the “soul of all flesh, 
which is synonymous with the governing mind that dwells in the body and is called 
                                                 
40“Nec umquam rationabilis sensus, id est mens vel anima, sine motu aliquo esse 
vel bono vel malo potest.” De principiis 3.3.5. He speaks elsewhere about the movement 
of the soul in regard to sin in In Ieremiam 1.7. 
41“Esse namque animas in singulis quibusque animalibus . . .  a nullo arbitror 
dubitari.” De principiis 2.8.1. 
42“Alia vero in semet ipsis habent movendi causam, ut animalia vel arbores et 
omnia, quae vel per naturalem vitam vel per animam constant.” De principiis 3.1.2. On 
Origen’s idea of animal souls, see Patricia Cox, “Origen and the Bestial Soul: A Poetics 
of Nature,” Vigiliae Christianae 36, no. 2 (1982): 115-140. 
43“Enim anima per omne corpus inserta movet omnia et agit atque operatur 
universa.” De principiis 2.8.5. Note the emphasis placed on this citationg in Karpp, 
Probleme, 186. 
44“In quo evidentissime ‘sanguinem’ omnium animalium ‘animam’ ipsorum esse 
designat.” De principiis 2.8.1. Karpp, Probleme, 186-187; Weiss, 164-165. 
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‘heart.’”45 In regard to those animals that do not have blood, he argues that they have 
another substance that is not red, as the color is not important.  
Origen approvingly quotes Plato’s words, “For the essence, which is both 
colorless and formless, and which cannot be touched, which really exists, is the pilot of 
the soul, and is beheld by the understanding alone; and around it the genus of true 
knowledge holds this place.”46 He supports this notion by quoting Paul’s words in 2 Cor 
4:17-18, “For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, works for us a far more 
exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen, but 
at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things 
which are unseen are eternal.” This is a favorite verse of Origen’s, which he uses multiple 
times to support the notion of the unseen world of the soul outweighing in importance the 
material world of this life. Origen writes that “we, however, who know of only one nature 
in every rational soul, and who maintain that none has been created evil by the Author of 
all things.”47 
 
Powers of the Soul 
Origen suggests that the unconverted soul feels emotions when he writes that the 
soul of one who has received the Holy Spirit “can in no respect be troubled, or admit any 
                                                 
45“πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ‘πάσης σαρκὸς’ (ἥτις ἐστὶν ὁμωνύμως ᾧ ἐγκατοικεῖ 
σώματι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, ὃ καλεῖται καρδία).” De oratione 29.2.11. 
46“Ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως 
οὖσα ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ νῷ μόνῳ θεατή, περὶ ὃν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης 
γένος τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον.” Contra Celsum 6.19.29. See also ibid., 7.32.15 where 






feeling of sorrow; nor is he alarmed by anything.”48 His understanding regarding the soul 
and emotions is further clarified when he writes that “concupiscence and wrath, which 
are in every soul, are necessarily said to be unclean in the sense that they serve to make 
man sin.”49 He notes, however, the concupiscence is necessary to promulgate the human 
species and anger is necessary in order to have discipline and correction.  
This understanding of feelings, especially with that of desire, and their 
relationship to the soul is connected to Origen’s understanding on the infirmities of the 
soul. He writes, “Avarice is one of the worst of its infirmities; pride, anger, boasting, fear, 
inconstancy, timidity, and the like.”50 Elsewhere he adds that “if you wish to see of what 
nature are the sicknesses of the soul, contemplate with me the lovers of money, and the 
lovers of ambition, and the lovers of boys, and if any be fond of women.”51 Speaking of 
one who looks on a woman in lust, he writes, “For his heart touched the vice of lust and 
his soul became defiled.”52 Origen talks of a leprous soul which is one “who is bound by 
                                                 
48“In nullo utique conturbari eius anima poterit aut ullum sensum maeroris 
accipere; nec in aliquo terretur.” De principiis 2.7.4. 
49“Puto quod concupiscentia et ira, quia inest omni animae, necessario istae 
secundum hoc, quod ad peccandum homini famulantur, immundae dicuntur; secundum 
hoc vero, quod neque posteritatis sine concupiscentia successio reparatur neque 
emendatio ulla sine ira potest neque disciplina constare, necessariae et conservandae 
dicuntur.” In Genesim homiliae 2.6. 
50“Sunt enim multi animae ‘languores’: avaritia ‘languor’ eius est, et quidem 
pessimus; superbia, ira, iactantia, formido, inconstantia, pusillanimitas et horum 
similia.” In Numeros homiliae 27.12. 
51“Εἰ δὲ θέλεις ἰδεῖν ποῖά ἐστι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρρωστήματα, κατανόει 
μοι τοὺς φιλαργύρους καὶ τοὺς φιλοδόξους καὶ τοὺς φιλόπαιδας καὶ εἴ τίς 
ἐστι φιλόγυνος.” Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 10.24.1. 
52“Tetigit enim cor eius concupiscentiae vitium et immunda facta est anima eius.” 
In Leuiticum homiliae 3.3. 
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sins.”53 Not every sin is vice, however. He writes, “For not every sin is to be considered a 
sickness, but that which has settled down in the whole soul.”54 He also writes of a “weak 
and sick soul.”55 
As he describes the sicknesses of the soul, Origen also writes of the health of the 
soul. He writes, “For the soul acquires health from the Lord in order to accept toils with 
delight.”56 He also states that one who has taught the way of salvation and enlightened 
and instructed other souls “bestows health” on these souls.57 Origen speaks of the 
“salvation of his soul.”58 He writes of one who heals the soul59 while also noting that Isa 
1:6 “teaches that there are certain wounds of the soul.”60 
                                                 
53“Qui in anima leprosus est, id est qui peccatis confixus est.” In Leuiticum 
homiliae 8.10. 
54“Οὐ πᾶν δὲ ἁμάρτημα νομιστέον ἀρρωστίαν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ 
ἐναπέσκηψεν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ.” Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 10.24.6. 
55“Aegrae atque invalidae non competant animae.” In Numeros homiliae 27.1. 
See also “infirmitas est in anima nostra.” Ibid., 27.1. See also In Leuiticum homiliae, 
12.2, “so understand that the sickness of sin also certainly makes the soul lowly and 
small” (ita intellige quia et animam aegritudo quidem peccati humilem facit et parvam). 
56“Propterea enim et adipiscitur a Deo anima sanitatem, ut labores delectabiliter 
et non invita suscipiat.” In Numeros homiliae 27.12. 
57“Viam Dei ostendit et animae salutem divini Verbi illuminationibus confert.” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 3.187. See also In Ieremiam 17.5.8. Cf. In 
Ieremiam 14.1.11 where prophets are described as “healers of soul” (εἶναι ἰατροὺς 
ψυχῶν). 
58“Animae salutem prodesse iudicabit.” In Numeros homiliae 27.1. Compare later 
his discussion of a dead soul. 
59“πόσῳ πλέον ὁ πολλῶν ψυχὰς θεραπεύσας.” Contra Celsum 1.9.43. See 
also ibid., 1.63.31; 4.15.17. 




Origen sees a connection between the acts of the body and the state of the soul. 
Based upon the command of Lev 16:29 to humble one’s soul and Matt 9:15 where Christ 
says that when the bridegroom is gone, they will fast, Origen argues that one humbles 
their soul by bodily fasting.61 He also notes that “the soul is wounded by the tongue, it is 
wounded also through the thoughts and evil desires, shattered and bruised by the works 
of sin.”62 Elsewhere Origen writes, “Drunkenness of wine is destructive in all things, for 
it is the only thing which weakens the soul along with the body.”63 He does write of those 
who “are taken up from love of pleasure, and from deifying the belly which is treated 
with honor, when it, with its appetites, and not reason, rules our souls.”64 He also writes 
of “the corruptible body which presses heavily on the soul.”65 
He writes, “We train to habits of self-restraint boys just reaching the age of 
puberty, and feeling a desire for sexual pleasures, pointing out to them not only the 
disgrace which attends those sins, but also the state to which the soul of the wicked is 
                                                 
61“Quomodo ‘humiliat’ populus ‘animam’ suam, ipse dicit: ‘venient’ inquit ‘dies, 
cum auferetur ab iis sponsus, et tunc ieiunabunt in illis diebus.’” In Leuiticum homiliae 
9.5. 
62“Vulneratur ergo et per linguam anima, vulneratur et per cogitationes et 
concupiscentias malas, frangitur autem et conteritur per opera peccati.” In Numeros 
homiliae 8.1. 
63“Est ergo ebrietas vini perniciosa in omnibus; sola namque est, quae simul cum 
corpore et animam debilem reddat.” In Leuiticum homiliae 7.1. Origen argues that anger, 
desire, fear, vain suspicion, envy, and spite all inebriate the soul. On Origen’s concept of 
body, see Mark J. Edwards, “Origen No Gnostic, or, On the Corporeality of Man,” 
Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. 43, no. 1 (1992): 31-36. 
64“καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοποιεῖσθαι τιμωμένην τὴν γαστέρα, ὅταν αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ 
κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ὀρέξεις καὶ μὴ ὁ λόγος ἄρχῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν.” Commentarium in 





reduced through practices of that kind, and the judgments which it will suffer, and the 
punishments which will be inflicted.”66 However, Origen also asserts that the essence of 
the soul does not change.67 Concerning wealth and its effect on the soul, he writes, “For 
material wealth ought to be regarded as the ruin of the soul rather than its redemption 
price, unless it should be converted into good works and becomes righteousness and 
mercy and is transformed from material wealth into the wealth of the soul.”68 
In arguing with Celsus regarding the incarnation, Origen writes of those non-
Christians who acknowledge a connection between the rational capabilities of the soul 
and the constitution of the body that it inhabits. He then writes of a soul that “for certain 
mysterious reasons, is not deserving of being placed in the body of a wholly irrational 
being, nor yet in that of one purely rational, but is clothed with a monstrous body.”69 He 
then notes that a good body would allow for more reasoning powers in the soul. The 
argument is that the goodness of one’s body impacts that ability of the soul to act 
rationally. Elsewhere he quotes from Wis 9:15, noting that Scripture teaches that the 
“corruptible body weighs down the soul, and this earthy tent depresses the thoughtful 
                                                 
66“παρατιθέντες οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ 
καὶ ἐν οἷς ἔσται διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡ τῶν φαύλων ψυχή, καὶ οἵας τίσει δίκας καὶ 
ὡς κολασθήσεται.” Contra Celsum 3.56.26. 
67Ibid., 4.18.30. 
68“Nam corporales divitiae pernicies magis animae quam redemptio ejus esse 
credendae sunt, nisis ad bonum opus conversae justitiae et misericordiae fiant, et ex 








The soul is also capable of growth. Origen writes, “For as the understanding of 
the soul grows, it is also furnished with an acquaintance with high things and is given 
judgment by which to cut what is eternal away from what is temporal.”71 However he 
points out that no one should think that “because we call the soul a little child, she is so 
essentially; no, she is such only in that she lacks learning; because she has but small 
understanding and very little skill, do we speak of the soul as little.”72 Origen, in fact, 
writes that “in the first stage of growth false teachings certainly arise in the soul, for it is 
impossible from the beginning that man receive pure and true doctrines.”73 Thus, “every 
soul, therefore, which comes to childhood, and is on the way to full growth, until the 
fullness of time is at hand, needs a tutor and stewards and guardians.”74 Origen uses the 
call of Simon and Andrew as disciples to become fishers of men as a means of discussing 
                                                 
70“Ut ait Scriptura ‘Corruptibile corpus aggravat animam, et demergit terrena 
habitatio sensum multa cogitantem.” Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 3.3.14. See 
also 7.4.10. 
71“Crescente namque intellectu animae et notitia ei excelsorum praebetur et 
iudicium datur, quo sciat a temporalibus aeterna intercidere et a perpetuis caduca 
separare.” In Numeros homiliae 27.12. 
72“Verum quod ‘parvulam’ nominamus animam, nemo ita accipiat, quasi 
secundum substantiam ‘parvula’ dicatur, sed cui deest eruditio et in qua exiguus est 
intellectus ac minima peritia, hanc ‘parvulam’ dicimus animam.” Commentarium in 
Canticum canticorum 2.164. 
73“παραθήσομαι ὅτι κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν ψευδοδοξίαι πάντως 
γίνονται ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ∙ οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἀρχῆθεν ἀληθῆ δόγματα <καὶ> 
καθαρὰ λαβεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον.” In Ieremiam 5.15.4. 
74“Πᾶσα τοίνυν ψυχὴ ἐρχομένη εἰς νηπιότητα καὶ ὁδεύουσα ‘ἐπὶ τὴν 
τελειότητα’ δεῖται, μέχρις ἐνστῇ αὐτῇ ‘τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου’”, 
παιδαγωγοῦ καὶ οἰκονόμων.” Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 10.9.19. 
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the change in the soul that happens when one is caught in the nets of Jesus’ disciples.75 
Origen also speaks of the varying capacity of souls to take the Word of God.76 Here he 
refers to the varying abilities of people to understand the Scripture. 
In referring to the soul’s ability to know, Origen writes, “The soul cannot come to 
the perfection of knowledge otherwise than by inspiration of the truth of the divine 
wisdom.”77 He connects the soul with the place where truth is known. He writes, “It is 
not therefore matter of surprise that the same God should have sown in the hearts of all 
men those truths which He taught by the prophets and the Savior.”78 He writes of 
“uneducated souls” who went astray.79 In commenting on Sir 23:2, he writes, “The whips 
of God whip the thought. For the Word, by guiding the soul to a perception of how it has 
sinned, whips it.”80 Here Origen connects the thoughts of an individual with their soul. 
Regarding the soul’s knowledge of human wisdom, Origen writes, “We maintain, indeed, 
that ‘human’ wisdom is an exercise for the soul, but that ‘divine’ wisdom is the ‘end.’”81 
                                                 
75In Ieremiam 16.1. 
76“Quae Dei verba sunt et in quibus diversus pro captu animarum cibus est, 
unusquisque, prout sanum se et validum sentit, adsumat.” In Numeros homiliae 27.1. 
77“Quia nec aliter potest anima ad scientiae perfectionem venire, nisi divinae 








ἡμαρτημένων μαστιγοῖ.” In Ieremiam 6.2.17. 
81“Καὶ γυμνάσιον μέν φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν, 
τέλος δὲ τὴν θείαν.” Contra Celsum 6.13.11. 
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He writes that God provided “for each person in his soul so that it is endowed with 
reason, so that it can grasp knowledge and exercise its intelligence, and in the body so 
that it has healthy sense faculties?”82 He also speaks of someone who might “instruct and 
enlighten our souls, teach us the way of salvation, and deliver to us the rule of life.”83 
This also demonstrates how easily Origen slips between the soul and the individual in his 
usage. First he says souls and then he switches to the pronoun us. Origen also writes of 
the “the rational soul recognizing, as it were, its relationship (to the divine), at once 
rejects what it for a time supposed to be gods, and resumes its natural love for its 
Creator.”84 He notes in discussing the burial of the body that “it is not right that the 
dwelling-place of the rational soul should be cast aside anywhere without honor.”85 He 
argues that the “reasonable soul” is of far more value than the body86 and describes Christ 
as “the light of those rational souls which are in the sensible world.”87 
                                                 
82“κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἵνα λογικὸς ᾖ, ἵνα ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνῃ, ἵνα 
γυμνάζηται τὸ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἵνα ἔχῃ ἐρρωμένα ‘τὰ 
αἰσθητήρια.’” In Ieremiam 3.2.6. See also 6.3.28 where Origen notes that the Greeks 
also approve of a strong, rational soul. 
83“Si quis, verbi gratia ‘laboret in Verbo’ Dei atque animas nostras instruat et 
illuminet, viam salutis doceat, vivendi ordinem tradat, non tibi videtur et hic ‘proximus’ 
quidem esse, sed multo amplius alio ‘proximo diligendus,’ qui horum nihil gerit?” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 3.187. 
84“Καὶ εὐθέως ὡσπερεὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἐπιγνοῦσα ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ 
ἀπορρίπτει μὲν ἃ τέως ἐδόξαζεν εἶναι θεοὺς φίλτρον δ᾽ ἀναλαμβάνει 
φυσικὸν τὸ πρὸς τὸν κτίσαντα.” Contra Celsum 3.40.15. 
85“ἄξιον γὰρ τὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς οἰκητήριον μὴ παραρριπτεῖν 
ἀτίμως.” Ibid., 8.30.30. 
86“ψυχὴν γὰρ παντὸς σώματος καὶ μάλιστα τὴν λογικήν φαμεν εἶναι 
πρᾶγμα τιμιώτερον.” Contra Celsum 8.49.24. 
87“λέγω δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ κόσμῳ.” 
Commentarii in evangelium Joaniis 1.25.161. 
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Virtue is important in driving sin from the soul. Origen writes, “For virtue, taking 
up her abode in the souls of these persons, and expelling the wickedness which had 
previous possession of them, produces an oblivion of the past.”88 Origen does allow, 
though, that “although virtue does not effect an entrance, yet if a considerable progress 
take place in the soul, even that is sufficient.”89 Similarly he writes of those who go 
around and speak flattery and deception and that by doing so they fail to instill virtue in 
souls through God’s word.90 
When a person is not sincere, Origen writes of that person having an “insincere 
soul”91 and of a “proud and stubborn and false soul.”92 He also writes of a “contrite 
soul.”93 He writes that “unless a man has first ascertained the defects of his life, and the 
evil nature of his sins, and made this known by confession from his own lips, he cannot 
be cleansed or acquitted, lest he should be ignorant that what he possesses has been 
bestowed on him by favor, . . . which idea undoubtedly generates arrogance of mind and 
                                                 
88“Ἀμνηστίαν γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις δίδωσιν ἀρετή, ἐπιδημοῦσα αὐτῶν 




ἐξαφανίσαι τὴν τῆς κακίας χύσιν.” Ibid., 3.71.18. 
90“Inde est unde nonnulli circumeunt domos loquentes ad gratiam cum omni 
adulatione et deceptione, non ut in verbo Dei aedificent animas ad virtutem, sed ut 
adulatoriis dulcibusque sermonibus permanere.” Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 
10.35.2. 
91“Ὅρα οὖν τὸ νόθον αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆσ.” Contra Celsum 1.8.17. 
92“Superbam namque et contumacem animam.” In Leuiticum homiliae 6.2. 
93“Sed in anima contribulata.” In Leuiticum homiliae 4.5. 
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pride, and finally becomes the cause of the individual’s ruin.”94 In commenting on Judas, 
he writes that he “neither opposed Him [Christ] with his whole soul, nor yet with his 
whole soul preserved the respect due by a pupil to his teacher.”95 He includes Celsus 
among the “ignorant souls.”96 
 
The Corporeal and the Soul 
Origen refers to the hands of the soul when he writes, “Let us stretch out our 
hands, alike of body and soul, to God; that the Lord . . . may by His power bestow the 
word also on us.”97 He notes that this is because one will find in Scripture that “the names 
of the members of the body transferred to those of the soul; or rather the faculties and 
powers of the soul are to be called its members.”98 In this context he refers to the eyes, 
ears, head, hand, foot, and womb of the soul. He concludes that all these references must 
“be referred to the parts and powers of the invisible soul.”99 Origen notes that by studying 
                                                 
94“Ita et si qui non prius animae suae vitia et peccatorum suorum cognoverit mala 
ac proprii oris confessione prodiderit . . . quae res sine dubio arrogantiam rursus animae 
generat et elationem, et denuo ei causa fiet ruinae.” De principiis 3.1.12. 
95“ὅλῃ ψυχῇ γέγονε κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐδ᾽ ὅλῃ ψυχῇ ἐτήρησε τὴν αἰδὼ πρὸς 
διδάσκαλον φοιτητοῦ.” Contra Celsum 2.11.7. 
96“ἀπαίδευτοι … ψυχαί.” Ibid., 6.79.41. 
97“Tam corporis quam animae nostrae palmas protendamus ad Deum, ut 
Dominus, … donet et nobis in ‘virtute’ sua ‘verbum.’” Commentarium in Canticum 
canticorum prol. 
98“Ita invenies etiam membrorum nomina corporalium transferri ad animae 
membra, seu potius efficientiae haec animae affectus que dicendi sunt.” Ibid. 
99“Ex quibus evidenter ostenditur membrorum haec nomina nequaquam corpori 
visibili aptari posse, sed ad invisibilis animae partes virtutes que debere revocari.” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum prol. On the eyes of the soul, see also Contra 
Celsum 6.67.15. Cf. Eph 1:18. Thus, in Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 11.8.60 




“all the several powers of the bodily senses according to their kind and the corresponding 
powers of the soul” one will “clearly perceive what training should be undertaken in each 
case.”100 Origen notes that “Christ is said to become each of these things [senses] to suit 
the several sense of the soul.”101 He notes that “He is called the true Light, therefore, so 
that the soul’s eyes may have something to lighten them. He is the Word, so that her ears 
may have something to hear. Again, He is the Bread of life, so that the soul’s palate may 
have something to taste.”102 To this Origen adds that Christ is a fragrance to be smelled 
and the flesh to be “felt and handled . . . so that the hand of the interior soul may touch 
concerning the Word of life.”103 He writes of one who “injured the eye of the soul, that is, 
if he disturbed its understanding.”104 He describes the disciples as having “higher organs 
of hearing than they who heard them [parables] without explanation, so was it altogether 
                                                 
100“Consequenter etiam de auditu et gustu et odoratu tactu que per singulas 
quasque sui generis virtutes sensuum corporalium referens ad animae sensus, quae in 
singulis adhiberi debeant exercitia quae ve emendatio parari, dilucide recognosces.” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 1.105. Cf. In Exodum homiliae 10.2 where 
Origen states that the senses or functions of the soul and body have the same name; 
Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 9.36.3. 
101“Singulis quibusque sensibus animae singula quaeque Christus efficitur.” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 2.167. Cf. 3.180. 
102“Idcirco enim et ‘verum lumen’ dicitur, ut habeant oculi animae, quo 
illuminentur; idcirco et ‘verbum’, ut habeant aures, quod audiant; idcirco et ‘panis 
vitae’, ut habeat gustus animae, quod gustet.” Ibid., 2.167. Cf. In Leuiticum homiliae 5.7. 
See also Eph 1:18. 
103“Idcirco et palpabilis ac manu contractabilis et ‘Verbum caro factum’ dicitur, 
ut possit interioris animae manus contingere de Verbo vitae.” Commentarium in 
Canticum canticorum 2.167. 
104“Ponat etiam ‘oculum pro oculo’: si oculum laesit animae, id est intellectum 
eius turbavit.” In Exodum homiliae 10.4. Cf. Contra Celsum 4.31.20 where Origen notes 




the same with the eyes of their soul.”105 He uses “eye of the soul” in a description of an 
extraordinary perceptive power when he writes, “I maintain, moreover, that even after 
His incarnation, He is always found by those who possess the acutest eye of the soul to be 
most God-like.”106 
Origen also writes of one who is “an adulterer of the soul,”107 demonstrating his 
penchant for interpreting the physical world in its relation to the spiritual world. Another 
example of this is his interpretation of Christ’s command not to cause a little one to 
stumble. Origen interprets this with a view towards little souls.108 This argument is laid 
out in detail in Dialogue with Heraclides, listing each of the bodily senses, where it is 
used to support Origen’s argument that the soul is immaterial, arguing against the implied 
physical nature of the soul in Lev 17:11.109 Here Origen even writes of the blood of the 
soul.110 Origen clearly argues for a metaphorical understanding of the physical properties 
of the soul. 
In a similar line of argument, Origen describes the Mosaic food laws as “symbols 
                                                 
105“οὕτως καὶ ταῖς ὄψεσι πάντως μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 2.64.26. ibid., 
Contra Celsum 2.72.21. 
106“Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ὅτι καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν ἀεὶ εὑρίσκεται τοῖς 
ἔχουσιν ὀφθαλμοὺς ψυχῆς ὀξυδερκεστάτους θεοπρεπέστατος.” Ibid., 3.14.15. 
See also Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 8.8.6. For a more extended usage of the 
eye of the soul in an argument against Celsus, see Contra Celsum 7.39. 
107“μοιχός ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς.” Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 12.4.44. 
108Ibid., 13.26. 
109Dialogus cum Heraclide 16.20-24-15. 
110“ὡς ἐκχεῖται τὸ αἷμα καὶ ἡ δύναμις ἡ ζωτικὴ τῆς ψυχῆς.” Dialogus cum 




of the things which will maintain and strengthen our souls there.”111 He also writes of the 
different foods for the different dispositions of souls.112 He describes the appropriate 
disposition of the soul at prayer by quoting 1 Tim 2:8 that one should pray “without anger 
or quarreling.”113 The bodily senses are also described by Origen as the means through 
which death can come to the soul. If the eyes of a sinner should look on a woman to lust 
after her; . . . then death has gained entrance to the soul.”114 He notes that a similar thing 
can take place with the hearing.115 Origen quotes 2 Cor 4:18, “For the things which are 
seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal,” in support of his notion 
that the soul must seek for the unseen and invisible.116 While allowing that the soul can 
be accessed for good or evil through the senses, he calls these things as “certain analogies 
and tokens and images of visible things.”117 Another example of how easily Origen slips 
                                                 
111“σύμβολα τῶν ἐκεῖ μελλόντων τρέφειν καὶ ἰσχυροποιεῖν ἡμῶν τὴν 
ψυχὴν τυγχάνοντα, θεωρεῖν.” Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 10.15.85. 
112Ibid., 13.203-217. 
113De oratione 31.1. 
114“Si oculi peccatoris ‘videant mulierem ad concupiscendum’; et quoniam ‘qui’ 
ita ‘viderit mulierem, moechatus est eam in corde suo’, sic ‘mors’ ingressa est ad 
animam ‘per fenestras’ oculorum.” Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 3.219. Cf. In 
Exodum homiliae 10.4. 
115“Sed et cum recipit quis auditum vanum et praecipue falsae scientiae 
dogmatum perversorum, tunc ‘mors per’ aurium ‘fenestras’ intrat ad animam.” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 3.219. See also Contral Celsum 2.48.38. 
116Norris notes that thus for Origen, “the Apostle agrees with Plato in 
distinguishing two kinds of existence, Being and and Becoming.” Norris, 141. 
117“Sed per exempla quaedam et indicia atque imagines rerum visibilium illa, 
quae sunt invisibilia et incorporea, contemplatur.” Commentarium in Canticum 
canticorum 3.220. Cf. In Exodum homiliae 10.4; Contra Celsum 3.47.15. Altmann notes 
the Platonic notion of the sensible world being the images of the invisible forms. 
Alexander Altmann, “Homo Imago Dei in Jewish and Christian Theology,” Journal of 
Religion 48 (1968): 235-259. 
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back and forth between the physical and soulish sense is when he writes, “The voice of 
the soul is sweet when it utters the word of God, when it expounds the faith and the 
doctrines of the truth, when it unfolds God’s dealings and His judgments.”118 Here 
Origen seems to mean the actual physical voice of an individual rather than a 
metaphorical understanding of the voice of the soul. He also writes of a sleep of the soul, 
referring to a lethargy of the soul in doing the things of God.119 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Origen begins his De principiis by giving several concepts regarding the soul that 
are part of the apostolic teaching of the Church. First he declares that the soul has its own 
substance and life. He writes, “The apostolic teaching is that the soul, having a substance 
and life of its own . . .”120 This is followed by a statement regarding the future judgment 
of all souls, which suggests also the doctrine of the continued existence of the soul. He 
writes, “After its [soul] departure from the world, [it will] be rewarded according to its 
deserts.”121 He adds that the soul is a free agent; “every rational soul is possessed of free-
will and volition.”122 He then states that the Church does not have a clear concept of the 
derivation of the soul. “But with respect to the soul, whether it is derived from the seed 
                                                 
118“‘Suavis’ autem est ‘vox’ animae, cum verbum Dei loquitur, cum de fide et 
dogmatibus veritatis exponit, cum dispensationes Dei et iudicia eius explanat.” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 4.232. 
119Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 9.32.2. 
120“Anima substantiam vitam que habens propriam.” De principiis 1.praef.5. 
121“Cum ex hoc mundo discesserit, pro suis meritis dispensabitur.” De principiis 
1.praef.5. 
122“Omnem animam rationabilem esse liberi arbitrii et voluntatis.” Ibid. See also 
In Numeros homiliae 20.3; In Genesim homiliae 16.2. 
 
252 
by a process of traducianism, so that the reason or substance of it may be considered as 
placed in the seminal particles of the body themselves, or whether it has any other 
beginning; and this beginning, itself, whether it be by birth or not, or whether bestowed 
upon the body from without or not, is not distinguished with sufficient clearness in the 
teaching of the Church.”123 He concludes by suggesting that the nature of the soul needs 
to be investigated similarly as the nature of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit, in respect to 
their corporality or lack thereof.124 
 
Origins of the Soul 
Origen notes that Christians “have been instructed before now that the human soul 
was created in the image of God.”125 In his argument with Celsus, Origen asserts that that 
part of man which has been created after the image of God “consists in a nature which 
never had nor no longer has ‘the old man with his deeds.’”126 Origen asserts that one 
                                                 
123“De anima vero utrum ex seminis traduce ducatur, ita ut ratio ipsius vel 
substantia inserta ipsis corporalibus seminibus habeatur, an vero aliud habeat initium, et 
hoc ipsum initium si genitum est aut non genitum, vel certe si extrinsecus corpori inditur, 
necne: non satis manifesta praedicatione distinguitur.” De principiis 1.praef.5. 
124“Corporeus et secundum aliquem habitum deformatus…. Eadem quoque etiam 
de Christo et de sancto spiritu requirenda sunt, sed et de omni anima atque omni 
rationabili natura nihilominus requirendum est.” Ibid., 1.praef.9. 
125“προκατειληφότες τὸ ‘κατ᾽ εἰκόνα’ γεγονέναι θεοῦ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην 
ψυχὴν.” Contra Celsum 4.83.45. Cf. Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 9.4.1; 
Dialogus cum Heraclide 23.2. See also In Ieremiam 2.1.17 where Origen assures the 
reader that Gen 1:26 applies to all, not only Adam. On the soul and the image in Origen, 
see Altmann, 246-247; Pierre, 50-54. For a discussion on the distinction in Origen 
between image and likeness, see Telepneff, 183-184; R. M. Wilson, “The Early Exegesis 
of Gen. 1.26,” Studia Patristica II pt. I (1957): 436. For a helpful discussion of Origen’s 
understanding of the “beginning” in time of the soul, see Norris, 149-152. On the notion 
of humanity and the image of God in Origen, see Henri Crouzel, Théologie de l’image de 
Dieu chez Origène (Paris: Aubier, 1956). 
126“ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἢ μὴ ἐσχηκυίᾳ ἢ μηκέτι ἐχούσῃ ψυχῇ ‘τὸν παλαιὸν 
ἄνθρωπον σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτοῦ.’” Contra Celsum 6.63.10. 
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created after the image of God receives “into his virtuous soul the traits of God’s 
image.”127 The soul is from God, being breathed into Adam.128 It is the soul which is in 
the image of God, not the body.129 Elsewhere he writes, “For the soul that was created in 
the image of God is more precious than any body.”130 He adds later, “We hold the 
resemblance to God to be preserved in the reasonable soul, which is formed to virtue.”131 
However the soul does not exist without the body.132 
Origen argues that souls are not co-eternal with God or unbegotten.133 He writes, 
“All souls and all rational natures, whether holy or wicked, were formed or created, and 
all these, according to their proper nature, are incorporeal; but although incorporeal, they 
were nevertheless created.”134 In this context, Origen counts souls and rational creatures 
                                                 
127“ἀναλαμβάνει εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐνάρετον ψυχὴν τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τοῦ 
θεοῦ.” Ibid., 6.63.32. See also 8.49.26. 
128De principiis 2.8.1. 
129See Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 78. 
For a discussion on the distinction between the higher soul or nous and the soul see Henri 
Crouzel, “L’image de Dieu dans la théologie d’Origène,” Studia Patristica 2 pt. II 
(1957): 198; Telepneff, 181. 
130“ἡ γὰρ ‘κατ᾽ εἰκόνα θεοῦ’ δεδημιουργημένη τιμιωτέρα ἐστὶ πάντων 
σωμάτων.” Exhortatio ad martyrium 12.41. 
131“ὅτι τὸ ‘κατ᾽ εἰκόνα θεοῦ’ ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ, τῇ ποιᾷ κατ᾽ ἀρετήν.” 
Contra Celsum 7.66.27. See also Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 9.4.1-5.1. On 
the relationship between the soul and God, see Daniélou, Origen, 296.  
132Lothar Lies, “Origenes und Reinkarnation,” Zeitschrift für katholische 
Theologie 121, no. 3 (1999): 252-255. 
133“Quae non ab eo hoc ipsum ut esset acceperit . . . de ingenitis animabus.” De 
principiis 1.3.3. 
134“Omnes animae atque omnes rationabiles naturae factae sunt vel creatae, sive 
sanctae illae sint, sive nequam; quae omnes secundum propriam naturam incorporeae 
sunt, sed et per hoc ipsum, quod incorporeae sunt, nihilominus factae sunt.” Ibid., 1.7.1. 




as being humans and other incorporeal beings such as angels and demons and asserts that 
their rational nature is the same.135 As Christ also had a soul, Origen writes concerning it, 
“In this soul the divine fire itself must be believed to have rested, from which some 
warmth may have passed to others.”136 
 
Non-human Souls 
Here it is helpful to discuss Origen’s ideas relating to the stars and planets.137 
Origen asserts that they have souls.138 He writes that the “soul of the sun is in a body too, 
as is true also of all creation.”139 He notes on the basis of Job 25:5 that they are unclean, 
which implies that they can change from good to bad. He also quotes Isa 45:12, noting 
that they receive communication from God and thus must be rational. He questions 
“whether their souls came into existence at the same time with their bodies, or seem to be 
anterior to them.”140 He admits that this is difficult to prove from Scripture and admits to 
                                                 
David Bostock, “Quality and Corporeity in Origen,” in Origeniana Secunda, ed. Henri 
Crouzel et al. (Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1980), 323-324; Henri Crouzel, Origen, 
trans. A. S. Worrall (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989), 94; Pierre, 44. Both Crouzel 
and Pierre note that, strictly speaking, only God is incorporeal and thus the soul is always 
in need of a body, whether ethereal or earthly. 
135Cf. De principiis 1.8.2; 4. For the nature of Christ’s soul, see ibid., 2.6.3. 
136“In hac autem anima ignis ipse divinus substantialiter requievisse credendus 
est, ex quo ad ceteros calor aliquis venerit.” Ibid., 2.6.6. 
137For a study on the history of this notion in prior schools of thought, see Alan B. 
Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea, Oxford Early Christian 
Studies, ed. Henry Chadwick et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 3-110. 
138For an example of how Origen connects this with prayer, see De oratione 7.1-
20. 
139“καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐν σώματι καὶ πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις.” Commentarii 
in evangelium Joannis 1.17.98.5. 




do otherwise is mere conjecture. To attempt to provide an answer, however, Origen turns 
to the several verses in the Bible which speak of the infant in the womb doing 
something.141 Thus Jacob supplanted his brother in the womb, John leapt when Elizabeth 
heard Mary’s voice, and Jeremiah was known by God before he was created in the 
womb. Origen urges that because God cannot be unjust, God can only know someone 
before the body is formed by knowing that soul in some preexistent time. Origen thus 
argues that since stars are also souls, their soul must also have preexisted. As he has 
introduced this concept of prior existence and fall, Origen needs to make it clear that he 
does not support the concept of a rational soul falling so far as to be an irrational animal. 
He writes that one should not believe “that souls descend to such a pitch of abasement 
that they forget their rational nature and dignity, and sink into the condition of irrational 
animals.”142 
Another argument Origen uses is that the stars move orderly. “It manifestly 
follows from this, that neither can the movement of that body take place without a soul, 
nor can living things be at any time without motion.”143 He refers to Jer 7:18 where the 
                                                 
corporibus videantur.” De principiis 1.7.3. 
141Ibid., 1.7.4. See also Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 2.30.181 where 
Origen states that one “must admit that John’s soul, being older than his body and 
subsisting prior to it” (Τῷ γὰρ τηροῦντι τὸ μηδὲν ἀδίκως μηδὲ κατὰ συντυχίαν ἢ 
ἀποκλήρωσιν ποιεῖν ἀναγκαῖον παραδέξασθαι πρεσβυτέραν οὖσαν τὴν 
Ἰωάννου ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος). Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 2.30.181. 
142“Id est quod animae in tantum sui decessum veniant, ut naturae rationabilis ac 
dignitatis oblitae etiam in ordinem inrationabilium animantium vel bestiarum vel 
pecudum devolvantur.” De principiis 1.8.4. 
143“Neque motus ullius corporis sine anima effici potest, neque quae animantia 
sunt, possunt aliquando esse sine motu.” Ibid., 1.7.3. 
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prophet refers to the moon as the queen of heaven144 as scriptural support for this idea. 
For additional proof, Origen notes Paul’s conception of the creature and creation being 
made subject to vanity unwillingly and hoping for deliverance from corruption.145 He 
writes, “‘Because the creature was subjected to vanity, not willingly, but because of Him 
who subjected the same in hope’; so that both sun, and moon, and stars, and angels might 
discharge their duty to the world, and to those souls which, on account of their excessive 
mental defects, stood in need of bodies of a grosser and more solid nature.”146 
Origen uses Lev 4:27-28 in support of the concept that souls exist other than those 
of humans on earth. He notes that it would not have read “If one soul from among the 
people of the land” if the corollary concept of souls not of the people of the land was also 
understood.147 
Origen also discusses the divine soul as found in God and Christ. He quotes Lev 
17:10 and Isa 1:13-14 to support the notion that God has a soul. He then adds, “It is 
difficult indeed both to feel and to state how that which is called in Scripture the soul of 
God is to be understood; for we acknowledge that nature to be simple, and without any 
intermixture or addition.”148 Elsewhere he writes in regard to the question of the soul of 
                                                 
144Ibid. 
145Ibid., 1.7.5. 
146“‘Vanitati quippe creatura subiecta est non volens, sed propter eum, qui 
subiecit in spe,’ quo vel sol vel luna vel stellae vel angeli dei explerent obsequium 
mundo; et his animabus, quae ob nimios defectus mentis suae crassioribus istis et 
solidioribus indiguere corporibus.” Ibid., 3.5.4. 
147“Quod vero in hoc loco addidit, ‘anima’ dicens ‘si peccaverit ex populo 
terrae,’ non mihi videtur otiosum.” In Leuiticum homiliae 2.5. 
148“‘Dei anima’ . . . enim simplicem illam naturam et absque ullius adiectionis 
permixtione profitemur.” De principiis 2.8.2. 
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God, “That as with respect to everything corporeal which is spoken of God, such as 
fingers, or hands, or arms, or eyes, or feet, or mouth, we say that these are not to be 
understood as human members, but that certain of His powers are indicated by these 
names of members of the body; so also we are to suppose that it is something else which 
is pointed out by this title—soul of God.”149 A further possible interpretation is that it 
should be understood as the incarnate Christ.150 Origen does not seem to use the 
description of the divine soul as simple and without intermixture or addition further as he 
immediately goes back to the previous statement regarding “sensible and moveable” in 
describing the souls of angels, concerning whom he had already stated that there is no 
Scripture which can be used to support the notion that they “either possess souls or are 
called souls, and yet they are felt by very many persons to be endowed with life.”151 It is 
possible Origen introduced the “simple” concept to avoid applying the “sensible and 
moveable” to God. 
Origen quotes Ps 22:19-20 for support that Christ has a soul. He writes, “For as 
He truly possessed flesh, so also He truly possessed a soul.”152 He notes elsewhere that 
                                                 
149“Quia sicut omnia, quae corporaliter de deo dicuntur . . . ita et esse aliquid 
aliud putandum est, quod appellatione hac, quae ‘anima dei’ dicitur, indicatur.” Ibid., 
2.8.5. 
150“Potest fortasse ‘anima dei’ intellegi unigenitus filius eius.” Ibid. See also In 
Leuiticum homiliae 16.7. 
151“Vel animas habere vel animae dicantur; animantia tamen esse a quam 
plurimis sentiuntur.” De principiis 2.8.1. Cf. Contra Celsum 3.37.33 where angels and 
demons are said to be souls that exist apart from the body (οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἔξω 
σωμάτων ψυχαῖς καὶ ἀγγέλοις καὶ δαίμοσί τινες). 
152“Sicut enim vere carnem habuit, ita vere et animam habuit.” De principiis 
2.8.2. Cf. Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 3.8.3-7, 9 for a discussion on the 
relationship of the soul of Christ to the Word of God. On the difficulties of Origen’s 
teaching on Christ’s soul, see Alain le Boulluec, “Controverses au sujet de la doctrine 




this soul resembled “our souls indeed in nature, but in will and power resembling 
Himself.”153 He also states that Christ’s soul went to Hades at His death.154 He quotes Ps 
22:9-11 for support of this idea. “Now, that He had a soul, is most clearly shown by the 
Savior in the Gospels, when He said, ‘No man takes my life from me, but I lay it down of 
myself.’”155 Here he quoted John 10:18 and he also adds similar statements from Matt 
26:38 and John 12:27 regarding the sorrow of soul which Christ experienced. Origen is 
clear that the “‘Word’ of God is not to be understood to be a ‘sorrowful and troubled’ 
soul” and that he does not hold “that the Son of God was in that soul [Christ’s] as he was 
in the soul of Paul or Peter and the other saints, in whom Christ is believed to speak.”156 
As further support, he alludes to Job 15:14, asserting that no one person is clean, even 
those only born for one day.157 
Origen states that a human person cannot beget a soul. He writes, “I do not think 
that any man can beget a soul unless, perhaps, he be someone like” the apostle Paul.158 
                                                 
Tyrolia, 1987). 
153“Sed et animam, nostrarum quidem animarum similem per naturam, proposito 
vero et virtute similem sibi.” De principiis 4.4.4. 
154“ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾅδου.” Dialogus cum Heraclide 7.17. 
155“Quod autem habuerit animam, manifestissime in evangeliis designat ipse 
salvator dicens: ‘Nemo tollit a me animam meam, sed ego pono eam abs me.’” De 
principiis 4.4.4. 
156“Neque enim ‘tristis’ et ‘turbata’ ‘anima’ verbum dei intellegendum est . . . Nec 
tamen ita dicimus fuisse filium dei in illa anima, sicut fuit in anima Pauli vel Petri 
ceterorum que sanctorum” Ibid. 
157Ibid. 
158“Ego non puto quod quilibet hominum possit animam gignere, nisi si qui forte 
talis sit, qualis ille, qui dicebat: ‘nam etsi multa milia paedagogorum habeatis in Christo, 
sed non multos patres.’” In Exodum homiliae 1.3. 
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To defend this notion, Origen cites 1 Cor 4:15 and Gal 4:19; in both places, Paul is 
describing himself in fatherly terms to those whom he brought to Christ. He also quotes 
Adam’s words regarding Eve being bone of his bone, noting that “he does not add . . . 
‘and soul of my soul.’”159 Elsewhere, however, Origen, in writing of Mary, the mother of 
Jesus, describes her as “that soul which had conceived him of the Holy Spirit.”160 Though 
Origen argues that no one can give birth to a soul, yet, on the basis of Ps 51:5, he notes 
that still yet, the soul is born impure, “polluted by the filth ‘of iniquity and sin.’”161 
 
The Human Person and the Soul 
Origen conceives of the human person being composed of body and soul.162 He 
writes that “our one body is provided with many members, and is held together by one 
soul.”163 He also notes that “it is then clearly established, by many proofs, that . . . the 
soul of man exists in this body.”164 He also states that “every soul in this life is shadowed 
                                                 
159“Nec tamen addit: et anima de anima mea.” Ibid. 
160“ τὴν συνειληφυῖαν αὐτὸν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος.” 
Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 10.8.38. 
161“Ostendens quod quaecumque anima in carne nascitur, ‘iniquitatis et peccati’ 
sorde polluitur.” In Leuiticum homiliae 8.3. 
162“Nos homines animal sumus compositum ex corporis animae que concursu.” 
De principiis 1.1.6. For a study of Origen’s tripartite and dipartite anthropology, see 
Henri Crouzel, “L’anthropologie d’Origène dans la perspective du combat spirituel,” 
Revue d’ascétique et de mystique 31 (1955): 364-385; Lawrence R. Hennessey, “Origen 
of Alexandria: The Fate of the Soul and the Body after Death,” Second Century 8, no. 3 
(1991): 164-173. 
163“Sed ‘sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris’ aptum est et ab una 
anima continetur.” De principiis 2.1.3. In this context, Origen suggests that the soul/body 
relationship can be used to describe God’s relationship to the created world. 
164“Manifeste ergo et ex multis indiciis demonstratur quod humana anima, dum in 
hoc corpore est.” De principiis 3.3.4. 
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by the covering of this gross body.”165 He states that the soul “vivifies and moves the 
body.”166 The body, he writes, was “to help and to minister to the soul.”167 He does use 
the tripartite formulae “body, and soul, and spirit”168 and is clear that the soul is distinct 
and different from the spirit. He also writes of “human beings, who are composed of soul 
and body and vital spirit.”169 
Quoting 1 Thess 5:23, he writes that “the human being is a composite. For the 
                                                 
165“Omnis anima in hac vita velamento crassi huius corporis obumbratur.” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 3.183. 
166“ἐπείπερ ὥσπερ ψυχὴ ζῳοποιεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα.” Contra Celsum 
6.48.17. 
167“Corpus hoc meum ‘iumentum’ est; ad adiumentum enim animae et ad 
ministerium datum est.” Homiliae in librum Iudicum 6.5. 
168“Sicut ergo homo constare dicitur ex corpore et anima et spiritu.” De principiis 
4.2.4. Cf. Contra Celsum 2.51.40, De principiis 1.8.3; 2.6.5 2.8.4; 3.4.2; Commentarii in 
epistulam ad Romanos 1.5.3; 1.10.2; 1.18.5; 6.1.5; Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 
32.18. See also De oratione 24.2.6 where Origen talks of Paul’s soul, mind, and body 
(οἷόν ἐστι τὶς ἰδία ποιότης Παύλου τοῦ ἀποστόλου, ἡ μέν τις τῆς ψυχῆς, καθ᾽ 
ἣν τοιάδε ἐστὶν, ἡ δέ τις τοῦ νοῦ, καθ᾽ ἣν τοιῶνδέ ἐστι θεωρητικὸς, ἡ δέ τις 
τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, καθ᾽ ἣν τοιόνδε ἐστί). It should be noted that Origen needs the 
tripartite formula in this situation because he applies its three-fold structure to his 
hermeneutics of Scripture. On this, see Marguerite Harl, Origèn: Philocalie, 1-20: Sur 
Les Écritures, Sources Chrétiennes 302 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1983), 103-118; Toshio 
Mikoda, “Egemonikon in the Soul,” in Origeniana Sexta, ed. Gilles Dorival et al. 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995), 459; Antonia Tripolitis, Origen: A Critical 
Reading (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 37-39. It has been described as more functional 
rather than purely ontological. See additionally H. Urs von Balthasar, Origen: Spirit and 
Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings (Washington, DC: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 1984), 46; Crouzel, “L’anthropologie d’Origène: de l’arche au telos,” 
in Arché e Telos: L’antropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa:  Analisi storico-
religiosa (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1981), 37-49; T. Heither, Translatio Religionis: Die 
Paulusdeutung des Origenes in seinem Kommentar zum Römerbreif, Bonner Beiträge zur 
Kirchengeschichte 16 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1990), 198; Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man 
according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 84-85. On the contrast between Plato and Origen on 
this point, see Crouzel, Origen, 87-92. 




Apostle says: May God sanctify your spirit and your soul and your body . . . and may 
your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless.”170 He writes that “he can 
demonstrate through countless Scriptures that the spirit is different from the soul.”171 He 
interprets Ps 44:25, “Our soul has been brought down to the dust” as referring to the body 
not the soul.172 This, he writes, is because “the soul was fashioned into the body of 
sin.”173 “The soul is a mean, as it were, between the flesh and the Spirit.”174 From this 
idea, Origen suggests that it can move either to join the flesh or it can move to join the 
spirit. This relates in some ways to his notion of the soul having either the devil or Christ 
as its master. 
Origen insists that the soul has a separate existence from the body. He writes of 
the word of God which “cuts through, if I may speak in this way, the harmful friendship 
of soul and body.”175 He urges the one facing martyrdom to show “they love Him with all 
their soul by despising so far as they are able their earthen vessel.”176 In arguing with 
                                                 
170“Φησὶν γὰρ ὁ ἀπόστολος∙ ‘Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἁγιάσαι ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ 
ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα∙’ τὸ δὲ ‘Ἁγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὁλοτελεῖς, καὶ ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ 
πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμέμπτως.” Dialogus cum Heraclide 6.23 
171“διὰ μυρίων δυνάμενος ἀποδεικνύναι γραφῶν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ 
πνεῦμα τῆς ψυχῆς.” Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 6.11.66.9. 
172Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 5.9.10. 
173“Pro hoc ipso quod in porpore peccati et corpore mortis atque humilitatis 
effecta sit.” Ibid., 5.9.11. 
174“Unde apparet mediam quodammodo esse animam inter carnem et spiritum.” 
Ibid., 6.1.5. 
175“καὶ διακόπτων τήν, ἵν᾽ οὕτως εἴπω, ἐπιβλαβῆ φιλίαν ψυχῆς καὶ 
σώματος.” Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 1.32.229.8. 
176“διὰ τοῦ καταπεφρονηκέναι τοῦ ὀστρακίνου σκεύους 
ἐπιδειξαμένους τὴν ὅλῃ ψυχῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀγάπην.” Exhortatio ad martyrium 
2.22. See also Exhortatio ad martyrium 3.1. 
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Celsus, he speaks of “the necessary doctrine, that the soul of the dead exists in a separate 
state (from the body); and he who adopts such an opinion does not believe without good 
reason in the immortality, or at least in the continued existence, of the soul, as even Plato 
says.”177 In discussing prayer, Origen writes that “the soul is lifted up and following the 
Spirit is separated from the body.”178 Origen attempts to use Ps 25:1 to support this 
notion that “since it is by putting away its existence that the soul becomes spiritual.”179 
 
Free-Will and the Soul 
Origen describes the soul as being “actuated by freedom of will, and maintaining 
either their advance or retrogression according to the power of their will.”180 He writes, in 
comparing the soul of Christ to that of humans, that “the power of choosing good and evil 
is within the reach of all.”181 This notion must be balanced with his understanding that the 






χωριζομένη.” De oratione 9.2.16. 
179“πῶς οὐχὶ ἤδη ἀποτιθεμένη τὸ εἶναι ψυχὴ πνευματικὴ γίνεται.” Ibid., 
9.2.19. 
180“Libertate aguntur animae et vel profectus suos vel decessus pro voluntatis 
suae sustinent potestate.” De principiis 2.3.4. Cf. Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 
1.18.9; 6.9.10. This concept connects with his notion that the soul is intermediate 
between the spirit and the flesh and must move towards one or the other. It also explains 
Origen’s theodicy and the prior existence of souls. Chadwick writes, “Origen must assert 
the pre-existence of souls because he must explain the diversity of human fortune in this 
world as a consequence of choices freely made by souls before their incarnation here.” 
Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, 
Clement, and Origen, 115. Cf. Daniélou, Origen, 209-217. 
181“Boni mali que eligendi facultas omnibus praesto est.” De principiis 2.6.5. Cf. 
In Genesim homiliae 1.15. 
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soul always has a ruler. He writes, “So then, it is impossible that a soul exists at any time 
without having a ruler.”182 Here he relies on Rom 6:12 and Matt 11:30, asserting that one 
must choose either Christ or the devil. He notes that “a soul is always in possession of 
free-will, as well when it is in the body as when it is without it.”183 Origen gives a 
mystical interpretation of a biblical verse for support of this concept. In commenting on 
Song of Solomon 2:13 he writes, “And I think it is not without reason that He says “their 
sweet smell,” and not a sweet smell: it was to show that there is in every soul a potential 
force and a freedom of the will, by means of which it has the power to all things good.”184 
Elsewhere he writes, “The soul in us has opportunities and the freedom of choice to be 
either great or small.”185 In defending this notion, Origen quotes Deut 30:15, “See, I have 
set before you life and death,” and from Sir 15:16-17, “fire and water.” 
In this context, it is sometimes difficult to determine where the power of choice 
lies, in the soul or elsewhere? For example, Origen writes, “There is one nature for all 
rational beings, the choice of each—the liberty of the impulse of each is distributed 
equally—when summoned by the power of choice, and by guiding the soul subjected to 
them either toward virtue or toward evil desire, creates the species of a good tree or an 
                                                 
182“Non ergo potest fieri ut sine rege aliquando sit anima.” Commentarii in 
epistulam ad Romanos 5.7.8. 
183“Liberi namque arbitrii semper est anima, etiam cum in corpore hoc, etiam 
cum extra corpus est.” De principiis 3.3.5. 
184“Et non sine causa puto quod non dixerit: odorem ‘dederunt’, sed odorem 
suum’, ut ostenderet inesse unicuique animae vim possibilitatis et arbitrii libertatem, qua 
possit agere omne quod bonum est.” Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 4.227. 
185“Anima vero in nobis habet causas et arbitrii libertatem, ut vel magna vel 
parva sit.” In Leuiticum homiliae 12.2. 
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evil tree.”186 Here if the soul is guided by choice, who is making the choice that guides 
the soul? Similarly, in this context, note how Origen interprets Luke 2:52. “Therefore, 
understand that “‘he was advancing in age’ of the soul and his soul became great because 
of the remarkable works that he was doing.”187 
Origen speaks of a spiritual soul, asking “What is the place of the spiritual 
soul?”188 Perhaps this is meant as the soul which turns after the spirit. He speaks of such a 
one when he writes, “It is established that it is the soul which either ‘sows in the flesh’ or 
‘in the spirit’ and which can go to ruin in sin or be converted from sin.”189 
Connected with the concept of free-will is the notion that the soul is influenced by 
both good and evil spirits. In keeping with his concern on the preexistence of the soul, 
Origen urges his readers to think in terms before the person is in its mother’s womb, 
suggesting that this is antecedent to the examples of John the Baptist leaping in Elizabeth 
and Jeremiah being known by God before his birth or the examples from common history 
where children are known to be possessed by evil spirits at their birth. He writes “that no 
shadow of injustice rests upon the divine government, than by holding that there were 
certain causes of prior existence, in consequence of which the souls, before their birth in 
                                                 
186“Ita et cum omnium rationabilium una natura sit, arbitrii proprii aequaliter 
libertate donata, uniuscujusque proprii motus ex arbitrii potestate prolati, vel ad 
virtutem, vel ad libidinem subjectam sibi animam perducentes, vel in bonae eam, vel in 
malae arboris speciem formant.” Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 8.11.4. 
187“Intellige ergo quia ‘aetate’ animae ‘proficiebat’ et magna fiebat anima eius 
propter magna et ingentia opera, quae faciebat.” In Leuiticum homiliae 12.2. 
188“Quis ergo est locus animae spiritalis?” In Numeros homiliae 23.4. 
189“Constat animam esse, quae vel ‘in carne’ vel ‘in spiritu seminat’, et illam 




the body, contracted a certain amount of guilt in their sensitive nature, or in their 
movements, on account of which they have been judged worthy by Divine Providence of 
being placed in this condition.”190 
Though Origen argues strongly for the notion of the free will of the soul, yet he 
argues it is not capable of doing good deeds on its own. He writes, “For no noble deed 
has ever been performed amongst men, where the divine Word did not visit the souls of 
those who were capable, although for a little time, of admitting such operations of the 
divine Word.” 
As mentioned in the previous section, Origen argues from Scripture that the acts 
of the body influence the soul. Citing the command in Lev 16:29 to humble one’s soul 
and Christ’s words in Matt 9:15, he notes that when the bridegroom is gone, they will 
fast; Origen argues that one humbles their soul by bodily fasting.191 He cites Wis 9:15 to 
argue that Scripture teaches that the “corruptible body weighs down the soul, and this 
earthy tent depresses the thoughtful mind.”192 He also discusses the connection between 
                                                 
190“Absque omni iniustitiae culpa divina providentia demonstretur, nisi priores 
quaedam fuisse eis causae dicantur, quibus antequam in corpore nascerentur animae 
aliquid culpae contraxerint in sensibus vel motibus suis, pro quibus haec merito pati a 
divina providentia iudicatae sint.” De principiis 3.3.5. On the connection between the 
preexistence of the soul and the freedom of the will, see Peter Heimann, Erwähltes 
Schicksal: Präexistenz der Seele und christlicher Glaube im Denkmodell des Origenes 
(Tübingen: Katzmann, 1988), 197-220. See also Crouzel, “L’anthropologie d’Origène 
dans la perspective du combat spirituel,” 369-370. 
191“Quomodo ‘humiliat’ populus ‘animam’ suam, ipse dicit: ‘venient’ inquit ‘dies, 
cum auferetur ab iis sponsus, et tunc ieiunabunt in illis diebus.’” In Leuiticum homiliae 
9.5. 
192“Ut ait Scriptura ‘Corruptibile corpus aggravat animam, et demergit terrena 
habitatio sensum multa cogitantem.” Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 3.3.14. For 
more on this idea in Origen, see above on page 241. 
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the bodily sense, such as sight and smell, and the soul.193 In this context he quotes 1 Tim 
2:8 in regard to the disposition of the soul during prayer and 2 Cor 4:18 on the distinction 
between the visible and the invisible as regards the soul. 
 
Death and the Soul 
Origen talks about death as the soul separating from the body.194 In giving the 
spiritual interpretation of the departure from Egypt by the Israelites, Origen describes this 
as possibly referring to the soul leaving the body, obviously describing the point of 
death.195 He also describes Jesus’ raising of Lazarus in John 11 as “bring[ing] back a soul 
which had gone out.”196 
Origen quotes Gen 2:7 for support that humans have a soul. He, however, brings 
in his concept of the descent of souls at this point.197 His first point is to conjecture that 
the soul is imperfect.198 He discusses Paul’s concept of an “animal-man” which cannot 
                                                 
193See above on page 249 for a related discussion regarding the relationship 
between physical sense and the soul. 
194See, for example, Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 13.9.6; Commentarii 
in epistulam ad Romanos 3.4.3. 
195“Cum anima de corporis huius habitatione discedit.” In Numeros homiliae 
27.2. 
196“ψυχὴν γὰρ ἐξελθοῦσαν ἐπιστρέψαι.” Commentarium in evangelium 
Matthaei 12.2.49. 
197Cf. Contra Celsum 4.17; 4.40.25; Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 
9.1.11. See Jacques Dupuis, ‘L’esprit de l’homme’: étude sur l’anthropologie religieuse 
d’Origène (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1967), 183-192. For a helpful overview of 
Origen’s ontological system and its relationship to the human soul, see Telepneff, 157-
163. On the distinction between the creation account of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:7, see 
Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 79-81. 
198“Quod anima est, inperfecta sit.” De principiis 2.8.2. 
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receive spiritual things. He concludes that the mind can know spiritual things, not the 
soul.199 He also notes that Paul, in 1 Cor 14:15, prays and sings with his spirit, not his 
soul.200 In response to the possible argument based on 1 Pet 1:9 that it is the soul which is 
saved, Origen proposes a unique solution, that what was once a soul, perished and was 
lost, and then later, “being freed from destruction, it may become a second time what it 
was before it perished, and be called a soul.”201 This enables Origen to keep his 
hypothesis that the soul is imperfect and cannot comprehend the things of the Spirit and 
still accept any statement in Scripture which discusses the salvation of the soul. In 
discussing the descent, Origen seems to theorize that not all souls are the same that enter 
a body. For this, he comments on Ps 125:5-6, “Those who sow in tears shall reap in joy. 
When they went, they went and wept, bearing their seeds, but when they come, they shall 
come joyfully, bearing their sheaves.” He writes that it “seems to me to reveal the descent 
of the more noble souls that come into this life with the saving seeds.”202 This can also be 
                                                 
199“Id est spiritalia, intellegere possimus, mentem magis quam animam spiritui 
sancto coniungit et sociat.” Ibid. Thus Origen’s notion that soul must be joined or 
changed back to nous to receive ultimate salvation. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought 
and the Classical Tradition, 85. 
200“Et non dicit quia anima orabo, sed ‘spiritu et mente’; et non dicit: anima 
psallam, sed ‘spiritu psallam et mente.’” De principiis 2.8.2. Cf. Commentarii in 
epistulam ad Romanos 9.25.1 where Origen notes the gradations of quality pertaining to 
one’s spirit, soul, and body. 
201“Quae rursum ex perditione liberata potest iterum illud esse quod fuit, 
antequam periret et anima diceretur.” De principiis 2.8.3. Cf. with Origen’s statement in 
Exhortatio ad martyrium 12.33, “If we wish to save our soul in order to get it back better 




σωτηρίων σπερμάτων.” Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 13.43.293. 
 
268 
seen with Origen’s interpretation of Luke 1:15, “He will be great in the Lord’s sight,” by 
writing that this “shows the greatness of John’s soul.”203 
Another argument for the negative understanding of the soul which Origen uses 
here is based on the etymology of ψυχή.204 He quotes several verses such as Deut 4:24 
and Ps 104:4, which describe God as fire. He then quotes Matt 24:12, “and the love of 
many will grow cold,” and notes that the sea in Scripture is when the Devil and Serpent 
rule. Thus, he suggests, maybe soul is so named “because it seems to have cooled from 
that natural and divine warmth, and therefore has been placed in its present position, and 
called by its present name.”205 He concludes by asking whether “you can easily find a 
place in holy Scripture where the soul is properly mentioned in terms of praise.”206 He 
quotes verses such as Ezek 18:4 to note that Scripture does speak against the soul but 
seems to fail to speak positively regarding it. He then quotes Ps 116:7, “Return, O my 
soul, unto thy rest,” and suggests that “from all which this appears to be made out, that 
the understanding, falling away from its status and dignity, was made or named soul; and 
that, if repaired and corrected, it returns to the condition of the understanding.”207 This 
                                                 
203“Τὸ δὲ εἰπεῖν∙ ‘ἔσται μέγας’ μέγεθος ἐμφαίνει τῆς Ἰωάννου ψυχῆς.” 
Homiliae in Lucam 4.24.10. 
204Dillon, Origen and Plotinus, 23; Telepneff, 172. 
205“Requirendum est ne forte et nomen animae, quod graece dicitur ψυχή, a 
refrigescendo de statu diviniore ac meliore dictum sit et translatum inde, quod ex calore 
illo naturali et divino refrixisse videatur, et ideo in hoc quo nunc est et statu et vocabulo 
sita sit.” De principiis 2.8.3. Gross writes that “for Origen, human souls are intelligences 
[νόες] which were created pure by God, but which degraded due to failure and ‘cooled 
off.’” Gross, 142. See also Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical 
Tradition, 84-85; Louth, 61. 
206“Denique proprie laudabiliter animam poni in scripturis sanctis, require si 
facile invenias.” De principiis 2.8.3. 




notion of the nous, or understanding, changing to soul and then back to understanding, 
Origen states, is not intended to be dogmatic but rather only exploratory.208 In reality, 
though, it seems to serve a vital part in his system, though it could be argued that his 
whole system was rather exploratory in nature. 
Origen notes that with regard to the incarnate Christ, “when it wishes to indicate 
any suffering or perturbation affecting Him, it indicates it under the name of soul.”209 He 
quotes several verses from the Gospels here, such as Matt 26:38, “My soul is sorrowful, 
even unto death,” and notes that on the cross, Christ commends His spirit, not His soul, to 
the Father and states that the spirit, not the soul, is willing, and the flesh is weak.210 All 
this is with the intent of showing a less-than-positive view of the soul. 
In discussing human temptation and possible solutions that have been suggested 
by various authors regarding this and the human soul, Origen writes that the view which 
states “that the soul is tripartite [i.e., Plato], I do not observe to be greatly confirmed by 
                                                 
declinans, effecta vel nuncupata est anima; quae si reparata fuerit et correcta, redit in 
hoc, ut sit mens.” Ibid. Cf. ibid., 2.9.6 “Ex istis diversis vasis vel animis vel mentibus 
adornaret.” On the change from nous to psyche and back to nous in Origen’s thought, see 
Georg Bürke, “Des Origenes Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen,” Zeitschrift für 
katholische Theologie 72 (1950): 18-20. 
208On the initial incorporeality of the nous, see Eugène de Faye, Origène: sa vie, 
son oeuvre, sa pensée (Paris: Éditions Ernest Leroux, 1923-1928), 3:73-78; Wolf-Dieter 
Hauschild, Gottes Geist und er Mensch: Studien zur frühchristlichen Pneumatologie 
(Munich: C. Kaiser, 1972), 90-91; Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to 
Irenaeus and Origen,” 85. Jacobson notes that scholars are divided with some holding to 
its incorporeality. 
209“Nam cum passionem aliquam vel conturbationem sui vult indicare, sub 
nomine animae indicat.” De principiis 2.8.4. 
210For an argument of Origen’s against the divine nature of Christ’s soul, see 
Contra Celsum 2.9.14. For a general discussion on the spirit in contrast to the soul, see 
Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 13.2. 
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the authority of holy Scripture; while with respect to the remaining two there is found a 
considerable number of passages in the holy Scriptures which seem capable of 
application to them.”211 The other two are that either there are two souls, one “more 
divine and heavenly and the other inferior; or whether, from the very fact that we inhere 
in bodily structures which according to their own proper nature are dead, and altogether 
devoid of life (seeing it is from us, i.e., from our souls, that the material body derives its 
life, it being contrary and hostile to the spirit), we are drawn on and enticed to the 
practice of those evils which are agreeable to the body.”212 Elsewhere, Origen connects 
the soul with temptation when he writes, “Now the use of temptation is something like 
this. What our soul has received escapes everyone’s knowledge but God’s—even our 
own. But it becomes evident through temptations, so that we no longer escape the 
knowledge of what we are like.”213 His point is that sin reveals the existent character of 
the soul. Sin is clearly attributed to the soul and thus it is in need of salvation.214 Origen 
writes, “As much as the soul sins, that much is it wounded.”215 He describes sin as 
                                                 
211“Quia tripertita sit anima, non valde confirmari ex divinae scripturae 
auctoritate pervide.” De principiis 3.4.1. 
212“Velut duae animae in nobis dicendae sunt, una quaedam divinior et caelestis 
et alia inferior, an vero ex hoc ipso, quod corporibus inhaeremus (quae corpora 
secundum propriam quidem naturam mortua sunt et penitus exanima, quia ex nobis, id 
est ex animabus corpus materiale vivificatur, quod utique contrarium est et inimicum 
spiritui), trahimur et provocamur ad haec mala, quae corpori grata sunt.” Ibid. On the 
body being dead apart from the soul, see G. W. Butterworth, Origen: On First Principles 
(Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), 230n5. 
213“ἅπερ ἐδέξατο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, λανθάνοντα πάντας πλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ 
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, φανερὰ διὰ τῶν <πειρασμῶν> γίνεται.” De oratione 
29.17.2. 
214Cf. Diologus cum Heraclide 7.4 where body, soul, and spirit separately are 
listed as needing salvation. 
215“Anima quotiens peccat, totiens vulneratur.” In Numeros homiliae 8.1. 
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“malignant spears which are thrust into the soul.”216 
In dealing with sin and temptation, Origen present two theories that he claims are 
believed by some. One is that there are two souls, one heavenly and good, while the other 
is earthly and bad. The latter, a carnal soul, is that one that wars against the spirit. He 
attributes to those who hold this notion “that there were many . . . mental perturbations 
which derive their origin in no respect from the flesh, and yet against which the spirit 
struggles, such as ambition, avarice, emulation, envy, pride, and others like these; and 
seeing that with these the human mind or spirit wages a kind of contest, they lay down as 
the cause of all these evils, nothing else than this corporal soul.”217 Origen points out that 
those who hold the other notion, that there is only one soul which does either good or 
bad, make the point “that there is no other creator of soul and flesh than God.”218 It seems 
of some interest that Origen fails to decide which of these two contradictory concepts is 
corrupt. He says the readers must decide for themselves. 
When writing on the descent of souls into bodies based upon prior deeds, Origen 
writes, “Is it not more in conformity with reason, that every soul, for certain mysterious 
reasons (I speak now according to the opinion of Pythagoras, and Plato, and Empedocles, 
whom Celsus frequently names), is introduced into a body, and introduced according to 
                                                 
216“Peccata ‘maligni’ esse ‘iacula’, quae in animam diriguntur.” Ibid. 
217“Haec illi resolvere atque inpugnare conabuntur, ostendentes quam plurimas 
alias passiones esse animae, quae in nullo prorsus a carne originem trahant, et tamen his 
spiritus adversetur, sicut est ambitio avaritia aemulatio invidia superbia et his similia; 
cum quibus pugnam quandam esse humanae menti vel spiritui videntes, non aliud quid 
causam horum omnium malorum ponent nisi hanc, de qua superius diximus, velut 
corporalem animam et ex seminis traduce generatam.” De principiis 3.4.2. 
218“Quia alium nullum creatorem animae et carnis quam deum credendum esse 
defendunt.” De principiis 3.4.5. 
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its deserts and former actions?”219 Origen, himself, argues for the prior existence of the 
soul based on his concept of justice as well as from a teleological viewpoint. He suggests 
that one can look to what will happen at the end in order to determine what happened at 
the beginning, with respect to souls. He writes, “And if they had a beginning such as the 
end for which they hope, they existed undoubtedly from the very beginning in those 
(ages) which are not seen, and are eternal. And if this is so, then there has been a descent 
from a higher to a lower condition, on the part . . . of those souls who have deserved the 
change by the variety of their movements.”220 He makes it clear by writing, “Before they 
should do anything good, if indeed they were born of the Holy Spirit, then they are 
loved.”221 
Both the Holy Spirit and Christ may inhabit the soul. Origen notes that the Holy 




εἰσκρίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ τὰ πρότερα ἤθη.” Contra Celsum 1.32.34. Karpp suggests 
this illustrates Origen’s theology overuling his psychology. Karpp, Probleme, 201. On 
the descent and its relationship to Adam, see Bammel, “Adam in Origen,” 65-72. For a 
comparison here to the latter thought of Augustine, see Henry Chadwick, “Christian 
Platonism in Origen and Augustine,” in Origeniana Tertia, ed. Richard Hanson et al. 
(Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1985), 222. 
220“Quod si est, de superioribus ad inferiora descensum est non solum ab his 
animabus, quae id motuum suorum varietate meruerunt.” De principiis 3.5.4. Cf. In 
Numeros homiliae 20.2 where Origen quotes his favorite verse for the support of this 
theory: “Jacob I have loved but Esau I have hated.” Rom 9:11-14. On the prior existence 
of souls, see Gerald Bostock, “The Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Pre-existence,” in 
Origeniana Quarta, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1987); Marguerite Harl, “La 
préexistence des âmes dans l’oeuvre d’Origène,” in Origeniana Quarta, ed. Lothar Lies 
(Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1987); Pierre, 56-61. It is important to note the connection between 
the preexistence of Christ’s soul and that of all other human souls in Origen. 
221“Istae enim tales generationes animae etiam, ‘priusquam faciant boni aliquid,’ 
siquidem ex sancto spiritu generatae sunt, iam diliguntur; si vero ex spiritu maligno, 
etiam ‘priusquam opere impleant aliquid mali.’” In Numeros homiliae 20.2. 
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Spirit gives life to our soul.222 Elsewhere he writes, “The apostles could not yet receive 
those things which the Savior wished to teach them until the advent of the Holy Spirit, 
who, pouring Himself into their souls, might enlighten them regarding the nature and 
faith of the Trinity.”223 This indwelling of the Holy Spirit then takes on the notion of 
knowledge or understanding regarding the Trinity. Origen writes of a divine spirit 
residing “in the pure and pious soul of Moses.”224 He also talks of the Holy Spirit resting 
on those “who have purified their souls from sin”225 and notes the advantage of those 
who are “pure in soul and body.”226 He also notes that “when the Holy Spirit is ‘mingled’ 
with the soul, it transfuses it with its qualities, making the recipient of salvation 
pneumatikos.”227 He writes that prophets “by the contact—if I may so say—of the Holy 
Spirit they became clearer in mind, and their souls were filled with a brighter light.”228 
Elsewhere he describes those who receive the gift of prophecy “as holy and immaculate 
                                                 
222“οὓς ἀπαιτούμεθα, συνόντος αὐτοῦ ἡμῖν καὶ ζῳοποιοῦντος ἡμῶν τὴν 
ψυχήν.” De oratione 28.3.15. See Russell, 148. 
223“Apostolos ‘non posse capere’ adhuc ea, quae volebat eos docere salvator, nisi 
‘cum advenerit spiritus sanctus’, qui se eorum animabus infundens inluminare eos possit 
de ratione ac fide trinitatis.” De principiis 2.7.3. See also 2.7.4 where the Holy Spirit 
“bestows consolation upon the soul to whom He openly reveals the apprehension of 
spiritual knowledge.”  
224“ἐν καθαρᾷ καὶ εὐσεβεῖ ψυχῇ Μωϋσέως.” Contra Celsum 1.19.16. 
225“‘Requiescit’ enim ‘spiritus’ Dei in his, ‘qui mundo sunt corde’, et in his, qui 
purificant animas suas a peccato.” In Numeros homiliae 6.3. See also Commentarii in 
evangelium Joannis 13.140-144 for a discussion of the Spirit of God being infused in the 
believer. 
226“ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα.” Contra Celsum 3.61.10.  
227Russell, 148. 
228“ἁφῆς τοῦ καλουμένου ἁγίου πνεύματος διορατικώτεροί τε τὸν νοῦν 
ἐγίνοντο καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν λαμπρότεροι.” Contra Celsum 7.4.7. 
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souls,” and he states that “after devoting themselves to God with all affection and purity, 
and after preserving themselves free from all contagion of evil spirits, and after being 
purified by lengthened abstinence, and imbued with holy and religious training, assume 
by this means a portion of divinity”229 they receive the gift of prophecy. 
Origen describes Christ as the Word of God “who stands at the door and knocks 
and wishes to enter their souls.”230 He writes that “Jesus” as “the Word of God . . . enters 
the soul.”231 Origen supports this last statement by an allegorical interpretation of Jesus’ 
entrance to Jerusalem. Elsewhere, he writes that “also in my soul I ought to have Christ 
within me.”232 Origen also writes of souls receiving the indwelling of the word and 
wisdom of the Father.233 
                                                 
229“Quae hoc modo geri arbitranda sunt, quod sicut sanctae et inmaculatae 
animae, cum se omni affectu omni que puritate voverint deo et alienas se ab omni 
daemonum contagione servaverint et per multam abstinentiam purificaverint se et piis ac 
religiosis inbutae fuerint disciplinis, participium per hoc divinitatis adsumunt et 
prophetiae ceterorum que divinorum donorum gratiam promerentur.” De principiis 
3.3.3. Cf. Robert J. Hauck, The More Divine Proof: Prophecy and Inspiration in Celsus 
and Origen (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989). 
230“τὸν ἑστῶτα ἐπὶ τὴν θύραν καὶ κρούοντα καὶ εἰσελθεῖν βουλόμενον 
εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς λόγον θεοῦ.” Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 1.4.26. 
231“Ἰησοῦς τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, ὅστις εἰσέρχεται εἰς τὴν 
Ἱεροσόλυμα καλουμένην ψυχήν.” Ibid., 10.28.174. 
232“ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ὀφείλω ἔχειν ἔνδον μου τὸν Χριστόν” In 
Ieremiam 5.6.11. On the notion of union of the soul with the divine, see Mark J. Edwards, 
“Christ of Plato? Origen on Revelation and Anthropology,” in Christian Origins: 
Theology, Rhetoric and Community, ed. Lewis Ayres et al. (London: Routledge, 1998), 
18. Edwards notes that becoming one with God happens only through “mutual love and 
voluntary obedience.” 
233“Et eas animas, quae verbi eius ac sapientiae efficiuntur capaces.” De 
principiis 1.1.2. Cf. Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 4.1.17. On the relationship 
between God, His wisdom or Logos and human souls in Origen’s thought, see Crouzel, 
“L’image de Dieu dans la théologie d’Origène,” 195; Daniélou, Origen, 255-256; 
Telepneff, 165, 177, 182. 
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In one place, Origen writes of all three members of the God-head inhabiting the 
soul. He writes, “Yet that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are in the soul of 
man is said variously and diversely in the Scriptures.”234 
Demons can also possess either the soul or the soul and the body. The devil 
himself, Origen notes, entered Judas.235 He writes “that the souls of those who condemn 
Christians, and betray them, and rejoice in persecuting them, are filled with wicked 
demons.”236 Origen writes that prayers are used to cast the demons out. “By the use of 
prayers and other means which we learn from Scripture, we drive them out of the souls of 
men, out of places where they have established themselves.”237 Christ is described as 
having “cast out demons from the souls of men.”238 He also writes of “the despicable 
weakness of demons, which, in order to be overcome and driven out of the bodies and 
souls of men, do not require the power and wisdom of those who are mighty in argument, 
and most learned in matters of faith.”239 





αὐτὸς εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἐπλήρωσεν αὐτόν.” Commentarium in 
evangelium Matthaei 11.9.93. 
236“ἀληθὲς γὰρ τὸ φαύλων δαιμόνων πληρουμένας τὰς τῶν 
καταδικαζόντων Χριστιανοὺς ψυχὰς καὶ τῶν προδιδόντων καὶ τῶν 
εὐδοκούντων Χριστιανοῖς προσπολεμεῖν.” Contra Celsum 8.43.38. Cf. 
Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 11.17.46. 
237“Καὶ τοσοῦτόν γε ἀποδέομεν τοῦ θεραπεύειν δαίμονας, ὥστε καὶ 
ἀπελαύνειν αὐτοὺς εὐχαῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων μαθήμασιν 








Immortality of the Soul 
The soul, according to Origen, is immortal.240 He writes that “it is believed not 
only among Christians and Jews, but also by many others among the Greeks and 
Barbarians, that the human soul lives and subsists after its separation from the body.”241 
He notes that it is something uncertain for non-Christian philosophers which is resolved 
by the teachings of the Word of God.242 For those who do not believe in the immortality 
of the soul, he will have to prove it as it “is to us a doctrine of pre-eminent 
importance.”243 To those who already believe it, he still desires to prove it, not only from 
the Greeks but also in harmony with the Scriptures. He argues that Celsus is an Epicurean 
and that he should argue against the Greeks regarding the “immortality of the soul.”244 
Origen writes regarding God’s long-suffering with sinners that “the soul over 
                                                 
τὸ ἡττηθῆναι καὶ εἶξαν ὑπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου καὶ σώματος 
σοφοῦ τινος καὶ δυνατοῦ ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς περὶ τῆς πίστεως ἀποδείξεσιν.” 
Ibic., 7.4.24. See also 8.43.34. 
240Origen, in Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 2.26.167, does acknowledge 
that there is a sense in which “the Father ‘alone has immortality.’” 
241“Ἰουδαίοις μόνοις ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ᾽ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς Ἑλλήνων καὶ 
βαρβάρων ὅτι ζῇ καὶ ὑπάρχει μετὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος χωρισμὸν ἡ 
ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχή.” Contra Celsum 7.5.4. 
242“De animae immortalitate . . . gentiles dumtaxat philosophos, incertum semper 
ac dubium manebat, absolvitur.” Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 2.119. 
243“Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνετε αὐτούς, τὸν προηγούμενον ἡμῖν 
περὶ ψυχῆς κατασκευαστέον λόγον.” Contra Celsum 3.22.25. 
244“ὁμολογῶν ἐπικούρειος εἶναι πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις 
οὐκ εὐκαταφρονήτως λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 3.80.17. 
Cf. 5.42.26 where Origen states that the Jews had the advantage of being taught from 




which He exercises this providential care is immortal.”245 He adds, “For God deals with 
souls not merely with a view to the short space of our present life, included within sixty 
years or more, but with reference to a perpetual and never-ending period, exercising His 
providential care over souls that are immortal, even as He Himself is eternal and 
immortal.”246 Origen then provides his rational for this statement by adding, “For He 
made the rational nature, which He formed in His own image and likeness, incorruptible; 
and therefore the soul, which is immortal, is not excluded by the shortness of the present 
life from the divine remedies and cures.”247 Here, the creation of the soul and its 
immortal nature are connected with the imago dei. In a related argument, Origen argues 
for the immortality of the soul based upon its participation in the intellectual light which 
is the divine nature. He writes, “If the heavenly virtues, then, partake of intellectual light, 
i.e., of divine nature, because they participate in wisdom and holiness, and if human 
souls, have partaken of the same light and wisdom, and thus are mutually of one nature 
                                                 
245“Quoniam quidem immortalis est anima.” De principiis 3.1.13. See also Contra 
Celsum 8.18.24. 
246“Deus enim dispensat animas non ad istud solum vitae nostrae <breve> 
tempus, quod intra sexaginta fere aut si quid amplius annos concluditur, sed ad 
perpetuum et aeternum tempus, tamquam aeternus ipse et immortalis, immortalium 
quoque animarum providentiam tenens.” De principiis 3.1.13. 
247“Incorruptibilem namque fecit esse rationabilem naturam, quam et ‘ad 
imaginem suam ac similitudinem condidit’; et ideo non excluditur brevitate temporis 
huius vitae nostrae a cura et remediis divinis anima, quae immortalis est.” Ibid. See also 
De oratione 29.13; In Ieremiam 2.1.17. Cf. Commentarium in Canticum canticorum prol. 
where Origen suggests the bride in Solomon’s song may be the soul made in the Word of 
God’s image; In Numeros homiliae 12.1. where by virtue of being created in the image of 
God, the soul in itself has great power to create what Origen symbolically describes as 
wells and springs and streams. For Origen, the notion of image found in Gen 1:26-27 
refers to the soul, while Gen 2:7 refers to the creation of the body. Jacobsen, “The 
Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 78-82. This distinction between 
the interior and exterior man is also found in Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 2.52. 
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and of one essence,—then, since the heavenly virtues are incorruptible and immortal, the 
essence of the human soul will also be immortal and incorruptible.”248 
In a somewhat different interpretation of the immortality of the soul, Origen 
writes, “I think that by itself this human soul can be called neither mortal nor immortal. 
But if it should take hold of life, by partaking of life it will be immortal (for death does 
not fall into life); but if turning itself from life, it should draw to the participation of death 
it makes itself mortal.”249 Elsewhere, Origen writes regarding the daily bread from the 
Lord’s Prayer that it is “bread for being,” and “what corresponds most closely with a 
rational nature and is akin to Being itself. It procures at one time health, vigor, and 
strength to the soul; and since the Word of God is immortal, it shares its own immortality 
with the one who eats it.”250 These quotes seem to indicate the possibility of movement 
                                                 
248“Si ergo caelestes virtutes intellectualis lucis, id est divinae naturae, per hoc 
quod sapientiae et sanctificationis participant, participium sumunt, et humana anima 
eiusdem lucis et sapientiae participium sumit, erunt et ista unius naturae se cum invicem 
unius que substantiae; incorruptae autem sunt et inmortales caelestes virtutes: 
incorrupta sine dubio et inmortalis erit etiam animae humanae substantia” De principiis 
4.4.9. Origen also adds that as the intellectual light of the immortal Father, Son, and Sprit 
created all things, so also will all created things participate in this immortality. De 
principiis 4.4.9. Note Telepneff’s critique, 164-165. For an overview of the notion of 
participation in Origen’s thought, see David L. Balas, “The Idea of Participation in the 
Structure of Origen’s Thought: Christian Transposition of a Theme of the Platonic 
Tradition,” in Origeniana: Premier colloque international des études origéniennes, ed. 
Henri Crouzel et al. (n.p.: Universita di Bali, 1975), 257-275; Crouzel, Théologie de 
l’image de Dieu chez Origène; idem, “L’image de Dieu dans la théologie d’Origène”; 
idem, Origen, 92-98. On creation and the soul in Origen, see Peter Nemeshegyi, La 
paternité de Dieu chez Origène (Tournai: Desclée, 1960), 109-114. 
249“Unde et arbitror quod ipsa per se anima humana neque mortalis neque 
immortalis dici potest. Sed si contigerit vitam, ex participio vitae erit immortalis (in 
vitam enim non incidit mors); si vero avertens se a vita participium traxerit mortis, ipsa 




τῷ ἐσθίοντι αὐτοῦ.” De oratione 27.9.22. 
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by the soul either to mortality or immortality. This is in agreement with his understanding 
of free will and the soul. Thus Origen notes that “the soul of the sinner is in the flesh, but 
of the righteous man in spirit.”251 Elsewhere, he adds that the soul can “attach its love not 
to its lawful Bridegroom, who is the Word of God, but to some seducer or adulterer,”252 
adding also that “this spiritual love of the soul does flame out, as we have taught, 
sometimes towards certain spirits of evil, and sometimes towards the Holy Spirit and the 
Word of God.”253 Though he does not mention in this passage the change of the nature of 
the soul from immortal to mortal, yet he does again reiterate the notion of the soul 
moving either towards the flesh or towards the Spirit. The idea that the soul moves either 
to a mortal or immortal state must be interpreted in light of Origen’s statements on death. 
After quoting Ezek 18:4, which explicitly states that “the soul which sins will 
die,” Origen defines what he means by the death of the soul by adding, “We do not think 
that its death is to the destruction of the substance, but from the fact that the soul is alien 
and remote from God who is true life, we must believe that it dies.”254 Origen writes 
similarly “because the soul is capable of sin, and the soul that sins shall die, we also will 
                                                 
251“ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ μὲν ἁμαρτωλοῦ ἐν σαρκί ἐστι, τοῦ δὲ δικαίου ἐν 
πνεύματι.” Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 13.2.202. This concept of the soul 
either turning to the flesh or the spirit is common in Origen. See, for example, 
Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 1.5.2-3; 1.18.5. 
252“Interiori homini, hoc est animae, accidere potest amor non in legitimum 
sponsum, quem diximus esse Verbum Dei, sed in adulterum aliquem et corruptorem.” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum prol. 
253“Exardescit autem etiam hic spiritalis amor animae aliquando quidem, ut 
edocuimus, erga aliquos spiritus nequitiae, aliquando autem erga Spiritum sanctum et 
Verbum Dei.” Ibid.. 
254“Quamvis mortem eius non ad interitum substantiae sentiamus, sed hoc ipsum, 
quod aliena et extorris sit a Deo, qui vera vita est, mors ei esse credenda est.” In 
Leuiticum homiliae 9.11. 
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say that the soul is mortal. But if [one] supposes that death means the total dissolution 
and destruction of the soul, we will not agree, because we cannot conceive, so far as the 
concept goes, of a mortal essence changing into an immortal one, and a corruptible nature 
changing to incorruption.”255 
Origen also develops several different definitions of death found in Scripture. He 
writes, “Let us carefully define the word ‘death’. . . . I will attempt to present all its 
meanings, not according to the Greeks, but all it meanings according to holy 
Scripture.”256 He lists “death to sin” from Rom 6:10, “The soul that sins shall die” from 
Ezek 18:4, and the general death of a human, which he supports by quoting Gen 5:5, 
“Adam lived nine hundred and thirty years and died.”257 Origen argues that the soul 
cannot experience the ordinary natural death of humans “for if it did die, it would not be 
punished after death.”258 Thus Origen clearly states that the nature of the soul must be 
                                                 
255“Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι δεκτικὴ ἁμαρτίας, ψυχὴ δὲ ἡ ἁμαρτάνουσα αὐτὴ 
ἀποθανεῖται, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν αὐτὴν θνητήν.” Commentarii in evangelium 
Joannis 13.61.429. Cf. Origen’s interpretation of 1 Cor 15 where Paul discusses the 
change of the corruptible into the incorruptible below on page 286. 
256Dialogus cum Heraclide 25.2. 
257Ibid., 25.12. Origen does not often refer to the “general death” as the separation 
of the soul from the body as is common with other Fathers. See Commentarium in 
evangelium Matthaei 13.9.6. “Now we must think that the devil has the power of 
death,—not of that which is common and indifferent, in accordance with which those 
who are compacted of soul and body die, when their soul is separated from the body” 
(χωριζομένης αὐτῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος). See also Commentarii in 
epistulam ad Romanos 4.5.10; 6.6.5. 
258“<Τοῦτον> τὸν θάνατον οὐδεμία ψυχὴ ἀνθρώπου ἀποθνῄσκει∙ εἰ γὰρ 
ἀπέθνῃσκεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκολάζετο μετὰ τὸν θάνατον.” Dialogus cum Heraclide 
25.24. See Daley, 51-52. Daley refers to this as the notion of personal continuity. He 
describes Origen’s notion as an argument against those anti-Origenists who might find in 
his notion of the soul’s immortality something more akin to Celsus than to the Scriptures. 
This assumption is only one possibility however. The other is that Origen began with the 
notion of the necessity of the immortality of the soul because of his prior belief in the 




immortal in order to guarantee the reality of a future judgment. In regard to “death to 
sin,” Origen concedes that the soul is mortal in this case and that it is blessed to 
experience this.259 
Regarding the third case, “The soul that sins shall die,” Origen states that in this 
“we are not immortal; but it is possible for us, through vigilance, not to die this death. And 
perhaps what is mortal in the soul is not mortal forever. For to the extent that it allows itself 
to commit such a sin that it becomes a soul that sins which itself will die, the soul is mortal 
for a real death.”260 Origen adds, however, that the soul, by possessing eternal life, can in 
regard to this meaning also be immortal. Origen connects this concept of death to what is 
said in Rom 5:12, “Therefore through one man sin entered into the world. And through sin, 
death.” On this he writes, “Without a doubt this is the death concerning which the prophet 
says ‘The soul which sins will die.’”261 In commenting on Rom 5:17, “By the transgression 
of the one, death exercised dominion through the one,” he writes that “what seems to be 
made known in this is that since a soul created by God is itself free, it leads itself into 
slavery by means of transgression and hands over to death, so to speak the IOU of its own 
immortality which it had received from its own Creator. ‘For the soul that sins will die.’ 
                                                 
Diaglogue with Heraclides, see Jean Daniélou and Henri I. Marrou, The First Six 
Hundred Years, trans. Vincent Cronin, vol. 1 of The Christian Centuries (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1964), 186-188; W. H. C. Frend, The Rise of Christianity 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 384. 
259“θνητὴ ψυχή, καὶ μακαρία ἐὰν ἀποθάνῃ τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ.” Dialogus cum 
Heraclide 26.10. 
260“Καὶ τάχα τὸ θνητὸν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἀεί ἐστιν θνητόν. . . .  θνητὴ τοῦ 
ὄντως θανάτου ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή.” Ibid., 26.21-24. 
261“Illa sine dubio mors de qua et propheta dicit, quia ‘anima quae peccat ipsa 
morietur.’” Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 5.1.19. 
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That soul, after all, cries out through the prophet, saying, ‘You have led me down to the 
dust of death.’”262 This last notion of death is illustrated by his statement comparing this 
with the death of the body. He writes, “For just as a man is called a murderer who separates 
the body from the soul, through which it is vivified, how much more truly should he be 
called a murderer who separates the soul from the true life, which is God?”263 Elsewhere he 
states that “the prophet says what is dead: The soul that sins, it shall die.”264 But again, this 
must be interpreted by his other statements regarding the death of the soul. For support of 
this concept of death, Origen quotes Eph 2:5, “And when we were dead in our 
transgressions and sins, he raised us up together with him.” He applies this notion of death 
to Rom 6:23, “The wages of sin is death,” and notes that this is also the understanding of 
death in mind when “the Apostle was handing over the sinner for the destruction of the 
flesh in order that his spirit might be saved; that is to say, in order that he would die to sin 
and live to God,” referring evidently to 1 Cor 5:5.265 Elsewhere, Origen adds another 
meaning of death to this list. He writes, “Moreover, the place below in the underworld, 
                                                 
262“Per quod indicari videtur, quod cum libera a Deo creata sit anima, ipsa se in 
servitutem redigat per delictum, et velut chirographa immortalitatis suae, quae a 
creatore suo acceperat, morti tradat. ‘Anima enim quae peccat, ipsa morietur.’ Ipsa 
denique anima clamat per Prophetam dicens: ‘In pulverem mortis deduxisti me.” Ibid., 
5.3.3. Quotes from Ezek 18:4 and Ps 22:15. 
263“Sicut enim homicida dicitur ille qui corpus ab anima separat, per quam 
vivificatur: ita multo etiam verius ille homicida dicendus est, qui animam a vera viata 
separat, quae est Deus.” Ibid., 3.4.3. Cf Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 4.5.10. 
264“Quae est mortua; propheta dicit: ‘anima quae peccat, ipsa morietur.’” In 
Leuiticum homiliae 12.3. 
265“Sic et Apostolus peccatorem tradebat in interitum carnis, ut spiritum faceret 




where souls were being held by death, is also named death.”266 
In commenting on Luke 9:24, “Whoever loses his life for my sake will save it,” 
Origen discusses what he understands this losing of one’s life means. He writes, “He 
destroys the soul, according to Christ, who curbs his desires, who resects his lusts, who 
castigates his luxury and weakness and in nothing forward makes his will but the will of 
God; and through this, the soul is said to perish.”267 
Origen is very clear that the soul should not be understood as corporeal. He 
writes, “If there are any now who think that the mind itself and the soul is a body, I wish 
they would tell me by way of answer how it receives reasons and assertions on subjects 
of such importance—of such difficulty and such subtlety? Whence does it derive the 
power of memory? and whence comes the contemplation of invisible things? How does 
the body possess the faculty of understanding incorporeal existences?”268 He asks other 
rhetorical questions in this defense of the incorporeality of the soul but they all hinge on 
                                                 
266“Sedet inferni locus in quo animae detinebantur a morte, etiam ipse mors 
appellatur.” Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 6.6.5. See also 5.10.9. 
267“‘Perdit’ enim ‘animam’ secundum Christum, qui desideria eius refrenat, qui 
cupiditates eius resecat, qui luxuriam eius resolutionem que castigat et in nullo prorsus 
facit voluntatem suam, sed voluntatem Dei; et per haec perire dicitur anima.” In 
Numeros homiliae 18.4. 
268“Si qui autem sunt qui mentem ipsam animam que corpus esse arbitrentur, 
velim mihi responderent, quomodo tantarum rerum, tam difficilium tam que subtilium, 
rationes assertiones que recipiat. Unde ei virtus memoriae, unde rerum invisibilium 
contemplatio, unde certe incorporalium intellectus corpori inest?” De principiis 1.1.7. 
Cf. however, his statement in Contra Celsum 2.60.15 where he writes, “Now the 
phantoms which exist about the soul of the dead are produced by some substance, and 
this substance is in the soul, which exists apart in a body said to be of splendid 
appearance” (Τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα περὶ μνημεῖα τεθνηκότων ‘φαντάσματα’ 
ἀπό τινος ὑποκειμένου γίνεται, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑφεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ 
αὐγοειδεῖ σώματι ψυχήν). He seems to further explain this when he writes in Contra 




the basic premise that what is corporeal cannot understand or perceive that which is 
incorporeal.269 In his argument with Celsus, Origen asserts that Christians do not believe 
the soul is corporeal, similar to the Stoics, but that he wants to “demonstrate that the 
rational soul is superior to all ‘corporeal’ nature, and that it is an invisible substance, and 
incorporeal.”270 Elsewhere, Origen again asserts these characteristics of the soul. He 
writes of the “rational being of the soul, which has a certain kinship with God. For both 
are intelligible and invisible and, as the prevailing argument demonstrates, 
incorporeal.”271 It is presumably based on the relationship of the soul to the divine which 
provides the basis for the claim to incorporeality. 
Origen acknowledges that there are scriptural passages which seem to indicate 
that the soul is not immaterial. He lists Lev 17:11 as the vexing passage, “The soul of all 
flesh is its blood.” He notes also similar ideas in Deut 12:33 and Gen 9:4. He then 
reiterates his hermeneutical principle which holds that incorporeal things are given 
corresponding names to things found in the corporeal world.272 He notes several texts in 
                                                 
269As this argument is couched in the discussion of the nature of God, Origen 
notes several texts from Scripture regarding the nature of God. He notes that in John 
1:18, Jesus says that no one has seen God. This is because to see or be seen is a property 
of bodies and cannot be applied to God. Then, in Matt 11:27 Jesus states that no one 
knows the Father except the Son. This, Origen writes, is because to know or be known is 
the property of an intellectual being. De principiis 1.1.8. 
270“κατὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν πειρωμένους ἀποδεικνύναι 
κρείττονα πάσης σωματικῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίαν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον.” 
Contra Celsum 6.71.20. 
271“Ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλοζωεῖ ἄνθρωπος πεῖσμα λαβὼν περὶ οὐσίας λογικῆς 
ψυχῆς ὡς ἐχούσης τι συγγενὲς θεῷ. νοερὰ γὰρ ἑκάτερα καὶ ἀόρατα καὶ, ὡς ὁ 
ἐπικρατῶν ἀποδείκνυσι λόγος, ἀσώματα.” Exhortatio ad martyrium 47.2. 
272Dialogus cum Heraclide, 11.25. 
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Paul, 2 Cor. 4:16 and Rom 7:22, regarding the “inner human nature”273 along with Col 
3:9-10274 for support regarding the dual nature of humans, an inner and an outer. In this 
context, Origen argues that the soul of Lev 2:1 which is commanded to offer various 
offerings is different from the individual referenced in Lev 1:2. Based upon the different 
offering requirements, Origen writes, “From this, it seems to me that what is here called 
‘a soul’ is to be understood as that person whom Paul calls ‘the natural person.’”275 
Corresponding to this, he looks to the imago dei concept from Gen 1:27 and argues that 
this is separate from the creation from the dust described in Gen 2:7, referring only to the 
inner incorporeal nature.276After giving a lengthy study of various passages in which 
physical parts of the body are used referring not to the physical organ itself but some 
other sense or power of the inner person, Origen writes, “Since you have all these 
elements of the physical body in the inner human being, you should no longer have 
problems about the blood, which, with the same name as physical blood, exists, just like 
the other members of the body, in the inner human being.”277 This inner human being is 
the soul.278 
                                                 
273Ibid., 11.29. 
274Ibid., 16.10. 
275“Unde videtur mihi hic ‘anima’ quae appellata est, homo ille, quem Paulus 
‘animalem hominem’ nominat.” In Leuiticum homiliae 2.2. 
276Dialogus cum Heraclide 16.1. On Origen’s notion of the image of God, see 
Crouzel, “L’image de Dieu dans la théologie d’Origène.” Cf. also R. Wilson, “The Early 
Exegesis of Gen. 1.26.” On Origen’s distinction between the creation events of Gen 1:26 
and Gen 2:7, see Bürke, 28-33. 
277Dialogus cum Heraclide 22.17. 
278“Εἰ νενόηται ἡ ψυχή, καὶ νενόηται κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, καὶ 
νενόηται ὅτι ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἐστὶν τὸ ‘κατ᾽ εἰκόνα.’” Ibid., 23.2. Cf. De principiis 3.4.2 
for a similar discussion. 
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In commenting on the words of Paul in 1 Cor 15, Origen writes that Paul could be 
understood to have written, “‘This corruptible nature of the body must receive the 
clothing of incorruption—a soul possessing in itself incorruptibility,’ because it has been 
clothed with Christ, who is the Wisdom and Word of God.”279 He also adds, “Now, what 
else will incorruption and immortality be, save the wisdom, and the word, and the 
righteousness of God, which mould; and clothe, and adorn the soul?”280 After the 
resurrection, Origen proposes that the soul will gradually lose the need of the body and 
ultimately the material world will cease to exist. 
Origen also seems to follow others in the early Church in understanding 1 Pet 
3:19-20 as referring to Christ going down to Hades. He writes, “When He became a soul, 
without the covering of the body, he dwelt among those souls which were without bodily 
covering, converting such of them as were willing to Himself.”281 This is clearly shown 
in Origen’s homily on 1 Sam 28. In describing Saul and the Witch of Endor, Origen 
argues that the story should be interpreted literally, that is, that the witch actually saw and 
communicated with the soul of Samuel, who had been called up from Hades. In response 
                                                 
279“‘Necesse est corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem,’ ut si diceret: necesse 
est naturam hanc corruptibilem corporis indumentum accipere incorruptionis, animam 
habentem in se incorruptionem, pro eo videlicet quod induta est Christum, qui est 
sapientia et verbum dei.” De principiis 2.3.2. 
280“‘Incorruptio’ autem et ‘inmortalitas’ quid aliud erit nisi sapientia et verbum et 
iustitia dei, quae formant animam et induunt et exornant?” Ibid. 
281“γυμνὴ σώματος γενόμενος ψυχὴ ταῖς γυμναῖς σωμάτων ὡμίλει 
ψυχαῖς.” Contra Celsum 2.43.6. See also De engastrimytho 6. Here Origen quotes Acts 
2:27-31 for its quote of Ps 15:10, “You will not leave my soul in Hades” for his defense 
of the concept that Christ was in Hades. Cf. Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 
5.1.37 where Origen notes that a possible interpretation of Rom 5:14 is that this refers to 
Christ preaching to souls dead or trapped in the underworld. This point is reiterated in 
Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 5.10.12 where Origen combines it with the 
parable of Christ about the binding of the strong man in Matt 12:29. 
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to the question, Did a demon have “sway over the soul of the Prophet?”282 Origen 
answers that to deny this leads to unbelief. These two incidents serve as biblical support 
for the notion of the continued existence of souls after the death of the body. 
Origen also comments on the souls under the altar from Rev 6:9-11, writing, “So 
also the souls of those who have been beheaded for their witness to Jesus do not serve the 
heavenly altar in vain and minister forgiveness of sins to those who pray.”283 He writes 
similarly elsewhere describing the souls of the martyrs going to the heavenly altar.284 One 
might question if paradise is in the same place as the altar. It may be that as this is 
reserved only for the souls of martyrs, the rest of the souls of the saints go elsewhere to 
await the resurrection. Origen also writes of the prayers of the saints. Commenting on 
Christ’s statement regarding the joy of heaven over the one sinner who repents, he writes, 
“So do the souls of the saints who have already fallen asleep. All this is demonstrated by 
the story of Raphael’s offering a spiritual sacrifice to God for Tobit and Sarah.”285 In the 
same context, Origen also notes the appearance of Jeremiah in 2 Macc 15. 
Origen argues against those who claim that the soul is in the physical blood and 
                                                 
282“ἀνήγαγεν αὐτὸν ἡ ἐγγαστρίμυθος, ἐξουσίαν ἔχει δαιμόνιον ψυχῆς 
προφητικῆς.” De engastrimytho 2.23. On Origen’s literal interpretation of this story, 
see Margaret M. Mitchell, “Patristic Rhetoric on Allegory: Origen and Eustathius Put 1 
Kingdomes 28 on Trial,” in The ‘Belly-Myther’ of Endor: Interpretations of 1 Kingdoms 
28 in the Early Church (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), xcvi-ciii. 
283“οὕτως αἱ ψυχαὶ ‘τῶν πεπελεκισμένων’ ἕνεκεν τῆς μαρτυρίας Ἰησοῦ, 
μὴ μάτην τῷ ἐν οὐρανοῖς θυσιαστηρίῳ παρεδρεύουσαι, διακονοῦσι τοῖς 
εὐχομένοις ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτημάτων.” Exhortatio ad martyrium 30.13. 
284“Quis enim sequi possit animam martyris, quae supergrassa omnes ‘aerias 
potestates’ ad coeleste tendit altare?” Homiliae in librum Iudicum 7.2. 
285“αἵ τε τῶν προκεκοιμημένων ἁγίων ψυχαί. ἅτινα δηλοῦται, Ῥαφαὴλ 
μὲν προσφέροντος περὶ Τωβὴτ καὶ Σάῤῥας λογικὴν ἱερουργίαν τῷ θεῷ.” De 
oratione 11.1.4. Translation Greer. 
 
288 
thus lies with the body in the grave after death. “But according to those of you who say 
that the soul lies in the tomb with the body, it did not depart from the body, it does not 
enjoy repose, it does not dwell in God’s paradise, it does not repose in the bosom of 
Abraham.”286 He adds, “For if the soul is indeed blood, there is no being with Christ just 
as soon as the dissolution takes place.”287 Here Origen clearly alludes to Luke 16 and the 
parable of the rich man and Lazarus as well as Christ’s words to the thief on the cross 
recorded in Luke 23:43. 
A corresponding theory to the idea of the descent of the souls is the theory of their 
ascent. Here Origen sees the soul as rising to the heavens ultimately to God.288 Reason 
itself suggests the notion that pure souls not having the “weight of sin” are able to ascend 
while those yet “weighed down” are seen at times around “sepulchers where they appear 
as apparitions of shadowy spirits, at other times among other objects on the ground.”289 
He finds a description of this ascent of the soul in the book of Numbers. The description 
of the wanderings of the children of Israel is, according to Origen, a description of the 
soul’s wanderings towards God. “The ascent from Egypt to the promised land is 
something by which, as I have said, we are taught in mysterious descriptions the ascent of 
the soul to heaven and the mystery of the resurrection from the dead.”290 Origen talks 
                                                 
286“Κατὰ δὲ ὑμᾶς τοὺς λέγοντας ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ κεῖται ἐν τῷ μνημείῳ μετὰ 
τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἐξῆλθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἀναπαύεται, οὐ γέγονεν ἐν 
τῷ παραδείσῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ.” Dialogus cum Heraclide 23.9. 
287“οὐ γὰρ σὺν Χριστῷ ἐστιν ἅμα τῷ ἀναλῦσαι, εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ αἷμα.” Ibid., 
23.15. 
288On the doctrine of apotheosis in Origen, see Russell, 140-154. 
289“ἡ μέν τις ἐπὶ ‘τὰ μνήματα’, ἔνθα καὶ ὤφθη σκιοειδῶν ψυχῶν 
‘φαντάσματα’, ἡ δέ τις ἁπαξαπλῶς περὶ τὴν γῆν.” Contra Celsum 7.5.11. 




about stages and pilgrimages leading to God. He writes regarding these pilgrimages of 
the soul that “we understand these pilgrimages only dully and darkly so long as the 
pilgrimage still lasts. But when the soul has returned to its rest, that is, to the fatherland in 
paradise, it will be taught more truly and will understand more truly what the meaning of 
its pilgrimage was.”291 
Origen gives a demonstration of this interpretation by interpreting Num 33, 
describing how the various stages of the flight from Egypt can be understood to apply to 
the soul’s movement toward God. In harmony with his general theory of hermeneutics, 
which relies on the three-fold understanding of humanity, Origen states that beyond the 
historical account given, there is a two-fold understanding to the flight from Egypt which 
applies to the soul. The first refers to the soul’s movement before death and the second 
refers to what occurs after the resurrection. He writes, “Employing a double line of 
interpretation, we must examine the entire order of stages as it is narrated, so that our soul 
may make progress by both interpretations, when we learn from them either how we 
ought to live the life that turns from error and follows the Law of God or how great an 
expectation we have of the future hope that is promised on the basis of the 
resurrection.”292 
                                                 
mysticis, ut dixi, descriptionibus edocemur adscensum animae ad coelum et 
resurrectionis ex mortuis sacramentum.” In Numeros homiliae 27.4. On the challenges to 
the soul during the ascent, see Tripolitis, The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of 
Plotinus and Origen, 124-130. 
291“Sed hebescit harum intellectus et obscuratur, donec adhuc peregrinatur; tunc 
autem verius edocebitur et verius intelliget, quae fuerit ratio peregrinationis suae, cum 
regressa fuerit ad requiem suam, id est ad patriam suam paradisum.” In Numeros 
homiliae 27.4. 
292“Duplici igitur expositione utentes omnem hunc, qui recitatus est, considerare 
debemus ordinem mansionum, ut ex utroque sit animae nostrae profectus, agnoscentibus 




Origen notes that Ramses means “confused agitation” and Succoth is translated 
“tent.” “Thus, the first progress of the soul is to be taken away from earthly agitation and 
to learn that it must dwell in tents like a wanderer, so that it can be, as it were, ready for 
battle and meet those who lie in wait for it unhindered and free.”293 In this way, Origen 
interprets the stages from Egypt to the Jordan River. 
He supports this notion of the soul on a pilgrimage to rest with references to 
passages from the Psalms such as Ps 119:6 (LXX), “My soul has long been on 
pilgrimage,” and Ps 116:7 where the Psalmist writes, “Return, O my soul, to your rest; 
for the Lord has dealt bountifully with you.” These are mysteries and Origen thus asks, 
“Who will be found worthy and so understanding of the divine mysteries that he can 
describe the stages of that journey and ascent of the soul and explain either the toils or the 
rest of each different place?”294 In the end, he writes, “When the soul has made its 
journey through all these virtues and has climbed to the height of perfection, it then 
‘passes’ from the world and ‘separates’ from it, as it is written of Enoch, ‘And he was not 
found because God had taken him across.’”295 Elsewhere, Origen turns to the story of 
                                                 
vel futurae spei, quae ex resurrectione promittitur, quanta sit exspectatio.” In Numberos 
homiliae 27.6. For a similar usage, this time applying the ten plagues to the soul, see In 
Exodum homiliae 4.8. 
293“Igitur primus animae profectus est, ut auferatur a commotione terrena et sciat 
sibi tamquam peregrinanti et iter agenti in tabernaculis habitandum, quo velut in 
procinctu posita adversum insidiantes expedita occurrere possit et libera.” In Numeros 
homiliae 27.9. 
294“Et quis ita invenietur idoneus et divinorum conscius secretorum, qui possit 
itineris istius et adscensionis animae describere mansiones et uniuscuiusque loci vel 
labores explicare vel requies?” In Numeros homiliae 27.4. 
295“Ubi enim per has omnes virtutes iter egerit anima et ad summam perfectionis 
adscenderit, transit iam de saeculo et abscedit, sicut scriptum est de Enoc: ‘et non 
inveniebatur, quia transtulerat illum Deus.’” Ibid., 27.12. 
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Jacob’s ladder for support of the following. He writes, “Celsus, too, agreeably to the 
opinion of Plato, asserts that souls can make their way to and from the earth through the 
planets.”296 Origen notes that the story of Jacob’s ladder either hints at Plato’s doctrine or 
at something greater, as do the visions of different gates in Ezek 48 and the various 
foundations and gates of the New Jerusalem in Rev 21.297 
The theory of the descent and ascent of souls helps to solve Origen’s concern 
regarding predestination and the soul’s free will. He especially mentions Mal 1:2-3 as 
interpretive of Gen 25:25-26 regarding God’s regard for Jacob over Esau. This theory of 
descent based on prior actions, Origen writes, will cause one to “come to the same 
conclusion respecting the nature of souls, and (believe) that this was the reason why 
Jacob was beloved before he was born into this world, and Esau hated, while he still was 
contained in the womb of his mother.”298 Noting 2 Tim 2:20, where both vessels made 
for honor and for dishonor are made from the same lump of clay, Origen argues that all 
souls have one nature.299 Origen thus concludes, “Whence we are of opinion that, seeing 
the soul, as we have frequently said, is immortal and eternal, it is possible that, in the 
                                                 
296“Καὶ τὸ ὁδὸν δὲ εἶναι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐς γῆν καὶ ἀπὸ γῆς Κέλσος μὲν 
κατὰ Πλάτωνά φησι γίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν πλανήτων.” Contra Celsum 6.21.6. 
297Ibid., 6.23. 
298“Non videtur absurdum eodem ordine atque eadem consequentia discutientes 
nos antiquiores causas, eadem etiam de animarum sentire ratione, et hoc esse in causa 
quod Iacob dilectus est etiam antequam huic mundo nasceretur, et Esau odio habitus est, 
dum adhuc in ventre matris haberetur.” De principiis 3.1.22. In this context, Origen is 
fighting the understanding of the nature of souls taught by certain of the Gnostics who 
suggest three types of souls that effectively determined whether one would be saved or 
lost. 
299“Unam etenim naturam omnium esse dicimus rationabilium animarum, sicut 
‘una luti massa subiacere figulo’ designatur.” Ibid., 3.1.21. 
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many and endless periods of duration in the immeasurable and different worlds, it may 
descend from the highest good to the lowest evil, or be restored from the lowest evil to 
the highest good.”300 
Origen is not always clear on the distinction between understanding or nous and 
the soul, especially in the context of his theory of the ascent and descent of souls. Though 
he separates them clearly in his discussion of the preexistent individual’s change from 
understanding to the soul and then back to understanding, yet he also speaks of 
understanding in respect of the human person living on earth. Concerning the Christian 
who has a positive view of the Old Testament, he writes, “It [the Scriptures] will be the 
bread of life, which may nourish the soul with the food of truth and wisdom, and 
enlighten the mind, and cause it to drink from the cup of divine wisdom.”301 Here truth 
and wisdom from the Scriptures are applied to the soul. He refers to Prov 9:1-5 in support 
of this. He also makes reference to the “natural and innate longing of the soul for the 
thing itself.”302 He elsewhere writes of one who “would then know more clearly the 
reasons of all things which are done on earth, either respecting man, or the soul of man, 
or the mind; or regarding any other subject.”303 Here it seems that Origen thinks of these 
                                                 
300“Ex quo opinamur, quoniam quidem, sicut frequentius diximus, immortalis est 
anima et aeterna, quod in multis et sine fine spatiis per inmensa et diversa saecula 
possibile est, ut vel a summo bono ad infima mala descendat, vel ab ultimis malis ad 
summa bona reparetur.” Ibid., 3.1.23. Here again, Rufinus seems to summarize Origen’s 
thought. 
301“Sed ‘panem vitae’, qui veritatis et sapientiae cibis nutriat animam et inluminet 
mentem et potet eam divinae ‘sapientiae’ poculis.” De principiis 2.11.3. 
302“Quam naturalis sit et insita animae rei ipsius cupiditas inquiramus.” Ibid., 
2.11.4. 
303“Omnium quae geruntur in terris manifestius agnosceret rationes, id est vel de 




three as distinct entities. Elsewhere, he writes of the “means of which false knowledge is 
introduced into the minds of men, and human souls led astray.”304 He also writes of “the 
suggestions which are made to the soul, i.e., to the faculty of human thought.”305 It seems 
clear, then, that notwithstanding Origen’s suggestion of a change for the preexistent 
person from mind to soul in his theory of descent, yet the individual as soul does not lose 
its rational powers. 
Origen further describes his understanding of the rational faculties of the soul, 
“just as the Church’s dowry was the volumes of the Law and the Prophets, so let us 
regard natural law and reason and free will as the soul’s betrothal gifts.”306 He interprets 
this to mean that 
Every soul that has been first instructed in ethics and then practiced in natural 
philosophy, then the Word of God is drawn by means of all those things which, as we 
showed just now, are taught in the aforesaid studies—namely, amendment of 
manners, knowledge of affairs, and uprightness of conduct. And He is willing to be 
drawn, and comes very gladly to instructed souls; and He accepts their drawing of 
Him courteously, and kindly yields thereto.307 
In describing the ascending soul, Origen writes, “And thus the rational nature, 
growing by each individual step, not as it grew in this life in flesh, and body, and soul, 
                                                 
304“Quibus falsa scientia humanis mentibus inseritur et seducuntur animae.” Ibid., 
3.3.2. 
305“De his vero, quae a diversis spiritibus animae, id est humanis cogitationibus, 
suggeruntur.” Ibid., 3.3.6. 
306“Sicut enim ecclesiae dos fuit legis et prophetarum volumina, ita huic lex 
naturae et rationabilis sensus ac libertas arbitrii dotalia munera deputentur.” 
Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 1. 
307“Quaecumque anima fuerit erudita primo in moralibus, secundo etiam in 
naturalibus exercitata, per illa omnia, quae in his disciplinis edoceri supra ostendimus, 
ipsa morum emendatio et eruditio rerum ac probitas disciplinae ‘trahit ad se’ Verbum 
Dei; et libens ‘trahitur’, gratissime enim ad eruditas animas venit et ‘trahi’ se ab his 
indulgenter accipit benigne que concedit.” Ibid., 1.102. 
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but enlarged in understanding and in power of perception, is raised as a mind already 
perfect to perfect knowledge.”308 Here it is clear that body and soul are tied to this earth 
and that understanding is the key to the future life. In his Commentary on the Song of 
Songs, Origen notes that love is “that which leads the soul from earth to the lofty heights 
of heaven.”309 
Based on the appeal in Cant 1:8 to “know thyself,” Origen asserts that it is 
essential for the soul to know itself. He notes that it is difficult to explain what this means 
but he does attempt to provide a meaning. The soul should “know what she is like 
essentially, and what she is like according to her disposition. She should know . . . 
whether she is of a good disposition or not, and whether or not she is upright in intention; 
and, if she is in fact of an upright intention, whether, in thought as in action, she has the 
same zeal for all virtues, or only for necessary things and those that are easy.”310 To this 
he adds that the soul should know “whether she does these evil deeds of hers 
intentionally and because she likes them; or whether it is through some weakness.”311 
Also, the soul should know “whether she is greatly desirous of glory, or only slightly so, 
                                                 
308“Et ita crescens per singula rationabilis natura, non sicut in carne vel corpore 
et anima in hac vita crescebat, sed mente ac sensu aucta ad perfectam scientiam mens 
iam perfecta perducitur.” De principiis 2.11.7. 
309“Ostendere non aliud esse amoris vim nisi quae animam de terris ad fastigia 
caeli celsa perducat.” Commentarium in Canticum canticorum prol. 
310“Videtur ergo mihi duplici modo agnitionem sui capere animam debere, quid 
ve sit ipsa et qualiter moveatur, id est quid in substantia et quid in affectibus habeat; ut 
puta ut intelligat, si boni affectus sit aut non boni, et recti propositi aut non recti; et si 
quidem recti sit, si erga omnes virtutes eundem tenorem habeat, tam in intelligendo quam 
in agendo, an erga necessaria tantum et quae in promptu sunt.” Commentarium in 
Canticum canticorum 2.143. 
311“Sed et in eo opus videtur esse animae ‘cognoscentis semet ipsam’, si haec 
ipsa, quae operatur mala, ex affectu ea et studio operetur an fragilitate quadam.” Ibid. 
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or not in the least.”312 Origen also notes that the soul who knows herself should perceive 
“whether she makes her offerings and bestows her gifts in a spirit of sharing . . . or 
whether she does so, as it is said, with sadness or of necessity.”313 He adds that the soul 
should “find out whether she is easily moved by the hearing of some apparent truth and 
carried away by the skill and grace of its verbal presentation.”314 He also asks “whether 
the soul puts on a body only once and, having laid it down, seeks for it no more; or 
whether, when it once has laid aside what it took, it takes it yet again; and, if it does so a 
second time, whether it keeps what it has taken always, or some day puts it off once 
more.”315 Origen responds to this question and asserts that based upon the biblical notion 
of a coming judgment, it must be clear that the soul does not keep putting on and off the 
body but must do so only once. This is another example of his usage of the biblical 
teaching of a future judgment in connection with the doctrine of the soul. 
Origen connects the sins of the soul with the fires of judgment. He writes, “So, 
when the soul has gathered together a multitude of evil works, and an abundance of sins 
against itself, at a suitable time all that assembly of evils boils up to punishment, and is 
                                                 
312“Adhuc et istud opus est animae ‘cognoscentis se’, si gloriae multum cupida sit 
aut parum aut omnino nihil.” Ibid., 2.144. 
313“Sed et in dando et accipiendo animae ‘cognoscentis semet ipsam’ sunt 
quaedam indicia, si quod tribuit et praebet, utrum communicabili affectu et quasi cui 
aequitatem haberi inter homines placeat, an, ut ille ait, ‘ex tristitia aut necessitate’ vel 
certe gratiam sive ab accipientibus sive ab audientibus quaerens.” Ibid. 
314“Utrum indifferenter habeat ea, quae accipit, an velut super aliquo bono 
gaudeat.” Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 2.144. 
315“Sed et illud requiritur, utrum semel tantum corpore induatur et id postmodum 
depositum ultra non quaerat, an cum semel susceptum deposuerit, iterum assumat; et si 
secundo, sumptum semper habeat an aliquando iterum abiciat.” Ibid., 2.147. 
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set on fire to chastisements.”316 Here it is suggested that the fire of hell is actually created 
by the soul itself, rather than from another source.317 He also describes the devil as one 
who “will either gain possession of us, or at least will pollute the soul, if he has not 
obtained the entire mastery over it.”318 He adds, “From which it is understood that around 
the substance of the soul certain tortures are produced by the hurtful affections of sins 
themselves.”319 As examples of this, he mentions “those passions which are wont to 
befall some souls, as when a soul is consumed by the fire of love, or wasted away by zeal 
or envy, or when the passion of anger is kindled, or one is consumed by the greatness of 
his madness or his sorrow.”320 Though Origen notes that the resurrected body of the 
damned cannot be dissolved by fire,321 yet he places the work of fire more directly on the 
soul. 
 
                                                 
316“Ita anima cum multitudinem malorum operum et abundantiam in se 
congregaverit peccatorum, conpetenti tempore omnis illa malorum congregatio 
effervescit ad supplicium atque inflammatur ad poenas.” De principiis 2.10.4. See Daley, 
56. 
317See James W. Armantage, “Will the Body Be Raised? Origen and the Origenist 
Controversies” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1970), 183. 
318“Aut obtineat nos aut certe vel polluat animam, si non penitus obtinere 
potuerit.” De principiis 3.2.4. 
319“Ex quo intellegitur quod circa ipsam animae substantiam tormenta quaedam 
ex ipsis peccatorum noxiis affectibus generantur.” De principiis 2.10.4. 
320“Considerari possibile est ex his passionum vitiis, quae animabus accidere 
solent, id est cum vel flammis amoris exuritur anima vel zeli aut livoris ignibus 
maceratur, aut cum irae agitatur insania vel tristitiae inmensitate consumitur.” Ibid. See 
also Contra Celsum 8.51.22. 
321De principiis 2.10.3. 
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Hell and Paradise 
Origen seems to suggest a healing purpose for the fire of hell. He speaks of God 
as the physician of our souls.322 In this context he writes of God “desiring to remove the 
defects of our souls, which they had contracted from their different sins and crimes” and 
then he adds the “punishment of fire to those who have lost their soundness of mind.”323 
He adds, “If any one, then, at his leisure gather together out of the whole of Scripture all 
the enumerations of diseases which in the threats addressed to sinners are called by the 
names of bodily maladies, he will find that either the vices of souls, or their punishments, 
are figuratively indicated by them.”324 This idea that Scripture lists the diseases of the 
soul is referred to when he writes, “In the Holy Scriptures the sicknesses of the soul are 
enumerated and the remedies described.”325 Origen refers to the parable of the sower who 
sowed on various types of soils, including rocky soil, and describes the rocks as 
representing the human soul.326 Elsewhere, he also references the purification purpose of 
                                                 
322“Multa sunt etiam alia quae nos latent, quae illi soli cognita sunt, qui est 
medicus animarum nostrarum.” Ibid., 2.10.6. See also In Leuiticum homiliae 7.1. On the 
relationship between the illnesses of the soul and the body in earlier Greek thought, see 
David Bostock, “Medical Theory and Theology in Origen,” in Origeniana Tertia, ed. 
Richard Hanson et al. (Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1985), 192-193. 
323“Quanto magis intellegendum est medicum nostrum deum volentem diluere 
vitia animarum nostrarum, quae ex peccatorum et scelerum diversitate collegerant, uti 
huiuscemodi poenalibus curis, insuper etiam ignis inferre supplicium his, qui sanitatem 
animae perdiderunt?” De principiis 2.10.6. See Daley, 57. 
324“Si qui ergo ex otio de omni scriptura congreget omnes languorum 
commemorationes, quae in comminatione peccatoribus velut corporearum aegritudinum 
appellationibus memorantur, inveniet quod animarum vel vitia vel supplicia per haec 
figuraliter indicentur.” De principiis 2.10.6. 
325“Et ideo in divinis Scripturis aegritudines animae numerantur et remedia 
describuntur.” Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 2.6.4. Latin text PG, Translation 
FC. 




the fires of punishment. He writes regarding the biblical Gehenna that it was “intended 
for the purification of such souls as are to be purified by torments, agreeably to the 
saying: ‘The Lord cometh like a refiner’s fire, and like fullers’ soap: and He shall sit as a 
refiner and purifier of silver and of gold.’”327 
The threat to destroy the world by fire is also interpreted by Origen as follows, 
“That, as the soul of man is immortal, the supposed threatening has for its object the 
conversion of the hearers.”328 He further writes that “we, however, know of no 
incorporeal substance that is destructible by fire, nor (do we believe) that the soul of man, 
or the substance of ‘angels,’ or of ‘thrones,’ or dominions,’ or ‘principalities,’ or 
‘powers,’ can be dissolved by fire.”329 He refers to several passages in Scripture for his 
assertion but none of the passages demonstrate his main point, that the soul is immaterial 
and thus cannot be destroyed by fire. 
Origen also is clear that there is a place called Hades where the souls of the 
wicked go.330 This is where Christ went after He died on the cross, to preach to the souls 
of the wicked.331 This is also where Samuel was when called up by the Witch of Endor at 
                                                 
3.1.14. 
327“τι εἰς τὸν περὶ κολάσεων τόπον, μεταλαμβανομένων εἰς τὴν μετὰ 
βασάνου κάθαρσιν τῶν τοιωνδὶ ψυχῶν.” Contra Celsum 6.25.33. See also 6.26. 
328“ἀθανάτου τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τυγχανούσης, ἡ μὲν 





ἐξουσιῶν ὑπόστασιν.” Contra Celsum 6.71.27 
330Ibid., 2.43. Cf. De principiis 4.3.10. 
3311 Pet 3:19-20. 
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Saul’s request.332 In concluding his homily on this story, he writes, “Therefore the souls 
of those who die, I may dare to say, have need of prophetic grace.”333 He does note that 
Christ threatens “that sentence that condemns body and soul to the fires of hell.”334 
As noted, Origen writes ambiguously regarding the actual events associated with 
the judgment of the soul, most especially the notion of an eternal-burning hell. In writing 
on the negative effects on the soul of sexual impurity, he mentions “the judgments which 
it will suffer, and the punishments which will be inflicted.”335 He adds, “See then how 
very bad sinning is, that they may be delivered to Satan, who holds captive the souls of 
those forsaken by God.”336 
Origen describes the resurrected soul as being “a perfect soul, and one furnished 
with the marks of incorruption.”337 He even notes that the soul can then be referred to as 
the clothing of the body based upon his interpretation of Rom 13:14. However, even after 
the resurrection, the body will still be situated according to the merits of the soul. He 
writes, regarding the flesh, that it “will be again raised from the earth, and shall after this, 
                                                 
332See De engastrimytho 8. 
333“τῆς οὖν χάριτος τῆς προφητικῆς αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν κοιμωμένων (<ἵνα> 
τολμήσω καὶ εἴπω) ἐδέοντο.” De engastrimytho 9.26. 
334“Ista sententia quae corpus et animam gehennae ignibus damnat.” 
Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 7.5.10. 




337“Perfecta anima et dogmatibus incorruptionis.” De principiis 2.3.2. There is 
some concern as to the precise meaning of the phrase. G. W. Butterworth translates it, 
“instructed in the doctrines of incorruption.” See also ibid., 3.6.4. 
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according to the merits of the indwelling soul, advance to the glory of a spiritual 
body.”338 
In regard to the various stages that he refers to in leading the ascent to God, he 
writes, “And in the case of each of them what purpose, what sojourn of use to the soul, or 
what instruction or enlightenment a person may receive is something only the Father of 
the age to come knows.”339 He adds more regarding this advancement: “When, therefore, 
all rational souls shall have been restored to a condition of this kind, then the nature of 
this body of ours will undergo a change into the glory of a spiritual body.”340 The 
spiritual body which Origen mentions is not to be confused with the body of flesh which 
humans have in this life and which they will also have following the resurrection. The 
ultimate goal is “when the soul, united to God, shall have been made one spirit with Him 
(the body even then ministering, as it were, to the spirit), attain to a spiritual condition 
and quality.”341 Here Origen relies on verses such as 1 Cor 15:28 when God has become 
                                                 
338“Rursum resuscitetur e terra et post hoc iam, prout meritum inhabitantis 
animae poposcerit, in gloriam ‘corporis’ proficiat ‘spiritalis.’” Ibid., 3.6.5. See also In 
Numeros homiliae 27.2. On the relationship of the soul and the body after death, see 
Armantage, 183-184; Mark J. Edwards, “Origen’s Two Resurrections,” Journal of 
Theological Studies, n.s. 46, no. 2 (1995): 502-513; Tripolitis, The Doctrine of the Soul in 
the Thought of Plotinus and Origen, 114-116. On the connection to astral bodies, see 
Henri Crouzel, “La thème platonicien du ‘véhicule de l’âme’ chez Origène,” Didaskalia 7 
(1977): 232; Scott, Origen and Life, 150-157. 
339“Quid utilitatis animae commoratio, quid ve eruditionis aut illuminationis 
accipiat, scit ille solus ‘futuri saeculi pater.’” In Numeros homiliae 27.2. On akoloutheo 
in Origen, see Steven L. Chase, “‘What Happens Next?’ Biblical Exegesis and the Path 
of the Soul’s Journey in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa,” The Patristic and Byzantine 
Review 10, no. 1-2 (1991): 40-44; Dupuis, 165-175. 
340“Cum ergo restitutae fuerint omnes rationabiles animae in huiuscemodi statum, 
tunc etiam natura huius corporis nostri in ‘spiritalis corporis’ gloriam perducetur.” De 
principiis 3.6.6. 
341“Cum anima adiuncta deo ‘unus’ cum eo ‘spiritus’ fuerit effecta, iam tum 
corpus quasi spiritui ministrans in statum qualitatem que proficiat spiritalem.” Ibid. 
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“all in all”342 and the imago dei conception of humanity from Gen 1:26-28.343 He adds to 
this the notion “we will be like Him” from 1 John 3:2 and “Father, I will that . . . as You 
and I are one, they also may be one in Us,” alluding to John 17:21.344 
One reason for the perceived lack of emphasis on the judgment in Origen may be 
attributed to his theory of universal salvation. Origen asserts that “our belief is, that the 
Word shall prevail over the entire rational creation, and change every soul into His own 
perfection.”345 He adds, “For stronger than all the evils in the soul is the Word, and the 
healing power that dwells in Him.”346 In defense of this notion, Origen writes, “Many 
things are said obscurely in the prophecies on the total destruction of evil, and the 
restoration to righteousness of every soul.”347 He quotes from Zeph 3:7-13 as biblical 
support pointing especially to statements such as “All shall call upon the name of the 
Lord, and serve Him with one consent; also that all contemptuous reproach shall be taken 
away, and there shall be no longer any injustice, or vain speech or a deceitful tongue.”348 
                                                 
342Ibid., 3.6.2. 
343Cf. In Leuiticum homiliae 4.3 where Origen writes, “God entrust ‘his own 
image and likeness’ to your own soul.” Ipsi animae tuae Deus ‘imaginem suam et 
similitudinem’ commendavit. 
344De principiis 3.6.1. 
345“ἡμεῖς δὲ τῆς λογικῆς φύσεώς φαμεν ὅλης κρατῆσαί ποτε τὸν λόγον 
καὶ μεταποιῆσαι πᾶσαν ψυχὴν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελειότητα.” Contra Celsum 
8.72.13. 
346“Πάντων γὰρ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ κακῶν δυνατώτερος ὢν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐν 
αὐτῷ θεραπεία προσάγει κατὰ βούλησιν θεοῦ ἑκάστῳ αὐτήν.” Ibid., 8.72.20. 
See Daley, 58. 
347“Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν αἱ προφητεῖαι περὶ τῆς παντελοῦς ἀναιρέσεως τῶν 





While Origen is not dogmatic on this idea, it, along with the notion of the prior existence 
of souls, is perhaps the most contentious teaching associated with Origen. 
For Origen, the place where the saints go who depart this life is called paradise. 
He describes it as “some place of instruction, and, so to speak, class-room or school of 
souls.”349 This is a good example of Origen’s conception of an ascent through 
understanding, which the soul embarks on once one dies. He also describes Paul, after his 
death, as becoming “the Apostle not only of the Gentiles but also of the Israelites and 
possibly of other invisible creatures in that place where the spirits and souls of the just are 
praising the Lord, singing a hymn to him and highly exalting him forever.”350  
Origen, along with all the early Church Fathers, did not teach the transmigration 
of souls.351 He writes that souls “are not driven on in a cycle which returns after many 
ages to the same round.”352 There was the serious charge by his detractors that Origen 
taught that the human soul could be reincarnated in a beast. This has been suggested from 
Origen’s comments on Lev 20:16 where an animal is put to death for sodomy. Origen 
                                                 
349“Velut in quodam eruditionis loco est, ut ita dixerim, auditorio vel schola 
animarum.” De principiis 2.11.6. Even the apostles were in need of further training after 
death. Cf. In Numeros homiliae 25.6. Daley notes that the righteous souls still play an 
active role in the life of the living. Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 15.35; 
Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 13.58. He also notes that the martyrs and all the 
righteous souls of the dead “intercede for the living and help Christ in his work of 
purifying.” Exhortatio ad martyrium 30.38; In Numeros homiliae 24.1; Homiliae in 
Canticorum 3; Daley, 56.  
350“Et apostolum futurum etiam post exitum suum non solum gentium, sed et 
Israelitarum, et aliorum fortassis invisibilium, ibi ubi benedicunt spiritus et animae 
justorum Dominum, humnum dicunt, et superexaltant eum in saecula?” Commentarii in 
epistulam ad Romanos 8.10.2. 
351This did not stop others from accusing Origen of holding this doctrine. 
352“Non enim cursu aliquo in eosdem se circulos post multa saecula revolvente 
aguntur animae.” De principiis 2.3.4. See Hoheisel, 41-42. 
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notes that only the human soul can be punished and held culpable for wrong deeds.353 
Elsewhere, in discussing the prophecy concerning Elijah he writes, “In this place it does 
not appear to me that by Elijah the soul is spoken of, lest I should fall into the dogma of 
transmigration, which is foreign to the church of God.”354 
 
Summary 
The soul is an invisible substance with the power of thought and movement. 
Though Origen does use soul for life and to refer to individuals and even races of people, 
he clearly intends, more often than not, that by soul he means a separated, psychological 
entity from the body. It is, however, affected by the actions of the body, though Origen 
does not spend as much time emphasizing this as Clement of Alexandria does. The soul is 
not good by nature. It can be overcome with emotions. Origen describes it in negative 
terms. It is, however, endowed with free will and a rational faculty and must choose to 
follow either the flesh or the Spirit. The choice to follow the Spirit is made from 
knowledge and by the aid of Christ’s instruction. At times, even, he can refer salvation 
only to the nous rather than the soul. 
Origen allegorizes the possible physical attributes of the soul. He argues that the 
                                                 
353De principiis 1.8.4. 
354“Ἐν τούτοις Ἠλίασ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ <Ἠλίου> δοκεῖ μοι λέγεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ 
ἐμπίπτω εἰς τὸ ἀλλότριον” Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 13.1.46. See 
Norbert Brox, “The Early Christian Debate on the Migration of Souls,” in Reincarnation 
or Resurrection, ed. Hermann Häring et al. (London: SCM Press, 1993), 76-80; Daniélou, 
“Origène comme exégète de la Bible,” 249-250; Dupuis, 127-142; Mark J. Edwards, 
Origen Against Plato (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 98-99; Lies, “Origenes und 
Reinkarnation,” no. 3, 143. On the notion of transmigration from human to angels, see 
Edwards, Origen Against Plato, 100-101. On the connection of this teaching to that of the 
preexistence of the soul, see Ugo Bianchi, “Origen’s Treatment of the Soul and the 
Debate over Metensomatosis,” in Origeniana Quarta, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck: 
Tyrolia, 1987), 274-275. 
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hands or eyes of the soul refer to the various powers of the soul associated with the 
physical symbol. 
One of Origen’s key elements in his doctrine of the soul that has caused concern 
in the eyes of fellow Christians is his theory regarding the prior existence of the soul, 
which is combined with his theory of the soul’s descent to the material world and its 
ascent back to God. The idea of the soul’s prior existence is directly connected with his 
notion of free will and God’s ultimate fairness in not being unjust in condemning some to 
death and others to life. Thus he notes Paul’s assertion in Romans that before their birth, 
God loved Jacob and hated Esau. Origen thus concluded that this could be fair only if 
their souls had existed prior to their birth on this earth and had the opportunity to choose 
right and wrong. In defending the free will of the soul, Origen quotes a variety of verses 
including Rom 6:12 and Matt 11:30. He also quotes Deut 30:15 and Luke 2:52. The 
connection between free will and the soul’s prior existence is very strong for Origen. 
Based upon Gen 1:26-27, the soul is created imago dei but is not coeternal with 
God. It does, however, have certain divine qualities. This verse, however, refers to its 
original creation, not the physical creation of humankind described in Gen 2:7. Origen 
suggests that stars and other celestial bodies have souls, relying here on Job 25:5 and Isa 
45:12. Quoting Lev 17:10 and Isa 1:13-14, he also argues that God has a soul. He quotes 
Ps 22:19-20, John 10:18; Matt 26:38, and John 12:27 to prove that Christ also has a soul. 
Following the tradition of earlier Fathers, Origen argues that Christ’s soul went down to 
Hades to preach to wicked souls there at the time of His crucifixion based upon 1 Pet 
3:19-20. 
Origen also argues that a human person cannot beget a soul. Here he relies on 
1 Cor 4:15 and Gal 4:19 in Paul’s writings, as well as noting that in the creation account, 
Adam states only that Eve is bone of his bone, not soul of his soul. The human person, in 
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this life, is a composite of body and soul. He quotes here 1 Thess 5:23, referencing Paul’s 
statement describing the trichotomy of the human individual. 
To interpret several scriptural texts which suggest a material nature in the soul 
(Lev 17:11; Deut 12:33; Gen 9:4), Origen turns to Paul, quoting 2 Cor 4:16, Rom 7:22, 
and Col 3:9-10 where Paul writes of the inner and outer man. He thus argues that the soul 
of Lev 2:1 and that of Lev 1:2 refers differently to the inner and outer person. 
Origen argues for the soul’s immortality based upon several different arguments. 
One is its creation in the imago dei. He also argues that an essence which is immortal 
cannot be changed to one that is mortal, thus the soul does not die with the body. He also 
argues that the soul must be immortal and survive the death of the body in order to 
experience the future judgment. He uses 1 Pet 3:19-20, describing Christ’s descent to 
Hades, along with 1 Sam 28 and Saul’s meeting with Samuel through the Witch of Endor 
to further corroborate the notion that the soul survives the death of the body. He also 
begins a new trend in the use of various Scriptures by applying Luke 23:43 and Rev 6:9-
11 literally and thus suggesting that the souls of the righteous do not go to Hades but 
immediately begin their ascent to God. The souls of the wicked are confined to Hades but 
the fires there are meant as cleansing rather than as destroying, thus lending credence to 
his proposal that, ultimately, all might be saved. 
Origen notes that the Scriptures do speak of the death of the soul and he therefore 
gives several different usages of death that are to be found in the Scriptures. He notes that 
the soul can die to sin and in this sense it is mortal. However, he argues, it cannot die the 
natural death associated with the body and in this respect it must be immortal. 
 
Gregory Thaumaturgos 
Gregory Thaumaturgos (The Wonderworker) was a student of Origen’s at 
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Caesarea. He wrote a Metaphrase on Ecclesiastes along with an Oration and Panegyric 
Addressed to Origen.355 He also wrote a Canonical Letter and an apologetic work to 
Theopompus. Several other works including a brief Treatise on the Soul are generally 
thought to be spurious. 
 
Usage of Psyche 
Gregory describes the soul as the “ruling powers in man.”356 He writes that “the 
soul is able to arrest the body in its disposition to intoxication and wine-bibbing, and that 
temperance makes lust its subject.”357 Gregory writes that “the soul is free, and cannot be 
coerced by any means, not even though one should confine it and keep guard over it in 
some secret prison-house.”358 He also uses the concept “know yourself.” He writes that 
“in this there is one virtue common to God and to man; while the soul is exercised in 
beholding itself as in a mirror, and reflects the divine mind in itself.”359 Note Gregory’s 
presumed similarity between the soul and the mind of God. 
Gregory states that “words are nothing else than a kind of imagery of the 
                                                 
355On Gregory’s works, see John Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphase of 
Ecclesiastes (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990); Moreschini and Norelli, 308-312; Horst 
Schneider, “Gregory the Wonderworker,” DECL, 270. 
356“αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ κυριώτατα, ψυχή.” In Origenem oratio panegyrica 6.81. 
357“Λογισάμενος δὲ, ὅτι ψυχὴ δύναται στῆσαι μεθύουσαν καὶ ῥέουσαν 
ὥσπερ οἶνον σώματος φύσιν, ἐγκράτεια δὲ δουλοῦται ἐπιθυμίαν.” Metaphrasis 
in Ecclesiasten Salamonis 992.16 
358“Ψυχὴ γὰρ ἐλεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἐγκατάκλειστον οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ, οὐδ᾽ 
ἂν ἐν οἰκίσκῳ καθείρξας τηρῇς.” In Origenem oratio panegyrica 6.84. 
359“τὴν αὐτὴν ὄντως οὖσαν θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετήν, αὐτῆς τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἑαυτὴν ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ὁρᾶν μελετώσης καὶ τὸν θεῖον νοῦν, εἰ 
ἀξία γένοιτο τῆς κοινωνίας τῆσδε.” Ibid.,  11.51. 
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dispositions of our soul”360 and that by them “we represent the native dispositions of our 
soul”361 and endeavor “to exhibit the impressions of the figures of our soul.”362 He also 
writes of the “capacity of our mind which deals critically with words and reasonings, 
[being] educated in a rational manner; not according to the judgments of illustrious 
rhetoricians.”363 
Gregory describes Origen, his teacher, as one who had “so deeply studied the 
clear and luminous oracles of God, as to be able at once to receive their meaning into his 
own soul, and to convey it to others.”364 He also describes Origen as having been given 
“the gift of investigating and unfolding and explaining … so that, if there chanced to be 
any one of obtuse and incredulous soul, or one again thirsting for instruction, he might 
learn from this man.”365 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Gregory does not develop a doctrine of the soul. He does not use the Scriptures in 
his discussions at all. 
                                                 
360“ Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ εἰκόνες τινές εἰσι τῶν <τῆς ψ>υχῆς ἡμῶν 
παθημάτων αἱ λέξεις ἡμῶν.” Ibid., 1.44. 
361“ τὰ πρωτότυπα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν <παθη>μάτων.” Ibid., 2.6. 
362“ὑποφαίνειν τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς τύπων.” Ibid., 2.8. 
363“ Οὕτως μὲν τὸ περὶ τὰς λέξεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους κριτικὸν ἡμῶν τῆς 
ψυχῆς μέρος λογικῶς ἐξεπαιδεύετο∙ οὐ κατὰ τὰς καλῶν ῥητόρων κρίσεις.” In 
Origenem oratio panegyrica 7.86. 
364“ὧν αὐτός τε ἔγνων καὶ ἑτέρων ἤκουσα περί τινων λεγόντων, 
μεμελετηκότι τὰ καθαρὰ τῶν λογίων φωτεινά τε παραδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τῇ 
ψυχῇ καὶ διδάσκεσθαι ἑτέρους.” Ibid., 15.18. 
365“ἵν᾽ εἴ τις σκληρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἄπιστος ἢ καὶ φιλομαθὴς ὢν τύχοι, 





Gregory is very reflective of the thought of his teacher, Origen. He connects the 
soul with the mind and learning. He teaches that the soul should know itself and that in so 
doing, it will be reflecting the divine mind. He also argues for the free will of the soul and 
notes that the soul is free and cannot be coerced by outside forces. He does not use 
Scripture in the development of a doctrine of the soul. 
 
Methodius 
The only complete, extant work of Methodius is titled The Banquet of the Ten 
Virgins or the Symposium.366 He wrote several other works which survive only in 
fragments of part of an eleventh-century Slavic translation including On the Resurrection, 
On Things Created, and On Free Will, though some scholars list the latter as being of 
doubtful authorship.367 He is well noted for his anti-Origenist stance in his works.368  
 
Usage of Psyche 
Methodius uses soul to refer to people. He writes in describing Ps 137:1-2, “For 
why do the souls declare that they were asked by those who led them captive to sing the 
                                                 
366On Methodius’s works, see Moreschini and Norelli, 313-316; Lloyd G. 
Patterson, Methodius of Olympus: Divine Sovereignty, Human Freedom, and Life in 
Christ (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 1-4; Judith 
Pauli and Christiane Schmidt, “Methodius of Olympus,” DECL, 421-423. On 
Methodius’s use of dialogue, see M. Hoffmann, Der Dialog bei den christlichen 
Schriftstellern der ersten Vier Jarhunderte, 67-83; Patterson, 11-13. 
367Patterson, 21-34. 
368Ibid., 4-7; Jean Pépin, Idées grecques sur l’homme et sur Dieu (Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres, 1971), 172-175. Patterson notes that while Methodius was critical of 
Origen, yet he was indebted to Origen’s scriptural interpretation. 
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Lord’s song in a strange land?”369 He writes that those “souls which take care of the 
body, place around the outward neck of the flesh this visible ornament to deceive those 
who behold.” He also writes, “Undoubtedly these are the souls whom the Word calls 
alone His chosen spouse and His sister.”370 Similarly, “For such fruits do the souls bring 
forth with whom Christ has had intercourse.”371 
Methodius also notes that the soul can be influenced by the deeds of the flesh. In 
the context of passions, Methodius writes of the sense of the soul: “For the senses of the 
soul, . . . when, being overcome by the excitements to passion which fall upon them from 
without, they receive the sudden bursts of the waves of folly which rush into them, being 
darkened turn aside from the divine course its whole vessel.”372 Here the soul is described 
as having the power of sense which can be overpowered by an outside influence of 
passions. In a similar context, he writes of a woman “decorating herself with textures of 
different cloths, or with stones and gold, and other decorations of the body, things which 
intoxicate the soul.”373 Elsewhere he writes of “the passions which obscure and cloud the 
                                                 
369“Τί δή ποτε ἐπηρωτῆσθαι πρὸς τῶν αἰχμαλωτιστῶν ὁμολογοῦσιν αἱ 
ψυχαὶ τὴν ᾠδὴν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀλλοτρίας ᾆσαι κυρίου ἢ πάντως.” Symposium sive 
Convivium decem virginum 4.4.14. 
370“Ἀμέλει ταύτας μόνον ἐκλεκτὴν νύμφην τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ γνησίαν ὁ 
λόγος ἑαυτοῦ καλεῖ, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς παλλακὰς καὶ νεάνιδας καὶ θυγατέρας.” 
Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum 7.3.2. 
371“Τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἀποβλαστήματα φύουσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀείμνηστον 
φέροντα κάλλος, ὁπόσαις ἂν ὁ Χριστὸς συνανακραθῇ.” Ibid., 7.4.17. 
372“Αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις τῆς (15) ψυχῆς, ὡς οἱ τούτων ἔφασαν ἐπιστήμονες, 
ἐπειδὰν τῶν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων παθῶν ἡσσηθεῖσαι προσδέξωνται τὰς 
ἐπιφορὰς τοῦ τῆς ἀνοίας ἐπικλύσαντος εἴσω κύματος.” Ibid., 4.2.16. 
373“Καὶ εἰ χρὴ φάναι λόγῳ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀληθεῖ, πᾶν τὸ μέθην φέρον καὶ 
ἔκστασιν τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ τὸν οἶνον τὸν ἐξ ἀμπέλου σίκερα κικλήσκουσιν οἱ 
σοφοί.” Ibid., 5.6.16. 
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mind, which increase in us from our luxuriousness and carelessness.”374 Chastity is the 
most useful in controlling the outside passions. Methodius writes, “Nothing can so much 
profit a man, O fair virgins, with respect to moral excellence, as chastity; for chastity 
alone accomplishes and brings it about that the soul should be governed in the noblest 
and best way, and should be set free, pure from the stains and pollutions of the world.”375 
Elsewhere, he writes, “For it speedily brings great and much-desired gifts of hope to 
those who strive for it, drying up the corrupting lusts and passions of the soul.”376 Here 
Methodius notes that abstaining from a physical act will prevent passions from 
overcoming the soul. 
Methodius argues that there is a difference between male and female souls. In 
describing the murder of the Jewish boys by the command of Pharaoh, he writes that 
Pharaoh, as a type of the devil, “took care to have the male and rational offspring of the 
soul carried away and destroyed by the streams of passions, but he longs for the carnal 
and irrational offspring to increase and multiply.”377 This discussion is rare among the 
Fathers, having only been discussed previously by Clement of Alexandria, who uses the 
Bible to claim that there is no difference between male and female souls. 
                                                 
374“τὰ ἐπισκοτοῦντα καὶ καλύπτοντα πάθη τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς 




ποιεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ἐργάζεται ἁγνεία.” Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum 
10.1.16. 
376“τὰ λυμαντήρια τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπομαραίνουσα πάθη καὶ 
ὑπεκκαύματα.” Ibid., 5.3.23. 
377“τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα καὶ νοητὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονα ὑπὸ τῶν ῥευστῶν 
παραφέρεσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖσθαι παθῶν σπουδὴν ἔσχε, τὰ δὲ σαρκικὰ καὶ 
αἰσθητὰ αὐξάνεσθαί τε καὶ πληθύνεσθαι γλίχεται.” Ibid., 4.2.36. 
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Methodius has a two-fold understanding of the senses of the body as they are 
described in Scripture, similar to that of Origen. He writes in commenting on Song of 
Solomon 4:9-12, “For it is clear to every one that there is a twofold power of sight, the 
one of the soul, and the other of the body.”378 This dual application of the sense is 
reminiscent of Origen’s interpretation. 
Methodius mentions the eye of the soul, writing, “And He says that they shall 
look upon God with confidence, because they bring in nothing that darkens or confuses 
the eye of the soul for the beholding of God.”379 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
In discussing the creation, Methodius writes of “the sending down of our souls 
from heaven, and their descent into the bodies.”380 In this context, he does not, however, 
intend a kind of preexistence for the soul along the lines suggested by Origen but rather 
suggests this as its origin. 
Methodius uses the imago dei concept from Gen 1:27. He writes that “the souls of 
men do then most accurately resemble Him who begat and formed them, when, reflecting 
the unsullied representation of His likeness, and the features of that countenance, to 
which God looking formed them to have an immortal and indestructible shape, they 
                                                 
378“Δισσὴν γὰρ ὄψεως δύναμιν εἶναι παντί που καταφανές, μίαν μὲν 
ψυχῆς, θατέραν δὲ σώματος.” Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum 7.2.6. 
379“μετὰ παρρησίας ἀποφθέγγεται ‘τὸν Θεόν’, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐπισκοτοῦν ἢ 
συνταράσσον τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἐπιφέρονται 
θεωρίαν.” Ibid., Epiloge.1.60. 
380“τὴν δὲ προσκειμένην εἴσοδον τοῖς ὄρεσι τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανῶν εἰς τὰ 




remain such.”381 Elsewhere he writes that God “creating and arranging, made the soul 
after the image of His image. Therefore, also, it is reasonable and immortal.”382 
Methodius writes of the body as the garment of the soul.383 He suggests, on the 
basis of Gen 2:7, that while one might argue that the creation of the body happens apart 
from the command of God, yet the soul is not fashioned in this way. In this context, 
Methodius notes that the soul is the “undying and undecaying part” and “the invisible and 
indestructible.”384 This is in line with his notion of the soul’s immortal nature. 
Methodius writes of “accomplishing in the receptacle of the soul, as in a womb, 
the blameless will of the Word.”385 This demonstrates that for Methodius, the soul is 
where the decisions made by an individual take place. Methodius also argues for the 
freedom of the soul. He writes, in describing Paul’s call to virginity, “that none of those 
things which conduce to sanctification should be of necessity and by compulsion, but 
according to the free purpose of the soul, for this is acceptable to God.”386 
                                                 
381“Ἀπηκρίβωνται γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ τῷ γεννήσαντι τότε μάλιστα καὶ 
πλασαμένῳ, ὁπότε τὴν ‘καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν’ ἰδέαν ἄχραντον ἐκλάμπουσαι καὶ 
τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῆς ὄψεως ἐκεί.” Ibid., 6.1.15. 
382“καὶ κτίζον καὶ μετασκευάζον ἐτεκτήνατο ‘κατ’ εἰκόνα’ τῆς εἰκόνος 
ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ψυχήν. Διὸ καὶ λογικὴ καὶ ἀθάνατός ἐστι.” Symposium sive 
Convivium decem virginum 7.2.6.., 6.1.25. 
383“τὸν χιτῶνα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν σάρκινον τοῦτον.” Ibid., 2.7.2. 
384“Τὸ γὰρ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήρων μόνος ὁ παντοκράτωρ ἐμφυσᾷ, ᾗ καὶ 
μόνος τῶν ἀοράτων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνωλέθρων ποιητής.” Ibid., 2.7.6. 
385“ἀνατροφὴν μήτρας δίκην ἐν τῷ δοχείῳ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θέλημα 
τελεσφορήσαντες ἀλώβητον τοῦ λόγου.” Ibid., 3.8.64. 
386“ὅπως δὴ μηδὲν τῶν εἰς ἁγιασμὸν ἀναφερομένων κατ’ ἀνάγκην 
γένοιτο καὶ βίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτεξούσιον ψυχῆς— τοῦτο γὰρ 
πρόσφορον θεῷ.” Ibid., 3.13.17. 
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Methodius argues that Paul’s call to virginity is placed only to those endowed 
with such a gift. And to the others he “advise[d] them to marry, lest in their time of manly 
strength, the flesh stirring up the desires and passions, they should be goaded on to defile 
the soul.”387 Chastity, Methodius argues, is most helpful in controlling the passions. He 
gives as support of this notion an allegorical interpretation of Judg 9:8-15, Jotham’s poem 
after the lords of Shechem made Abimelech king over them. This, Methodius interprets 
to be about souls, not trees. The olive is compared to the compassion and mercy of God, 
the fig is the command given in Eden to Adam, and the vine is the command given to 
Noah after the flood. The bramble, however, represents the law given to the Apostles.388 
These are given other interpretations as well389 but all rely on this allegorical 
interpretation of Scripture. He also refers to Zech 4:1-3 as support of the notion that the 
olive represents the law of Moses.390 
Methodius writes of sin as passions of the soul. In arguing against the notion of 
destiny, he writes that “either education and habit are the cause of sins, or the passions of 
the soul, and those desires which arise through the body.”391 In this context he writes of 
two kinds of desire. “There are two motions in us, the lust of the flesh and that of the 
soul, differing from each other, whence they have received two names, that of virtue and 
                                                 
387“ἵνα μὴ καιρῷ τῆς ἀκμῆς σφυγμοὺς καὶ φλεγμονὰς παρεχούσης 
αὐτοῖς τῆς σαρκὸς ἀσχημονῶσιν οἰστρηλατούμενοι τὴν ψυχήν.” Symposium 
sive Convivium decem virginum 3.14.6. 
388Ibid., 10.2. 
389See ibid., 10.3-4. 
390Ibid., 10.6. 
391“Ἤτοι ἀνατροφαὶ καὶ τὰ ἔθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἰσὶν αἴτια, ἢ τὰ 
πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ αἱ διὰ σώματος ἐπιθυμίαι.” Ibid., 8.16.100. 
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that of vice.”392 He also argues that the continent, concupiscent soul is better than the 
chaste soul which has not had to fight against lust. As support for this, he refers to Jesus’ 
parable about the house built on the rock which was able to withstand the storm, as well 
as several other arguments from common life. 
Methodius writes of death as the soul putting off the body.393 In commenting on 
1 Thess 4:17 he notes that those who are alive and remain are the souls394 which before 
had put off their bodies at death. He adds, “For we truly who are alive are the souls 
which, with the bodies, having put them on again, shall go to meet Him in the clouds.”395 
In describing the death of virgins, he writes, “For, as soon as their souls have left the 
world, it is said that the angels meet them with much rejoicing, and conduct them to the 
very pastures already spoken of.”396 
Methodius mentions the salvation of the soul from the wrath of a future judgment. 
He writes of the Jews in the following manner: “Nor do they understand that by it also 
the death of Christ is personified, by whose blood souls made safe and sealed shall be 
preserved from wrath.”397 In discussing the resurrection, when the soul will put on an 
                                                 
392“Δύο γὰρ κινήσεε ἐν ἡμῖν ἔστον∙ ἐπιθυμία πεφυκότε σαρκὸς καὶ 
ψυχῆς, διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν.” Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum 8.17.8. 
393“ἐνεκρώθησαν γὰρ ἀπαμφιασθέντα τῶν ψυχῶν.” Ibid., 6.4.42. 
394“ἡμεῖς γὰρ κυρίως οἱ ζῶντές ἐσμεν αἱ ψυχαί.” Ibid., 6.4.44. 
395“γὰρ κυρίως οἱ ζῶντές ἐσμεν αἱ ψυχαί, αἵτινες μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων, 
ἀπειληφυῖαι ταῦτα.” Ibid., 6.4.45. 
396“Ἅμα γὰρ τῷ καταλεῖψαι τὸν κόσμον τὰς ψυχὰς λόγος ταῖς 
παρθένοις ὑπαντῶντας ἀγγέλους μετὰ πολλῆς εὐφημίας εἰς τοὺς 
προειρημένους παραπέμπειν λειμῶνας αὐτάς.” Ibid., 8.2.26. 
397“Οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τῆς σφαγῆς τύπον ἡγήσαντο τοῦτο προδηλωτικὸν 
γεγονέναι Χριστοῦ, οὗ αἱ κατησφαλισμέναι τῷ αἵματι καὶ σφραγισθεῖσαι 
ψυχαί.” Ibid., 9.1.85. 
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immortal body, Methodius writes that God put an end to sin by means of death when the 
“soul was separated from the flesh, that sin might perish by death, not being able to live 
longer in one dead.”398 Thus the separation of the soul from the body was the means by 
which sin is eradicated from the individual.  
Methodius, in discussing chastity and the power necessary to attain it, writes of 
one “direct[ing] the chariot of the soul upwards from the earth” in view of reaching the 
heavens and viewing God.”399 This has hints of the ascent theory described by Origen. 
 
Summary 
Methodius uses soul generally to refer to a separate psychological entity from the 
body. He argues that the deeds of the body impact the soul. He notes a distinction 
between the male and female souls. When interpreting the Scriptures, he attributes sense 
to the soul as well as to the body. 
Methodius uses both Gen 1:27 and Gen 2:7 in discussing the creation of souls. 
From the imago dei concept, he argues for the immortal nature of the soul. He mentions 
the soul’s descent into the body and argues for it being the part of humanity which was 
created in the image of God. He describes the body as the garment of the soul and argues 
for the soul’s freedom. He uses Judg 9:8-15 to allegorically describe chastity in the soul. 
Chastity is what is necessary to instill virtue in the soul. It is the means by which soul is 
directed to the heavens, finally attaining a view of God. 
                                                 
398“Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τέθνηκεν οὐ γενόμενος θνητὸς ἢ φθαρτὸς καὶ 
διεκρίθη τῆς σαρκὸς ἡ ψυχὴ ἵνα νεκρωθῇ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τὸ παράπτωμα 
μηκέτι δυνάμενον ζῆν ἐν τῷ τεθνηκότι.” Symposium sive Convivium decem 
virginum 9.2.28. 
399“αἵτινες ἀθρόως τὸ ῥεῦμα μετοχετεύσασαι τῆς ἡδυπαθείας ἄνω 
μετέωρον ἀπευθύνουσι τὸ ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 1.1.15. 
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Death is described as the soul putting off the body. He interprets 1 Thess 4:17 as 
referring to the souls which had put off the body. After death, the souls of the righteous 
go to a place prepared separately for them to enjoy before the resurrection. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has studied both the general usage of the soul in Origen, Gregory 
Thaumaturgos, and Methodius as well as the use of Scripture in its doctrinal 
development. It is dominated by Origen’s work. While in other areas, Gregory and 
Methodius primarily react—the former positively and the other negatively—to Origen’s 
work, in regard to the concept of the soul, they both more often agree with Origen, 
offering very little that is new and original. 
Origen describes the soul as the principle of life and movement. He mentions Job 
25:5 as biblical support for this idea. Both he and Methodius view the soul in a 
dichotomous relationship with the body. For Origen, the soul is described as incorporeal 
and invisible. 
The soul is clearly the seat of mental activity. Both Origen and Methodius discuss 
or at least mention the Greek philosophical phrase “eye of the soul.” With Origen, the 
education and development of the soul is also important. In this context, free will is 
closely associated with the soul. It is also the seat of emotions. For Gregory and 
Methodius, the soul is described as the ruling power of the individual. Gregory also 
writes of it as divine, which is fairly unusual. 
Origen sees a connection between the actions of the body and the health or state 
of the soul. On a related point, Methodius is unique in arguing for a difference between 
male and female souls. Most authors in the Ante-Nicene period who mention the topic 
argue that there is no difference between the male and female soul. As earlier authors 
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have done, Origen describes the soul as connected to the body through the blood, based 
upon Lev 17:14. The soul is thought to be spread throughout the body, giving life to it. 
Methodius is the only author in this chapter to describe the soul as entombed in 
the body. For both Origen and Methodius, though, the soul is explicitly said to survive 
the death of the body, with death being defined as the separation of the soul from the 
body. Origen notes, however, that death has several different usages in the Scriptures and 
these must be understood in order to correctly understand the soul and its relationship to 
death. Methodius writes of the soul rejoining the body to face the judgment. Origen 
almost grudgingly allows for this but prefers to keep all discussion regarding the afterlife 
on the spiritual plane with little mention of the body at all. 
For Origen and Methodius, Gen 1:27 is the source of the imago dei concept. 
Though the verse does not mention the soul, yet for them, it describes the soul as the 
locus of rational activity and the more important part of humanity and, assuming this is a 
key element also of divinity, use this passage to connect the soul with the divine. From 
this, Origen argues for the immortal nature of the soul. He also finds a special 
significance for the soul in the idea of the “breath of God” from Gen 2:7. He suggests 
there is evidence here for his idea of the descent of the soul. 
Origen also argues that the idea of an immortal soul is required because of the 
biblical description of a future judgment. The argument is that the soul must be immortal 
in order to face the judgment at a future time. Origen does not quote a specific passage, 
as Clement did earlier, but does state that the soul must be immortal to endure a future 
judgment. 
Origen uses 1 Sam 28:12-13 (Saul, Samuel, and the Witch of Endor) and 1 Pet 
3:19-20 to support the notion of Hades and a continued existence for the soul. He also 
uses Luke 16:19-31 (Rich Man and Lazarus) and Luke 23:43 (Jesus words to the Thief on 
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the Cross) to suggest that the soul goes straight to paradise after death. The use of Luke 
23 in this context is unique in the Ante-Nicene era. He is explicit that this happens to the 
martyrs, alluding directly to the “souls under the altar” of Rev 6:5. 
Origen offers several ideas that are new in the development of the concept of the 
soul. He argues both for a spiritual salvation and a spiritual fire of punishment. This is 
related to his proposed idea that ultimately all will be saved by the power of God’s love. 
Along with Origen’s idea of the descent of the soul, he also proposes the ascent of the 
soul upon death. Thus, Hades plays a much smaller role for him. The soul begins this 
ascent upon the death of the body. While this idea does not seem to catch on quickly with 









THE LATIN FATHERS 
 
As the Church gravitated to the west of the empire, it was perhaps natural that 
Latin, the language of the West, would become prominent among the Church Fathers. 
This chapter looks at the Latin word for soul, anima. Among Latin writers, another word, 
animus, is sometimes used where one might expect anima. Generally animus relates to 
the mind. While there is a certain amount of cross-over between these two terms, yet 




Tertullian was a very prolific writer, leaving many extant works. His writings 
generally fall into three categories: apologetic works, anti-heretical or controversial 
works, and works relating to moral discipline in which he began to show his Montanist 
leanings.1 Because of his later move towards Montanism, there has been much scholarly 
                                                 
1See Cross, The Early Christian Fathers, 137-145; Ernest Evans, Tertullian’s 
Treatise Against Praxeas (London: SPCK, 1948), 1-6; Quasten, 251-317; Eva Schulz-
Flügel, “Tertullian,” DECL, 554-555. On his Montanism and the impact on his works, see 
Geoffrey D. Dunn, Tertullian (London: Routledge, 2004), 4-9; Schulz-Flügel, 555. On 
the chronology of his writings, see Timothy D. Barnes, Tertullian: A Historical and 
Literary Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 30-56. Tertullian wrote the first 
Christian document specifically on the soul, his De anima, which was itself an anti-
heretical work. Jan H. Waszink, Tertullian: De anima; Edited with Introduction and 
Commentary (Amsterdam: J. M. Meulenhoff, 1947), 7*. 
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debate as to which of his writings predate his Montanist tendencies and which were 
written during the latter Montanist period of his life. However, these arguments are not of 
great concern to this study. 
 
Usage of Anima 
General Usage 
Tertullian uses soul for human life. He talks of rulers who urge Christians “to 
deny, say, ‘Save your life;’ and, ‘Do not lose your life.’”2 He writes of murder as not 
“only in the shedding forth of blood, and in the actual taking away of life.”3 In arguing 
against the charge that Christians murder their children in secret rites, Tertullian 
describes his view on abortion. He declares that it is wrong and states, “To hinder a birth 
is merely a speedier man-killing; nor does it matter whether you take away a life that is 
born, or destroy one that is coming to the birth.”4 Elsewhere, in arguing for religious 
tolerance, he urges that a person should be allowed to “consecrate his own life to his 
God”5 or to that of a goat. He also writes, “They know from whom they have obtained 
their power; they know, as they are men, from whom they have received life itself.”6 He 
                                                 
2“Ipsi denique praesides cum cohortantur negationi, serua animam tuam! dicunt, 
et, noli animam tuam perdere!” Scorpiace 11. 
3“Homicidium in sola sanguinis profusione et in animae ereptione reputandum.” 
De idololatria 2. 
4“Homicidii festinatio est prohibere nasci, nec refert, natam quis eripiat animam 
an nascentem disturbet.” Apologeticum 9.33. 
5“Alius suam animam deo suo uoueat.” Ibid., 24.23. 
6“Sciunt quis illis dederit imperium; sciunt, qua homines, quis et animam; 
sentiunt eum esse deum solum.” Ibid., 30.3. 
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also speaks of those who do not redeem their life by the denial of their faith.7 He notes 
that “one will not be permitted to love even life more than God.”8 He presents Moses as 
offering his life for the people of Israel when God intended to destroy them.9 He also 
writes how Marcion “destroy[s] the origin of flesh and life”10 by denying the nativity of 
Christ and how he and his fellow Montanists, as ones persecuted for their faith, are “as 
men whose very lives are not their own.”11 We are also told to do as Christ did. “That is, 
for as Christ laid down His life for us, so, too, we should do for Him.”12 Tertullian writes 
elsewhere of Christ, “He has both suffered the penalty in our presence, and surrendered 
His life, laying it down for our sakes.”13 Later he adds that Christ “saved the lives of the 
three brethren, who had agreed to lose them for God’s sake”14 and insists that 
“whosoever loses his life for God saves it, so that you may here again recognize the 
Judge who recompenses the evil gain of life with its destruction, and the good loss 
                                                 
7“Animam negatione lucraris.” Aduersus Marcionem 1.27. See also De 
exhortatione castitatis 13.33 and Scorpiace 12  where the expression is “animam ponas”. 
8“Ceterum super deum diligere nec animam licebit.” Scorpiace 14. 
9“In persona moysi figuratum, patris deprecatorem et oblatorem animae suae pro 
populi salute.” Aduersus Marcionem 2.27. 
10“Carnis atque animae originem destrue.” Ibid., 3.11. 
11“Ut etiam animas nostras exauctorati.” Ad scapulam 1.2. 
12“Oportet enim, quomodo christus animam suam posuit pro nobis, ita fieri pro eo 
et a nobis.” De fuga in persecutione 12.76. This usage seems heavily influenced by 
Christ’s statement that the good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep and John’s 
statement that greater love has no one than to lay down his life for his friend. 
13“Nam et sancitur penes nos et animam suam circumscribit, propter non eam 
ponens.” Aduersus Marcionem 4.14. 




thereof with its salvation.”15 Tertullian compares the god of Marcion with Pharaoh when 
he writes, “For while he destroyed lives, our heretic’s god refuses to give them.”16 While 
discussing the command to march around Jericho for seven days, he notes that this would 
have presumably included a Sabbath. Commenting he writes, “For that was really God’s 
work, which He commanded Himself, and which He had ordered for the sake of the souls 
of His servants when exposed to the perils of war.”17 As is evident, Tertullian most often 
used soul for life in the context of death, or the loss of life. 
Tertullian occasionally uses soul to refer to animals and people in discussing the 
Sabbath laws. In a commentary on Luke 13:15, he states, “When, therefore, He did a 
work according to the condition prescribed by the law, He affirmed, instead of breaking, 
the law, which commanded that no work should be done, except what might be done for 
any living being; and if for any one, then how much more for a human life?”18 Here 
anima is used in reference to any living animal. Tertullian uses soul for living thing.19 
This is very common when referring to the creation narrative in Gen 1, 2. In this, he is 
                                                 
15“Qui animam suam propter deum perdit seruat illam. Vt et hic tamen iudicem 
adcognoscas, qui malum animae lucrum perditione eius et bonum animae detrimentum 
salute eius remuneraturus sit.” Aduersus Marcionem 4.21. 
16“Nam ille animas adimit, hic non dat.” Ibid., 1.29. 
17“Nam et illud opus dei erat, quod ipse praeceperat et quod propter animas 
disposuerat hominum suorum in discrimine belli constitutas.” Aduersus Marcionem 4.12. 
18“Ergo secundum condicionem legis operatus legem confirmauit, non dissoluit, 
iubentem nullum opus fieri, nisi quod fieret omni animae, quanto potius humanae?” 
Aduersus Marcionem 4.30. 
19Cf. “Ut ex aquis natatiles et uolatiles animae.” Aduersus Hermogenem 32. This 
is in place of the more common animalia. See for example Aduersus Hermogenem 36  
where Tertullian writes, “All things, indeed, have motion—either of themselves as 
animals (animalia), or of others as inanimate things.” 
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similar to Origen who also saw the creation story account as indicating that animals have 
souls as well. 
Tertullian also notes that the soul is often called the breath.20 In this context, it is 
difficult to determine if Tertullian is referring to an interpretation of Gen 2:7 or of some 
other source. Tertullian also uses soul for life as found in the plant world. In writing 
about trees and whether there is a time when their soul is without an intellect, Tertullian 
writes, “For it is an undoubted fact, that when trees are yet but twigs and sprouts, and 
before they even reach the sapling stage, there is in them their own proper faculty of life, 
as soon as they spring out of their native beds.”21 He uses the expression “water of life”22 
and elsewhere writes, “Surely if killing means taking away life from the flesh, and its 
opposite, reviving, amounts to restoring life to the flesh, it must needs be that the flesh 
rise again, to which the life, which has been taken away by killing, has to be restored by 
vivification.”23 
In a different usage, Tertullian writes of man-made objects as having a soul. In 
reference to idols he writes, “I take it that that trade which pertains to the very soul and 
spirit of idols.”24 Here his usage may be of a more allegorical rather than literal usage of 
the term. 
                                                 
20“Ipsum quod anima uocitatus est flatus.” Aduersus Marcionem 2.9. 
21“Illis necdum arbusculis, sed stipitibus adhuc et surculis etiamnunc, simul de 
scrobibus oriuntur, inest propria uis animae.” De anima 19.11. 
22“Uinum animae.” De resurrectione mortuorum 26.38. 
23“Certe si occidere carni animam eripere est, uiuificare, contrarium eius, carni 
animam referre est, caro resurgat necesse est, cui anima per occisionem erepta referenda 
est per uiuificationem.” Ibid., 28.25. 
24“Quae ad ipsam idolorum animam et spiritum pertinet.” De idololatria 11. 
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In some places it can be difficult to determine if Tertullian intends by anima a 
separated, sentient soul or rather life itself. He describes the Apostle Paul as “desiring 
souls to keep a fast from the legitimate fruit of nature—the apple, I mean, of marriage.”25 
He also adds, “Thus Christ did not at all rescind the Sabbath: He kept the law thereof, and 
both in the former case did a work which was beneficial to the life of His disciples.”26 In 
describing the work which Christ did on the Sabbath, Tertullian notes that this was done 
“for a soul.”27 This seems to be based upon Luke 6:9, “to save life or to destroy it?” He 
also writes, “One soul cannot be due to two masters—God and Caesar.”28 In these last 
examples, it is possible to interpret them as referring to a separate entity from the body 
rather than referring directly to an individual. He also refers to the tongue as the “very 
organ of the soul.”29 This also seems as if it is best interpreted as referring to the soul in 
distinction to the body as no one would question that the tongue is an organ of the body. 
Tertullian writes of “a divorced woman, who has been separated (from her 
husband) in soul as well as body, through discord, anger, hatred, and the causes of 
these.”30 In a commentary on Luke 11:41, Tertullian inserts into Jesus’ statement 
                                                 
25“Aspice illum a iusta fruge naturae, a matrimonii dico pomo, animas ieiunare 
cupientem.” De pudicitia 16.45. Here one might argue that Tertullian uses soul to refer to 
the separated soul which should be kept from desires of the flesh or to refer to the 
individual as a whole and the call to a chaste life. 
26“Ita nec christus omnino sabbatum rescindit, cuius legem tenuit, et supra in 
causa discipulorum pro anima operatus.” Aduersus Marcionem 4.12. 
27“Pro anima facturus esset.” Ibid. 
28“Non potest una anima duobus deberi, deo et caesari.” De idololatria 19. 
29“Ipsius animae organo.” Ad nationes 1.8.22. 
30“Et anima et corpore separata est.” De monogamia 10.7. 
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regarding the inside of a person that this refers to one’s soul.31 These examples seem 
clearly to indicate a reference to a separated entity, distinct from the body. 
Tertullian uses soul when writing of the mental capabilities of a person, as when 
he refers to some people as “simple souls.”32 He similarly writes of these “common 
people” being susceptible to novel ideas.33 This usage seems to highlight the mental 
capabilities of the soul rather than indicating directly a separate entity from the body. 
 
The Corporeal and the Soul 
Tertullian writes of the acts of the body affecting the soul. This concept becomes 
key in his discussion on the corporeality of the soul.34 He argues that exomologesis, or the 
act of making one’s body penitent through actions such as living in sackcloth and ashes 
and “to know no food and drink but such as is plain,” is done “not for the stomach’s sake, 
to wit, but the soul’s.”35 Tertullian accuses charioteers of “disquiet[ing] so many souls.”36 
He also argues against the notion that “comeliness” is “a kind of goodly garment of the 
                                                 
31“Interiora autem uestra non emundastis, id est animam, adiciens: nonne qui 
exteriora fecit, id est carnem, et interiora fecit, id est animam?” Aduersus Marcionem 
4.27. 
32“Simplices animae.” Scorpiace 1; 15. 
33“Sed ipsam nouitatem cognitionis percutientem rudes animas ipsam que 
naturalem nouitatis gratiositatem uolui repercutere, et hinc iam de ignoto deo 
prouocare.” Aduersus Marcionem 1.9. 
34Marsha L. Colish, Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth 
Century, vol. 2 in The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (Leiden: 
Brill, 1985), 24. 
35“Ceterum pastum et potum pura nosse, non uentris scilicet sed animae causa.” 
De paenitentia 9.8. 
36“An deo placebit auriga ille tot animarum inquietator.” De spectaculis 23.5. 
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soul”37 urging rather that it should be feared. These seem to admit of some connection 
between the outward body and the inward soul.38 
Tertullian describes a connection between food and the soul. He writes, “Are 
there not some who prohibit to themselves (the use of) the very ‘creature of God,’ 
abstaining from wine and animal food, the enjoyments of which border upon no peril or 
solicitude; but they sacrifice to God the humility of their soul even in the chastened use of 
food?”39 Elsewhere, also in a discussion on fasting, Tertullian speaks of the connection 
between food and the soul and how fasting must be practiced before an individual is 
arrested and sent to prison where food will be in short supply. He describes such a person 
who had prepared for martyrdom as follows, “The succulence of his blood already sent 
on (heavenward) before him, the baggage as it were of his soul,—the soul herself withal 
now hastening (after it), having already, by frequent fasting, gained a most intimate 
knowledge of death!”40 
 
                                                 
37“Nam etsi accusandus decor non est, ut felicitas corporis, ut diuinae plasticae 
accessio, ut animae aliqua uestis bona.” De cultu feminarum 2.2.42. 
38This connection is not always clear. Elswhere he presents opinions regarding the 
connection between the seasons of the year and the soul and also between the way one 
lies to sleep at night and their mind (De anima 47.1-6) and then proceeds to chalk it up to 
mere conjecture, even though it is that of Plato. 
39“Numquid non aliqui ipsam dei creaturam sibi interdicunt, abstinentes uino et 
animalibus esculentis, quorum fructus nulli periculo aut sollicitudini adiacent, sed 
humilitatem animae suae in uictus quoque castigatione deo immolant?” De cultu 
feminarum 2.9.36. 
40“Cum sola et arida sit cute loricatus, et contra ungulas corneus, praemisso iam 
sanguinis suco tamquam animae impedimentis, properante iam et ipsa, quae iam saepe 
ieiunans mortem de proximo norit.” De ieiunio aduersus psychicos 290.13. See Wiebke 
Bähnk, Von der Notwendigkeit des Leidens: Die Theologie des Martyriums bei 
Tertullian, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 78, ed. Adolf M. Ritter et 
al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2001), 193-232. 
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Powers and Divisions of the Soul 
Tertullian argues for a unity of substance for the soul among all humans. He 
attributes the differences among people to the varying circumstances and influences upon 
them.41 This concept proves useful in his argument against the Gnostics who proposed a 
tripartite division of souls into three separate categories.42 
Tertullian lists the faculties of the soul as follows. “The soul, then, we define to be 
sprung from the breath of God, immortal, possessing body, having form, simple in its 
substance, intelligent in its own nature, developing its power in various ways, free in its 
determinations, subject to the changes of accident, in its faculties mutable, rational, 
supreme, endued with an instinct of presentiment, evolved out of one (archetypal 
soul).”43 Elsewhere, he reviews his view on the soul, writing that he 
Reckon[s] the soul as very far below God: for we suppose it to be born, and hereby to 
possess something of a diluted divinity and an attenuated felicity, as the breath (of 
God), though not His spirit; and although immortal, as this is an attribute of divinity, 
yet for all that passable, since this is an incident of a born condition, and consequently 
from the first capable of deviation from perfection and right, and by consequence 
susceptible of a failure in memory.”44 
Tertullian allows for the ability of the soul to occasionally know something 
                                                 
41De anima 20. 
42De anima 21.1. 
43“Definimus animam dei flatu natam, immortalem, corporalem, effigiatam, 
substantia simplicem, de suo sapientem, uarie procedentem, liberam arbitrii, accidentis 
obnoxiam, per ingenia mutabilem, rationalem, dominatricem, diuinatricem, ex una 
redundantem.” De anima 22.8. 
44“Nos autem, qui nihil deo adpendimus, hoc ipso animam longe infra deum 
expendimus, quod natam eam agnoscimus ac per hoc dilutioris diuinitatis et exilioris 
felicitatis, ut latum, non ut spiritum; et si immortalem, ut hoc sit diuinitatis, tamen 
passibilem, ut hoc sit natiuitatis, ideo que et a primordio exorbitationis capacem et inde 
etiam obliuionis affinem.” De anima 24.8. 
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regarding the future apart from the gift of prophecy. This he refers to as divination. He 
writes, “But there is not a man living, who does not himself feel his soul possessed with a 
presage and augury of some omen, danger, or joy.”45 
Tertullian notes that many philosophers have divided the soul variously but that 
these “ought not to be regarded so much as parts of the soul, as powers, or faculties, or 
operations thereof, even as Aristotle himself has regarded some of them as being.”46 
Tertullian does not give a definitive list as to his powers of the soul. He, instead, writes of 
“motion, of action, of thought, and whatsoever others they divide in this manner; such, 
likewise, as the five senses themselves, so well known to all—seeing, hearing, tasting, 
touching, smelling.”47 For this concept, Tertullian looks for support from several 
philosophers and from the example of air being blown through an organ and yet it is not 
divided in its substance.48 He adds, “Nothing, therefore, pertaining to the soul is 
unconnected with sense, nothing pertaining to sense is unconnected with the soul.”49 He 
goes even further, adding, “Sense is the soul’s very soul.”50 He also writes, “Accordingly, 
                                                 
45“Sed nec quisquam hominum non et ipse aliquando praesagam animam suam 
sentit, aut ominis aut periculi aut gaudii augurem.” De anima 24.78. 
46“Huiusmodi autem non tam partes animae habebuntur quam uires et efficaciae 
et operae, sicut de quibusdam et aristoteles iudicauit.” De anima 14.13. 
47“Non enim membra sunt substantiae animalis, sed ingenia, ut motorium, ut 
actorium, ut cogitatorium, et si qua in hunc modum distinguunt, ut et ipsi illi quinque 
notissimi sensus, uisus auditus gustus tactus odoratus.” Ibid., 14.16. Note here that 
Tertullian uses animalis rather than animae. The connection between this line of thinking 
with the Stoic eight-part division of the soul seems clear. Cf. De corona 5.10. 
48De anima 14.23-36. 
49“Adeo nihil animale sine sensu, nihil sensuale sine anima.” De carne Christi 
12.9. 
50“Animae anima sensus est.” Ibid., 12.10. 
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sensation comes from the soul, and opinion from sensation; and the whole is the soul.”51 
Tertullian locates the senses in the soul. Here he fights the Platonists, who impugn the 
accuracy of the senses, and the Epicureans, who accept the accuracy of the senses but 
separate them from opinions regarding them. Tertullian, however, disagrees with both. 
He states, “Again, whence arises sensation if not from the soul? For if the soul had no 
body, it would have no sensation.”52 It is not clear here if Tertullian is referring to the 
body of the soul or the visible body. Tertullian’s argument does not appear to depend on 
it. He argues that the problem is with the medium through which the senses perceive an 
object that causes the confusion, not the ability of the soul to sense accurately. 
In arguing against the physical philosopher Varro, who claimed that the stars were 
gods and animated, Tertullian writes, “But if this be the case, they must needs be also 
mortal, according to the condition of animated nature; for although the soul is evidently 
immortal, this attribute is limited to it alone: it is not extended to that with which it is 
associated, that is, the body.”53 Here Tertullian makes use of what he appears to be the 
accepted fact that the soul is immortal. 
Tertullian distinguishes between the soul and the spirit of a person. After quoting 
Paul’s prayer which includes the tripartite formula of body, soul, and spirit, Tertullian 
writes, “For although the soul has a kind of body of a quality of its own, just as the spirit 
has, yet as the soul and the body are distinctly named, the soul has its own peculiar 
                                                 
51“Ita et sensus ex anima est et opinio ex sensu et anima totum.” De anima 17.30. 
52“Et unde sensus, si non ab anima? denique carens anima corpus carebit et 
sensu.” De anima 17.26. 
53“Nam etsi immortalem constat animam, ipsi hoc soli lic<ebit>, non etiam illi 
cui adnectatur, id est corpori.” Ad nationes 2.3.45. 
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appellation, not requiring the common designation of body.”54 Here it seems that he lends 
some concept of physicality to the term soul. Elsewhere, in comparing the offerings of 
Christians to those of believers of other religions, he describes them as “that costly and 
noble sacrifice of prayer dispatched from the chaste body, an unstained soul, [and] a 
sanctified spirit.”55 
Elsewhere, however, Tertullian connects the soul with the idea of spirit and 
breathing. He writes, “We, however, claim this (operation) for the soul, which we 
acknowledge to be an indivisible simple substance, and therefore we must call it spirit in 
a definitive sense—not because of its condition, but of its action; not in respect of its 
nature, but of its operation; because it respires.”56 Thus he sees the spirit as a function of 
the soul, that is breathing, rather than part of the nature of the soul or something separate 
from the soul. “Some maintain that there is within the soul a natural substance—the 
spirit—which is different from it: as if to have life—the function of the soul—were one 
thing; and to emit breath—the alleged function of the spirit—were another thing.”57 He 
                                                 
54“Licet enim et anima [et] corpus sit aliquod suae qualitatis, sicut et spiritus, 
cum tamen et corpus et anima distincte nominantur, habet <autem> anima suum 
uocabulum proprium.” Aduersus Marcionem 5.15. See De resurrectione mortuorum 
47.71 where he also quotes the tripartite formula for the human person from 1 Thess 
5:23. Cf. Aduersus Marcionem 5.10. 
55“Orationem de carne pudica, de anima innocenti, de spiritu sancto profectam.” 
Apologeticum 30.23. 
56“Hoc dum animae uindicamus, quam uniformem et simplicem agnoscimus, 
spiritum necesse est certa condicione dicamus, non status nomine, sed actus, nec 
substantiae titulo, sed operae, quia spirat, non quia spiritus proprie est.” De anima 11.3. 
See also ibid.,  18. See Jean-Claude Fredouille, “Observations sur la terminologie 
anthropologique de Tertullien: constantes et variations,” in Les Pères de l’Église face à la 
science médicale de leur temps (Paris: Beauchesne, 2005), 325; Jean Steinmann, 
Tertullien (Paris: Éditions du Chalet, 1967), 194. 
57“Quidam enim uolunt aliam illi substantiam naturalem inesse spiritum, quasi 




argues from nature, drawing on the anatomy and physiology of certain small insects to 
point out that life and breath are not two different things. To those who argue this point, 
he asks, “If indeed the soul and the spirit are two, they may be divided; and thus, by the 
separation of the one which departs from the one which remains, there would accrue the 
union and meeting together of life and of death.”58 He concludes that “therefore this 
entire process, both of breathing and living, belongs to that to which living belongs—that 
is, to the soul.”59 
In another context, Tertullian calls the soul spirit in respect of its action of 
breathing. The reason he gives for this is to counter the claim of Hermogenes’ writing, 
“Moreover, we properly and especially insist on calling it [the soul] breath (or spirit), in 
opposition to Hermogenes, who derives the soul from matter instead of from the afflatus 
or breath of God.”60 He, however, admits regret in applying it in this “lower” sense, 
rather than the Scripture sense of the Spirit of God. To prove this dual notion of spirit 
(physiological and spiritual), he quotes from Isa 57:16, “My Spirit went forth from me, 
and I made the breath of earth. And the breath of my Spirit became soul,” and Isa 42:5, 
“He gives breath unto the people that are on the earth and Spirit to them that walk 
                                                 
On the relationship of soul and spirit and Tertullian, see Jérôme Alexandre, Une chair 
pour la gloire: l’anthropologie réaliste et mystique de Tertullien, Théologie Historique 
115 (Paris: Beauchesne, 2001), 257-263. 
58“Si enim duo sunt anima et spiritus, diuidi possunt, ut diuisione eorum alterius 
discedentis, alterius inmanentis, mortis et uitae concursus eueniat.” De anima 10.61. 
Fischer notes the Stoic teaching here which Tertullian follows. Fischer, 29. 
59“Ergo totum hoc et spirare et uiuere eius et cuius et uiuere, id est animae.” De 
anima 10.56. 
60“Ita et animam, quam flatum ex proprietate defendimus, spiritum nunc ex 
necessitate pronuntiamus, ceterum aduersus hermogenen, qui eam ex materia, non ex dei 
flatu contendit, flatum proprie tuemu.” De anima 11.7. See Fredouille, 323, 327-329. 
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thereon.”61 He concludes that the natural soul comes first, or the breath, and then later the 
Spirit of God comes to the believer.62 He adds that the Spirit did not turn Saul into a 
different man by causing him to prophecy (1 Sam 10:6-12) any more than the wicked 
Spirit later turned him into an evil man or the spirit of Satan (1 Sam 28:12-13). Elsewhere 
he demonstrates this distinction by writing, “Men of soul and flesh alone as you are, 
justly do you reject things spiritual.”63 
Similarly, Tertullian seeks to define the relationship between the soul and the 
mind. He writes, “As the spirit or breath is the faculty of the soul to respire, so animus is 
the inherent faculty to act, learn and move.”64 He does not want to end up with two 
separate entities, as Aristotle argues for, or with one, as Democritus asserts. In asserting 
this he states, “The question will arise how two can be one—whether by the confusion of 
two substances, or by the disposition of one? We, however, affirm that the mind 
coalesces with the soul,—not indeed as being distinct from it in substance, but as being 
its natural function and agent.” This solution is similar to his description of soul and 
spirit. Animus is a function of anima. He then makes it clear that the soul is the superior 
substance. He first notes that in common speech, people use soul to refer to a person, 
such as a pilot of ship questioning how many souls were lost in a storm, not mind. He 
                                                 
61See Adhémar d’Alès, La théologie de Tertullien (Paris: Beauchesne, 1905), 119. 
62In arguing that the Spirit of God or the spirit of Satan is not present naturally at 
birth, Tertullian mentions the Spirit’s influence on Adam (Gen 2:24-25) and on Saul (1 
Sam 10:6-12) along with Satan’s later influence over Judas (John 13:27). 
63“Merito homines solius animae et carnis spiritalia recusatis.” De ieiunio 
aduersus psychicos 17. 
64“Quo agit, quo sapit, quem se cum habens ex semetipsa se cum moueat in 
semetipsa.” De anima 12.1. 
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then notes how Christ also did the same thing, noting that Christ spoke of destroying the 
soul in hell, of the Good Shepherd laying down his life for his sheep.65 He then describes 
the mind as the “instrument, not the ruling power” of the soul.66 
Tertullian’s understanding of the soul in relation to the mind and the spirit is 
summarized well when he writes “that the mind is nothing else than an apparatus or 
instrument of the soul, and that the spirit is no other faculty, separate from the soul, but is 
the soul itself exercised in respiration; although that influence which either God on the 
one hand, or the devil on the other, has breathed upon it, must be regarded in the light of 
an additional element.”67 Then, regarding the soul’s relation to the material and spiritual 
world, he writes, “Both the one and the other must be regarded as inherent in the soul, 
and as obedient to it, seeing that it embraces bodily objects by means of the body, in 
exactly the same way that it conceives incorporeal objects by help of the mind, except 
that it is even exercising sensation when it is employing the intellect.”68 In summarizing 
his position on the development of the soul and its constituent parts, Tertullian writes, 
“And here, therefore, we draw our conclusion, that all the natural properties of the soul 
                                                 
65De anima 13.6-18. 
66“Habes animae principalitatem, habes in illa et substantiae unionem, cuius 
intellegas instrumentum esse animum, non patrocinium.” De anima 13.18. 
67“Ob haec ergo praestruximus neque animum aliud quid esse quam animae 
suggestum et structum, neque spiritum extraneum quid quam quod et ipsa per flatum, 
ceterum accessioni deputandum quod aut deus postea aut diabolus adspiraret.” De 
anima 18.46. Note that Tertullian also identifies the “carnal mind” of Rom 8:6-7 as the 
soul because he points out that the flesh does not have any sense without the soul and 
thus it cannot be the flesh. De resurrectione mortuorum 46.52. 
68“Apud animam tamen et istis et illis obsequio deputatis, quae perinde per 
corpus corporalia sentiat, quemadmodum per animum incorporalia intellegat, saluo eo, 
ut etiam sentiat, dum intellegit.” De anima 18.46. 
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are inherent in it as parts of its substance; and that they grow and develop along with it, 
from the very moment of its own origin at birth.”69 
Tertullian has another argument in the mind/body debate. It follows his 
understanding that at death, the soul separates from the body.70 At this time of separation, 
Tertullian argues that the mind also follows and is not left behind.71 From this, Tertullian 
infers that the soul and the mind are “indissolubly attached.”72 He also makes it clear that 
the soul must always have a mind. After pointing to the natural world as seen in the 
development of trees, Tertullian argues that “even the infancy of a log, then, may have an 
intellect (suitable to it): how much more may that of a human being, whose soul (which 
may be compared with the nascent sprout of a tree) has been derived from Adam as its 
root, and has been propagated amongst his posterity by means of woman, to whom it has 
been entrusted for transmission, and thus has sprouted into life with all its natural 
apparatus, both of intellect and of sense!”73 
Of the various powers of the soul, key among them is “the ruling power of the 
                                                 
69“Et hic itaque concludimus omnia naturalia animae ut substantia eius ipsi 
inesse et cum ipsa procedere atque proficere, ex quo ipsa censetur.” Ibid., 20.1. 
70See Fredouille, 323. 
71“Quod anima digressa nec animus in homine inueniatur; ita illam ubique 
sequitur, a qua nec in fine subremanet.” De anima 18.78. See Salvador Vicastillo, Un 
cuerpo destinado a la muerte: su significado en la antropología de Tertuliano (Madrid: 
Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2006), 77. 
72“Sequitur et addicitur.” De anima 18.80. 
73“Viuant ut philosophi uolunt, sapiant ut philosophi nolunt, intellegat et infantia 
ligni, quo magis hominis, cuius anima uelut surculus quidam ex matrice adam in 
propaginem deducta et genitalibus feminae foueis commendata cum omni sua paratura 
pullulauit tam intellectu quam et sensu.” Ibid., 19.36. 
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soul” or hegemonikon as the philosophers called it.74 Without this, Tertullian writes, the 
soul itself is jeopardized. He refers to it as “some supreme principle of vitality and 
intelligence.”75 From his argumentation, it seems clear that he sees himself countering 
those philosophers who contend that there is no such thing as a soul. He lists several 
philosophers who belong to this category and then counters with a list of biblical texts 
which he cites as proof that God teaches that there is a ruling faculty of the soul.76 What 
is unique about this list is that they all refer to the heart. He then concludes “that there is a 
directing faculty of the soul, with which the purpose of God may agree; in other words, a 
supreme principle of intelligence and vitality,” and that it resides in the heart.77 After 
listing the philosophers who disagree, he points out that this agrees with the Egyptians 
and several other philosophers.78 
Tertullian allows for Plato’s distinction between the rational and the irrational 
elements of the soul.79 He, however, makes it clear that the irrational part is not by nature 
                                                 
74Ibid., 15.1. See Fredouille, 327; Marsha L. Colish Stoicism in Christian Latin 
Thought through the Sixth Century, 21. 
75“Aliqui summus in anima gradus uitalis et sapientialis.” De anima 15.1. 
76Tertullian quotes from Wis 1:6, Prov 24:12, Ps 134:23; Matt 9:4; Ps 51:12; Rom 
10:10; 1 John 3:20; Matt 5:28. See d’Alès, 120. Cf. De resurrectione mortuorum 15.16 
where this ruling faculty of the soul is said to be located in the flesh, i.e., the brain. 
77“Et esse principale in anima, quod intentio diuina conueniat, id est uim 
sapientialem atque uitalem (quod enim sapit, uiuidum est), et in eo thesauro corporis 
haberi.” De anima 15.25. 
78On the connection between blood and soul, cf. De anima 25.36. On the Egyptian 
reference, cf. Rosalie David, Religion and Magic in Ancient Egypt (London: Penguin 
Books, 2002), 158. This describes the notion of the heart being weighed in the judgement 
after one’s death to determine one’s worthiness for immortality. 
79De anima 16.1. On this, see Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists, 52-53. 
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part of the soul. Only the rational part of the soul has this distinction. The reason for this 
is that God is seen as the origin and author of the soul from his own breath. He asks, “For 
how should that be other than rational, which God produced on His own prompting; nay 
more, which He expressly sent forth by His own afflatus or breath?”80 As for the 
irrational part, Tertullian does not wish to assign its origin to God’s nature so he argues 
that it comes from Satan.81 However, he points out that all three were operative in Christ, 
the irascible and concupiscible in subjection to reason. Thus he notes, “In our own cases, 
accordingly, the irascible and the concupiscible elements of our soul must not invariably 
be put to the account of the irrational (nature), since we are sure that in our Lord these 
elements operated in entire accordance with reason.”82 Thus Tertullian is forced to 
recognize two separate irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul:83 that which is in 
accordance with reason, which God even has, and that which is irrational and thus 
originating with the devil. 
Tertullian writes of “concupiscence” as one who has “stirred his soul with 
immodest commotion.”84 He speaks of Christ in Gethsemane as being “in the trouble of 
His soul.”85 He also refers to the knowledge which those who kill the Christians use, 
                                                 
80De anima 16.6. See d’Alès, 113. 
81“Acciderit ex serpentis instinctu, ipsum illud transgressionis admissum, atque 
exinde inoluerit et coadoleuerit in anima ad instar iam naturalitatis.” De anima 16.7. 
82Ibid., 16.30. 
83In support of this distinction, Tertullian quotes from or alludes directly to Luke 
22:15; 1 Tim 3:1; Gal 5:12; Eph 2:3; Matt 6:24; John 8:44; Matt 13:25. See d’Alès, 120-
121. 
84“In concupiscentia designat, . . . et animam commouerit impudice.” De 
idololatria 2. 




knowing that “they [Christians] are never to be approached more than when fear has 
opened the entrances to the soul, especially when some display of ferocity has already 
arrayed with a crown the faith of martyrs.”86 This type of usage shows a connection 
between the emotions and the soul. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Origin of the Soul 
Tertullian argues that humans have a soul. In this he sees himself writing against 
the philosophers of old who taught that people had no souls.87 To establish this, he turns 
to the creation narrative. “Goodness,” writes Tertullian, “breathed into [Adam] a soul, not 
dead but living.”88 This notion of a breathed soul is very important to Tertullian.89 This 
defines for him where the soul comes from, that is the breath of God.90 He refers to it as 
the “shadow of His own soul, the breath of his own Spirit, the operation of his own 
                                                 
12:27. 
86“Nam quod sciant multos simplices ac rudes tum infirmos, plerosque uero in 
uentum et si placuerit christianos, numquam magis adeundos sapiunt, quam cum aditus 
animae formido laxauit, praesertim cum aliqua iam atrocitas fidem martyrum coronauit.” 
Scorpiace 1. 
87“Quibus animas aut nullas aut non in pristina corpora redituras adfirmabant?” 
De spectaculis 30.14. 
88“Bonitas inflauit in animam, non mortuam, sed uiuam.” Aduersus Marcionem 
2.4. 
89When writing De anima, Tertullian notes that he has demonstrated this point in 
his treatise Against Hermogenes. In the argument against Hermogenes, the key point was 
that the soul was formed from nothing and not from a previous material existance. See De 
anima 3.24. 
90See for example, Aduersus Marcionem 2.8; 5.6; De anima 11:7; 27.42; De 
resurectione mortuorum 7.28. Cf. Fredouille, 327-329; Karpp, Probleme, 41. 
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mouth.”91 He writes in an argument against Marcion’s creator, who was different from 
the Supreme God, regarding the effect of baptism, “If the bestowal of the Holy Ghost, 
how will he bestow the Spirit, who did not at first impart the soul?”92 Thus Tertullian 
clearly understood the soul as being given by God. Tertullian then states that man is like 
God, “the very image and likeness of Himself, and, by the origin of his soul, His own 
substance too.”93 Thus the origin of the human soul is connected also to its substance. 
Tertullian, in countering Plato, insists that if it is accepted “that the soul originates 
in the breath of God, it follows that we attribute a beginning to it.”94 In fact, Tertullian 
states that “we ascribe both birth and creation to it.”95 Tertullian argues against Plato’s 
concept of the origins of the soul along with his notion that the souls on earth have 
forgotten what they once knew and then later remember it. He does so only based upon 
logical arguments regarding memory and how it is impossible for a memory that existed 
from eternity could be snuffed out by the body.  
In this same context, Tertullian argues against those who “begin by maintaining 
that the soul is not conceived in the womb, nor is formed and produced at the time that 
                                                 
91“Uero animae suae umbram, spiritus sui auram, oris sui operam.” De 
resurectione mortuorum 7.30. 
92“Si consecutio est spiritus sancti, quomodo spiritum adtribuet qui animam non 
prius contulit?” Aduersus Marcionem 1.28. 
93“Hominem, et quidem imaginem et similitudinem suam, immo et substantiam 
suam, per animae scilicet censum.” Aduersus Marcionem 2.5. On the notion of image in 
Tertullian, see Alexandre, 157-165; Leal, 95-106; Stephan Otto, “Der Mensch als Bild 
Gottes bei Tertullian,” Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift 10 (1959): 276-282. 
94“Consequens enim est, ut ex dei flatu animam professi initium ei deputaremus.” 
De anima 4.2. On the origins of the soul in Tertullian, see Alexandre, 229-241. 
95“Et natam autem docemus et factam ex initii constitutione.” De anima 4.4. 
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the flesh is molded, but is impressed from without upon the infant before his complete 
vitality, but after the process of parturition.”96 To counter this, Tertullian goes into a 
discussion relating more to the obstetrics knowledge of his age than anything else. The 
point he makes is that infants before birth have life and vitality. As biblical support, he 
notes the stories regarding the seven demons in Mary Magdalene and the legion in the 
Gadarenes man.97 He uses these to assert that multiple souls can exist in one body, which 
counters what Plato states that only one soul can exist in a body, therefore the soul must 
enter at the infant’s first breath because the mother’s body can contain only one soul, her 
own, not her baby’s also.98  
Tertullian uses another quote from Plato to support the claim that the soul is 
passed through the seed implanted in the womb.99 To this, Tertullian adds a proof from 
nature in that children resemble their parents and an additional argument relying on the 
ancient practice of astrologers using the time of conception rather than the time of birth in 
their predictions of the future.100 
Tertullian provides several scriptural examples to support the notion of the soul 
                                                 
96“Qui praesumunt non in utero concipi animam nec cum carnis figulatione 
compingi atque produci, sed et effuso iam partu nondum uiuo infanti extrinsecus 
inprimi.” De anima 25.5. 
97Mark 16:9; 5:1-9. 
98De anima 25.82. 
99“Ostendit enim animam de semine induci, quod curari monet, non de prima 
aspiratione nascentis.” De anima 25.85. Karpp refers to this as the “traduzianische 
Anschauung Tertullians von der Entstehung der einzelnen Seelen.” Karpp, Probleme, 59. 
See also I. L. S. Balfour, “The Fate of the Soul in Induced Abortion in the Writings of 
Tertullian,” Studia Patristica 16, no. 2 (1985): 128-129; Steinmann, 194-195. 
100De anima 25.27-29. 
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existing in the fetus before its birth.101 These are the biblical narratives where children in 
utero are spoken of. He mentions Rebecca’s twins fighting in her and John leaping in 
Elizabeth’s womb at the voice of Mary. He also mentions God’s statement in Jer 1:5, 
“Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee. And before you came forth out of the 
womb, I sanctified thee.” 
Tertullian goes beyond the concept that the soul is formed before birth. He asserts 
that its substance is formed at conception, together with the body.102 He states that the 
body was “conceived, formed, and generated along with the soul from its earliest 
existence in the womb.”103 He allows for two kinds of seed, that of the body and that of 
the soul.104 This is defended first by noting that the sexual act itself is a combination of 
the desire of the soul and the action of the flesh.105 He adds to this a defense from the 
creation narrative, noting that God made Adam of clay and added to this his own 
breath106 and then gave the command to “be fruitful and multiply.”107 To this concept, 
Tertullian adds the notion that the sex of the infant is not determined either by the soul or 
                                                 
101Ibid., 26. 
102De anima 27.1. See also De resurrectione mortuorum 45.16. 
103“Caro autem, ab exordio uteri consata conformata congenita animae.” De 
resurrectione morutorum 16.38. 
104“Nam etsi duas species confitebimur seminis, corporalem et animalem, 
indiscretas tamen uindicamus et hoc modo contemporales eiusdem que momenti.” Da 
anima 27.19. 
105“In hoc itaque sollemni sexuum officio, quod marem ac feminam miscet, in 
concubitu dico communi, scimus et animam et carnem simul fungi, animam 





the body alone. “The soul, being sown in the womb at the same time as the body, receives 
likewise along with it its sex; and this indeed so simultaneously, that neither of the two 
substances can be alone regarded as the cause of the sex.”108 
 
The Human Person and the Soul 
For Tertullian, it is quite clear that the human person consists of two 
substances.109 One argument he uses for this is based on the words of Christ in Matt 
10:28 regarding fear for the one who was able to destroy both body and soul. Tertullian 
remarks, “For since both substances are set before us (in this passage, which affirms) that 
‘body and soul’ are destroyed in hell, a distinction is obviously made between the 
two.”110 In arguing against the heretics regarding Christ’s flesh, Tertullian writes, 
“Whatever is the condition of our soul in its secret nature, it is certainly not one of 
flesh.”111 
In commenting on the words of Jesus, “For the Son of man is come to seek and to 
save that which was lost” (Luke 19:10), Tertullian writes, “Now, since he consists of two 
                                                 
108“Anima in utero seminata pariter cum carne pariter cum ipsa sortitur et sexum, 
ita pariter, ut in causa sexus neutra substantia teneatur.” De anima 36.7. Tertullian even 
attempts an explanation for the origin of Eve’s soul as being in Adam before being taken 
out with the flesh from the side from which she was formed. De anima 36.25. 
109See, for instance, De resurrectione mortuorum 14.30; 32.11; 34.45; 40.9; 
43.22; 49.37. Cf. Aduersus Praxean 30.7; De pudicitia 20.51, 64. On the relationship of 
the soul and the body in Tertullian, see Alexandre, 279-328; Leal, 57-61. See also 
Fredouille, 322-323; Paulo Siniscalco, Ricerche sul De resurrectione di Tertulliano 
(Rome: Editrice Studium, 1966), 115-117. 
110“Cum enim utrumque proponitur, corpus atque animam, occidi in gehennam, 
distinguitur corpus ab anima.” De resurrectione mortuorum 35.16. 
111“Cuiuscumque <autem> formae est in occulto anima nostra, non tamen 
carneae.” De carne Christi 10.18. 
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parts, body and soul, the point to be inquired into is, in which of these two man would 
seem to have been lost?”112 Tertullian, in an interesting argument, urges that if only the 
soul is lost, then the body is not lost and salvation belongs only to the soul. After 
allowing for the opposite to this (body is lost and soul is safe), Tertullian mentions a third 
option, which he seems to favor. This is that the whole person is lost and in need of 
salvation, both soul and body. The soul then, whatever substance it is allowed to be, must 
be presumed to be lost and in need of salvation.113 As scriptural support for this notion, 
Tertullian points to the parable of the lost sheep, which was lost both in body and soul 
and thus was saved in both body and soul.114 
In seeking to defend the importance of the body to the human person, Tertullian 
points out that Adam was first clay, that is body, and only later became man.115 He notes 
that man “became a living soul by the inbreathing of God—by the breath indeed which 
was capable of hardening clay into another substance.”116 He also writes, “Yes; and so 
intimate is the union, that it may be deemed to be uncertain whether the flesh bears about 
the soul, or the soul the flesh; or whether the flesh acts as apparitor to the soul, or the 
                                                 
112“Hic cum ex duabus substantiis constet, ex corpore et anima, quaerendum est, 
ex qua substantiae specie perisse uideatur.” Aduersus Marcionem 4.37. 
113Se also De resurrectione mortuorum 34.3. 
114Ibid., 34.9. 
115Ibid., 5.38-44. See also De resurrectione mortuorum 40.9. That is, God created 
man from the dust of the ground and, only aftwards, breathed into him the breath of life, 
or his soul. See Fernández Ardanaz, El Mito del “hombre Nuevo” en el Siglo II: El 
Dialogo Cristianismo-Helenismo, 61-62. 
116“Factus est homo in animam uiuam de dei flatu, uaporeo scilicet et idoneo 
torrere quodammodo limum in aliam qualitatem, quasi in testam, ita et in carnem.” De 
resurrectione mortuorum 7.13. 
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soul to the flesh.”117 He does acknowledge that the soul is served by the body, but even 
this he interprets as increasing the body’s glory.118 He also writes regarding the soul that 
the body “is mixed up with it likewise in all its operations.”119 
Though Tertullian is quite emphatic as to the importance of the body to the human 
person, yet he can also express the opposite opinion at times. In discussing the flesh of 
Christ, he writes that one of his opponent’s arguments “implies that we are ourselves 
separate from our soul, when all that we are is soul.”120 He adds, “Indeed, without the 
soul we are nothing; there is not even the name of a human being, only that of a 
carcass.”121 Elsewhere, he adds, that it was not by the physical makeup of the human 
body that showed a likeness to God, “but he showed his stamp in that essence which he 
derived from God Himself (that is, the spiritual, which answered to the form of God), and 
in the freedom and power of his will.”122 Tertullian connects the concept of free will 
elsewhere with the soul. He writes that it is through free will that sin entered the human 
                                                 
117“Tanta quidem concretione, ut incertum haberi possit, utrumne caro animam 
an carnem anima circumferat, utrumne animae caro an anima adpareat carni.” Ibid., 
7.40. 
118“Sed etsi magis animam inuehi atque dominari credendum est, ut magis deo 
proximam, hoc quoque ad gloriam carnis exuberat, quod proximam deo et continet et 
ipsius dominationis compotem praestat.” De resurrectione mortuorum 7.43. 
119“Etiam in omni operatione miscetur illi.” Ibid., 16.38. 
120 “Quasi nos seorsum ab anima simus, cum totum quod sumus anima sit.” De 
carne Christi 12.3. Cf. De resurrectione mortuorum 32.36. 
121“Denique sine anima nihil sumus, neque hominis quidem, sed cadaueris 
nomen.” De carne Christi 12.5. 
122“Sed in ea substantia, quam ab ipso deo traxit, id est anima, ad formam dei, 





Tertullian argues for a close connection between the soul and the body. He writes, 
“The soul is never without the flesh, as long as it is in the flesh.”124 In discussing the 
divine commands regarding eating in Gen 2-3, he writes that God “has regard rather to 
the body than to the soul, although it be in the interest of the soul also.”125 Thus food is 
important for the soul as well as the body. He quickly notes, though, that it is not 
necessary for the life of the soul as the soul is not mortal.126 Elsewhere he writes, “The 
flesh, indeed, is washed, in order that the soul may be cleansed; the flesh is anointed, that 
the soul may be consecrated; the flesh is signed (with the cross), that the soul too may be 
fortified; the flesh is shadowed with the imposition of hands, that the soul also maybe 
illuminated by the Spirit; the flesh feeds on the body and blood of Christ, that the soul 
likewise may fatten on its God.”127 He also points to other things such as “fastings, 
                                                 
123“Itaque non per illud iam uideri potest anima deliquisse, quod illi cum deo 
adfine est, id est per adflatum, sed per illud, quod substantiae accessit, id est per liberum 
arbitrium, a deo quidem rationaliter adtributum, ab homine uero qua uoluit agitatum.” 
Ibid., 2.9. 
124“Numquam anima sine carne est, quamdiu in carne est.” De resurrectione 
mortuorum 15.19. 
125“Prospectam non tam animae quam carni, etsi propter animam.” De anima 
38.20. 
126“Auferenda est enim argumentatoris occasio, qui quod anima desiderare 
uideatur alimenta, hinc quoque mortalem eam intellegi cupit, quae cibis sustineatur, 
denique derogatis eis euigescat, postremo subtractis intercidat.” Ibid., 38.26. The only 
reason the soul desires meat and drink is for the body which it inhabits. De anima 38.34-
35. 
127“Sed et caro abluitur, ut anima emaculetur; caro unguitur, ut anima 
consecretur; caro signatur, ut [et] anima muniatur; caro manus impositione adumbratur, 
ut [et] anima spiritu inluminetur; caro corpore et sanguine christi uescitur, ut et anima 




abstinences, and . . . humiliations” along with “virginity and widowhood, and the modest 
restraint in secret on the marriage-bed” are all carried out in the flesh but described as 
“conflicts of the soul.”128 This is a strong statement regarding the connection between 
what is done in the body and the result to the soul. 
As the body develops, so does the soul for Tertullian. He writes that the soul 
grows “in intelligence” and “in sensibility. . . . Its inherent power, in which are contained 
all its natural peculiarities, as originally implanted in its being, is gradually developed 
along with the flesh, without impairing the germinal basis of the substance, which it 
received when breathed at first into man.”129 Tertullian is quite cautious on this point 
however. He writes, “We are, however, forbidden to suppose that the soul increases in 
substance, lest it should be said also to be capable of diminution in substance, and so its 
extinction even should be believed to be possible.”130 He clarifies this by adding that “the 
growth and developments of the soul are to be estimated, not as enlarging its substance, 
but as calling forth its powers.”131 He argues that the soul reaches its maturity at the same 
time as puberty is reached for the body. Though he acknowledges that this is believed by 
                                                 
128“Nam et sacrificia deo grata, conflictationes dico [carnis] animae, ieiunia et 
seras et aridas escas et adpendices huius officii sordes, caro de proprio suo incommodo 
instaurat. Virginitas quoque et uiduitas et modesta in occulta matrimonii dissimulatio et 
una notitia eius de bonis carnis deo adulantur.” De resurrectione mortuorum 8.14. 
129“Caro modulo, anima ingenio, caro habitu, anima sensu . . . sed uis eius, in qua 
naturalia peculia consita retinentur, saluo substantiae modulo, quo a primordio inflata 
est, paulatim cum carne producitur.” De anima 37.27-33. 
130“Ceterum animam substantia crescere negandum est, ne etiam decrescere 
substantia dicatur atque ita et defectura credatur.” Ibid., 37.32. See Salvador Vicastillo, 
Tertuliano y la muerte del hombre (Madrid: Dundacion Universitaria Españalo, 1980), 
67. 




others, he draws his support from the account of the entrance of sin in Gen 3. Here, Adam 
and Eve became ashamed of their nakedness only after they had obtained the knowledge 
of good and evil. Thus also, humans have shame regarding sexual matters at the onset of 
puberty, this taking place, Tertullian argues, when they have come to a knowledge of 
good and evil.132 
Tertullian writes that the soul has a corporeal nature.133 He refers to arguments 
from both Zeno, who argues that the body dies when the soul departs, and Cleanthes, who 
argues that characteristics of the soul pass along familial lines, to set up his argument that 
the soul is corporeal. Tertullian writes, “But the soul certainly sympathizes with the body, 
and shares in its pain, whenever it is injured by bruises, and wounds, and sores: the body, 
too, suffers with the soul, and is united with it (whenever it is afflicted with anxiety, 
distress, or love) in the loss of vigor which its companion sustains, whose shame and fear 
it testifies by its own blushes and paleness.”134 Tertullian later calls on Soranus who 
states “that the soul is even nourished by corporeal aliments; that in fact it is, when 
failing and weak, actually refreshed oftentimes by food.”135 
                                                 
132De anima 38.12. 
133See De resurrectione mortuorum 17.4. For a discussion on the importance of 
this in Tertullian’s thought, see Alexandre, 241-256; Dunn, 37; Karpp, Probleme, 46-59. 
Dunn argues that when Tertullian understood the soul to be corporeal, he meant it was 
real though spiritual. 
134“Porro et animam compati corpori, cui laeso ictibus uulneribus ulceribus 
condolescit, et corpus animae, cui afflictae cura angore amore coaegrescit per 
detrimentum socii uigoris, cuius pudorem et pauorem rubore atque pallore testetur.” De 
anima 5.22. 
135“Animam corporalibus quoque ali, denique deficientem a cibo plerumque 
fulciri.” Ibid., 6.44. On the use of Soranus by Tertullian in De anima, see Heinrich Karpp, 




Because of this shared commonality of the soul with the body, Tertullian argues 
that the soul must be corporeal in nature. He concludes by referring to two more writers, 
Chrysippus and Lucretius. “The soul, therefore, is endued with a body; for if it were not 
corporeal, it could not desert the body.”136 Here the notion of the soul escaping from the 
body at death is used to support the notion that the soul then must be corporeal.137 
Though the soul is corporeal, yet Tertullian insists it not be referred to as an 
animate body, “inasmuch as it is the soul itself which makes the body either animate, if it 
be present to it, or else inanimate, if it be absent from it.”138 However, he argues, it is the 
soul which moves the body.139 He then asks rhetorically, “Whence could accrue such 
power to the soul, if it were incorporeal? How could an unsubstantial thing propel solid 
objects?”140 
Tertullian argues against the idea that the soul is not perceived by bodily organs 
but only by the intellectual capabilities. If this were true then he understands that the soul 
must be incorporeal.141 He attempts to disprove this argument by noting that sound, color, 
                                                 
136“Igitur corpus anima, quae nisi corporalis corpus non derelinquet.” De anima 
5.33. 
137“Derelicto autem corpore ab anima affici morte.” Ibid., 5.28. Cf. ibid., 27.5 
where the same assumption is made without being defended. 
138“Non enim potest anima animale corpus dici aut inanimale cum ipsa sit quae 
aut faciat corpus animale, si adsit, aut inanimale, si absit ab illo” De anima 6.8. See also 
De resurrectione mortuorum 53.30. 
139“Anima autem mouet corpus, et conatus eius extrinsecus foris parent.” De 
anima 6.22. 
140“Vnde haec uis incorporalis animae? vnde uacuae rei solida propellere?” Ibid., 
6.26. Based on De carne Christi 11.4, Leal argues that for Tertullian, even God is 
corporeal. Leal, 40-41. For an overview of scholarly attempts at explaining Tertullian’s 
concept of a corporeal soul, see Leal, 43-46. 




and smell are incorporeal and yet are perceived by the corporeal faculties of the body.142 
He concludes, “Inasmuch, then, as it is evident that even incorporeal objects are 
embraced and comprehended by corporeal ones, why should not the soul, which is 
corporeal, be equally comprehended and understood by incorporeal faculties?”143 As 
further proof, Tertullian notes that barbarians unlearned in philosophy live quite well. 
“For it is not the soul’s actual substance which is benefited by the aliment of learned 
study, but only its conduct and discipline.”144 
Tertullian also quotes Soranus to counter the argument that if the soul were 
corporeal, then after death, the body should be lighter, but it is in fact heavier.145 He also 
points to the eagle’s ability to look at the sun as proof that some things appear to be 
invisible but in reality it is only a difference in ability to see. So, Tertullian suggests, 
perhaps the soul’s corporeality is “invisible to the flesh, but perfectly visible to the 
spirit.”146 This, Tertullian says, may be how John in Rev 6:9 was able to see the souls of 
martyrs noting that “thus John, being ‘in the Spirit of God,’ beheld plainly the souls of 
the martyrs.”147 Tertullian adds another proof, which he attempts to present as a biblical 
                                                 
sed intellectualibus sensibus comprehendantur.” De anima 6.31. 
142De anima 6.34. 
143“Igitur si constat incorporalia quoque a corporalibus comprehendi, cur non et 
anima, quae corporalis, ab incorporalibus renuntietur?” De anima 6.38. 
144“Non enim substantiae ipsi alimenta proficiunt studiorum, sed disciplinae” De 
anima 6.61. 
145De anima 8.19. 
146“Tantundem et animae corpus inuisibile carni, si forte, spiritui uero uisibile 
est.” De anima 8.30. He notes that John saw the souls under the altar in Rev 6:9-11 by the 
power of God as they are not naturally visible. 
147“Sic iohannes in spiritu dei factus animas martyrum conspicit.” De anima 8:31. 
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defense. This is the statements of a woman in his church who had received visions and, in 
them, claimed to have seen souls.148 
After discussing the arguments of the philosophers for a corporeal soul, Tertullian 
turns to the Scriptures. He finds the clearest example of this in Luke 16:23-24. “In hell 
the soul of a certain man is in torment, punished in flames, suffering excruciating thirst, 
and imploring from the finger of a happier soul, for his tongue, the solace of a drop of 
water.”149 He adds, “For unless the soul possessed corporeality, the image of a soul could 
not possibly contain a finger of a bodily substance.”150 Therefore, Tertullian concludes 
that it is the souls that reside in Hades waiting judgment.151 It is of note here that 
Tertullian adds the above statement parenthetically. The text of Luke does not state that 
the souls of the rich man, Lazarus or Abraham, were there. So Tertullian believes that it 
is the souls of the dead who are in Hades awaiting judgment, though he does not attempt 
to prove this point. But based upon that assumption, he assumes the corporeality of the 
soul as “whatever is incorporeal is incapable of being kept and guarded in any way; it is 
also exempt from either punishment or refreshment.”152 The conclusion of this argument 
                                                 
148On the role of this story in Tertullian’s argument against Hermogenes, see T. 
Barnes, 124. 
149“Dolet apud inferos anima cuiusdam et punitur in flamma et cruciatur in lingua 
et de digito animae felicioris implorat solacium roris.” De anima 7.3. See d’Alès, 116-
117. 
150“Si enim non haberet anima corpus, non caperet imago animae imaginem 
corporis, nec mentiretur de corporalibus membris scriptura, si non erant.” De anima 7.8. 
151“Quid est autem illud quod ad inferna transfertur post diuortium corporis, 
quod detinetur illic, quod in diem iudicii reseruatur.” Ibid., 7.11. 
152“Incorporalitas enim ab omni genere custodiae libera est, immunis et a poena 
et a fouella.” Ibid., 7.15. 
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is that only corporeal things are capable of suffering. Elsewhere he does allow for a 
suffering soul.153 
Having proved the corporeal nature of the soul, Tertullian also insists that it is not 
inconsistent to “declare that the more usual characteristics of a body, such as invariably 
accrue to the corporeal condition, belong also to the soul—such as form and limitation; 
and that triad of dimensions—I mean length, and breadth and height—by which 
philosophers gauge all bodies.”154 In order to prove this statement, Tertullian cites a 
witness from his church (Montanist) who claims to have had visions in which she states 
that it “has been shown to me a soul in bodily shape, and a spirit has been in the habit of 
appearing to me; not, however, a void and empty illusion, but such as would offer itself 
to be even grasped by the hand, soft and transparent and of an ethereal color, and in form 
resembling that of a human being in every respect.”155 Tertullian argues that the “ethereal 
transparent” color is what should be expected as whatever “is very attenuated and 
transparent bears a strong resemblance to the air” which is “the case with the soul, since 
in its material nature it is wind and breath (or spirit.)”156 The shape of the soul, according 
                                                 
153Cf. De resurrectione mortuorum 18. See also Apologeticum 48 and De 
testimonio animae 6. where he argues contrary to this, asserting that only by being 
connected with the body can one soul feel good or bad. In this context though, the soul is 
not specifically named, leaving it to be assumed that this is what cannot feel suffering 
without the body. 
154“Omnimodo debita corpulentiae adesse animae quoque, ut habitum, ut 
terminum, ut illud trifariam distantiuum, longitudinem dico et latitudinem et 
sublimitatem, quibus metantur corpora philosophi.” De anima 9.6. 
155“Ostensa est mihi anima corporaliter, et spiritus uidebatur, sed non inanis et 
uacuae qualitatis, immo quae etiam teneri repromitteret, tenera et lucida et aerii coloris, 
et forma per omnia humana.” Ibid., 9.32. 
156“Sed quoniam omne tenue atque perlucidum aeris aemulum est, hoc erit anima, 
qua flatus et spiritus tradux, siquidem prae ipsa tenuitatis subtilitate de fide 




to Tertullian, is the same as the shape of the body. He draws on the creation account of 
God breathing His breath into Adam, on Paul being able to see the Lord on the road to 
Damascus (Acts 9:1-8), on the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16) and on 
John seeing the souls under the altar (Rev 6:9).157 Adam’s soul, then, also became the 
seed for all future souls. “The soul indeed which in the beginning was associated with 
Adam’s body, which grew with its growth and was molded after its form proved to be the 
germ both of the entire substance (of the human soul) and of that (part of) creation.”158 
In discussing sin, Tertullian notes that the soul is the real culprit rather than the 
body. He writes, “How then is it, that the soul, which is the real author of the works of 
the flesh, shall attain to the kingdom of God, after the deeds done in the body have been 
stoned for, whilst the body, which was nothing but (the soul’s) ministering agent, must 
remain in condemnation?”159 Elsewhere, he divides blame between the flesh and soul 
based on any effects which come of the sin. “The emotions of sin, indeed, when not 
resulting in effects, are usually imputed to the soul.”160 For the righteous, the reward also 
                                                 
to argue that the soul is immaterial. 
157De anima 9.57-69. On the function of the parable of the Rich Man and 
Lazaraus and the descent of Christ in Tertullian’s eschatology, see Heinz Finé, Die 
Terminolgie der Jenseitsvorstellungen bei Tertullian: Ein semasiologischer Beitrag zur 
Dogmengeschichte des Zwischenzustandes (Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1958), 236; Leal, 179-
180. Cf. Stuiber, 43. 
158“A primordio enim in adam concreta et configurata corpori anima, ut totius 
substantiae, ita et condicionis istius semen effecit.” De anima 9.70. 
159“Quale est autem ut, si anima, auctrix operum carnis, merebitur dei regnum 
per expiationem eorum, quae in corpore admisit, corpus, ministrum solummodo, in 
damnatione permaneat?” Aduersus Marcionem 5.10. 
160“Denique sensus delictorum etiam sine effectibus imputari solent animae.” De 
anima 40.20. When it results in some effect, then it is usually blamed on the flesh. 
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goes both to the soul and the body.161 
The soul also suffered a change in its nature because of evil. He writes, “There is, 
then, besides the evil which supervenes on the soul from the intervention of the evil 
spirit, an antecedent, and in a certain sense natural, evil which arises from its corrupt 
origin.”162 This is in contrast to his statement elsewhere that the irrational part of the soul 
is not part of the soul by nature, as God is it originator and He cannot create anything evil 
by nature.163 He attempts to balance this view with the concept that the soul still has in 
part a good nature. “Still there is a portion of good in the soul, of that original, divine, and 
genuine good, which is its proper nature.”164 Just what he means when he says divine 
good is not clear. From other statements, it does not seem that this should be interpreted 
to mean that the soul originally had a divine nature. 
Though he clearly connects the soul with sin, Tertullian also makes the argument 
that the soul is by nature Christian.165 He states, “Though under the oppressive bondage 
of the body, though led astray by depraving customs, though enervated by lusts and 
passions, though in slavery to false gods; yet, whenever the soul comes to itself, as out of 
a surfeit, or a sleep, or a sickness, and attains something of its natural soundness, it 
                                                 
161De resurrectione mortuorum 33.34. 
162“Malum igitur animae, praeter quod ex obuentu spiritus nequam superstruitur, 
ex originis uitio antecedit, naturale quodammodo.” De anima 41.1. 
163Cf. ibid., 16. 
164“Tamen insit et bonum animae, illud principale, illud diuinum atque germanum 
et proprie naturale.” Ibid., 41.3. 
165On this idea in Tertullian, see G. Quispel, “Anima naturaliter christiana,” 
Eranos-Jahrbuch 18 (1950): 173-182; Carlo Tibiletti, “Postilla sul tema dell’anima 
Cristiana per natura,” Augustinianum 34, no. 2 (1994): 447-454. 
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speaks of God; using no other word, because this is the peculiar name of the true God.” 
He then notes how often is used expressions such as “God is great and good” and “I 
commend myself to God” and concludes with the statement, “O noble testimony of the 
soul by nature Christian.”166 
The concept of the soul being Christian means to Tertullian that it knows its 
creator. Thus, based upon people fearing God and invoking his name in various ways in 
common speech, Tertullian makes the argument that the soul is made by God or is divine 
itself or both.167 To those who argue that the soul only learned to say such things from the 
writings of others, Tertullian counters by stating, “Unquestionably the soul existed before 
letters, and speech before books, and ideas before the writing of them, and man himself 
before the poet and philosopher.”168 Then, as if to allow for the possibility that the soul 
might have learned something from the things which had been written down, he argues 
that the Scriptures clearly predate secular writings and thus if the soul learned anything 
from written materials, it must have learned from the writings of Scripture since they 
                                                 
166“O testimonium animae naturaliter christianae!” Apologeticum 17.27. Cf. De 
testimonio animae 1-2 where he seems to argue precisely the opposite, that the soul 
becomes a Christian, though he uses the same argument of habit of souls (or people) 
using God in various statements such as “If God so will” and “May God repay” as a 
witness for the Christians from among demons. See also Aduersus Marcionem 1.10; De 
anima 39.19-28; 40.1. See T. Barnes, 113. Barnes suggests that, for Tertullian, the soul is 
not Christian itself but “bears witness to Christianity.” The solution seems to be in his 
statement: “Thus the divinity of the soul bursts forth in prophetic forecasts in 
consequence of its primeval good; and being conscious of its origin, it bears testimony to 
God (its author) in exclamations such as: Good God! God knows! and Good-bye!” De 
anima 41.17.  
167“Si enim anima aut diuina aut a deo data est, sine dubio datorem suum nouit, et 
si nouit, utique et timet et tantum postremo ad auctorem.” De testimonio animae 2.31. 
See also ibid., 5.18. 
168“Certe prior anima quam littera, et prior sermo quam liber, et prior sensus 
quam stilus et prior homo ipse quam philosophus et poeta.” Ibid., 5.22. 
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were first.169 But even having said this, Tertullian elsewhere asserts that “the soul was 
before prophecy. From the beginning the knowledge of God is the dowry of the soul, one 
and the same amongst the Egyptians, and the Syrians, and the tribes of Pontus. For their 
souls call the God of the Jews their God.”170 Tertullian supports this notion by asking an 
apparent rhetorical question, “Whence, then, the soul’s natural fear of God, if God cannot 
be angry?”171 
Tertullian asserts that the soul, as the breath of God, is not weak in terms of will 
power and the strength to follow God’s law.172 Here the soul should not be identified with 
the Spirit of God. Tertullian maintains a distinction between breath, or afflatus, and 
Spirit.173 The latter causes the former and is the image of it, but it is not identical with it. 
Tertullian uses the example of one who plays a flute. “And in an act of your own, such as 
blowing into a flute, you would not thereby make the flute human, although it was your 
own human breath which you breathed into it, precisely as God breathed of His own 
Spirit.”174 Tertullian here argues against a divine nature of the soul. He does, however, 
                                                 
169De testimonio animae 5.37. De testimonio animae 6 provides a summary of this 
argumentation with a call to listen to either God, nature, or the soul itself on this matter. 
170“Ante anima quam prophetia. Animae enim a primordio conscientia dei dos 
est; eadem nec alia et in aegyptiis et in syris et in ponticis. [Iudaeorum enim deum dicunt 
animae deum].” Aduersus Marcionem 1.10. 
171“Unde igitur naturalis timor animae in deum, si deus non nouit irasci?” De 
testimonio animae 2.35. This whole argument occurs in the context of a discussion upon 
the essence of God. 
172Aduersus Marcionem 2.8; 5.6. 
173See ibid., 4.9 where Tertullian admits that many wise men claim the soul has a 
divine nature. 
174“Nec tu enim, si in tibiam flaueris, hominem tibiam feceris, quamquam de 
anima tua flaueris, sicut et deus de spiritu suo.” Aduersus Marcionem 2.9. 
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argue in this context for the immortality of the soul, stating that although the breath is not 
the same as the spirit, yet there are several clear similarities.175 
 
Death, Immortality, and the Soul 
Tertullian argues for a simple soul. He writes, “It is essential to a firm faith to 
declare with Plato that the soul is simple; in other words uniform and uncompounded; 
simple that is to say in respect of its substance.”176 He describes it as being “single, 
simple, and entire in itself, it is as incapable of being composed and put together from 
external constituents, as it is of being divided in and of itself, inasmuch as it is 
indissoluble.”177 He clearly states the key reason why he argues this way. “For if it had 
been possible to construct it and to destroy it, it would no longer be immortal. Since, 
however, it is not mortal, it is also incapable of dissolution and division.”178 It is very 
clear that Tertullian seeks to protect the soul from even the possibility of death.179 He 
even goes so far as to write that he is “forbidden” from supposing “that the soul increases 
                                                 
175“In hoc erit imago minor ueritate et adflatus spiritu inferior, habens illas 
utique lineas dei, qua inmortalis, [anima] qua libera et sui arbitrii, qua praescia 
plerumque, qua rationalis, capax intellectus et scientiae.” Ibid. 
176“Pertinet ad statum fidei simplicem animam determinare secundum platonem, 
id est uniformem, dumtaxat substantiae nomine.” De anima 10.1. 
177“Singularis alioquin et simplex et de suo tota est, non magis structilis aliunde 
quam divisibilis ex se, quia nec dissolubilis.” Ibid., 14.1. See Steinmann, 194. On the 
concern by Tertullian to explain the human soul in mind of Christ’s soul and the 
comparison to Plato’s tripartite soul, see Waszink, Tertullian, 229-230. Both authors note 
that for Tertullian, the irrational part of the soul comes as a result of the fall and is thus 
not part of its nature. It is introduced through the work of Satan. 
178“Si enim structilis et dissolubilis, iam non immortalis. Itaque quia non mortalis, 
neque dissolubilis neque diuisibilis.” De anima 14.3. See also 51.29.  
179See Vicastillo, Un cuerpo destinado a la muerte: su significado en la 
antropología de Tertuliano, 35-56. 
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in substance, lest it should be said also to be capable of diminution of substance.”180 
Elsewhere he adds, “The truth is, the soul is indivisible, because it is immortal; (and this 
fact) compels us to believe that death itself is an indivisible process, accruing indivisibly 
to the soul, not indeed because it is immortal, but because it is indivisible.”181 The 
immortality of the soul is assumed and from this is proved by the soul’s simpleness. 
Tertullian notes that the immortality of the soul is generally a universal principle 
among all people.182 He writes, “There is no need, I suppose, to treat of the soul’s safety; 
for nearly all the heretics, in whatever way they conceive of it, certainly refrain from 
denying that.”183 Elsewhere he argues that the soul “has no trace of a fall in its 
designation, as indeed there is no mortality in its condition.”184 As proof here he notes 
that “that cannot fall which by its entrance raises; nor can that droop which by its 
                                                 
180“Ceterum animam substantia crescere negandum est, ne etiam decrescere 
substantia dicatur atque ita et defectura credatur.” De anima 37.32. 
181“Ceterum anima indiuisibilis, ut immortalis, etiam mortem indiuisibilem exigit 
credi, non quasi immortali, sed quasi indiuisibili animae indiuisibiliter accidentem.” 
Ibid., 51.26. 
182See De resurrectione mortuorum 1.14 where he compares his views to those of 
Pythagoras and Plato. See, also, his statement in De praescriptione haereticorum 7.10 
against the Epicureans who hold that the soul dies. Wolfson argues that Tertullian does 
not hold to a natural immortality of the soul but rather holds a view similar to others that 
the existence of the soul is by virtue of God’s will rather than natural to it. Wolfson also 
argues that “natural immortality” means that God could not destroy the soul if He wanted 
to. Wolfson, 305-306. This does not seem a helpful argument as no author in this study 
has been found to offer such an idea. He is correct in judging that most of the early 
Church Fathers’ beliefs on the immortality of the soul were the same. 
183“Animae autem salutem credo retractatu carere <posse>.” De resurrectione 
mortuorum 2.61. Cf. 34.22. 
184“Atque adeo caro est, quae morte subruitur, ut exinde a cadendo cadauer 
enuntietur; anima porro nec uocabulo cadit.” De resurrectione mortuorum 18.34. 
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departure causes ruin.”185 In commenting on the death of Christ in this context, he notes 
that Jesus said, “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up again” (John 
2:19), in reference to His body (John 2:21), not His soul. He notes that the Scriptures 
state that His “soul was trembling even unto death” (Matt 26:38) but does not state that 
His soul died. Tertullian also argues based on Matt 10:28 where Christ said, “‘He is 
rather to be feared, who is able to destroy both body and soul in hell,’ that is, the Lord 
alone; ‘not those which kill the body, but are not able to hurt the soul,’ that is to say, all 
bureau powers.”186 He interprets this as follows: “Here, then, we have a recognition of 
the natural immortality of the soul, which cannot be killed by men; and of the mortality 
of the body, which may be killed.”187 
Another argument Tertullian uses is constructed around the definition of the word 
dead. He writes, “The word dead expresses simply what has lost the vital principle, by 
means of which it used to live. Now the body is that which loses life, and as the result of 
losing it becomes dead. To the body, therefore, the term dead is only suitable.”188 He also 
                                                 
185“Non potest cadere quae suscitauit ingressa; non potest ruere quae elidit 
egressa.” Ibid., 18.34. 
186“Sed et praecipit eum potius timendum, qui et corpus et animam occidat in 
gehennam, id est dominum solum, non qui corpus occidant, animae autem nihil nocere 
possint, id est humanas potestates.” Ibid., 35.1. 
187“Adeo hic et anima inmortalis natura recognoscitur, quae non possit occidi ab 
hominibus, et carnis esse mortalitatem, cuius sit occisio.” Ibid., 35.4. 
188“[Ita] mortuum [uocabulum] non est nisi quod amisit animam, de cuius 
facultate uiuebat; corpus est quod amittit animam et amittendo fit mortuum: ita mortui 
uocabulum corpori competit.” Aduersus Marcionem 5.9. He also uses this argument 
against those who argue that the natural body of 1 Cor 15 which is sown and raised again 
is the soul only and not the flesh. He thus argues that the soul is not “sown” and thus it 
cannot be identifed with the natural body. De resurrectione mortuorum 53.4. The body 
itself is the natural body and at the resurrection, the soul is rejoined with it to become a 
spiritual body. De resurrectione mortuorum 53.27. See Fernández Ardanaz, El Mito, 60. 
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argues based upon the word resurrection, which, he notes, must refer to the body as that 
is the only thing that has fallen.189 For this, he refers to Gen 3:19 where Adam, who is 
man and/or clay and not soul, is told “Dust you are, and unto dust shall you return.” He 
also uses the story of Abraham requesting a place to bury Sarah in Gen 23:4 where he 
says, “Give me the possession of a burying place with you that I may bury my dead.” 
Tertullian interprets this as “meaning, of course, her flesh; for he could not have desired a 
place to bury her soul in, even if the soul is to be deemed mortal, and even if it could bear 
to be described by the word dead.”190 Thus the soul cannot die and the resurrection does 
not apply to it.191 
Tertullian uses several non-biblical arguments to support the notion of the 
continued existence of souls after death. One is from the general habits of people. He 
notes that most people are very concerned about their “posthumous fame.” “How is it the 
nature of the soul to have these posthumous ambitions and with such amazing effort to 
prepare the things it can only use after decease? It would care nothing about the future, if 
the future were quite unknown to it.”192 He then proceeds to add to this argument for a 
post-mortem sentient soul the doctrine of a future resurrection. In support of this, he uses 
                                                 
189This entire argument is very similar to the one given in De resurrectione 
mortuorum 18.17-33. On Tertullian’s motive for his doctrine of the resurrection, see 
Siniscalco, Ricerche, 148-153. 
190“Neque enim animae humandae spatium desiderasset, et si anima mortalis 
crederetur, et si mortuus dici mereretur.” De resurrection mortuorum 18.56. 
191Tertullian uses this as a key argument for the resurrection of the body, which, 
in general, is a more imporant theme than the nature of the soul for him. Cf. Aduersus 
Marcionem 5.10. 
192“Unde animae hodie affectare aliquid quod uelit post mortem et tantopere 
praeparare quae sit usura post obitum?” De testimonio animae 4.56. 
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a similar style of argumentation, the habits of people. He notes that when someone has 
died, it is often said that “‘He has gone.’” The obvious conclusion being that “He is 
expected to return, then.”193 Clearly in this section, Tertullian is relying on a natural 
argument. He adds, “These testimonies of the soul are simple as true, commonplace as 
simple, universal as commonplace, natural as universal, divine as natural.”194 He adds to 
this the following: “And what the soul may know from the teachings of its chief 
instructor, you can judge from that which is within thee.”195 From this argumentation 
based upon non-scriptural teaching by unbelievers, Tertullian argues that it is possible for 
one to be a witness to truth using only one’s natural powers, without the aid of divine 
revelation. “For some things are known even by nature: the immortality of the soul, for 
instance, is held by many. . . . I may use, therefore, the opinion of a Plato, when he 
declares, ‘Every soul is immortal.’”196 
Tertullian goes so far as to say that “he who destroys the very soul, (as Epicurus 
does), cannot help destroying death also.”197 This is made in the context of Epicurus’s 
statement that death does not pertain to humans as we are dissolved at death and thus 
have no sense. Tertullian provides no argument other than to point out that if the 
deprivation of our sensation be nothing to us, neither can the acquisition of sensation 
                                                 
193Ibid., 4.61. 
194Ibid., 5.1. 
195“Quid anima possit de principali institutore praesumere, in te est aestimare de 
ea quae in te est.” Ibid. 
196“Quaedam enim et naturaliter nota sunt, ut inmortalitas animae penes plures, 
. . . Vtar ergo et sententia platonis alicuius pronuntiantis: omnis anima inmortalis.” De 
anima 3.4-5. 
197“Sed mortem quoque interimat qui et animam.” Ibid., 42.16. 
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have anything to do with us. It seems possible to here infer that Tertullian is wanting to 
maintain the importance of the notion of death as this is also understood to be the penalty 
of sin. He does not clearly develop the point here, however. 
At this point, it is necessary to address Jan Waszink’s claim that the immortality 
of the soul is not discussed in De anima but rather in Tertullian’s lost De censu animae. 
Waszink writes, “To understand De anima, fully we ought to have access to De censu 
animae, not only because this work induced Tert. [sic] to occupy himself with 
psychological problems, but also because he continually assumes that the readers of De 
anima are acquainted with it. . . . Thus, for instance, we do not know the grounds on 
which Tert. [sic] defended the immortality of the soul.”198 However, Tertullian, in 
condemning Lucan, states that in his “book on the entire condition of the soul” 
(presumably De anima rather than De censu animae),199 he gives an explanation 
regarding the immortality of soul.200 This would seem to counter Waszink’s claim that we 
do not know how Tertullian defends the notion of the immortality of the soul. 
Waszink also claims that a correct interpretation of De anima 22.1 demonstrates 
that the immortality of the soul is one of the natural faculties of the soul and is discussed 
in Tertullian’s treatise on the soul written against Hermogenes (presumably De censu 
animae). However, this does not appear to be proven.201 While Tertullian does argue for 
                                                 
198Waszink, Tertullian, 7. Cf. d’Alès, 112. 
199See De anima 58.52 where Terturllian states that he has in the De anima 
“encountered every human opinion concerning the soul, and tried its character by the 
teaching of (our holy faith).” 
200“Habet et iste a nobis plenissimum de omni statu animae stilum.” De 
resurrectione mortuorum 2.67. 
201Cf. A. Cleveland Coxe, ANF 3:202 n9. 
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the natural immortality of the soul, yet Waszink offers no evidence that Tertullian has 
written of this elsewhere and, thus, in the current debate, does not offer the argument 
again. If this were the case, it would seem that Tertullian himself would in some way 
refer to it. 
In De anima 24.2, Tertullian mentions the immortality of the soul in connection 
with his argument against Hermogenes (presumably De censu animae). Waszink asserts 
that its usage there is proof that Tertullian’s understanding of the immortality of the soul 
is found there, not in De anima. However, the point under discussion in De anima 24.2 is 
not primarily the immortality of the soul but rather the soul’s relationship to God; 
Tertullian’s point being that the human soul is not divine. It is immortal, yes, which is 
akin to divinity but it is born, and most importantly, it is also passable.202 The conclusion 
then is that it can be subject to a failure of memory. This argument is to counter the claim 
made by Plato that the soul is unborn and yet suffers from a loss of memory of its prior 
state. It does not seem sufficient evidence to have Tertullian discuss the loss of memory 
in the soul and correspondingly state that this point is discussed in his document against 
Hermogenes and to then make the claim that, in that document, Tertullian gives his 
fullest discussion on the immortality of the soul. 
For Tertullian, a corollary concept derived from the notion of the soul’s 
immortality pertains to motion and, through this, to sleep. This argument reasons that the 
soul is “always in motion, and always active, [it] never succumbs to rest,—a condition 
which is alien to immortality: for nothing immortal admits any end to its operation.”203 
                                                 
202De anima 24.2. 
203“Animam enim ut semper mobilem et semper exercitam numquam succidere 
quieti, alienae scilicet a statu immortalitatis; nihil enim immortale finem operis sui 




He writes, “In like manner, the immortality of the soul precludes belief in the theory that 
sleep is an intermission of the animal spirit, or an indigence of the spirit, or a separation 
of the (soul’s) connatural spirit.”204 As in his argument regarding the growth of the soul, 
Tertullian also asserts that during sleep, the soul does not undergo “diminution or 
intermission,” for to do so would mean that the soul would perish.205 He is left with the 
opinion of the Stoics who hold that sleep is the “temporary suspension of the activity of 
the senses, procuring rest for the body only, not for the soul also.”206 
In commenting on the creation narrative, Tertullian sees a typological example 
connecting the soul, sleep, and death. He points to the fact that Adam slept while Eve was 
created. This is a type of Christ and an example of how the body is during death, waiting 
for the soul that has recently left.207 Of significant interest to Tertullian in regard to 
human sleep is the dreams that are then experienced. 
Tertullian refers to dreams as “no slight or trifling excitements of the soul.”208 He 
seems to even indicate that they demonstrate the continual movement of the soul, which, 
                                                 
mortuorum 18.39. 
204“Perinde deminutionem animalis spiritus aut indigentiam spiritus aut 
segregationem consati spiritus immortalitas animae non sinit credi.” De anima 43.21. 
205“Perit anima, si minoratur.” Ibid., 43.23. 
206“Superest, si forte, cum stoicis resolutionem sensualis uigoris somnum 
determinemus, quia corporis solius quietem procuret, non et animae.” Ibid., 43.24. On 
Stoic influence on Tertullian’s thought, see d’Alès, 137-138. 
207De anima 43.61-89. 
208“Non modicis iactationibus animae.” De anima 45.2. On dreams in the ancient 
world, see John S. Hanson, “Dreams and Visions in the Graeco-Roman World and Early 




he declares, “is a proof and evidence of its divine quality and immortality.”209 He 
attributes the smiles and movements of the body in sleep as evidence of the “emotions of 
their soul as it dreams.”210 Tertullian argues that part of the nature of the soul is to dream. 
He writes strongly against a report by Aristotle concerning the people of Atlantes, a 
nation in Africa, that Aristotle alleged did not dream during their sleep. “Could it then be 
that rumor deceived Aristotle, or is this caprice still the way of demons? (Let us take any 
view of the case), only do not let it be imagined that any soul is by its natural constitution 
exempt from dreams.”211 
Tertullian teaches that the soul leaves the body at death. He writes, “But the 
operation of death is plain and obvious: it is the separation of body and soul.”212 He 
supports this notion by alleging that this is the common opinion.213 This separation of the 
soul from the body, Tertullian refers to as the “work of death.”214 Against those who 
suggest that occasionally the soul might stay with the body, at least for a period of time, 
Tertullian adds, “But not a particle of the soul can possibly remain in the body, which is 
itself destined to disappear when time shall have abolished the entire scene on which the 
body has played its part.”215 
                                                 
209“Quod diuinitatis et immortalitatis est ratio.” De anima 45.4. 
210“Ex re comprehendant motus animae somniantis.” Ibid., 49.1. 
211“Dum ne animae aliqua natura credatur immunis somniorum.” Ibid., 49.18. 
212“Opus autem mortis in medio est, discretio corporis animaeque.” Ibid., 51.1. 
213De resurrectione mortuorum 19.9. 
214“Hoc igitur opus mortis: separatio carnis atque animae.” De anima 52.1. 
215“Sed nec modicum quid animae subsidere in corpore est decessurum 
quandoque et ipsum, cum totam corporis scenam tempus aboleuerit.” De anima 51.19. 
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Elsewhere, in a gruesome description of the charge made against Christians of 
sacrificing infants during their rites, Tertullian writes, “Come, plunge your knife into the 
babe, . . . await the departure of the lately given soul.”216 In another place he exhorts 
those leaders persecuting the Christians in the following manner. “Let this, good rulers, 
be your work: wring from us the soul, beseeching God on the emperor’s behalf.”217 Here 
the poetic description seems to be of the soul leaving the body at death which was 
brought on by the persecutions they were enduring. In commenting on Jesus’ parable of 
the rich man and Lazarus,218 Tertullian, after making reference to the “Elysian fields,” 
states “that there is some determinate place called Abraham’s bosom, and that it is 
designed for the reception of the souls of Abraham’s children.”219 This location is higher 
than hell but lower than heaven. Tertullian also uses “those stories toward heaven” 
(Amos 9:6) and “Who shall declare unto you the eternal place” (Isa 33:15-16) in support 
of his notion of a “temporary receptacle of faithful souls.”220 
Death is always violent, in that it is not by nature part of the human person.221 It is 
owed to “a fault or defect which is not itself natural.”222 It expels the soul from the 
                                                 
216“Fugientem animam nouam exspecta.” Apologeticum 8.5. 
217“Hoc agite, boni praesides, extorquete animam deo supplicantem pro 
imperatore!” Apologetcium 30.38. 
218Luke 16:19-31. 
219“Vnde apparet sapienti cuique, qui aliquando elysios audierit, esse aliquam 
localem determinationem, quae simus dicta sit abrahae, ad recipiendas animas filiorum 
eius.” Aduersus Marcionem 4.34. 
220“Temporale aliquod animarum fidelium receptaculum.” Aduersus Marcionem 
4.34. 
221See Vicastillo, Tertuliano y la muerte del hombre, 186-194. 
222“Ex culpa, ne ipsa quidem naturali.” De anima 52.6. 
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body.223 It is forced slowly from the body as injury occurs to the body. “It must needs 
come to pass, amidst the gradual decay of its instruments, domiciles, and spaces, that the 
soul also itself, being driven to abandon each successive part, assumes the appearance of 
being lessened to nothing.”224 Here Tertullian does not present death as an aid to the soul. 
On the contrary, it forces itself on the soul.225 Death is also understood as being simple in 
nature. He writes, “Death, however, would have to be divided in its operation, if the soul 
were divisible into particles, any one of which has to be reserved for a later stage of 
death.”226 The purpose of this argument is not entirely clear. 
Tertullian mentions the Platonic concept of the body being the prison for the 
soul.227 He himself also refers to the body as the “temporary lodging” of the soul228 and 
states that “the flesh is the clothing of the soul.”229 He points out that for Christians, it is 
the temple of God. He, however, notes that he must admit that “by reason of its enclosure 
it obstructs and obscures the soul.”230 He here draws more on Platonic thought than any 
                                                 
223“Quae animam per commoda expellit.” Ibid., 52.22. 
224“Finium, situum officiorum, necessario et anima dilabentibus paulatim 
instrumentis et domiciliis et spatiis suis paulatim et ipsa migrare compulsa deducitur in 
deminutionis effigiem.” Ibid., 53.16. 
225This is similar to the language of Melito of Sardis. 
226“Diuidetur autem et mors, si et anima, superfluo scilicet animae quandoque 
morituro; ita portio mortis cum animae portione remanebit.” De anima 51.29. On the 
notion of death in Tertullian, see Vicastillo, Tertuliano y la muerte del hombre. 
227De anima 53.45. 
228De resurrectione mortuorum 46.54. 
229“Vestitus enim animae caro.” Scorpiace 12. 
230“Sed interim animam consepto suo obstruit et obscurat et concretione carnis 
infaecat.” De anima 53.47. 
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biblical concept. He writes, “Undoubtedly, when the soul, by the power of death, is 
released from its concretion with the flesh, it is by the very release cleansed and purified: 
it is, moreover, certain that it escapes from the veil of the flesh into open space, to its 
clear, and pure, and intrinsic light; and then finds itself enjoying its enfranchisement from 
matter, and by virtue of its liberty it recovers its divinity, as one who awakes out of sleep 
passes from images to verities.”231 
Though Tertullian argues for the continuance of the soul after death, he is clear to 
note that the souls of the dead generally cannot interfere in the lives of the living, though 
the demons attempt this. He points out that some people cooperate with demons and thus 
have the ability to “make what seem the souls of the dead to appear.”232 Elsewhere, 
however, Tertullian writes of those souls occupied by demons during life continuing to 
cooperate with demons even after their death.233 He even speaks of those souls coming 
back to inhabit others. He supports this concept by discussing cases of exorcism when the 
evil spirit “affirms himself sometimes to be one of the relatives of the person possessed 
by him, sometimes a gladiator or a bestiarius, and sometimes even a god.”234 Tertullian 
notes that whenever this happens, it is the purpose of the demons to attack the truth that 
                                                 
231“Procul dubio cum ui mortis exprimitur de concretione carnis et ipsa 
expressione colatur, certe de oppanso corporis erumpit in apertum ad meram et puram et 
suam lucem, statim semetipsam in expeditione substantiae recognoscit et in diuinitatem 
ipsa libertate resipiscit, ut de somnio emergens ab imaginibus ad ueritates.” Ibid., 53.50. 
232“Porro si et magi phantasmata edunt et iam defunctorum infamant animas.” 
Apologeticum 23.1. 
233De anima 57.16. 
234“Nisi fallor, etiam rebus probamus, cum in exorcismis interdum aliquem se ex 
parentibus hominis sui affirmat, interdum gladiatorem uel bestiarium, sicut et alibi 
deum.” Ibid., 57.26. 
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all the souls of the dead go to Hades and that there awaits a resurrection and judgment.235 
Tertullian notes that even the spirit which Saul thought was the dead prophet Samuel (1 
Sam 28:12-13) was only a trick of the demons.236 For supporting this concept, Tertullian 
points out that “‘Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light’—much more into a 
man of light—and that at last he will ‘show himself to be even God,’ and will exhibit 
‘great signs and wonders, insomuch that, if it were possible, he shall deceive the very 
elect.’”237 As final support for the idea that no dead person can return from Hades, 
Tertullian turns to the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus from Luke 16:26. He writes, 
“The fact that Hades is not in any case opened for (the escape of) any soul, has been 
firmly established by the Lord in the person of Abraham, in His representation of the 
poor man at rest and the rich man in torment.”238 Tertullian notes that it is possible for 
God alone to recall a soul from Hades. “But yet in all cases of a true resurrection, when 
the power of God recalls souls to their bodies, either by the agency of prophets, or of 
Christ, or of apostles, a complete presumption is afforded us, by the solid, palpable, and 
ascertained reality (of the revived body), that its true form must be such as to compel 
one’s belief of the fraudulence of every incorporeal apparition of dead persons.”239 
                                                 
235“Nihil magis curans quam hoc ipsum excludere quod praedicamus, ne facile 
credamus animas uniuersas ad inferos redigi, ut et iudicii et resurrectionis fidem 
turbent.” Ibid., 57.30. This is a very indirect support of the notion that souls continue to 
exist after the death of the body because of the reality of a future judgment. 
236“Et credo, quia mendacio possunt; nec enim pythonico tunc spiritui minus licuit 
animam samuelis effingere post deum mortuos consulente saule.” Ibid., 54.47. 
237Ibid., 57.52. 
238“Nulli autem animae omnino inferos patere satis dominus in argumento illo 
pauperis requiescentis et diuitis ingemiscentis ex persona abrahae sanxit.” De anima 
57.71. 





Hell and Paradise 
In the context of judgment, Tertullian discusses Christ’s words in Matt 10:28 
regarding the destruction of both body and soul in Gehenna. He writes,  
If, therefore, any one shall violently suppose that the destruction of the soul and the 
flesh in hell amounts to a final annihilation of the two substances, and not to their 
penal treatment (as if they were to be consumed, not punished), let him recollect that 
the fire of hell is eternal—expressly announced as an everlasting penalty; and let him 
then admit that it is from this circumstance that this never-ending “killing” is more 
formidable than a merely human murder, which is only temporal.240 
Tertullian does note that for the sinner, “the body after the resurrection has to be killed by 
God in hell along with the soul.”241 This killing, though, must be understood to be eternal 
or without end. 
Tertullian seems to support the popular notion that the souls of the dead could be 
prayed for and redeemed. He writes, “And so it knows nothing save how to recall the 
souls of the departed from the very path of death.”242 Elsewhere, in discussing the 
remarriage of a widow, he writes, “Indeed, she prays for his soul, and requests 
refreshment for him meanwhile, and fellowship (with him) in the first resurrection; and 
                                                 
christum siue per apostolos in corpora animas repraesentat, solida et contrectabili et 
satiata ueritate praeiudicatum est hanc esse formam ueritatis, ut omnem mortuorum 
exhibitionem incorporalem praestrigias iudices.” Ibid., 57.79. 
240“Proinde si quis occisionem carnis atque animae in gehennam ad interitum et 
finem utriusque substantiae adripiet et non ad supplicium, quasi consumendarum, non 
quasi puniendarum, recordetur ignem gehennae aeternum praedicari in poenam 
aeternam, et inde aeternitatem occisionis agnoscat, propterea humanae ut temporali 
praetimendam.” De resurrectione mortuorum 35.23. See also Scorpiace 12. 
241“Certe cum post resurrectionem corpus cum anima occidi habeat a deo in 
gehennam.” De resurrectione mortuorum 35.30. 
242“Itaque nihil nouit nisi defunctorum animas de ipso mortis itinere reuocare.” 
De oratione 29.18. 
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she offers (her sacrifice) on the anniversaries of his falling asleep.”243 Though he does not 
mention it specifically, it must be assumed that he has Paul’s words in mind, though he 
does address that statement elsewhere. 
Tertullian places the location of Hades, where souls are kept until the judgment, 
in the “interior of the earth.”244 He relies on Matt 12:40 for this. He places all souls in 
Hades until the Day of Judgment.245 He writes, “You must suppose Hades to be a 
subterranean region, and keep at arm’s length those who are too proud to believe that the 
souls of the faithful deserve a place in the lower regions.”246 Tertullian quotes 1 Thess 
4:16 as support against those who place the Christian dead in heaven already. “How, 
indeed, shall the soul mount up to heaven, where Christ is already sitting at the Father’s 
right hand, when as yet the archangel’s trumpet has not been heard by the command of 
God?”247 He does note in commenting on Rev 6:9 that only the souls of the martyrs are 
                                                 
243“Enimuero et pro anima eius orat, et refrigerium interim adpostulat ei, et in 
prima resurrectione consortium, et offert annuis diebus dormitionis eius.” De monogamia 
10.23. 
244On the underworld in Tertullian, see Finé, 79-112. 
245“Habes etiam de paradiso a nobis libellum, quo constituimus omnem animam 
apud inferos sequestrari in diem domini.” De anima 55.40. The martyrs have a special 
place and are said to go straight to paradise. See Daley, 36. Daley writes that “Tertullian 
eleborates more clearly than any Christian writer before him a theory of an ‘interim state’ 
in which the souls of the dead await and even anticipate their final punishment or 
reward.” On the notion of judgment, see Finé, 63-79. 
246“Habes et regionem inferum subterraneam credere et illos cubito pellere qui 
satis superbe non putent animas fidelium inferis dignas.” De anima 55.8. 
247“Quo ergo animam exhalabis in caelum christo illic adhuc sedente ad dexteram 
patris, nondum dei iussu per tubam archangeli audito, nondum illis quos domini 
aduentus in saeculo inuenerit, obuiam ei ereptis in aerem, cum his qui mortui in christo 
primi resurgent?” De anima 55.19. On what happens to the soul after death in Tertullian 
and how this compares to other ancient authors, see Finé, 54-63. 
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presented as under the altar.248 These are the only group of souls that go heavenward at 
death rather than down to Hades. Elsewhere while describing a martyr’s death, he writes 
of the martyr’s soul going up to heaven.249 
Though the souls of the saints do go to Hades, Tertullian is clear that there are 
two separate regions there, one for the good and the other for the bad.250 He concludes his 
De anima with a chapter discussing the need of Hades as an active place. He notes that 
some ask why the soul should undergo punishment or consolation in Hades before the 
judgment at the resurrection.251 He gives several reasons as to why this might not be the 
case. “Because in the judgment of God its matter ought to be sure and safe, nor should 
there be any inkling beforehand of the award of His sentence; and also because (the soul) 
ought to be covered first by its vestment of the restored flesh, which, as the partner of its 
actions, should be also a sharer in its recompense.”252 Tertullian’s reply to this is quite 
telling as to his thought. He asks, “What, then, is to take place in that interval? Shall we 
sleep? But souls do not sleep even when men are alive: it is indeed the business of bodies 
to sleep, to which also belongs death itself, no less than its mirror and counterfeit 
                                                 
248De anima 55.29; Scorpiace 12. See Dunn, 37-38. 
249“Cum sola et arida sit cute loricatus, et contra ungulas corneus, praemisso iam 
sanguinis suco tamquam animae impedimentis, properante iam et ipsa, quae iam saepe 
ieiunans mortem de proximo norit.” De ieiunio aduersus psychicos 290.13. 
250De anima 56.61. 
251“Cur enim non putes animam et puniri et foueri in inferis interim sub 
expectatione utriusque iudicii in quadam usurpatione et candida eius?” Ibid., 58.4. Cf. 
De resurrectione mortuorum 17.7. 
252“Quia saluum debet esse, inquis, in iudicio diuino negotium suum sine ulla 
praelibatione sententiae; tum quia et carnis opperienda est restitutio ut consortis 
operarum atque mercedum.” De anima 58.8. 
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sleep.”253 Thus, because he has already proved the point that souls do not sleep, then they 
must do something in Hades.  
Tertullian further defends this concept. First, he notes that it would be unjust for 
the guilty to have rest that they do not deserve and the righteous to not yet have the 
reward that they do deserve.254 He then asks, “Must the soul always tarry for the body, in 
order to experience sorrow or joy?”255 He notes examples of where this is not the case in 
common literature and that in fact the soul can experience both pain and suffering 
without involving the body. He then notes that Christ stated that anyone who looked at a 
woman lustfully had committed adultery with her in his heart. He concludes from this 
statement that “it is most fitting that the soul, without at all waiting for the flesh, should 
be punished for what it has done without the partnership of the flesh.”256 He then notes 
that the same must be true of the righteous also. 
Tertullian believes in the soul returning to the body at the resurrection and 
judgment.257 He points out that this is a much better opinion to hold than that of some 
non-Christians. He writes, “If there is any ground for the moving to and fro of human 
souls into different bodies, why may they not return into the very substance they have 
                                                 
253“Quid ergo fiet in tempore isto? dormiemus? at enim animae nec in uiuentibus 
dormiunt; corporum enim est somnus, quorum et ipsa mors cum speculo suo somno.” 
Ibid., 58.9. 
254Ibid., 58.14. 
255“Semper autem expectat anima corpus, ut doleat aut gaudeat?” Ibid., 58.19. Cf. 
De resurrectione mortuorum 17. 
256“Ergo uel propter haec congruentissimum est animam, licet non expectata 
carne, puniri, quod non sociata carne commisit.” De anima 58.36. 
257On the resurrection of the body in Tertullian, see Francine J. Cardman, 
“Tertullian on the Resurrection” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1974), 112-140. 
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left, seeing this is to be restored, to be that which had been?”258 He adds, “But how much 
more worthy of acceptance is our belief which maintains that they will return to the same 
bodies! And how much more ridiculous is your inherited conceit, that the human spirit is 
to reappear in a dog, or a mule, or a peacock!”259 Elsewhere he writes, “Get the demons if 
you can to join you in your mocking; let them deny that Christ is coming to judge every 
human soul which has existed from the world’s beginning, clothing it again with the body 
it laid aside at death.”260  
Tertullian also seems to suggest a change for the soul at the resurrection also, in a 
similar way that the body is changed, though this point is not entirely clear. He writes, 
“But if the soul is not to be changed also, then there is no resurrection of the soul; nor 
will it be believed to have itself risen, unless it has risen some different thing.”261 
Elsewhere, Tertullian is clear that the soul does not undergo change from the point of 
death until the resurrection. He writes, “We therefore maintain that every soul, whatever 
                                                 
258“Quasi non, quaecumque ratio praeest animarum humanarum in corpora 
reciprocandarum, ipsa exigat illas in eadem corpora reuocari, quia hoc sit reuocari, id 
est: esse quod fuerant!” Apologeticum 48.11. 
259“Quae similiter asseuerant animas in corpora redituras. Attamen quanto 
acceptabilior nostra praesumptio est, quae in eadem corpora redituras defendit; uobis 
autem quanto uanius traditum est, hominis spiritum in cane uel mulo aut pauo 
moraturum!” Ad nationes 1.19.3. See also Apologeticum 48.11. It is assumed that 
Tertullian is employing a parallel usage between anima and spiritus rather than stating 
that the Christian belief is that the spiritus would return to the same human body and that 
the non-Christian belief was that the anima would return to a body of some other animal. 
Earlier in the passage, Tertullian also uses mens in an apparent parallel style. In arguing 
against Marcion (Aduersus Marcionem 1.24), Terullian calls the salvation of only the 
soul a half salvation. 
260“Quodcumque ridetis, rideant et illi uobis cum: negent christum omnem ab 
aeuo animam restituto corpore iudicaturum.” Apologeticum 23.68. 
261“Quodsi non et anima mutabitur, iam nec animae resurrectio est; nec ipsa enim 
resurrexisse credetur, si non alia resurrexerit.” De resurrectione mortuorum 56.19. 
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be its age on quitting the body, remains unchanged in the same, until the time shall come 
when the promised perfection shall be realized.”262 Elsewhere he adds, “A man will come 
back from a man—any given person from any given person, still retaining his humanity; 
so that the soul, with its qualities unchanged, may be restored to the same condition, 
though not to the same outward framework.”263 
As previously noted, a major theme when Tertullian discusses the soul is actually 
his defense of the notion of the resurrection of the body. He presents several arguments in 
this discussion. He asserts against Marcion that the soul is the one which leads a person 
to sin first. Thus if the soul is not reunited to the body at the resurrection, then the result 
is only a half salvation. “Although sins are attributed to the body, yet they are preceded 
by the guilty concupiscence of the soul; nay, the first motion of sin must be ascribed to 
the soul, to which the flesh acts in the capacity of a servant.”264 Additionally he adds that 
“when freed from the soul, the flesh sins no more.”265 As another proof, Tertullian, again 
going to the creation narrative, asserts that the essential nature of humans is material 
rather than spiritual, quoting Gen 2:7, “And the Lord God made man of the dust of the 
                                                 
262“Ita dicimus omnem animam quaqua aetate decesserit, in ea stare ad eum diem 
usque, quo perfectum illud repromittitur.” De anima 56.54. See Vicastillo, Tertuliano y 
la muerte del hombre, 65. Vicastillo argues here and based upon De anima 42.1; 67, that 
though the soul continues for Tertullian, yet it has also reached the end of life: “The 
separation is, for the soul, a death.” 
263“Hominem ex homine rediturum, quemlibet pro quolibet, dum hominem: ut 
eadem qualitas animae in eandem restauretur, etsi non effigiem, certe condicionem.” 
Apologeticum 48.29. 
264“Sed et si carni delicta reputantur, praecedit animae reatus et culpae 
principatus animae potius adscribendus, cui caro ministri nomine occurrit.” Aduersus 
Marcionem 1.24. 
265“Carens denique anima caro hactenus peccat.” Ibid., 1.24. 
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ground, . . . and man became a living soul.”266 Thus, humans are essentially flesh and not 
soul, at least in this argument.267 
Tertullian argues that the resurrection of the body and soul is to ensure the reality 
of the judgment. “Assuredly, as the reason why restoration takes place at all is the 
appointed judgment, every man must needs come forth the very same who had once 
existed, that he may receive at God’s hands a judgment, whether of good desert or the 
opposite. And therefore the body too will appear; for the soul is not capable of suffering 
without the solid substance (that is, the flesh; and for this reason, also) that it is not right 
that souls should have all the wrath of God to bear: they did not sin without the body, 
within which all was done by them.”268 
Tertullian argues against the notion of the reincarnation of souls.269 He does not 
use any biblical support for this though. He also argues against the reincarnation of 
human souls from animals. He writes, “Now our position is this: that the human soul 
                                                 
266“Et fecit hominem deus, inquit, limum de terra, non animam; anima enim de 
afflatu: et factus est homo in animam uiuam.” Ibid., 1.24. On Tertullian’s use of Gen 2:7, 
see G. T. Armstrong, Die Genesis in der Alten Kirche: Die drei Kirchenväter, 112-117; 
Franz Seyr, “Die Seelen- und Erkenntnislehre Tertullians und die Stoa,” Commentationes 
Vindobonenses 3 (1937): 53-54. 
267Cf. “quod finxit, non quod flauit; qui caro nunc, non qui anima.” Aduersus 
Marcionem 1.24. However, Tertullian also writes that the Christian view regarding the 
soul after death is better than the Pythagorean, “as it does not transfer thee into beasts.” 
De testimonia animae 4. This seems to imply that the identity of a person is located in the 
soul, rather than the flesh. This is continually a challenge with Tertullian, as it is with all 
who propose different parts to the human person. 
268“Ideo que repraesentabuntur et corpora, quia neque pati quicquam potest 
anima sola sine materia stabili, id est carne, et quod omnino de iudicio dei pati debent 
animae, non sine carne meruerunt, intra quam omnia egerunt.” Apologeticum 48.35. See 
also De anima 33.81. 
269De anima 28-31. See Cardman, 118-120. 
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cannot by any means at all be transferred to beasts, even when they are supposed to 
originate, according to the philosophers, out of the substances of the elements.” 270 
Tertullian offers several arguments, only one of which he bases on a biblical text. 
Quoting Ps 49:20 he writes, “Man is like the beasts that perish” and “the very fact of your 
judging that a man resembles a beast, you confess that their soul is not identical; for you 
say that they resemble each other, not that they are the same.”271 Tertullian argues against 
those, such as Carpocrates, who use the question asked of John the Baptist concerning 
whether he was Elijah. Tertullian notes that the Bible clearly states, “And he shall go 




Tertullian often uses soul for human life. In this context, he also refers to the soul 
or life of an aborted fetus. He also uses soul to refer to people and to animals and living 
things in general. He even refers to the souls of idols. 
For Tertullian, the soul is simple, endowed with the power of intelligence and yet 
changeable in regard to its faculties and in no way possessing anything divine. In 
discussing the different parts of the soul, Tertullian writes of these as different faculties 
rather than different parts of the soul. He attributes motion, thought, and also the five 
                                                 
270“Dicimus animam humanam nullo modo in bestias posse transferri, etiamsi 
secundum philosophos ex elementiciis substantiis censetur.” De anima 32.11. 
271“Ipsum enim quod hominem similem bestiae iudicas, confiteris animam non 
eandem, similem dicendo, non ipsam.” Ibid., 32.89. 
272“Sed quomodo helias johannes? habes angeli uocem: et ipse, inquit, praecedet 
coram populo in uirtute et in spiritu heliae, non in anima eius nec in carne.” Ibid., 35.57. 
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senses to the soul. When discussing Plato’s rational and irrational parts of the soul, 
Tertullian suggests that the irrational element in the soul is not by nature part of the soul. 
Tertullian notes that the acts of the body affect the soul both positively and negatively. 
Breathing is a key function of the soul and thus Tertullian connects the soul and spirit. 
Against those who argue against the soul, he notes that God discusses the ruling faculty 
of the soul in the Scriptures. Against the Gnostics, Tertullian argues that there is a unity 
of substance among all human souls. He does allow for, though, a difference in the 
development of the souls of different individuals. 
Genesis 2:7 is very important in the development of Tertullian’s doctrine of the 
soul. He focuses on the notion of breath. Though the soul is not divine, yet it comes from 
God. This means that the soul has a beginning. Tertullian argues that the soul is not 
breathed into the infant at birth but is present before this. He cites biblical examples of 
infants being spoken of while in utero, mentioning Esau and Jacob, John the Baptist, and 
Jeremiah. 
The human person is a composite of soul and body. He mentions here Matt 10:28 
and the creation narrative regarding Adam’s creation first as body/dust and then soul. 
Tertullian, however, can also write that the human person is nothing but a soul, arguing 
that the imago dei is not found in the physical constitution of the individual but in the 
power of freedom of one’s will which is a power of the soul. He argues that the soul 
develops its powers but its substance does not increase. He draws on Gen 3 and the 
entrance of sin to argue that the soul reaches maturity along with the body at puberty. 
The soul is of a corporeal nature. Christ’s parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus 
(Luke 16) has a prominent role in providing a scriptural argument for this idea. The souls 
under the altar (Rev 6:9-11) also contribute to his argument. He also mentions Paul’s 




Tertullian connects the soul directly to the sin of the individual, both from a 
partial evil nature and through the influence of demons on it. He also argues, though, that 
the soul is inherently Christian and does not lack the power to obey God’s law. This 
element in Tertullian results in a tension which he does not resolve. For him, the soul has 
both good and evil in it. 
Tertullian argues for a simple soul, agreeing in this with Plato, so as to protect the 
soul from destruction. That is, the soul must survive the death of the body in order to 
receive the punishment or reward that awaits at the judgment. Writing on the reunion of 
the soul with the body at a time subsequent to death, he states, “The reason why 
restoration takes place at all is the appointed judgment.”273 While he does not argue that 
the soul is immortal so as to experience the judgment, yet he is explicit that the 
resurrection and recombining of soul and body is necessary because of the resurrection. 
Tertullian uses Christ’s parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16) to support 
the notion that the soul survives the death of the body. He also argues from statements 
made concerning Christ’s death (John 2:19-21; Matt 26:38) that Christ’s body went into 
the grave but not His soul. He also argues from Christ’s words in Matt 10:28 that only he 
who can kill both body and soul in hell is to be feared. 
Though the soul survives the death of the body, it does not have the ability to 
interfere in the lives of the living. The demons use illusions to give this appearance. This 
is how he explains 1 Sam 28 and Saul’s desire to see Samuel called up by the Witch of 
Endor. The souls are confined to Hades, which is in the inside of the earth until the 




resurrection. He uses Matt 12:40 and 1 Thess 4:16 as support for the notion that the souls 
of all, even of the righteous, are not in heaven until after the resurrection. This does not 
include the special group of martyrs who, based upon Rev 6:9-11, are already in heaven. 
Key for Tertullian in this discussion is the reality of the resurrection of the body to be 
joined together with the same soul to face the judgment. 
Tertullian uses the Scriptures heavily in defending his doctrine of the soul. He 
does, however, perhaps more than any other previous author, include many arguments 
explicitly quoting the ideas of other philosophers in defending his doctrine. 
 
Minucius Felix 
Minucius’s sole work is a dialogue titled the Octavius.274 It exhibits many 
connections with some of Tertullian’s works. The dialogue is between two of Minucius’s 
friends, Caecilius, a pagan, and Octavius, a fellow Christian along with Minucius.275 In 
this section, what Octavius is represented as saying will be taken for the belief of 
Minucius himself as he everywhere presents himself as agreeing with Octavius’s 
position. 
Usage of Anima 
Minucius Felix does not use anima sufficiently enough to allow for a detailed 
study. He does ask rhetorically, “Do you wish to see God with your carnal eyes, when you 
are neither able to behold nor to grasp your own soul itself, by which you are enlivened and 
                                                 
274On this, see Bettina Windau, “Minucius Felix,” DECL, 423-424. On the use of 
the dialogue in comparison with other writers of the time period, see M. Hoffmann, Der 
Dialog bei den christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten Vier Jarhunderte, 28-39; Windau, 
424. 




speak?”276 There seems here to be a hint of a connection between God and the soul; as one 
cannot be seen, even more so can the other not be seen. From this statement, it can also be 
deduced that Minucius understood the soul to be invisible and the principle of life. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
When Minucius asks, “Do you wish to see God with your carnal eyes, when you 
are neither able to behold nor to grasp your own soul itself, by which you are enlivened 
and speak?”277 he clearly has in mind a composite understanding of the human individual. 
This is referred to by the mentioning of the carnal eyes and the soul which gives life. 
Minucius notes that the doctrine of the resurrection as presented by others such as 
Pythagoras and Plato represents some degree of similarity with the Christian teaching. In 
this context, he begins an argument that may lead some to conclude that Minucius 
supported the notion of the dissolution of the soul after the death of the body. In the 
dialog, Octavius argues that if God originally created humans out of nothing, then it is 
not difficult to conceive of Him having the ability to recreate them. He writes of the 
individual “that he is nothing after death, and that he was nothing before he began to 
exist; and as from nothing it was possible for him to be born, so from nothing it may be 
possible for him to be restored.”278 It is then noted that the decomposed bodies are not 
lost to God and, thus, Christians do not fear burial in the earth but rather await the 
springtime restoration of the body. 
                                                 
276“Deum oculis carnalibus vis videre, cum ipsam animam tuam, qua vivificaris et 





It seems more likely in this argument that what is at issue pertains only to the 
body. This is suggested in the introduction to the argument where Minucius notes that the 
Pythagorean/Platonic notion of the resurrection is corrupt as they argue that the body is 
dissolved and the soul alone endures, often with a return to the body of another animal. 
Minucius also argues that it is not foolish to believe that as God formed humans 
originally from nothing, so he can re-form them from nothing. Here still the emphasis 
seems to be on the physical forming of the human body rather than the soul. He then 
discusses the cyclical nature of bodies in the birth/death/rebirth cycle and argues that 
when something is withdrawn from our eyes, it has not died to God. Here he specifically 
mentions the body but leaves out the soul. This further suggests that Minucius was 
focused on the physical reality of the body that is seen and then is seen no more, yet is 
still known to God. This seems more likely when compared with his previously discussed 
notion of an invisible soul.  
Minucius mentions those who hope “that they shall be nothing after death; for 
they would prefer to be altogether extinguished, rather than to be restored for the purpose 
of punishment.”279 Here he seems to describe those who hope for death to be the 
destruction of the entire being, body and soul, leaving no possibility for a judgment. It 
does not seem apparent, though, that from this can be implied that Minucius was 
advocating the death being the dissolution of both body and soul. First of all, he is 
speaking about what others are hoping for. Secondly, he is talking more about the 
absence of a future judgment than about the state of the human soul after death. This is 
not even mentioned in the discussion. 




Minucius writes against the reincarnation of the soul into other bodies declaring, 
“Thus also the most illustrious of the wise men, Pythagoras first, and Plato chiefly, have 
delivered the doctrine of resurrection with a corrupt and divided faith; for they will have 
it, that the bodies being dissolved, the souls alone both abide for ever, and very often pass 
into other new bodies.”280 He then notes also the belief in the return of the souls into the 
bodies of other animals. 
 
Summary 
Minucius describes a composite individual composed of body and soul. The soul 
is described as invisible. He also calls it the principle of life. 
While Minucius makes it clear that God can recreate a dead person out of nothing 
just the same as He created them before their birth, yet it is not clear that Minucius 
intends that this argument pertains to the soul also. Rather, it seems more likely that this 
argument was construed to be used against those who were discussing the body and its 
destruction at death and its future resurrection at the judgment. He does not use any 
Scripture in this discussion, but clearly holds that the reality of the future judgment 
should assure all that they will exist again after the resurrection. 
 
Cyprian 
Cyprian was a major figure in the Church during a crucial period in the middle of 
the third century. He wrote many letters and treatises.281 Some of his more prominent are 
                                                 
280“Sic etiam condicionem renascendi sapientium clariores, Pythagoras primus et 
praecipuus Plato, corrupta et dimidiata fide tradiderunt; nam corporibus dissolutis solas 
animas volunt et perpetuo manere et in alia nova corpora saepius commeare.” Octauius 
34.6. 
281Maurice Bévenot, “Cyprian von Karthago,” Theologische Realenzyklopädie 




his letters To Donatus and To Fortunatus and his treatises On the Unity of the Catholic 
Church, and On the Lapsed. His letters number eighty-one but several are not his. In his 
writings, he was not as much occupied by theological matters as he is with the practical 
exigencies of Church life amidst fierce external persecution and internal strife.282 
 
Usage of Anima 
Cyprian uses soul to refer to life. He writes regarding martyrs who have separated 
from the Church, “Although they burn, given up to flames and fires, or lay down their 
souls, thrown to the wild beasts, that will not be the crown of faith, but the punishment of 
perfidy.”283 In describing the conditions of humanity, Cyprian writes that we “bear 
chains, spend our souls, endure the sword, the wild beasts, fires, crucifixions.”284 He 
writes regarding martyrdom that “they readily deliver up both their souls and their 
blood.”285 
Cyprian uses soul where he is referring to people, though this often has to do with 
their abilities. He writes concerning the temptations of the Devil that “from the very 
beginning of the world he deceived; and flattering with lying words, he misled 
inexperienced souls by an incautious credulity.”286 Elsewhere he uses a similar 
                                                 
Christian Literature, ed. Frances Young et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 152-157; Andreas Hoffmann, “Cyprian of Carthage,” DECL, 148-153. 
282A. Hoffmann, “Cyprian of Carthage,” 151; Quasten, 344. 
283“Ardeant licet flammis, et ignibus traditi uel obiecti bestiis animas suas ponant, 
non erit illa fidei corona sed poena perfidiae.” De ecclesiae catholicae unitate 14.359. 
284“Portandae catenae, animae impendendae, gladius, bestiae, ignes, cruces.” De 
bono patientiae 12.226. 
285“Sed prompte et animas et sanguinem tradere.” Epistulae 60.2.3.41. 




expression, “By a natural foresight, the untrained soul laments the anxieties and labors of 
the mortal life.”287 
Cyprian uses soul to refer to a separated entity in distinction to the body. In 
describing the pains of a martyr, he writes, “My mind stood firm, and my faith was 
strong, and my soul struggled long.”288 Here mind and soul seem to be somewhat distinct, 
though related. In a similar usage, he describes those facing death as being of “a steadfast 
mind and a firm faith, and a devoted soul.”289 In describing a girl who had been exposed 
to the pagan sacrifices and later suffered from this, Cyprian writes that “as if by the 
compulsion of a torturer the soul of that still tender child confessed a consciousness of 
the fact with such signs as it could.”290 
Cyprian uses soul sometimes where it is difficult to determine if he is referring to 
an individual or to a separated soul distinct from the body. He writes, “When the soul, in 
its gaze into heaven, has recognized its Author, it rises higher than the sun, and far 
transcends all this earthly power, and begins to be that which it believes itself to be.”291 
                                                 
incauta credulitate decepit.” De ecclesiae catholicae unitate 1.14. 
287“Prouidentia naturali lamentatur uitae mortalis anxietates, et labores et 
procellas mundi, quas ingreditur in exordio, statim suo ploratu et gemitu rudis anima 
testatur.” De bono patientiae 12.223. 
288“Stetit mens stabilis et fides fortis, et cum torquentibus poenis inmobilis diu 
anima luctata est.” De lapsis 13.251. 
289“Mens solida est et fides firma et anima deuota.” De mortalitate 1.1. 
290“Velut tortore cogente quibus poterat indiciis conscientiam facti in simplicibus 
adhuc annis rudis anima fatebatur.” De lapsis 25.484. 
291“Postquam auctorem suum caelum intuens anima cognouit, sole altior et hac 




Elsewhere he writes in a discussion about heresy that by it, “before the day of judgment, 
the souls of the righteous and of the unrighteous are already divided, and the chaff is 
separated from the wheat.”292 He also describes his attitude in the face of persecution as 
one whose “mind [soul] is always secure of its God.”293 
Cyprian also speaks of losing one’s soul. He writes, “Miserable creature, you 
have lost your soul; spiritually dead . . .”294 Elsewhere he writes of those who hold onto 
their wealth, “that you are a lover of mammon more than of your own soul.”295In 
describing one who needs to do good works because he has many children, Cyprian 
writes, “The sins of many have to be redeemed, the consciences of many to be cleansed, 
the souls of many to be liberated.”296 He also writes concerning the lapsed and those who 
cause schism in the church, “In the former, it is the loss of one soul; in the latter, the risk 
of many.”297 In describing a lapsed individual who protected those who were fleeing 
persecution, Cyprian writes that he was “showing and offering to the Lord many souls 
living and safe to entreat for a single wounded one.”298 He writes concerning those who 
                                                 
292“Sic et ante iudicii diem hic quoque iam iustorum adque iniustorum animae 
diuiduntur, et a frumento paleae separantur.” De ecclesiae catholicae unitate 10.248. 
293“De deo suo semper anima secura.” Ad Demetrianum 20.380. 
294“Animam tuam, misera, perdidisti; spiritaliter mortua.” De lapsis 30.603. 
295“Ipse minuaris amator magis mamonae quam animae tuae.” De opere et 
eleemosynis 10.202. 
296“Multorum purgandae conscientiae, multorum animae liberandae.” Ibid., 
18.357. 
297“Hic animae unius est damnum, illic periculum plurimorum.” De ecclesiae 
catholicae unitate 19.465. In this case, it could be argued that Cyprian has in mind the 
soul of an individual rather than one’s life. 
298“Offerens domino multas uiuentes et incolumes animas quae pro una saucia 
deprecentur.” Epistulae 55.13.2.214. 
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have led others astray from the Church that those “souls in the day of judgment shall be 
required at the hands of those who have stood forth as the authors and leaders of their 
ruin.”299 This usage seems to be a way of speaking in reference to one’s eternal salvation 
as he elsewhere argues that it is not only the soul but the body that is lost. 
Cyprian describes the human person as flesh and spirit and then writes that when 
God’s will is done in both of them, then “the soul which is new-born by Him may be 
preserved.”300 Elsewhere he also exhibits this similarity of understanding between spirit 
and soul when he writes of Celerinus and his sufferings that “although his body was laid 
in chains, his spirit remained free and at liberty. His flesh wasted away by the long 
endurance of hunger and thirst; but God fed his soul, that lived in faith and virtue, with 
spiritual nourishments.”301 It is not clear here what distinction Cyprian is making between 
the soul and spirit. 
Cyprian hints at the idea of only one kind of soul for humans. He writes to 
Fortunatus that he has a “like bodily substance and a common order of souls.”302 This is 
similar to Tertullian. 
Cyprian locates some elements of mental anxiety in the soul. He describes one 
who had partaken unworthily of the Eucharist, how she “began presently to be tormented 
                                                 
299“Quorum animae in die iudicii de ipsorum manibus expetentur qui perditionis 
auctores et duces extiterunt.” Epistulae 72.2.3.58. 
300“Quae per eum renata est anima seruetur.” De dominica oratione 16.291. 
301“Sed posito in uinculis corpore solutus ac liber spiritus mansit. Caro famis ac 
sitis diuturnitate contabuit, sed animam fide et uirtute uiuentem nutrimentis spiritalibus 
deus pauit.” Epistulae 39.2.2.27. 




in soul, and to become stiffened with frenzy.”303 He also writes to one stating that “the 
gloom of barrenness has besieged your soul.”304 Other mental states or actions are also 
used. He describes jealously as “a gnawing worm of the soul.”305 In describing an attitude 
of humility before God, Cyprian writes, “Let our soul lie low before Him.”306 
Cyprian notes a connection between the material world and the soul. In his 
argument for the use of inebriating wine at the Eucharist, he writes that by drinking 
“common wine the mind is dissolved, and the soul relaxed, and all sadness is laid 
aside.”307 Cyprian advises the penitent to practice almsgiving “by which souls are freed 
from death.”308 Cyprian describes the fight of patience against “the deeds of the flesh and 
the body, wherewith the soul is assaulted and taken.”309 The enemy, he writes, in order 
“to take captive the soul by money, . . . heaps together mischievous hoards.”310 He also 
writes regarding the effects of a blind love for property by which “the spirit [is] bound, 
                                                 
303“Angi et anima exaestuante concludi postmodum coepit.” De lapsis 26.500. 
304“Obsederunt animum tuum sterilitatis tenebrae.” De opere et eleemosynis 
13.252. 
305“Qualis uero est animae tinea, quae cogitationum tabes, pectoris quanta rubigo 
zelare in altero.” De zelo et liuore 7.118. 
306“Illi se anima prosternat.” De lapsis 29.576. 
307“Quemadmodum uino isto communi mens soluitur et anima relaxatur et tristitia 
omnis exponitur.” Epistulae 63.11.3.198. 
308“Elemosynis frequenter insistere quibus a morte animae liberantur.” De lapsis 
35.679. 
309“Contra facta carnis et corporis quibus anima expugnatur et capitur uirtutum 
suarum propugnaculo reluctatur.” De bono patientiae 14.272. 




and the soul hindered.”311 To one who gives liberally he writes that “the soul according to 
the spirit is preserved.”312 Cyprian also writes describing the soul that “is at once 
instructed by what we hear, and nourished by what we see.”313 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Cyprian mentions the soul when he writes of the penalty which the souls and 
bodies of the unrighteous will suffer. “Souls with their bodies will be reserved in infinite 
tortures for suffering.”314 He quotes Isa 66:24 as proof of this concept and also from Wis 
5:1-9. 
“Souls are delivered from death by almsgiving.”315 Cyprian bases this on Tob 
12:8-9. He then adds “that souls are delivered by almsgiving not only from the second, 
but from the first death,”316 noting that Tabitha was raised from the dead by Peter after he 
had been summoned and shown all the works of charity that she had performed. It is clear 
here that Cyprian means by the second death the punishment of everlasting torture, not 
the cessation of existence. 
 
                                                 
311“Et mens uincta et anima praeclusa.” De lapsis 11.207. 
312“Spiritaliter anima seruetur.” De opere et eleemosynis 17.334. 
313“Animam simul et auditus instruit et pascit obtutus.” Ad Donatum 1.13. 
314“Seruantur cum corporibus suis animae infinitis cruciatibus ad dolorem.” Ad 
Demetrianum 24:468. See Daley, 42; Machael A. Fahey, Cyprian and the Bible: A Study 
in Third-Century Exegesis, Beiträge zur Geschichte der biblischen Hermenteutik 9, ed. 
Oscar Cullmann et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1971), 216-217. 
315“Eleemosynis a morte animas liberari.” De opere et eleemosynis 5.106. See a 
similar statement in De lapsis 35.679. 
316“Quod eleemosynis non tantum a secunda sed et a prima morte animae 




Cyprian uses soul to refer to life, to people and to the separated soul. He locates 
mental anxiety in the soul and notes that there is one kind of soul for all humans. The 
soul is influenced by the actions done in the physical realm. Cyprian uses soul and spirit 
together at times, not making a clear attempt to differentiate between them. 
Cyprian uses Isa 66:24 and Wis 5:1-9 to argue that souls are punished along with 
their bodies in never-ending fire. He also quotes Tob 12:8-9 to argue that the soul is 
saved from death by almsgiving. Noting Peter’s raising of Tabitha (Acts 9:36-43), 
Cyprian argues that this refers both to the first and second death. 
Cyprian does not use any of the traditional verses used in describing the soul. He 
instead refers to the Isaiah passage to argue for the eternal burning of the wicked souls. 




Commodianus was not a prolific writer, though he is considered the first Christian 
poet of the Latin period.317 His main treatise is titled The Instructions. Another work, 
Apologetic Poem, is extant though lacks a modern translation. 
 
Usage of Anima 
Commodianus uses soul sparingly. He uses it in describing the state of happiness 
of the individual. He writes, “If you wish to be refreshed (soul to be cooled), give help 
and encouragement to the martyr.”318 He also elsewhere notes that the soul can be made 
                                                 
317Siegmar Döpp, “Commodian,” DECL, 139-140. 
318“Si refrigerare cupis animam.” Instructionum libri ii 2.13.19. 
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happy.319 Here he continues the idea which Cyprian taught that good works are good for 
the salvation of the soul. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Commodianus seems to suggest that the eternal punishment of hell is a spiritual 
one. He writes, “But since you seek to wander, you disbelieve all things, and therefore 
you will go into hell. By and by you give up your life (soul); you shall be taken where it 
grieves you to be: there the spiritual punishment, which is eternal, is undergone; there are 
always wailings: nor do you absolutely die therein—there at length too late proclaiming 
the omnipotent God.”320 Here, though Commodianus is not precise in stating that it is the 
soul which goes to hell, he is clear that the unbeliever is taken there to undergo eternal, 
spiritual punishment. That he means the soul may be understood from another statement 
where he writes, “The souls of those that are lost deservedly of themselves separate 
themselves . . . and there the eternal flame will torment on the day decreed.”321 Thus it 
seems likely that for Commodianus, the soul suffers punishment without the body being 
restored to it. Commodianus does not use any direct, biblical citations to support his idea. 
 
Summary 
Commodianus has a similar usage to Cyprian regarding good works and the soul, 
                                                 
319“Exhilaratur enim ex anima regibus aptis.” Ibid., 2.24.8. 
320“Lex docet ipsius, sed quia uagari tu quaeris, omnia discredis et inde in tartara 
ibis: mox animam reddis, duceris quo te paenitet esse. At luitur ibi poena spiritalis 
aeterna; lugia sunt semper, nec permoreris in illa omnipotentem deum iam tunc ibi sero 
proclamans.” Ibid., 1.29.14. 
321“Damnatorum animae merito se ipsae secernunt; ex hoc protegenti iterum ad 
sua recurrunt.” Instructionum libri ii 2.9.1. 
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arguing that they provide for its happiness. In a new development, he also argues that the 
unbelieving soul will receive spiritual punishment for eternity. Though fire is also used 
by Commodianus as the means of punishment, yet the introduction of the notion of a 
spiritual punishment hints at the direction that church thought seems to be moving, 
namely, away from the insistence on the physical resurrection and ultimate salvation of 
the body, replacing this with the spiritual superiority of the soul, both for salvation and 
damnation. This is in stark contrast to earlier writers who, save for Origen’s proposals, 
were united in their insistence on the resurrection of the body to be rejoined to the soul 
for the reception of real rewards and real, literal punishments. 
 
Novation 
Novation has several extant works including On the Trinity and On the Jewish 
Foods. On the Trinity was found among the works of Tertullian. Two letters, On the 
Goodness of Chastity and On the Spectacles, were included among the works of Cyprian 
but are believed to have been written by Novation.322  
 
Usage of Anima 
Novation uses soul to refer to life. In commenting on Jesus’ own words, Novation 
writes, “Now who is it who says that He can lay down His life, or can Himself recover 
His life again, because He has received it of His Father?”323 
Novation locates the purity of an individual in their soul, writing, “The meat, I 
                                                 
322On the works of Novation, see Heine, “Cyprian and Novation”; Moreschini and 
Norelli, 1:378-380. 
323“Quis est enim qui dicit animam suam se posse ponere aut animam suam posse 
se rursum recuperare, quia hoc mandatum acceperit a patre.” De trinitate 21.12.  
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say, true, and holy, and pure, is a true faith, an unspotted conscience, and an innocent 
soul.”324 
Novation writes of the soul being killed. “It must be said, moreover, that adultery 
is not pleasure, but mutual contempt; nor can it delight, because it kills both the soul and 
modesty.”325 He also writes, “If Christ is only man, why may not Christ be denied 
without destruction of the soul, when it is said that a sin committed against man may be 
forgiven?”326 Both of these usages may refer to the death of the soul in the sense of the 
loss of eternal salvation. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Novation describes humans as “flesh and soul.” 327 He describes the soul as 
created by Christ. In the context of defending against those who claimed that Christ’s 
divinity had been put to death on the cross, Novation writes of “the soul itself, which was 
made by the Word of God.”328 
For Novation, the soul does not die at death. In comparing Christ’s death to that 
of others he writes, “When in other men also, who are not flesh only, but flesh and soul, 
the flesh indeed alone suffers the inroads of wasting and death, while the soul is seen to 
                                                 
324“Cibus, inquam, uerus et sanctus et mundus est fides recta, inmaculata 
conscientia, et innocens anima.” De cibis iudaicis 5.30. 
325“Dicendum etiam quod adulterium uoluptas non est, sed mutua contumelia nec 
delectare potest quod et animam interficiat et pudorem.” De bono pudicitiae 14.1. 
326“si homo tantummodo christus, cur non licet christum sine exitio animae 
negari, cum in hominem commissum delictum referatur posse dimitti?” De trinitate 
14.26. 
327“Qui non sunt caro tantummodo, sed caro et anima.” Ibid., 25.24. 
328“Nam cum ipsa anima, quae per dei uerbum facta est.” De trinitate 25.42. 
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be uncorrupted, and beyond the laws of destruction and death.”329 For support of this 
idea, Novation quotes Matt 10:28 about the destruction of soul and body. In this context, 
Novation refers to the soul as immortal and thus analogous to the divine in Christ which 
did not die when Christ was crucified.330 Presumably he has here in mind 1 Pet 3:19-20. 
As additional scriptural support for this notion of an immortal soul, Novation argues that 
when the Scripture in Luke 20:37-38 says referring to Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, 
that they “live unto God,” this means that their souls did not die, only their bodies were 
dissolved at death.331 
Novation argues for a location where the souls of the just and the unjust are taken 
after the death of the body. He writes,  
And truly, what lies beneath the earth is not itself void of distributed and arranged 
powers. For there is a place whither the souls of the just and the unjust are taken, 
conscious of the anticipated dooms of fixture judgment; so that we might behold the 
overflowing greatness of God’s works in all directions, not shut up within the bosom 
of this world, however capacious as we have said, but might also be able to conceive 
of them beneath both the abysses and the depths of the world itself.332 
                                                 
329“Quando et in ceteris hominibus, qui non sunt caro tantummodo, sed caro et 
anima, caro quidem sola incursum interitus mortis que patitur, extra leges autem 
interitus et mortis anima incorrupta cernatur?” Ibid., 25.24. 
330“Quodsi anima immortalis occidi aut interfici non potest in quouis alio.” Ibid., 
25.32. See also 25.36, 39. 
331“Nam si abraham et isaac et iacob, quos homines tantummodo constat fuisse, 
manifestum est uiuere—omnes enim, inquit, illi uiuunt deo nec mors in illis animam 
perimit, quae corpora ipsa dissoluit; ius enim suum exercere potuit in corpora, in animas 
exercere non ualuit, aliud enim in illis mortale et ideo mortuum, aliud in illis immortale 
et ideo intellegitur non exstinctum.” Ibid., 25.50. 
332“Nam neque quae infra terram iacent, neque ipsa sunt digestis et ordinatis 
potestatibus uacua—locus enim est quo piorum animae impiorum que ducuntur futuri 
iudicii praeiudicia sentientes—ut operum ipsius in omnibus partibus redundantes 
magnitudines non intra mundi huius capacissimos licet, ut diximus, sinus conclusas 
uideremus, sed etiam infra ipsius mundi et profunda et altitudines cogitare possemus et 




Novation, in describing things which the Christian will see, writes, “He will look 
also upon souls brought back even from death. Moreover, he will consider the marvelous 
souls brought back to the life of bodies which themselves were already consumed.”333 
The second sentence seems clearly to refer to the resurrection, while the first is not so 
clear. In this context, Novation moves from scenes which the Christian will see while on 
earth, to those which will be observed after the resurrection. This sentence lies at the 
dividing point, and it is not certain as to what it should refer to. The document On the 
Trinity clearly argues that the soul does not cease to exist at the death of the body. This 
statement here, if it were to refer to a time after the death of the body, would seem to 
indicate a time when the soul was dead. 
 
Summary 
Novation uses soul for life. When he writes of its death, it seems to be in the 
context of the loss of salvation. Novation also has a composite or dipartite view of the 
human person, consisting of both soul and body. The body is corruptible and dies at 
death, while the soul is immortal, likened to the indestructibility of Christ’s divinity. 
Novation argues for this concept by referring to Christ’s words in Matt 10:28 and in Luke 
20:37-38. He also uses the notion of Christ’s descent from 1 Pet 3:19-20. Novation 
argues that all souls, both of the just and the unjust, are held in the inner part of the earth 
until the resurrection. 
While Novation continues the use of Matt 10:28 to argue for the continued nature 
of the soul, he also introduces a new verse to the argument. This is Luke 20:37-38. Here 
                                                 
333“Intuebitur et animas ab ipsa iam morte reuocatas, considerabit etiam de 
sepulcris admirabiles ipsorum consummatorum iam uitas corporum redactas.” De 
spectaculis 10.11.  
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God is described as the God of the living, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. 
 
Arnobius 
Arnobius wrote only one document which is known and extant, Against the 
Heathen.334 The work is divided into seven books and is an apologetic against the pagan 
religions of the early fourth century. He is noted for suggesting several ideas at variance 
with other early Church Fathers on the topic of the soul. 
 
Usage of Anima 
Arnobius uses soul for life. He writes, “The serpent by his bite takes away life.”335 
He also describes the sacrifice of animals as “the life fleeing away with the blood.”336 In 
noting the power which Christ showed, he asked, “Was He one of us, who ordered the 
breath that had departed to return to the body.”337 Here he connects soul with breath, 
though he does not connect it to the creation narrative. In the same vein he writes, “And 
to restore feeling and life to bodies long cold in death.”338 Here Arnobius connects the 
soul with feeling or sense in the body. 
Arnobius also identifies the soul as referring to oneself. He writes, “Beyond a 
                                                 
334See Rainer Jakobi, “Arnobius the Elder (of Sicca),” DECL, 50; Oliver 
Nicholson, “Arnobius and Lactantius,” in The Cambridge History of Early Christian 
Literature, ed. Frances Young et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
259-261. 
335“Morsu animam serpens tollit.” Aduersus nationes 1.11.12.3. 
336“Animas cum cruore fugientes.” Ibid., 7.4.346.17. 
337“Vnus fuit e nobis qui redire in corpore iamdudum animas praecipiebat 
efflatas.” Aduersus nationes 1.46.40.15. 
338“Et in frigentia olim membra sensus animas que redducere.” Ibid., 1.52.48.1. 
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doubt the soul is a precious thing, and nothing can be found dearer to a man than 
himself.”339 Elsewhere he writes, “Do you dare to laugh at us because we see to the 
salvation of our souls?—that is, ourselves care for ourselves.”340 While surely other 
authors intended this usage, Arnobius is the first to explicitly identify the soul with 
oneself. 
Arnobius describes congenital defects of character as the “inborn depravities of 
the soul.”341 This notion becomes important in his argument against the divine or 
immortal nature of the soul. In this, he clearly locates moral and ethical failings in the 
soul itself. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
In discussing the origins of the soul, Arnobius describes of it as “being either sent 
forth from Him, or having fallen from Him”342 and as being confined in the body. 
However, he also urges that the soul is not a child of God. He writes “that souls are not 
the children of the Supreme Ruler, and did not begin to be self-conscious, and to be 
spoken of in their own special character after being created by Him; but that some other 
is their parent, far enough removed from the chief in rank and power, of His court, 
however, and distinguished by His high and exalted birthright.”343 He argues that “if 
                                                 
339“Si quidem res anima pretiosa est, nec ipso se homini quicquam potest carius 
inveniri.” Ibid., 1.53.48.22. 
340“Audetis ridere nos, quod animarum nostrarum provideamus saluti id est ipsi 
nobis?” Ibid., 2.13.81.3. 
341“Qui ergo luctatur animarum ingenitas corrigere pravitates.” Ibid., 2.50.124.2. 
342“Quod ab eo vel missae <animae> vel lapsae caecitate huius in corporis 
continemur?” Aduersus nationes 1.29.25.6. Note that anima is supplied. 




souls were, as is said, the Lord’s children, and begotten by the Supreme Power, nothing 
would have been wanting to make them perfect, as they would have been born with the 
most perfect excellence.”344 He concludes, “But let this monstrous and impious fancy be 
put far from us, that Almighty God, the creator and framer, the author of things great and 
invisible, should be believed to have begotten souls so fickle, with no seriousness, 
firmness, and steadiness, prone to vice.”345 As to the question of who did create human 
souls, Arnobius states that he does know.346 He writes that as Plato uses the Demiurge, 
“we do nothing out of place or foolish in believing that the souls of men are of a neutral 
character, inasmuch as they have been produced by secondary beings, made subject to the 
law of death, and are of little strength, and that are perishable.”347 
In an argument concerning Christ and His similarity to other humans, Arnobius 
writes, “But in the meantime let us grant, in submission to your ideas, that Christ was one 
of us—similar in mind, soul, body, weakness, and condition.”348 Here Arnobius gives a 
                                                 
esse, dignitatis et potentiae gradibus satis plurimis ab imperatore diiunctum, eius tamen 
ex aula et eminentium nobilem sublimitate natalium.” Ibid., 2.36.108.13. 
344“Quodsi essent ut fama est dominicae prolis et potestatis animae generatio 
principalis, nihil eis ad perfectionem | defuisset virtute perfectissima procreatis.” Ibid., 
2.37.109.1. 
345“Sed procul haec abeat sceleratae opinionis immanitas, ut deus credatur 
omnipotens, magnarum et invisibilium rerum sator et conditor, procreator, tam mobiles 
animas genuisse, gravitatis ac ponderis constantiae que nullius, in vitia labiles.” Ibid., 
2.45.118.5. 
346Ibid., 2.47. 
347“Ergo cum haec ita sint, non absone neque inaniter credimus, mediae qualitatis 
esse animas hominum utpote ab rebus non principalibus editas, iuri subiectas mortis, 
parvarum et labilium virium.” Aduersus nationes 2.53.126.23. 
348“Sed concedamus, interdum manum vestris opinationibus dantes, unum 




three-fold description of a human person. He more often writes of the soul and body in a 
dichotomous understanding.349 He writes explicitly, “For what are we men, but souls shut 
up in bodies?”350 He also writes of souls “clothed with the garment of the human 
body”351 and “confined in the darkness of this body.”352 
Arnobius does speak of death as the separation of the soul from the body. He 
writes, “For that which is seen by the eyes is only a separation of soul from body, not the 
last end.”353 He also refers to this “fear of death, that is, the ruin of our souls”354 and 
admonishes that “unless you give yourselves to seek to know the Supreme God, a cruel 
death awaits you when freed from the bonds of body.”355 
Arnobius argues that the soul is not immortal. He writes that the people should 
not think that “souls are immortal, next in point of rank to the god and ruler of the 
world.” He notes that “if the soul had in itself the knowledge which it is fitting that a race 
should have indeed which is divine and immortal, all men would from the first know 
everything; nor would there be an age unacquainted with any art, or not furnished with 
                                                 
349See for example ibid., 2.14.82.15. 
350“Quid enim sumus homines nisi animae corporibus clausae?” Ibid., 2.13.81.5. 
351“Humani corporis circumiectione vestiri?” Ibid., 2.43.116.10. 
352“Caecitate huius in corporis continemur.” Ibid., 1.29.25.6. 
353“Nam illa quae sub oculis cernitur animarum est a corporibus diiugatio, non 
finis abolitionis extremus.” Ibid., 2.14.82.15. 
354“Mortis nobis cum proponatur metus id est animarum interitus, quid?” Ibid., 
2.33.104.19. 
355“Nisi vos adplicatis dei principis notioni, a corporalibus vinculis exsolutos 
expectat mors saeva.” Aduersus nationes 2.61.137.18. 
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practical knowledge.”356 “For we do not see what is so wonderful in these arts, that 
because of their discovery the soul should be believed to be above the sun.”357 Arnobius 
notes that people do not have the same abilities, which they should if they were divine, 
and they do not have any ability to gain wisdom outside of space and time, which they 
would not need if they were descended from the divine. He argues that if the soul is 
incorporeal, it would not lose its memory by being in a body358 and wonders how it could 
be that it loses its memory from being joined to the body and yet, once this happens, it 
has no trouble remember things for many years.359 He also notes that no one has ever 
seen the soul descending from the Supreme Ruler to earth to enter a human body.360 
Arnobius argues that just as other beings have immortality as given by God, not 
from nature, so in the same way “will He deign to confer eternal life upon souls also, 
although hell death seems able to cut them off and blot them out of existence in utter 
annihilation.”361 He also writes that souls “are gifted with immortality, if they rest their 
hope of so great a gift on God Supreme, who alone has power to grant such blessings, by 
                                                 
356“Quodsi haberent scientias animae, quas genus et habere divinum atque 
immortale condignum est, ab initio homines cuncti omnia scirent nec saeculum esset 
ullum, quod artis esset ignarum alicuius aut rerum experientia non paratum.” Ibid., 
2.18.87.3. 
357“In quibus artificiis quidnam insit admirabile non videmus, ut ex eorum 
inventione credatur esse animas potiores et sole et sideribus cunctis.” Ibid., 2.19.87.21. 
358Ibid., 2.26. 
359Aduersus nationes 2.28. 
360Aduersus nationes 2.51. 
361“Quo igitur pacto immortalitatis largitus est donum dis <die> certa prolatis, et 
animas hoc pacto dignabitur immortalitate donare, quamvis eas mors saeva posse 




putting away corruption.”362 Arnobius may be drawing on 1 Tim 6:16 when in this 
context of discussing the soul’s neutral nature between life and death he writes that God 
alone is immortal.363 Here, also, Arnobius notes that it is based upon God’s word that he 
believes that that which is not immortal by nature (i.e., the soul) can be changed to 
become immortal. In the argument, Arnobius relies on the idea that God alone is 
immortal and thus the soul is obviously not immortal and anything that is or becomes 
immortal is so only by virtue of God’s will. In this context, Arnobius also argues that 
Plato lends some support to this notion by suggesting in the Timaeus that the various 
deities are corrupt by nature and only by the will of God are they kept from death. 
Arnobius writes of “hell, and fires which cannot be quenched, into which we have 
learned that souls are cast by their foes and enemies.”364 In countering Plato, he writes, 
“While he says that the soul is immortal, everlasting, and without bodily substance, he 
yet says that they are punished, and makes them suffer pain.”365 Arnobius then argues 
that this cannot be. What is immortal cannot suffer pain and, conversely, what suffers 
pain is not immortal. He rather argues that the damned are annihilated and go to 
everlasting destruction.366 This, he writes, “is man’s real death . . . annihilation: this, I say 
                                                 
362“Perpetuitate donari, <si> spem muneris tanti deum ad principem conferant, 
cui soli potestas est talia corruptione exclusa largiri.” Ibid., 2.53.126.23. As Arnobius is 
clear that God alone can preserve the soul and give it immortality, one must question 
what place the lower, creator God had in the economy of God. 
363Ibid., 2.35. 
364“Audetis ridere nos, cum gehennas dicimus et inextinguibiles quosdam ignes, in 
quos animas deici ab earum hostibus inimicis que cognovimus?” Aduersus nationes 
2.14.81.14. 
365“Ut cum animas dicat immortales perpetuas et ex corporali soliditate privatas, 
puniri eas dicat tamen et doloris adficiat sensu.” Ibid., 2.14.81.20. 




is man’s real death, when souls which know not God shall be consumed in long-
protracted torment with raging fire.”367 Of interest here is the continual loss of 
importance for the body. Only the soul is regarded to have experienced any suffering. 
This is a newer development that is found in the later Latin authors. 
Arnobius, in describing the things that Christ has taught the Christians, lists “what 
the soul, and whether it flew to us of its own accord, or whether it was generated and 
brought into existence with our bodies themselves; whether it sojourns with us, partaking 
of death, or whether it is gifted with an endless immortality; what condition awaits us 
when we shall have separated from our bodies relaxed in death; whether we shall retain 
our perceptions, or have no recollection of our former sensations or of past memories.”368 
Arnobius gives no indication here of scriptural citations where Christ answered these 
questions or even what answer Christ gave to them. Arnobius is clear, however, that he 
understands these issues to have been addressed biblically by Christ Himself. 
 
Summary 
Arnobius only rarely uses soul for life. He introduces the notion of the soul as the 
self. He also locates sin in the soul. 
Arnobius has, in general, a dichotomous view of the human person, soul, and 
                                                 
vanescunt.” Ibid., 2.14.82.6. 
367“Haec est hominis mors vera, haec nihil residuum faciens . . . non finis 
abolitionis extremus—haec inquam est hominis mors vera, cum animae nescientes deum 
per longissimi temporis cruciatum consumentur igni fero.” Ibid., 2.14.82.15. 
368“Quid anima, advolarit ne ad nos sponte an cum ipsis sata sit et procreata 
visceribus, mortis particeps degat an inmortalitatis perpetuitate donata sit, qui status nos 
maneat, cum dissolutis abierimus a membris, visuri ne nos sumus an memoriam nullam 
nostri sensus et recordationem habituri.” Aduersus nationes 1.38.32.15. 
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body. He does once use the trichotomous expression body, soul, and mind. He is quite 
clear that the body is viewed as that which restrains the individual and from which death 
brings release. 
For Arnobius, the soul is mortal because it was created by one lower than the 
Supreme God, who because he was a lesser god, he did not have the power to give 
immortality. This is evident in that all souls are different and all are sinful. God alone can 
give immortality. In this argument, Arnobius possibly alludes to 1 Tim 6:16. Thus if the 
soul becomes immortal, it is by virtue of God’s will, not of any natural characteristic. 
Arnobius argues that souls are subject to fires which will burn to the point of annihilation. 
Thus Arnobius introduces a new concept, that of a limited punishment for the wicked— 
limited, that is, in time.369 However, while he does not deny the soul’s being rejoined to 
the body, yet he also specifically mentions only the soul in describing the suffering of 
hell fire.  
Arnobius repeatedly notes that the Scriptures and Christ’s words are the source 
for his teachings. He does not specifically point to any passage in his argumentation. 
Thus the reader is left somewhat unsure of what Scriptures motivated his thinking, 
especially on the several important ideas where his thought differed from earlier writers. 
In this, it should be noted that Arnobius generally refrains from mentioning prior 
Christian teaching, choosing rather to argue against Plato and other pagan writers. 
 
Lactantius 
Lactantius, one of the more erudite of Latin Christian writers, is reported to have 
                                                 
369While some have argued that this is also true with both Justin and Irenaeus, 
Arnobius is the first to clearly advocate this notion. 
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been the student of Arnobius. He has left several important documents.370 These include 
the Divine Institutes, the Creation of God,371 Epitome of the Divine Institutes, Wrath of 
God, and the Death of the Persecutors. He also wrote a poem on the Phoenix. The soul 
appears prominent in both the Divine Institutes and the Creation of God. 
It has been noted that “Lactantius is very sparing in his use of Christian 
sources.”372 It should be observed, however, that he does indicate several times that the 
doctrine of the soul has been given from God and thus is not subject to the errors that are 
found in the writings of the philosophers. 
 
Usage of Anima 
General Usage 
Lactantius uses soul for life. In describing the killing of children, he writes, “They 
destroyed tender and innocent lives.”373 He describes those “who, though they eagerly 
seek their souls, and property, and children by sword and fire, yet are spared when 
conquered,”374 and writes of those “who do not even spare their own life, but sell their 
                                                 
370On the works of Lactantius, see Karl-Heinz Schwarte, “Lactantius,” DECL, 
366-367; Antonie Wlosok, “Lactantius,” Theologische Realsenzyklopädie (1990), 371-
374. For an overview of his life, see Mary F. McDonald, Lactantius, The Divine Institutes 
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1964), ix-xxv. 
371See Eberhard Heck, “Bemurkungen zum text von Lactanz, De opificio Dei,” 
Vigiliae Christianae 23 (1969): 273-292; Michel Perrin, “Le De opificio Dei de Lactance. 
Bilan d’une édition trente ans après: Retratatio et perspectives de recherche,” in Le De 
opificio Dei: Regards croisés sur l’anthropologie de Lactance, ed. Béatrice Bakhouche et 
al. (Saint-Étienne: Université de Saint-Étienne, 2007). 
372McDonald, xviii. 
373“Cum teneras atque innocentes animas.” Diuinae Institutiones 1.21.10. Cf. De 
mortibus persecutorum 1.5; 17.9. 
374“Quibus utique, cum animas eorum et opes et liberos ferro et igni adpetant, 




souls to be taken away in public.”375 He elsewhere writes to Christians that “where life is 
endangered, to be more careful of the soul of another than of one’s own.”376 Here anima 
is used in parallel with vita. He urges that all cherish “and support with kindness, the soul 
of men, that they may not be extinguished.”377 He writes of those who “destroy the lives 
of men.”378 He has an interesting usage when he writes, “Therefore let no one imagine 
that even this is allowed, to strangle newly-born children, which is the greatest impiety; 
for God breathes into their souls for life, and not for death.”379 Here life and soul are 
connected to God’s breath. And Lactantius specifically describes God as breathing into 
their souls to give them life rather than breathing a soul into them to give them life. Later, 
he will change course and write of God breathing a soul into the body. He also writes, 
“For if there is no existence after death, it is plain that he acts foolishly who spares the 
life of another to his own loss, or who consults the gain of another more than his own.”380 
Lactantius also uses soul for person. He writes, “We must endure it with 
                                                 
institutionum 49.5. 
375“Qui ne uitae quidem suae parcant, sed extinguendas publice animas suas 
uendant.” Diuinae Institutiones 5.9.15. 
376“Tam ineptum uidetur quam in periculo uitae alterius animam magis curare 
quam suam.” Ibid., 5.18.12. 
377“Foue quantum in te est et animas hominum ne extinguantur humanitate 
sustenta.” Ibid., 6.11.19. 
378“Ut cum animas hominum interficiant, ludere se opinentur.” Ibid., 6.20.11. 
379“Ergo ne illut quidem concedi aliquis existimet, ut recens natos liceat oblidere, 
quae uel maxima est inpietas: ad uitam enim deus inspirat animas, non ad mortem.” 
Diuinae Institutiones 6.20.18. 
380“Si enim post mortem nihil est, utique stulte facit qui alterius animae parcit 




equanimity, since the death of an innocent person cannot be unavenged, and since we 
have a great Judge who alone always has the power of taking vengeance in His hands.”381 
He writes, “Those ravenous and voracious wolves who have tormented just and innocent 
souls, without the commission of any crimes, will surely meet with their reward.”382 
Lactantius speaks of oneself and one’s soul in a way that might suggest a 
distinction. He writes, “Worship a living being, that you may live; for he must necessarily 
die who has subjected himself and his soul to the dead.”383 However, he also writes of 
one bowing down before idols as “prostrat[ing] his soul.”384 Here soul may possibly be 
seen as identifying the individual as a whole. 
Lactantius also describes the soul as a separate entity from the person. He writes, 
“Therefore, let those who destroy their own souls and the souls of others learn what an 
inexpiable crime they commit.”385 The context here suggests that this is not referring to 
life. He also writes of those who “place their own souls to be burned with the very 
incense on detestable altars.”386 He also describes spirits who “as long as there is peace 
                                                 
381“Et si uis aliqua inferatur, aequa mente patiendum, cum extincta innocentis 
anima inulta esse non possit habeamus que iudicem magnum.” Diuinae Institutiones 
3.18.7. 
382“Ueniet rabiosis ac uoracibus lupis merces sua, qui iustas et simplices animas 
nullis facinoribus admissis excruciauerunt.” Ibid., 5.23.4. 
383“Uiuum colite, ut uiuatis: moriatur enim necesse est qui se suam que animam 
mortuis adiudicauit.” Ibid., 2.2.24. 
384“Ut quisquis animam suam, cuius origo de caelo est, ad inferna et ima 
prostrauerit.” Diuinae Institutiones 2.18.5. 
385“Discant igitur et suarum et alienarum interfectores animarum quam 
inexpiabile facinus admittant.” Ibid., 5.19.1. 
386“Adorant itaque hostes suos, latrones et interfectores suos uictimis placant et 
animas suas cum ture ipso cremandas aris detestabilibus inponunt.” Ibid., 5.20.1. 
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among the people of God, flee from the righteous, and fear them; and when they seize 
upon the bodies of men, and harass their souls, they are adjured by them, and at the name 
of the true God are put to flight.”387 He writes of the persecutors of Christians, “Therefore 
let not the souls of the sacrilegious expect that those whom they thus trample upon will 
be despised and unavenged.”388 He adds, “But we do not refer the chief good to the body, 
but we measure every duty by the preservation of the soul only.”389 
Lactantius suggests that both virtue and vice impact the soul with vices being the 
more powerful.390 He writes of those who “would not subject their souls to the influence 
of earth-born fictions, nor would they seek the deadly fascinations of their lusts.”391 He 
writes of the commands of restraint “which restrain [sinners] from their pleasures, to 
which they have given up their soul, together with their body.”392 He notes that there are 
“three passions, or, so to speak, three furies, which excite such great perturbations in the 
souls of men,” these being anger, love of gain, and lust.393 
                                                 
387“Hi enim, quamdiu pax est in populo dei, fugitant iustos et pauent, et cum 
corpora hominum occupant animas que diuexant, adiurantur ab iis et nomine dei ueri 
fugantur.” Ibid., 5.21.4. 
388“Quapropter non sperent sacrilegae animae contemptos et inultos fore quos sic 
obterunt.” Ibid., 5.23.4. 
389“Nos autem summum bonum non referimus ad corpus, sed omne officium solius 
animae conseruatione metimur.” Ibid., 6.17.15. 
390“Non uides fore ut inrumpant uitia cum uirtutibus, quia mala bonis adhaerent 
et in animis hominum potentiora sunt?” Diuinae Institutiones 1.20.17. 
391“Terrenis figmentis animas suas non substernerent, mortiferas libidinum 
suauitates non adpeterent.” Ibid., 2.1.4. 
392“Quia uulnerant aures eorum praecepta continentiae, quae illos uoluptatibus 
suis prohibent quibus animam suam cum corpore adiudicauerunt.” Ibid., 7.1.14. 
393“Tres adfectus uel ut ita dicam tres Furiae sunt, quae in animis hominum tantas 





The Corporeal and the Soul 
Lactantius notes the ancient connection between heat and moisture with soul and 
body.394 He also writes that the soul is “that with which we breathe.”395 He suggests that 
the lungs are where the soul resides; or at least, that is where they are nourished.396 In 
further discussing the connections between the physical body and the soul, he writes, 
“But I think that all things which relate to the motions of the mind and soul, are of so 
obscure and profound a nature, that it is beyond the power of man to see through them 
clearly.”397 
Lactantius also connects the soul with the power of breath.398 Elsewhere he 
describes “the nature of the soul, which is so subtle that it escapes the eyes of the human 
mind.”399 He notes that “the soul appears to be like light, since it is not itself blood, but is 
                                                 
desiderat opes, libido, quae adpetit uoluptates.” Epitome diuinarum institutionum 55.5. 
394“Cum enim constet omne animal ex anima et corpore, materia corporis in 
umore est, animae in calore: quod ex auium fetibus datur scire, quos crassi umoris 
plenos nisi opifex calor fouerit, nec umor potest corporari nec corpus animari.” Diuinae 
Institutiones 2.9.22. 
395“Ipse animam qua spiramus infudit.” Ibid., 2.11.19. 
396“Sed cum homo constet ex corpore atque anima, illud quod supra dixi 
receptaculum soli corpori praestat alimentum, animae uero aliam sedem dedit.” De 
opificio Dei 11.3. Cf. 11.5. 
397“Sed omnia quae ad motus animi animae que pertineant, tam obscurae altae 
que rationis esse arbitror, ut supra hominem sit ea liquido peruidere.” De opificio Dei 
14.8. 
398Diuinae Institutiones 7.12.10. 
399“Sed quia non peruidebant animae rationem, quae tam suptilis est, ut oculos 
humanae mentis effugiat, interire dixerunt.” Ibid., 7.13.8. Cf. De ira Dei 15.3.15. On the 
“eyes of the mind,” see Eph 1:18. 
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nourished by the moisture of the blood, as light is by oil.”400 
Lactantius argues that the soul is not necessarily connected to the blood in the 
body. He writes, “For if the soul appears to be extinguished when the blood is poured 
forth through a wound, or is exhausted by the heat of fevers, it does not therefore follow 
that the system of the soul is to be placed in the material of the blood.”401 
 
The Powers of the Soul 
The soul is distinct from the mind, “for it is one thing that we live, another that we 
reflect.”402 He notes that it is the mind which is at rest when a person sleeps, not the soul. 
In this context, he also points out that people may lose their mind but still retain their 
soul. He adds that the mind increases and decreases with age, but the “soul is always in 
its own condition; and from the time when it receives the power of breathing, it remains 
the same even to the end.”403 Motion also defines the soul. He describes it as “in motion 
                                                 
400“Uidetur ergo anima similis esse lumini, quae non ipsa sit sanguis, sed umore 
sanguinis alatur ut lumen oleo.” De opificio Dei 17.3. See Michel Perrin, L’homme 
antique et chrétien: l’anthropologie de Lactance 250-325, Théologie Historique 59 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1981), 278. 
401“Non enim si anima sanguine aut per uulnus effuso aut febrium calore 
consumpto uidetur extingui, continuo in materia sanguinis animae ratio ponenda est, 
ueluti si ueniat in quaestionem lumen quo utimur, quid sit, et respondeatur oleum esse, 
quoniam consumpto illo lumen extinguitur, cum sint utique diuersa, sed alterum sit 
alterius alimentum.” De opificio Dei 17.3. 
402“Nam dormientium mens, non anima sopitur, et in furiosis mens extinguitur, 
anima manet, et ideo non exanimes, sed dementes appellantur.” Diuinae Institutiones 
7.12.9. On this and the connections with Tertullian and other philosophers, see Perrin, 
L’homme antique et chrétien, 288-293. 
403“Anima in statu suo semper est, et ex quo tempore spirandi accipit facultatem, 
eadem usque ad ultimum durat, donec emissa corporis claustro ad sedem suam reuolet.” 
Diuinae Institutiones 7.12.10. 
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by itself at all times.”404 He also writes, “But I think that all things which relate to the 
motions of the mind and soul, are of so obscure and profound a nature, that it is beyond 
the power of man to see through them clearly.”405 
After having made this distinction between the mind and the soul, Lactantius 
seems to reverse course and writes, “In the next place, the soul, although inspired by 
God, yet, because it is shut up in a dark abode of earthly flesh, does not possess 
knowledge, which belongs to divinity.”406 He adds that it gains wisdom by learning and 
hearing. Wisdom is of noted importance for the soul. This is evident when Lactantius 
writes, “But as these things are the nourishment of the body, so wisdom is of the soul.”407 
Wisdom thus seems vital in giving strength and health to the soul. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
Origins of the Soul 
In describing creation, Lactantius writes, “And thus, when all things had been 
settled with a wonderful arrangement, He determined to prepare for Himself an eternal 
kingdom, and to create innumerable souls, on whom He might bestow immortality.”408 
                                                 
404“Nec ideo tamen inmortalem esse animam non intellegimus, quoniam quidquid 
uiget mouetur que per se semper nec uideri aut tangi potest, aeternum sit necesse est.” 
De opificio Dei 17.1. See Perrin, L’homme antique et chrétien, 280-281. 
405“Sed omnia quae ad motus animi animae que pertineant, tam obscurae altae 
que rationis esse arbitror, ut supra hominem sit ea liquido peruidere.” De opificio Dei 
14.8. 
406“Deinde, quod anima quamuis a deo sit inspirata, tamen quia tenebroso 
domicilio terrenae carnis inclusa est, scientiam non habet, quae est diuinitatis.” Diuinae 
Institutiones 7.12.11. 
407“Ut illa corporis alimenta sunt, sic animae sapientia.” Ibid., 7.12.11. 
408“Ita rebus omnibus mirabili discriptione compositis regnum sibi aeternum 




Here, Lactantius locates the creation of souls after the creation of the rest of the animal 
world. In this initial description, immortality is to be conferred on them. He describes 
God as after “having made the body, He breathed into it a soul from the vital source of 
His own Spirit, which is everlasting, that it might bear the similitude of the world itself, 
which is composed of opposing elements.”409 He alone is the “giver of life” and can 
“impart the breath of life.”410 These are clear allusions to Gen 2:7. 
Lactantius argues that the soul is not given at birth but at conception.411 He further 
notes that this is done by God, not by anything from the father or mother. He writes, “For 
a body may be produced from a body, since something is contributed from both; but a 
soul cannot be produced from souls, because nothing can depart from a slight and 
incomprehensible subject.”412 He continues, “For nothing but what is mortal can be 
generated from mortals.”413 As further argument against the soul’s originating from the 
father he writes, “Nor ought he to be deemed a father who in no way perceives that he 
                                                 
2.10.2. 
409“Ficto enim corpore, inspirauit ei animam de uitali fonte spiritus sui qui est 
perennis, ut ipsius mundi ex contrariis constantis elementis similitudinem gereret.” Ibid., 
2.12.3. 
410“Quod uitae sit dator et animantibus inspiret animas, quae uirtus solius dei 
est—quam enim possit inspirare animam qui ipse accepit aliunde?” Ibid., 1.11.16. 
411De opificio Dei 17.7. Cf. Perrin, L’homme antique et chrétien, 266; Aline 
Rousselle, “L’embryologie dans le De opificio Dei de Lactance,” in Le De opificio Dei: 
Regards croisés sur l’anthropologie de Lactance, ed. Béatrice Bakhouche et al. (Saint-
Étienne: Université de Saint-Étienne, 2007). 
412“Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex 
utroque, de animis anima non potest, quia ex re tenui et inconprehensibili nihil potest 
decedere.” De opificio Dei 19.2. 
413“Nam de mortalibus non potest quicquam nisi mortale generari.” Ibid. 
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has transmitted or breathed a soul from his own.”414 Elsewhere he notes that “nothing can 
depart from a slight and incomprehensible subject. Therefore the manner of the 
production of souls belongs entirely to God alone.”415 
 
The Human Person and the Soul 
Lactantius has a clear dichotomous view of the human individual. He writes that 
“man is composed of body and soul.”416 He describes man as being made of “soul and 
body, that is, as it were, of heaven and earth: since the soul by which we live, has its 
origin, as it were, out of heaven from God, the body out of the earth, of the dust of which 
we have said that it was formed.”417 He adds, “For as much as the soul excels the body, 
so much does God excel the world, for God made and governs the world.”418 This is a 
clear conflict between the soul and the body.419 He writes, “Because God has set forth 
virtue before man, although the soul and the body are connected together, yet they are 
                                                 
414“Nec putari pater debet qui transfudisse <se> aut inspirasse animam de sua 
nullo modo sentit, nec si sentiat, quando tamen aut quomodo id fiat habet animo 
conprehensum.” Ibid., 19.3. 
415“Ex re tenui et inconprehensibili nihil potest decedere. itaque serendarum 
animarum ratio uni ac soli deo subiacet.” Ibid., 19.2-3. See Karpp, Probleme, 143. 
416“Sed cum homo constet ex corpore atque anima.” De opificio Dei 11.3. 
417“Constat enim ex anima et corpore id est quasi ex caelo et terra, 
quandoquidem anima qua uiuimus uelut e caelo oritur a deo, corpus e terra, cuius e limo 
diximus esse formatum.” Diuinae Institutiones 2.12.3. See also 7.4.12; 7.5.16; 7.5.23; De 
ira Dei 15.3. Cf. 19.1-2. 
418“Quia quanto pluris est anima quam corpus, tanto pluris est deus quam 
mundus, quia mundum deus et fecit et regit.” Diuinae Institutiones 3.9.16. 
419See Blandine Colot, “Le corps, du De opificio Dei aux Diuinae institutiones: 
martyre, philosophie chrétienne et religion chez Lactance,” in Le De opificio Dei: 
Regards croisés sur l’anthropologie de Lactance, ed. Béatrice Bakhouche et al. (Saint-
Étienne: Université de Saint-Étienne, 2007), 77. 
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contrary, and oppose one another.”420 
The soul also functions as the principle of life for the body. He writes that “a body 
abandoned by the soul wastes away.”421 This strong connection between the soul and the 
divine in contrast to the connection between the body and the earth is key to 
understanding Lactantius’s position on the nature of the soul. Though Lactantius has a 
generally dichotomous understanding of the human person, he does write that, “then, the 
soul being freed from intercourse with the body, he lives in the spirit only.”422 
Lactantius writes that one “cannot maintain the character of a man who is 
ignorant of God, the parent of his soul.”423 As God is the parent of the soul, Lactantius 
can write regarding the commonality of humanity, “and, indeed, the more closely united, 
because we are united in soul rather than in body.” Here Lactantius notes that all 
humanity is united in soul because all humanity derives its origin from God.  
The two separate substances, body and soul, which comprise the human 
individual wage war to determine the eternal destiny of the individual. Lactantius writes, 
“If the soul, which has its origin from God, gains the mastery, it is immortal, and lives in 
perpetual light; if, on the other hand, the body shall overpower the soul, and subject it to 
                                                 
420“Ergo quia uirtutem proposuit homini deus, licet anima et corpus consociata 
sint, tamen contraria sunt et inpugnant inuicem.” Diuinae Institutiones 7.5.23. On 
Lactantius’s explanation for the organs of the body and their relation to the soul, see De 
opficio Dei 14. 
421“Corpus relictum ab anima diffluit.” Diuinae Institutiones 3.20.14. 
422“Sed tunc, cum anima societate corporis liberata in solo spiritu uiuit.” Ibid., 
3.12.34. 
423“Non potest enim rationem hominis obtinere qui parentem animae suae deum 
nescit.” Diuinae Institutiones 6.9.1. Lactantius writes that God is capable of creating 
innumerable souls. See, for example, ibid., 7.5.9. 
 
412 
its dominion, it is in everlasting darkness and death.”424 He also writes that “those things 
which belong to God occupy the higher part, namely the soul, which has dominion over 
the body; but those which belong to the devil occupy the lower part, manifestly the body: 
for this, being earthly, ought to be subject to the soul, as the earth is to heaven.”425 
Lactantius does not explain why people sin or if the soul is the master over the body by 
nature. He adds, “For we have one great and principal struggle to maintain with the flesh, 
the boundless desire; of which press upon the soul, nor allow it to retain dominion, but 
make it the slave of pleasures and sweet allurements, and visit it with everlasting 
death.”426 Here it seems that the flesh is described as having power of the soul which 
requires a struggle to overcome. 
 
Immortality and the Soul 
Lactantius defends the doctrine of the immortality of the soul by several 
arguments. He connects the immortality of the soul with virtue and the return to the 
soul’s creator. He writes, “Those who discuss the immortality of the soul ought to have 
understood that virtue is set before us on this account, that, lusts having been subdued, 
and the desire of earthly things overcome, our souls, pure and victorious, may return to 
                                                 
424“Si anima superauerit quae oritur ex deo, sit inmortalis et in perpetua luce 
uersetur, si autem corpus uicerit animam dicioni que subiecerit, sit in tenebris 
sempiternis et in morte.” Ibid., 2.12.7. 
425“Superiorem partem tenent ea quae sunt dei, anima scilicet quae dominium 
corporis habet, inferiorem autem ea quae sunt diaboli, corpus utique, quod quia 
terrenum est, animae debet esse subiectum sicut terra caelo.” Ibid., 2.12.10. See also 
7.5.24. 
426“Una enim nobis et magna et praecipua cum carne luctatio est, cuius infinitae 
cupiditates premunt animam nec dominium retinere patiuntur, sed eam uoluptatibus et 




God, that is, to their original source.”427 He describes virtue as “the natural goodness and 
honor of which may teach us that the soul is not mortal, and that a divine reward is 
appointed for it by God.”428 He adds, “The gift of virtue also to man alone is a great proof 
that souls are immortal.”429 
Lactantius also argues that virtue demonstrates the immortality of the soul, as it is 
not good for the present life if there is not reward or punishment to follow. He argues, 
“For in defense of faith and justice, virtue neither fears want, nor is alarmed at exile, nor 
dreads imprisonment, nor shrinks from pain, nor refuses death; and because these things 
are contrary to nature, either virtue is foolishness, . . . or if it is not foolishness, then the 
soul is immortal, and despises present goods, because other things are preferable which it 
attains after the dissolution of the body.”430 
In comparing his notion of the immortality of the soul with that of Plato, 
Lactantius writes, “For although he perceived the truth respecting the immortality of the 
soul, yet he did not speak respecting it as though it were the chief good.”431 This he 
                                                 
427“Illi tamen qui de inmortalitate animae disputant intellegere debuerunt ideo 
propositam nobis esse uirtutem, ut perdomitis libidinibus rerum que terrestrium 
cupiditate superata purae ac uictrices animae ad deum id est ad originem suam 
reuertantur.” Ibid., 3.12.25. Cf. Epitome diuinarum institutionum 52.7. 
428“Cuius naturalis bonitas et honestas docere nos potest animam non esse 
mortalem diuinum que illi a deo praemium constitutum.” Diuinae Institutiones 5.18.10. 
429“Uirtus quoque soli homini data magno argumento est inmortales animas 
esse.” Ibid., 7.9.15. 
430“Uirtus enim pro fide, pro iustitia nec egestatem timet nec exilium metuit nec 
carcerem perhorrescit nec dolorem reformidat nec mortem recusat: quae quia naturae 
contraria sunt, aut stultitia est uirtus, si et commoda impedit et uitae nocet, aut si stultitia 
non est, ergo anima inmortalis est et ideo praesentia bona contemnit, | quia sunt alia 
potiora quae post dissolutionem corporis sui adsequatur.” Epitome diuinarum 
institutionum 65.3. 




explains by writing, “But these men, because they were ignorant or in doubt that the souls 
of men are immortal, estimated both virtues and vices by earthly honors or 
punishments.”432 Lactantius is clear to argue that virtue must always be kept in the 
context of immortality which God gives to those who practice virtue. Regarding this he 
writes, “For if our souls are mortal, if virtue is about to have no existence after the 
dissolution of the body, why do we avoid the goods assigned to us, as though we were 
ungrateful or unworthy of enjoying the divine gifts?”433 From this, Lactantius connects 
virtue to vice or pleasure. He adds, “Pleasure is common to all animals, virtue belongs 
only to man; the former is vicious, . . . the latter is opposed to nature, unless the soul is 
immortal.”434 Elsewhere he also writes, “But if the virtue of the soul shall have resisted 
the desires, and suppressed them, he will be truly like to God. From which it is evident 
that the soul of man, which is capable of divine virtue, is not mortal.”435 
Lactantius argues that the philosophers who agreed with the idea of the 
immortality of the soul did so accidentally,436 not relying on Scripture, which was opened 
                                                 
tamquam de summo bono disserebat.” Diuinae Institutiones 7.8.2. 
432“Hi uero quia ignorabant aut dubitabant animas hominum inmortales esse, et 
uirtutes et uitia terrenis honoribus aut poenis aestimauerunt.” Ibid., 6.3.5. 
433“Si enim mortales sunt animae, si uirtus dissoluto corpore nihil futura est, quid 
fugimus adtributa nobis bona quasi aut ingrati aut indigni qui diuinis muneribus 
perfruamur?” Ibid., 6.9.20. 
434“Uoluptas omnibus est communis animalibus, uirtus solius est hominis: illa 
uitiosa est, haec honesta, illa secundum naturam, haec aduersa naturae, nisi anima 
inmortalis est.” Epitome diuinarum institutionum 65.2. 
435“Vnde apparet animam hominis, quae uirtutem diuinam capit, non esse 
mortalem.” De ira Dei 19.2.8. See also 24.13.51. 
436Diuinae Institutiones 3.18. Lactantius, in Diuinae Institutiones 7.13.9, does 
mention Aristoxenus who he says denied that there was a soul at all. Lactantius notes that 
there can be nothing more senseless than this.  
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to the Christians by divinity.437 In arguing against Cicero’s notion that death is not to be 
feared because if the soul survives, it is divine, and if it does not, then there is no evil, 
Lactantius writes that “each conclusion is false. For the sacred writings teach that the soul 
is not annihilated; but that it is either rewarded according to its righteousness, or eternally 
punished according to its crimes.”438 Here Lactantius connects the immortality of the soul 
with the reality of a future judgment. In arguing against Epicurus, he notes that the idea 
that one does not need to fear a future punishment because the soul dies is more fitting of 
a leader of a band of robbers than a rational person.439 Here Lactantius makes a clear 
connection between the reality of a future judgment and the continued state of existence 
of the soul.440 
Lactantius notes that some philosophers understood in part the doctrine of the 
soul.441 He, however, states that there were often errors in understanding or in reasons or 
causes which they were describing. He argues that God has proclaimed the truth in this 
regard and thus he can explain it correctly.442 He asks, “But why do we infer from 
arguments that souls are eternal, when we have divine testimonies?”443 This point is 
                                                 
437Cf. ibid., 7.13.2. 
438“Docent enim diuinae litterae non extingui animas, sed aut pro iustitia praemio 
adfici aut poena pro sceleribus sempiterna.” Ibid., 3.19.3. 
439Ibid., 3.17.42. 
440See also Perrin, L’homme antique et chrétien, 369-370. 
441See, for example, Epitome diuinarum institutionum 63.8. 
442See, for example, ibid., 62.7; 65.1. 
443“Sed quid argumentis colligimus aeternas esse animas, cum habeamus 
testimonia diuina?” Ibid., 65.6. 
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reiterated. The immortal nature of the soul is taught in the Scriptures. Of note here is that 
Lactantius refers to the Scriptures as support for the idea of the immortal nature of the 
soul though he does not in general make any direct citations. 
The idea that God is incorporeal, invisible, and eternal also influences 
Lactantius’s thinking. From this, he argues “that the soul, since it is not seen, does not 
perish after its departure from the body.”444 Similarly he notes that “the soul is both 
endowed with perception and cannot be seen, and does not burn. From which it is evident 
that the soul is something like God.”445 He also argues that the soul will be able to sense 
without the members of the body just as God also senses without a body. He notes that 
even Cicero agrees that the immortal nature of the soul can be understood from the fact 
that humans are the only animal which has knowledge of God.446 He also refutes the 
argument of Lucretius that since the soul is created with the body, it also dissolves with 
the body. He notes that the soul does not perish with the body for when the soul departs 
(that is, at death), the body still remains undissolved for some time. Lactantius writes, 
“For the soul cannot entirely perish, since it received its origin from the Spirit of God, 
which is eternal.”447  
                                                 
444“Quodsi est deus et incorporalis et inuisibilis et aeternus, ergo non idcirco 
interire animam credibile est, quia non uidetur, postquam recessit a corpore, quoniam 
constat esse aliquid sentiens ac uigens quod non ueniat sub aspectum.” Ibid., 7.9.7. See 
also Perrin, L’homme antique et chrétien, 348-349. 
445“Sed ignis et sensu indiget et uidetur et tactu conburit, anima uero et sensu 
aucta est et uideri non potest et non adurit. unde apparet animam nescio quid esse deo 
simile.” De opificio Dei 17.4. See Perrin, L’homme antique et chrétien, 273-274. 
446Diuinae Institutiones 7.9.12. Cf. Cicero De legibus 1.8. 
447“Nam interire prorsus anima non potest, quoniam ex dei spiritu qui aeternus 
est originem cepit.” Diuinae Institutiones 7.12.16. 
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Lactantius argues that humans are made of two elements, one heavenly, the other 
earthly, one fire, the other water. He writes that Adam consisted of “soul and body, that 
is, as it were, of heaven and earth: since the soul by which we live, has its origin, as it 
were, out of heaven from God, the body out of the earth, of the dust of which we have 
said that it was formed.”448 He notes that the body is solid and can be sensed with the 
senses, while the soul can neither be seen nor touched.449 Elsewhere, he writes, “Nor, 
therefore, do we fail to understand that the soul is immortal, since whatever is vigorous 
and is in motion by itself at all times, and cannot be seen or touched, must he eternal.”450 
He does admit, however, that “what the soul is, is not yet agreed upon by philosophers, 
and perhaps will never be agreed upon.”451 
 
Death and the Soul 
Death, for Lactantius, is “the separation of body and soul.”452 Death, however, is 
not destruction. He notes that death does not “altogether annihilate the souls of the 
unrighteous, but subjects them to everlasting punishment.”453 He adds a further 
                                                 
448“Constat enim ex anima et corpore id est quasi ex caelo et terra, 
quandoquidem anima qua uiuimus uelut e caelo oritur a deo, corpus e terra, cuius e limo 
diximus esse formatum.” Ibid., 2.12.3. See also 2.12.7; 2.12.10; 2.12.14 
449Ibid., 7.9-11. 
450“Nec ideo tamen inmortalem esse animam non intellegimus, quoniam quidquid 
uiget mouetur que per se semper nec uideri aut tangi potest, aeternum sit necesse est.” 
De opificio Dei 17.1. 
451“Quid autem sit anima nondum inter philosophos conuenit nec umquam 
fortasse conueniet.” De opificio Dei 17.2. 
452“Mors est corporis animae que seductio.” Diuinae Institutiones 2.12.9. Cf. 
3.20.14. See Perrin, L’homme antique et chrétien, 496-502. Perrin notes the connection 
with the Platonic and Stoic definition. 




definition: “Death is the condemnation of souls for their deserts to eternal 
punishments.”454 It is clear that the multiple definitions of death are key in this 
interpretation. Lactantius also points out that the souls of the dumb animals do not suffer 
this fate, noting rather that their “souls, not being composed of God, but of the common 
air, are dissolved by death.”455 Here it is clear that the immortal nature of the soul is 
derived from the breath of the Creator. He also writes, “For it is not the soul that becomes 
senseless when the body fails, but it is the body which becomes senseless when the soul 
takes its departure, because it draws all sensibility with it.”456 He then adds, “But since 
the soul by its presence gives sensibility to the body, and causes it to live, it is impossible 
that it should not live and perceive by itself, since it is in itself both consciousness and 
life.”457 
In reading Lactantius, it is necessary to keep in mind his definitions of death and 
immortality. Immortality is the gift of God to the righteous.458 Death is the punishment of 
God to the wicked. Lactantius can write that the soul is immortal and that the wicked will 
suffer death.459 However, these need to be interpreted in light of the previous definitions. 
                                                 
aeternum.” Diuinae Institutiones 2.12.8. 
454“Mors est animarum pro meritis ad aeterna supplicia damnatio.” Ibid., 2.12.9. 
455“Haec mutas pecudes non adtingit, quarum animae non ex deo constantes, sed 
ex communi aere morte soluuntur.” Ibid., 2.12.9. 
456“Non enim anima corpore deficiente, sed corpus anima decedente brutescit, 
quia sensum omnem trahit se cum.” Ibid., 7.12.24. 
457“Cum autem praesens anima sensum tribuat corpori et uiuere id efficiat, fieri 
non potest ut non ipsa per se et uiuat et sentiat, quoniam ipsa est et sensus et uita.” 
Diuinae Institutiones 7.12.25. 
458Cf. Epitome diuinarum institutionum 62.4. 




This is clearly demonstrated in the following. “Again, as the life of the soul is everlasting, 
in which it receives the divine and unspeakable fruits of its immortality; also its death 
must be eternal, in which it suffers perpetual punishments and infinite torments for its 
faults.”460  
 
Hell and Paradise 
The dead are not judged immediately, according to Lactantius. He writes, “Nor, 
however, let anyone imagine that souls are immediately judged after death. For all are 
detained in one and a common place of confinement, until the arrival of the time in which 
the great Judge shall make an investigation of their deserts.”461 After this is the 
resurrection when their bodies are joined back to their souls. 
Fire figures in the future of all humans. The wicked are described as suffering 
eternal torment by fire, their souls being immortal.462 Lactantius also argues that the 
righteous will be tried by fire, which is repelled by those full of justice and virtue but 
bringing to light the sins of others.  
Lactantius writes that “the sacred writings teach that the soul is not 
                                                 
distinction and thus claims that Lactantius does not believe that the soul is immortal by 
nature. Wolfson, 305.  
460“Rursus sicut uita animi sempiterna est, in qua diuinos et ineloquibiles 
inmortalitatis suae fructus capit, ita et mors eius perpetua sit necesse est, in qua perennes 
poenas et infinita tormenta pro peccatis suis pendit.” Diuinae Institutiones 7.11.1. In this 
quote, Lactantius uses animus rather than anima. However, he can be casual about the 
interchange between these two words and he uses anima in the previous sentence and 
thus it seems warranted to include here. See also ibid., 7.12.15; 7.14. 
461“Nec tamen quisquam putet animas post mortem protinus iudicari: omnes in 
una communi que custodia detinentur, donec tempus adueniat quo maximus iudex 
meritorum faciat examen.” Diuinae Institutiones 7.21.7. 
462See ibid., 7.14. 
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annihilated.”463 He adds later, “The souls of the righteous being recalled to a happy life, a 
quiet, tranquil, peaceful, in short, golden age, as the poets call it, should flourish, under 
the rule of God Himself.”464 He writes that “God will come, that, having cleansed the 
world from all defilement, He may restore the souls of the righteous to their renewed 
bodies, and raise them to everlasting blessedness.”465 
 
Summary 
Lactantius often uses soul for life, especially in the sense of giving one’s life or 
dying. He also uses it to refer to a person. 
Virtue and vice are directly related to the soul. Sin happens in the soul. The soul is 
to rule over the body, yet it can easily be overcome by the desires of the body. The body 
functions as the enclosure of the soul. It is darkened by the body and kept from the full 
knowledge it ought to have, being akin to the divine. The soul is also the principle of life 
and movement for the body. Here, Lactantius makes a distinction not found with other 
writers. He argues that since the soul is the principle of life, then it is not the same thing 
as the mind. They are in fact distinct from each other. 
The soul was created by God. This was breathed into the body of Adam at 
creation. It is not given to humans at birth but rather at conception. As with the creation 
of Adam’s soul, Lactantius also argues that every soul is created by God, not passed on 
from father or mother. He argues this point based upon the immortal nature of the soul, 
                                                 
463“Docent enim diuinae litterae non extingui animas.” Ibid., 3.19.3. 
464“Piorum animis ad beatam uitam reuocatis quietum tranquillum pacificum, 
aureum denique ut poetae uocant saeculum deo ipso regnante florescat.” Ibid., 7.2.1. 
465“Deus enim ueniet, ut orbe hoc ab omni labe purgato rediuiuas iustorum 
animas corporibus innouatis ad sempiternam beatitudinem suscitet.” Ibid., 7.22.8. 
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suggesting that that which is mortal cannot be responsible for that which is immortal. 
The human person is a dichotomy of soul and body, though the soul, as the 
immortal part of humans, is clearly to be preferred. Lactantius continues the general 
denigration of the soul. With Lactantius, the body wars against the soul. Earlier writers 
wrote instead of the passions of the soul rather than the passions of the body. Death is the 
separation of the soul from the body. This does not mean the destruction of the 
individual. The soul is immortal and thus continues to exist. 
Lactantius connects the soul’s immortal nature to its creation by God. Based on 
this, God sets virtue before humans. This call to the virtuous life also hints at the 
immortal nature of the soul. Religion is what separates humans from other animals, as 
does knowledge. These all indicate the immortal nature of the soul. The believer who 
follows after virtue in this life is seen as one seeking immortality. Lactantius also 
connects the immortal nature of the soul to the notion of self-movement. Against Cicero, 
who says that death is not to be feared, Lactantius argues that the soul does survive to 
face a future judgment, arguing similarly against the ideas of Epicurus. Further proof of 
the soul’s immortal nature is when a believer intentionally deprives oneself of pleasure in 
the present for a future blessing. Lactantius reiterates the connection between the soul’s 
creation by God and its immortal nature. As God is incorporeal and eternal, so is the soul 
that is breathed by Him. Here there seems to be a clear allusion to Gen 2:7. As the soul is 
unseen, so also is it immortal, being in nature like fire or light. 
The souls of both the wicked and the righteous are kept in a subterranean location 
after death to await the judgment. The souls of the righteous are tested by fire but not 
punished by it. After the judgment, the soul and body are rejoined together to receive 
either eternal punishment by fire or eternal rewards. 
Though Lactantius does not quote or direct the reader to the Scriptures, yet he 
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draws on biblical themes like earlier apologists. He emphasizes the breath of God, which 
is clearly a direct allusion to Gen 2:7. He also is clear that the soul must be immortal and 
survive the death of the body because there is a future judgment with rewards and 
punishments, which is a biblical theme emphasized in various biblical texts. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has studied both the general usage of the soul in the Latin Fathers in 
the second, third, and early fourth centuries as well as studying the use of Scripture in the 
development of this doctrine. While this chapter contains fewer authors than the Greek 
Ante-Nicene period, yet several new ideas have been proposed. This era also witnessed 
the first treatise written specifically on the soul, a practice that would be continued by 
many later authors in the Church. While the later Greek Fathers discussed ideas such as 
rational activity and education, along with the emotions and feelings and their impact on 
the soul, in the Latin Fathers, this is much less prominent. With the Latin Fathers, there is 
more emphasis on what happens to the soul after death. 
The soul repeatedly carries the notion of natural life, often in the context of death 
and dying. It is connected with rational thinking in several authors along with ideas such 
as motion, being the principle of life, and its simple nature. In general, these ideas are 
more often mentioned in passing rather than appearing in a focused debate or discussion. 
An important development with the later Latin Fathers is that of the denigration of 
the body in relation to the soul. This is seen in several ways. First of all, the soul by itself 
is the entity that will receive both rewards or punishment. The body is no longer spoken 
of as reuniting with the soul. The soul also is more often seen in an entirely positive note, 
with evil coming from the influence of the body rather than passions existing in the soul 
as was common with the Greek Fathers. 
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For most authors, mental anxieties and other vices of the mind appear in the soul. 
The issue of the goodness of the soul is also discussed by Tertullian. He notes that sin 
takes place in the soul and yet he also calls the soul Christian by nature. Commodianus 
describes happiness in the soul. 
The usage of Scripture to support the doctrine of the soul is most prominent in 
Tertullian, though Novation also uses Scripture. The remaining authors devote 
comparatively little space to scriptural support of the doctrine. The works of Arnobius 
and Lactantius are apologetic in genre and thus do not refer to the Bible directly with 
citations. These authors do, however, claim that their ideas are those taught by the 
Scriptures. They claim authority for their doctrine based upon its scriptural origin, 
refraining, however, from quoting them directly. 
The Latin authors, as with their Greek counterparts, generally describe the human 
person is a composite of body and soul. For Arnobius and Lactantius, the body shelters, 
even restricts, the soul. Most authors write of the acts of the body also impacting the soul. 
This is in line with the general teaching of the Greek Fathers. Tertullian goes to great 
detail in establishing the birth and origin of the soul as well as arguing for its corporeal 
nature. Lactantius also describes the origins of the soul as well as noting its location in 
the physical body. He also follows earlier Greek authors in describing the fight between 
the body and the soul for mastery of the individual. Several authors also discuss death 
and the soul, following the later Greek Fathers in describing various ways in which the 
soul dies. 
Tertullian and Lactantius draw on the breath of God imagery of Gen 2:7. For 
Tertullian, this means that it had a beginning and that its origin was from God. He states 
that the imago dei refers only to the soul, not the body. 
Tertullian and Novation use Matt 10:28 to support the notion of the continued 
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existence of the soul after death. Novation himself also uses Luke 20:37-38 while 
Tertullian uses Luke 16. They both also argue that Christ’s soul did not enter the grave. 
Novation argues this on the basis of 1 Pet 3:19-20, while Tertullian uses John 2:19-21 
and Matt 26:38. 
Though the soul does continue after death, it cannot interfere in the lives of the 
living. Tertullian argues this fact based upon Matt 12:40 and 1 Thess 4:16. This also 
means that all souls, save for the martyrs (Rev 6:9-11), are confined to Hades until the 
judgment. Novation and Lactantius also argue for the confinement of all souls in Hades 
until the resurrection. After the resurrection and judgment, the souls of the wicked are 
punished by fire forever. Cyprian argues this based on Isa 66:24 and Wis 5:1-9. Though 
Tertullian acknowledges that Matt 10:28 writes of the death or destruction of the soul, yet 
he notes that this must be understood in the sense of lasting forever, not its actual 
annihilation. Lactantius defines death similarly. 
Lactantius connects the idea of a future judgment with an immortal soul, while 
Tertullian connects the judgment with the restoration of the soul to the body. 
Several ideas, some of them novel, are proposed in this period. Tertullian argues 
for a corporeal soul (Luke 16, Rev 6:9-11, Acts 9:1-8, Gen 2:7). Arnobius argues that the 
soul is not immortal because it was not created by the Supreme God but a lower 
demiurge. He also argues for a limit to the time of burning in hell, writing of the final 
annihilation of the wicked after a long period of time. Consistent with his beginning 
supposition that the soul is not immortal, he argues that only God is immortal (cf. 1 Tim 
6:16) and thus the immortality of the righteous is a gift of God rather than a natural state. 
It is possible that Minucius Felix also seems to have believed in the ultimate annihilation 
of the souls of the wicked. This is difficult to prove with certainty however. 
Commodianus suggests a spiritual, rather than physical punishment in hell, apparently 
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intending the soul only to be that which undergoes torment. 
The several new and distinct ideas introduced by the Latin Fathers in this period 
are truly unique. It is not clear what caused this phenomenon after what seemed to be 










SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has looked at the concept of the soul in the early Church Fathers and 
the development that took place during the Ante-Nicene era. It has analyzed the role of 
Scripture in this process and has identified various Scripture passages and themes that 
provide pivotal support for this developing doctrine during the Ante-Nicene era. While at 
first glance,  the many various and sometimes contradictory ideas discussed regarding the 
soul give the impression of little in the way of coherence, yet this study demonstrates that 
recognizable themes and patterns emerge during this era, which have stayed with 
Christian theology to the present day. It has also identified several challenges that the 
early Church Fathers struggled with when seeking to articulate a biblical concept of the 
soul in the context of the first three centuries CE.  
In the summary that follows, the general practice of dividing the results into the 
two separate categories of general usage and doctrinal development is again followed. In 
the Usage section, the attributes and powers of the soul are discussed. This section gives 
an overview of the semantic range which the early Church Fathers traversed when using 
the word soul. In the Doctrinal Teaching section, themes such as the origin of the soul, 
the death of the soul, and the soul in the afterlife are reviewed. In general, the first section 
does not find much in the way of scriptural support for the ideas on the soul that the 
Church Fathers were teaching, while in the latter, it is quite common. Often, the 
arguments used in describing the powers and attributes of the soul are openly taken from 
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various philosophical teachings. The purpose of including this first section on the 
semantic range of usage of soul, which does not deal with scriptural usage to a great 
degree, has been to provide a general context within which to frame the more detailed 
analysis of the early Church Fathers’ development of the concept of the soul. 
 
Summary 
Usage of Psyche and Anima 
As one looks at the semantic range of the soul words, psyche and anima, in the 
Ante-Nicene period, multiple points of emphasis are apparent. The early Apostolic 
Fathers begin the general practice of using soul for life. This is by far the most consistent 
way to use the term, being used by the Greek Apologists and later Greek authors along 
with the later Latin Fathers. The one author who stands out is Origen. He only rarely uses 
it in this sense. He does use it to refer to an individual. Other authors also use it to refer to 
an individual or to one’s self, though this is a less common practice. It begins with the 
Shepherd of Hermas and continues with a small sampling of authors throughout the entire 
era. 
Beyond using soul for life and an individual, the Apostolic Fathers are also 
consistent in noting that both good and evil exist in the soul as well as faith and unbelief. 
However in this early period, there is no clear conception of a dichotomy between body 
and soul which will appear only with the Epistle to Diognetus.1 Both Barnabas and the 
Shepherd of Hermas write of the death or destruction of the soul. However, as just 
mentioned, since there is no clear conception of a dichotomy between body and soul at 
                                                 
1In this way and in several others, the Epistle to Diognetus is more closely 
connected with the soul concepts of the Apologists than with the Apostolic Fathers. 
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this point, it would seem to be out of sequence to therefore conclude that this death refers 
to a separate entity from the body but rather is to be understood as referring to life in 
general. 
Several authors also argue for the soul as the principle of life. This idea is first 
mentioned by the Epistle to Diognetus. While it is not as prevalent, it has a related 
corollary which is talked of much more often. This is the understanding that the soul is 
the principle of movement. Authors from the Greek Apologists, the later Greek Fathers, 
and the Latin Fathers all mention this idea. With this borrowing from philosophy, that it 
is the soul which animates, or makes alive, and it is only living things that have in them 
the principle of self-movement, Origen moves to argue even that stars, having orderly 
motion, possess souls. He argues for this, suggesting that Job 25:5 notes that the stars are 
not pure in the eyes of God thus giving further evidence to support the idea of stars 
possessing a soul. This idea of the soul being the principle of life will become important 
in the discussion regarding the soul’s immortality or continued existence after the death 
of the body. In a related line of thinking, animals are sometimes thought of as having a 
soul. Origen and Tertullian note that the creation story in Gen 1 indicates that both land 
and sea animals are referred to as souls. 
Beginning with the Epistle to Diognetus, the practice of describing the soul as a 
separate, ontological entity from the body develops. What prompts this transition, if it 
may even be called a transition, is not entirely clear. It may be related to the fact that no 
earlier author addresses the concept of the soul in any detail. That is, there may have been 
no transition at all, only a vacuum of knowledge resulting from the paucity of theological 
writings in this period. While the soul is, from this point forward, always described as 
being separate from the body, nevertheless, it is generally thought to be in close 
connection with it. This is especially true for the next century or so. This connection 
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between soul and body is commonly made with blood. Irenaeus is the first to make this 
point. Origen argues for this based upon Lev 17:14. In this context, the soul is often 
described as being dispersed throughout the body. Lactantius is alone, at the end of the 
era, in arguing against the notion of the soul being in the blood, preferring rather the 
lungs, presumably because of his connection of breath and soul. 
Beginning with the Apologists, authors begin to make a connection between the 
soul and breath or the action of breathing. This idea is addressed below in the analysis 
regarding the immortality of the soul in relation to Gen 2:7. There God is described as 
breathing the breath of life into Adam, and Adam became a living soul. What is 
important here is to see that once the connection was made between breath and soul, 
several other attributes were added as well. Irenaeus, based upon Gen 2:7, argues that 
since the breath is incorporeal and invisible, the soul is also incorporeal and invisible. 
The Epistle to Diognetus, though, generally accepted to be written before the Apologists, 
also attributes invisibility to the soul. It seems likely that this was done based on his prior 
understanding rather than a connection between soul and breath based upon Gen 2:7. This 
practice happens at other times as well. There is a belief supported in the literature before 
an actual biblical defense is given. Thus, it seems that while the Hellenistic thesis of 
Harnack, while clearly overly simplistic in attributing much of early Church thought on 
the soul and other doctrines to Greek influence, should not be completely set aside as 
having no relevance. 
Two authors fall out of the mainstream on the notion of an incorporeal soul. 
Irenaeus and Tertullian argue, based upon Luke 16:19-31 and Rev 6:9, that souls are 
corporeal. While this thought has connections to the corporeal soul argued for by earlier 
Epicureans and Stoics, it seems clearly to be a result of the two Scripture passages 
mentioned that convinces these two authors to move outside the mainstream of Christian 
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thought. For though they argue for its corporeal nature, they also argue for its immortal 
nature. This put them at odds with the philosophical ideas of neo-Platonism and with later 
Church thinking as well.  
As a rule, the early Church Fathers argue that the actions of the body influence the 
soul. This is hinted at first with the Shepherd of Hermas, though with him, it seems too 
early to argue that this is resulting from a clear dichotomy. The idea is discussed the most 
in the extensive writings of Clement of Alexandria on the soul. Of note is the absence in 
the Greek Apologists of this idea. One of the most common ideas expressed in this 
context is advocating for bodily fasting as a means of improving the health of the soul. 
Out of line with the general tenor of the early Church Fathers on this topic is 
Athenagoras, who argues that there is no connection between the needs and actions of the 
body with the soul because the soul needs nothing from the body because of its 
“peculiar,” passionless nature. This perhaps illustrates the tension that is observable 
between describing the soul as immaterial and yet arguing for a connection between this 
immaterial soul and the material body. While most authors recognize that the actions we 
do affect our souls, Athenagoras pushes the notion of incorporeality to its logical 
conclusion. While he presents his argument based on the impassability of the soul, yet it 
seems probable that this was also motivated by his philosophical belief that the material 
and immaterial have no connection. 
Justin Martyr is the first author to argue for the rational capacity of the soul. Later 
Irenaeus and the rest of the later Greek Fathers use the same concept, as well as 
Tertullian from among the Latin Fathers. One notable exception to this understanding is 
Lactantius, who at times argues that reason is found in the soul and at other times argues 
that reason is too divine to be found in the “lowly” soul. 
The idea of a rational soul means that the soul is the ruler of the body. Most 
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authors who comment on this describe the soul as the place where the individual makes 
choices. The idea of a free soul endowed with the power to make choices for good or evil 
is an idea that germinates with Irenaeus and then becomes vital to the understanding of 
the powers of the soul in both Clement of Alexandria and Origen and even Origen’s 
followers. Tertullian also makes good use of it. Lactantius argues that if the soul gains 
mastery over the body, then it receives immortality, but that if the body gains mastery 
over the soul, then it receives eternal punishment. 
Connected to this idea of a soul endowed with free will, though somewhat in 
tension with it, is the notion that the soul must make choices between the irascible desires 
of the body and the pure virtues of the soul. Accepting this idea implies that evil may 
exist in the soul, which most authors don’t quarrel with. This difficulty is recognized by 
Tertullian and Origen. The latter offers creative options, including the option of two 
souls, while the former proposes no solution. In general, however, most authors will 
accept that evil can exist in the soul and leave unresolved this tension of divine and evil 
elements in the soul. This seems to be the result of a clear distinction between divine 
attributes that the soul has because of its origin from God and real divinity, which is 
attributed exclusively to God.  
Most authors describe the soul in very positive terms, though this is a notion that 
develops after the Apostolic era as that early period did not exhibit any trend regarding 
this idea. Irenaeus is representative when he describes it as the better part of man. In 
contrast to this majority view, Origen and Arnobius stand apart. They view the soul in 
terms that are more negative. Origen favors a positive view of the spirit and argues that 
the Bible does not speak positively regarding the soul, even suggesting that the soul will 
ultimately change to spirit. Origen goes so far as to posit a dual soul, one that is holy and 
good and the other that is evil. Arnobius argues that the soul is so bad that this is proof 
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that it is not divine or immortal. His reasoning is that nothing so bad could have been 
created by God. This further represents, for Origen, a trend towards making his 
understanding of the soul as logically consistent as possible while at the same time taking 
various biblical statements regarding the soul into account. While he recognized the 
challenge to Church teaching, his proposal was never repeated and surely was an example 
of the type of theology that resulted in his being posthumously anathematized. With the 
majority of the early Church Fathers, however, this tension is left unresolved. 
When one analyzes this section, Usage of Psyche and Anima, in the discussion of 
the various authors of this study, the role of Scripture is minimal. This seems primarily 
because the discussion of the attributes and powers of the soul is generally based on 
common belief and secular authors rather than on scriptural authority. The Bible is more 
likely to be quoted in this context if an author believes contrary to common knowledge. 
This is seen when Irenaeus and Tertullian argue for the corporeal nature of the soul. The 
commonly accepted opinion of people was that the soul was incorporeal, in agreement 
with the basic platonic framework. Because these two argue that Scripture teaches that 
the soul is corporeal, they quote the story of the Rich Man and Lazarus in support of this. 
More often, the beliefs of the early Church Fathers are in harmony with the commonly 
accepted opinions of others and thus no biblical defense is deemed necessary. 
 
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources 
One of the most important questions for the early Christian Fathers to discuss was 
the origin of the soul. The early Apostolic Fathers do not discuss this but the question 
arises in the subsequent era of the Apologists. In this context, one verse is used more than 
any other. Genesis 2:7, with its description of God breathing into Adam the breath of life, 
becomes the undisputed biblical proof for arguing both for the reality of the human soul 
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and for the soul’s origin from God. It is first proposed by Theophilus of Antioch and is 
voiced by all the major writers after him in both the later Greek writers and the Latin 
Fathers as well. This idea of the soul originating from the breath of God was used by 
various authors as a reason to assign various divine attributes to it. Theophilus is again 
the first to note this in writing that many consider the soul to be immortal based on its 
connection to the divine afflatus. Irenaeus and Tertullian also cite this verse in connection 
with the soul’s immortality. Lactantius’s exclamation that the soul cannot die because its 
origin is from God is typical of this argument. Tatian  argues that the soul originates from 
below. And Arnobius claims that the soul is not created by God but rather by another, 
lower being that possesses creative powers. This notion is reminiscent of some of the 
earlier Gnostic teachers whom Irenaeus wrote against in the second century. Arnobius is 
driven by the obvious evil present in the soul to argue that a good God would not create 
something as “fickle and prone to evil” as the soul. 
The idea of creation in imago dei in Gen 1:27 functions similarly to the breath of 
God concept, though it is not quoted by as many authors. Irenaeus and Origen use it to 
argue for the incorporeal nature of the human soul, while Origen and Methodius use it to 
attribute immortality to the soul. Tertullian uses it to argue for the free will of the soul in 
choosing its own path.  
The usage of this verse to argue that various attributes of divinity are to be found 
in the soul demonstrates two interpretative practices used by the early Church Fathers 
when using the Scriptures to defend the doctrine of the soul. The first practice is when 
examining a verse that says something regarding human beings, the author may assume 
that what is spoken of actually refers only to the soul rather than the entire person or just 
the body, even though the verse(s) under consideration does not mention the soul at all. 
Thus, authors quoting Gen 1:27 may declare that the soul alone is made in the imago dei, 
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even though no mention of the soul is made in Gen 1:27. Conversely, though no mention 
is made of the body or soul in this verse, nevertheless the early Church Fathers 
consistently refer the imago dei to the soul and deny it any reference to the body, save for 
Irenaeus who refers it to the whole person. 
Once this previous step is allowed, then assigning to the soul various attributes 
and powers that are divine follows naturally. This second step is to ascribe various 
attributes of divinity to the soul even though they are not mentioned in the text. So the 
attributes of incorporeality, immortality, and freedom of the will are all argued to be 
attributes and powers of the soul based on Gen 1:27, even though no mention is made of 
those attributes and powers in the verse itself. But since they are attributes of divinity, 
they can be assigned to the soul. 
An important observation is that, in general, no attempt is made by the early 
Church Fathers to prove that humans have an ontologically separate soul. Origen’s 
statements in De principiis to this effect are perhaps most revealing and indicative of this 
point. When he begins to discuss the soul in detail, Origen asserts that no one will argue 
that all living things have souls. Having admitted that this point is accepted on popular 
belief, he proceeds to offer Scripture citations to make it clear that this belief is accepted 
by the Christian because of its appearance in the Bible. He then quotes several statements 
from the creation account of Gen 1-2. He notes that both land animals and sea animals 
are referred to as souls. He then quotes Gen 2:7 to indicate that humans also have a soul. 
What is of note here is that none of the texts that Origen uses state that humans have a 
soul. Rather, they seem to indicate that humans, and animals for that matter, are a soul. 
This is the extent to which any of the early Church Fathers go to demonstrate from the 
Scriptures the idea that humans have a soul rather than are a soul. 
Thus all authors, save the early Apostolic Fathers who were writing within a very 
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limited doctrinal agenda, view the human person in a dichotomous relationship of body 
and soul. The body was physically visible to all and biblically necessary for the doctrine 
of the resurrection. So long as the resurrection was an important theological topic, the 
body had a corresponding importance. In addition, as the soul is mentioned throughout 
the Scriptures and the understanding of it was well accepted in the culture of the times, 
no writer seeks to deny the notion that every person has a soul. The Epistle to Diognetus, 
being the earliest to develop any doctrinal understanding of the soul, is also the first to 
argue for the dichotomy between body and soul. Though the dichotomy of body and soul 
is one of the most pervasive teachings on the soul in this era, nevertheless, only Tertullian 
offers a biblical defense of this idea. He argues from Christ’s words in Matt 10:28, “Fear 
not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul,” that this demonstrates a 
dichotomy of body and soul. 
Another doctrinal concept which develops in the midst of the era of the 
Apologists, directly related to the dichotomous vision of the human person, is the 
definition of death as the separation of the soul from the body. The soul, being often 
understood as the life principle, is what gives life to the body. And death occurs when 
this ontologically separate entity is separated from the body to which it has given life. 
Beginning with Athenagoras and Melito of Sardis, this idea becomes the de facto 
interpretation. Death is almost always described as a good thing, freeing the soul from the 
confines of the body. Tertullian, perhaps because of his consistent emphasis on seeing the 
human person as a combination of body and soul, describes death as something violent, 
not according to nature. Clement of Alexandria is alone in seeking biblical support for 
this view of death as separation of the soul from the body. He finds allegorical references 
for this in Matt 6:25, “Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat?” He adds Matt 
10:39, “He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall 
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find it.” In addition, he notes Christ’s words in Matt 16:26, “For what is a man profited, if 
he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?” These references, while 
specifically used for the call to the Gnostic life of knowledge and separation from the 
cares of the body, are also metaphorical for death as the separation of the soul from the 
body. It is of note that while the Epistle to Diognetus is the first to define death in this 
way, it is not until the writings of Clement of Alexandria that any writer offers a biblical 
defense of the idea. 
Clement’s usage of these last two Matthean verses highlights another 
interpretative challenge that the early Church Fathers faced in developing the doctrine of 
the soul. That is, they were faced with the semantic range for the word soul that the 
corresponding Greek and Hebrew terms comprised. The word in both verses that Clement 
of Alexandria cites is psyche, which can mean both life and soul. In both cases, Clement 
understands it to refer to soul, as in an ontologically separate entity, rather than to life. 
Clement’s usage highlights the challenge of bringing to the text an understanding of an 
ontologically separated soul which then guides in whether the semantic meaning of the 
word is interpreted to read soul or life. 
Developing alongside this understanding of the relationship between the soul and 
the body, the church begins to articulate an understanding of what happens to the soul at 
death. A group of three prominent texts is used by the early Church Fathers to 
demonstrate that the soul is alive after the death of the body. The first of these is found in 
the story of Israel’s king Saul going to the medium at Endor to consult the departed spirit 
of Samuel (1 Sam 28:12-13). This text is first used by Justin Martyr to highlight the 
notion that the soul is sentient after death. Justin even claims that this demonstrates that 
demonic forces have power over the soul of a dead believer, while Tertullian argues that 
demons are masquerading as Saul. Origen says the apparition of Samuel’s soul should be 
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understood literally, with all three authors agreeing that it demonstrates that souls are in 
Hades after death and are sentient. In this context, two additional points may be made. 
First, Tertullian quotes Ps 20 and Luke 23:46 as further support for his idea of demons 
having power over the departed-yet-alive soul. Secondly, it may be noted that Origen 
allowed for Samuel himself to be called up from Hades. This is important because when 
discussing Christ’s parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, another important text in this 
discussion, Origen argues that the souls of the righteous begin their assent to God 
immediately at death rather than spending time in the underworld. He supports this with 
Jesus’ words to the thief on the cross, “Today you shall be with me in paradise” (Luke 
23:43). This is a new development and the only time that it appears in the Ante-Nicene 
era. It appears as a forerunner to the current belief of many Christians, who see the souls 
of the righteous going immediately to heaven. Other authors who discuss the abode of the 
soul after death and before the resurrection do so in the context of a subterranean Hades 
that acts as a place of repose for both the wicked and the righteous.  
The second pivotal text used by the early Church Fathers in support of the 
continued existence of the soul after the death of the body was found in the pericope of 
the Rich Man and Lazarus in Luke 16:19-27. Irenaeus, Origen, and Tertullian use this 
pericope to argue that the souls of the righteous go to a different and better place than the 
souls of the wicked at death. Irenaeus and Tertullian also argue from this passage that 
souls have a corporeal nature. Even though Origen interprets the parable literally, as he 
does with the story of Samuel and the Witch of Endor, he does not allow that the soul has 
a corporeal nature, even though it is able to do all of the things that the body does even 
though it is separated from it at death. This slight ambiguity is found also in how these 
two Fathers use Rev 6:9-11. Tertullian argues for the corporeal nature of the soul from 




The description of the separate death of the soul and body in Matt 10:28 is noted 
by several authors. Justin uses it to argue for the reconnection of the soul with the body 
for judgment, while Tertullian and Novation argue that this also demonstrates the 
immortal nature of the soul. In looking at this text, Tertullian acknowledges that it 
discusses the destruction of the soul in hell. His solution is one that is used elsewhere by 
other authors for similar purposes. That is, he defines what destruction is. Here he 
suggests that it simply refers to the eternal reality of the punishment. This redefining will 
take place with respect to the notion of death in other authors as well. 
The descent of Christ into Hades upon His death on the cross is the third main text 
used by early Church Fathers as support of the continued existence of the soul after death. 
Irenaeus, in characteristic fashion, supports this idea with a variety of Scriptures. 
Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen all specifically use 1 Pet 3:19-20 as 
biblical support for this idea that Christ’s soul did not die on the cross but, instead, His 
soul descended to Hades to preach to the souls held there.  
These three texts, the story of Saul and the Witch of Endor, Jesus’s story of the 
Rich Man and Lazarus, and the interpretation of Peter’s description of Christ’s descent 
into hell after His death on the cross, along with the more limited usage of Matt 10:28, all 
prove pivotal in forming the defense for the idea that the Scriptures teach that the soul 
continues to exist after the death of the body. It is helpful to note that, as mentioned, the 
first two of these did not find a consistent interpretative model among those who argued 
from them. In addition, none of these three texts mentions the word soul, and thus any 
statement regarding the soul that is argued from these verses is ultimately based upon a 
prior understanding that can then be read into these verses. Any desire to find fault with 
the early Church Fathers’ understanding of the existence of the soul after the death of the 
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body being taught in Scripture must begin here. Tatian is the only author who allows that 
the soul is dissolved after death and reconstituted before the resurrection, thus denying 
any intermediate place of repose for it. He also, though, attributes immortality to it, either 
of rewards or of punishment. 
As mentioned previously when discussing Matt 10:28, multiple authors recognize 
that the biblical text attributes death and destruction to the soul in several places. In 
addition to the Matthaen text just mentioned, Ezek 18:4 and Matt 10:39 are also 
discussed. The solution to this dilemma of believing in an immortal soul on the one hand 
and yet have several biblical texts which speak of the death or losing of the soul is to 
argue that there are several different meanings of death used in the Bible. Clement of 
Alexandria is the first to recognize this problem and he suggests, based on an allusion to 
Rom 6:20-23, that death is “the fellowship of the soul in a state of sin with the body,” 
while Origen interprets Matt 10:39 as an exhortation to lose one’s “sinning soul.” 
Ephesians 2:5 talks about death to sin and was used to argue for this other notion of 
death. Cyprian refers to losing one’s soul as being spiritually dead or living in a sinful 
state. Lactantius states that death is simply the condemnation of the wicked to their 
eternal punishment, while Origen, in interpreting Ezek 18:4, writes that the death 
described here is the separation of the soul from God. This need to provide an 
interpretation beyond that of the natural reading of the texts involved highlights a 
tendency by some to adjust the meaning of certain texts in order to make them fit 
established teaching. 
Another important theme that directly influenced the doctrine of the soul was the 
Church’s teaching of an eternally burning hell. While this specific doctrine was not the 
focus of this study and thus was not analyzed in depth, yet nevertheless, it does show up 
in various places where authors write about the end of the soul. The early Apologists, 
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Justin and Tatian, describe the souls and bodies of the wicked being punished by eternal 
fire. In addition, almost all of the Latin Fathers describe this as the fate of the wicked 
souls. Cyprian is the only author to cite a biblical reference in support of this teaching, 
quoting from Isa 66:24, though surely references to “eternal fire” and other similar 
references in the NT lie behind this idea. Against this notion of an eternal burning hell, 
Arnobius clearly argues that the souls of the wicked receive a limited punishment rather 
than an eternal one. On this point, Justin, Irenaeus, and Minucius Felix hint at a limited 
punishment, but the evidence is not strong enough to make a definitive judgment on their 
position. No Scripture is used to support their points, however. It is not possible to make 
a clear case for whether the early Church Fathers’ doctrine of an eternally burning hell 
demanded a soul that was immortal or whether this was simply a corollary point. At this 
point, it seems most plausible that they simply went hand and hand as the Church’s 
teaching. 
Besides the penal aspect of the burning fires of hell that is experienced by the 
soul, several other options are proposed. Origen suggests that the fires have a purification 
function, in addition to punishment. This is perhaps in line with his proposal of an 
ultimately universal salvation. Commodianus, almost certainly following Origen, writes 
of a spiritual burning of the soul in hell. No one else picks up on this idea in the Ante-
Nicene era. 
The reality of a future resurrection proves to be a vital topic when the early 
Church Fathers write on the soul. They argue that this teaching demands that the 
immortal soul be reunited with the previously dead body. Where this becomes important 
in this present study is how the reality of the future resurrection, whose purpose was to 
enable all to participate in judgment and subsequent rewards and retribution, was 
connected to the need to argue for the immortal nature of the soul. The Church Fathers, 
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beginning with Justin Martyr, repeatedly point to this biblical idea of a future judgment 
when arguing for the necessity of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. In general, 
this idea has not been noticed by recent scholarship. Daley mentions it in connection with 
Origen’s teaching on salvation,2 and Norris hints at it when he writes, “Christian writers 
had gladly adopted the idea that the soul is called to participate in a divine mode of 
existence. It appealed to them as a convenient way of interpreting one aspect of the 
Christian eschatological hope.”3 
Justin Martyr notes that if there were no sensation after death, “this would be a 
godsend to the wicked.” This is an early presentation of the argument for the soul’s 
immortality based on the biblical doctrine of a future resurrection. Theophilus notes how 
a change in thought came about in the Greek authors to bring them in line with the 
Hebrew prophets’ teaching on a future judgment and the souls of the dead being kept in 
Hades. Athenagoras also argues that if the soul is extinguished at death, then there can be 
no resurrection and evil will abound. The notion of the soul being the principle of life is 
exhibited here. If it is destroyed, life is gone forever. Irenaeus vaguely alludes to this idea 
in Against Heresies 2.29.2. Clement of Alexandria argues that because the soul can be 
tortured, then it must be accepted that the soul is immortal, even though this also implies 
that the soul suffers. Origen argues the same as Athenagoras, that if the soul died, then it 
could not be punished. Tertullian, in arguing against Epicurus, makes the connection by 
arguing that if you allow the soul to be destroyed, as Epicurus does, then you in effect 
have actually destroyed the real power of death, which surely is the judgment of the 





wicked. Lactantius also makes this argument against Epicurus that the soul is not 
annihilated but is either rewarded or punished according to its deeds. 
What is clear is that the reality of a future judgment is an overarching theme that 
demanded a soul that was not dissolved at death. In combination with the notions of 
eternal punishment and eternal life, this dictated that the soul be immortal. Again, here it 
should be noted that this understanding of immortality was one that recognized no end 
but yet insisted on a beginning. Thus, the early Church Fathers also argued that, along 
with 1 Tim 6:16, only God was immortal. While the early Church Fathers do make the 
argument for immortality based upon other more philosophical notions, such as its 
simpleness or incorporeal nature, yet they nevertheless argued that the biblical teaching 
of a future judgment demanded that the soul be immortal. The essence of their 
understanding may be summed up by the idea that if you deny the immortality of the 
soul, you deny the Christian doctrine of the resurrection, for if the soul is allowed to 
cease to exist, life itself has been extinguished and the Christian faith is denied. 
 
Conclusions 
This study has sought to delve into the early Church Fathers’ usage of Scripture as 
a source for their doctrine of the soul. In so doing, it has uncovered the importance of 
several biblical citations and ideas that were vitally important for any statement made 
regarding the human soul. The Church Fathers, contrary to the notion suggested by 
Pelikan noted at the beginning of this study that the Bible does not contain a doctrine of 
the soul, believed that the Bible was an authoritative source for the doctrine of the soul. 
Thus, any argument that one may have with their teaching must take place at the 
interpretive level of Scripture. 
One can clearly see, at the end of the Ante-Nicene era, a fairly unified 
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understanding of the soul and one that was defended upon biblical testimony. The soul 
has its origin in the breath of God, breathing into Adam’s lifeless body the breath of life. 
The soul is thus seen to be distinct and in a dichotomous relationship with the body. At 
death, the soul is released from the body, residing in a place termed Hades to await the 
resurrection. At the resurrection, the soul, being reunited with the body, faces the 
judgment with its resultant reward or punishment. The reward and punishment received 
by the soul reunited with the body are both eternal and everlasting in nature. 
Several ideas are proposed during this era that are out of harmony with the 
general concept of the time. Tatian’s idea regarding a dissolved soul at death and 
Arnobius’s suggestion that the soul is created by a lower demiurge as well as his 
argument for a limited punishment for the damned all generally find themselves outside 
of the mainstream teaching. Origen’s idea of an immediate ascent of the soul and being 
with Christ upon the death of the body, though finding no other supporters in the Ante-
Nicene era, ultimately becomes standard Christian teaching. 
It should also be noted that those who argue for a teaching of conditional 
immortality in the writings of the early Church Fathers do so on very thin grounds. There 
is no direct statement to this effect that this study has discovered. While the Apostolic 
Fathers write of the death and destruction of the wicked, which has been used to argue 
that they were conditionalists, so also do the writings of later authors, all of whom clearly 
argue for the immortal nature of the soul. One could easily argue that the earlier period 
had not yet developed the sophistication applied by later authors such as Origen, who 
argued that, as mentioned above, the Bible does mention the death of the soul but this 
must be interpreted to mean something other than the cessation of its existence. 
One can clearly see the effect of sitz in Leben on the writings of the early Church 
Fathers. They found themselves in a world that basically offered two options: some form 
 
444 
of neo-Platonism on the one hand or Epicurean and Stoic naturalism on the other. The 
Platonists argued for the reality of the non-material world that saw true human existence 
in the spirit world, while Epicurean thought insisted that the natural, visible world was 
the sum total of existence and once one died, there was no more to life. Presented with 
these two options, it is easy to see how the early Church Fathers, citing Pauline phrases to 
the effect that what is seen is passing away and what is unseen is reality, tended toward 
the Platonic notion of the soul, all the while arguing against the limitations of Platonic 
philosophy. At times, an idea was promulgated before any biblical defense was offered 
for it. This is seen with Tertullian’s late defense for the dichotomous soul/body 
understanding of the human person along with Clement of Alexandria’s late biblical 
defense of the definition of death as the separation of the soul from the body. It may be 
argued that these are examples of where an idea was taught based upon a source other 
than the Bible and then later authors realized that a biblical defense of the idea was 
lacking and thus they provided one.  
Several interpretative challenges were faced by the early Church Fathers in 
explaining their doctrine of the soul. The stated acceptance of the fact that all humans 
have a soul that is an ontologically separate entity was clearly an example of bringing 
one’s own a priori assumptions to bear and reading this into the text. Little effort at all 
was made to support this scripturally. The use of exegetical standards regarding 
determining the appropriate translation for soul from among the word’s semantic range of 
meaning was also a step that was not often followed and surely impacted their study. As 
well, the tendency to read a verse as referring only to a separated soul when in fact the 
text referred in a non-partisan manner to the human person in general led them to assign 
one text as referring to the soul alone and another as referring only to the body. This was 
especially helpful in promoting the dichotomous view of humans and assigning various 
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attributes and powers to either the body or the soul, when no such distinction was present 
in the text. 
While several interpretive challenges were faced by the early Church Fathers in 
their use of Scripture in explaining their doctrine of the soul, an important element that 
this study has brought to bear when analyzing this usage is the importance of allowing 
the early Church Fathers to speak something new rather than simply passing on the 
teaching of previous generations. Much good work has been produced in the field of 
historical theology on the Greco-Roman world and its impact on the thought patterns of 
the early Church Fathers, especially as it relates to the doctrine of the soul. However, 
what can happen when the early Church Fathers are read only through the lens of the 
influence of the earlier and contemporary Greco-Roman authors, at the expense of 
allowing the Fathers to reinterpret and modify the thought patterns of the day, is that one 
loses much of the scriptural insights they brought to bear in their doctrinal discussions. 
Students of the era may simply assume that they are so heavily influenced by their 
cultural milieu that they produced little that may be of importance to the Church today. 
The benefit of studying the early Church Fathers’ concept of the soul from the 
vantage point of their usage of Scripture is that one quickly begins to realize the 
important role Scripture played in the development of this doctrine.4 While not denying 
the impact of prior thought on their thinking, this study has demonstrated that the early 
Church Fathers were well versed in the biblical statements regarding the soul and 
intended to incorporate these into their teaching. Once this fact is recognized, it then 
suggests that still, today, a doctrine of the soul may be searched for in the Scriptures. 
                                                 
4Cf. Hamman, L’homme, image de Dieu: essai d’une anthropologie chrétienne 
dans l’Église des cinq premiers siècles, 9. 
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While it may not agree with that which was constructed in the early Church period, yet it 
will continue in the tradition of the early Church of searching the Scriptures for a doctrine 
of the soul. 
 
Areas for Further Research 
While this study has produced information that will aid in understanding the early 
Church’s usage of Scripture in developing various doctrines, it has also been able to 
suggest more areas of study that should prove useful in further understanding this era. 
Research can be done, for example, in comparing anima and animus as well as looking at 
expressions such as πνοη ζωης and other related expressions in the early Church 
Fathers that should further clarify their understanding of the soul. Study of later Latin 
authors, beginning with Lactantius, should produce important information for an analysis 
of their use of animus. Key topics should also be studied, including creation, immortality, 
judgment, and hell with specific focus given to the role that Scripture played in their 
development. 
This study has shown that the early Church Fathers understood their belief in the 
reality of a future judgment demanded a corresponding belief in an immortal soul. This 
discovery suggests that other areas of belief are similarly related that should be explored. 
For instance, does one’s belief in a resurrection of the body play a role in one’s 
understanding of the immortal nature of the soul? Is their a connection between the 
ability of the soul to sin and other characteristics of the soul’s nature? Does a positive 
view of the body result in a belief in the resurrection, and is a positive view of the body 
influenced by one’s view, positive or negative, of the soul? These are other areas of 
related research that should prove useful in further understanding the interrelatedness of 
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